{
  "id": 3665330,
  "name": "Richard H. YOUNG v. Stark LIGON, Executive Director, Committee on Professional Conduct",
  "name_abbreviation": "Young v. Ligon",
  "decision_date": "2008-04-24",
  "docket_number": "07-990",
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          "parenthetical": "quoting Comm. on Prof'l Conduct v. Revels, 360 Ark. 69, 73, 199 S.W.3d 630, 632"
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        {
          "page": "422",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Comm. on Prof'l Conduct v. Revels, 360 Ark. 69, 73, 199 S.W.3d 630, 632"
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Danielson, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Richard H. YOUNG v. Stark LIGON, Executive Director, Committee on Professional Conduct"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nAppellant Richard H. Young ^.appeals from an order of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (\u201cCommittee\u201d) finding him in violation of two provisions of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct and suspending his license to practice law for six months. We affirm the suspension.\nThe facts leading up to the Committee\u2019s order are these. On March 5, 2004, Young received notice from the Committee that his license to practice law was going to be suspended for three months as a result of his failure to respond to a complaint that had been made before the Committee. Young was informed that the suspension would become final unless he filed a motion for reconsideration within twenty days. Young failed to file a motion for reconsideration, and the suspension was filed and became final on March 30, 2004, when the Committee filed its order with the clerk of this court.\nDespite having knowledge of his pending three-month suspension, Young met with Linnie Thomas and her son, Justin Thomas, who had been charged with a felony, on March 22, 2004. The Thomases engaged Young as Justin Thomas\u2019s attorney, and Ms. Thomas paid Young $3,000 of the $10,000 fee that he requested. At no time did Young inform the Thomases that his license to practice law was shortly due to be suspended. Ms. Thomas later learned of Young\u2019s three-month suspension in the newspaper. Unable to reach Young via telephone, the Thomases eventually engaged another attorney to represent Justin Thomas.\nAs advised by her new attorney, Ms. Thomas requested an itemized bill and refund from Young. When no bill or refund had been received by August 4, 2004, Ms. Thomas filed a complaint with the Committee. On February 28, 2006, the Office of Professional Conduct sent Young a letter informing him of the complaint that had been made against him. Young and Ms. Thomas communicated, and he agreed to repay her $2,500 of the money she had paid him. On June 5, 2006, he sent her the first installment of the refund, a money order for $200. Young failed to make any additional payments to Ms. Thomas.\nOn September 29, 2006, a summons and complaint were sent to Young via certified mail. It is not apparent from the record that Young received or signed for this letter. On October 13, 2006, Young sent Ms. Thomas another money order in the amount of $300. On October 26, 2006, the summons and complaint were again mailed to Young, who returned an affidavit of service on November 9, 2006, and filed a response. A panel of the Committee found that Young violated Rules 1.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him for six months. The panel also ordered Young to pay $2,500 in restitution to Ms. Thomas. Young then requested a public hearing.\nA hearing was held before Panel B of the Committee on June 15, 2007. At that time, despite the fact that more than three years had passed since Young accepted $3,000 from Young and more than one year had passed since Young agreed to refund $2,500 to Ms. Thomas, Young had only refunded $500. Young did not dispute the factual allegations made against him by the Committee or the fact that he owed Ms. Thomas $2,000. He contended, nevertheless, that a suspension would make it nearly impossible for him to find a good-paying job where he could pay the restitution owed to Ms. Thomas. Young also argued that his conduct was not intentional. As a mitigating factor, he noted his wife\u2019s severe depression and prescription drug dependence.\nThe Committee unanimously found that Young\u2019s conduct violated Rule 1.4(b) and Rule 8.4(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct. As a result, the Committee, by a vote of four to three, suspended Young\u2019s license to practice law for six months, ordered Young to pay Linnie Thomas restitution of $2,000, and assessed fees and costs against him of $100. Young appeals only the suspension of his license.\nYoung now asserts on appeal, as he did before the Committee, that he did not formally withdraw from Justin Thomas\u2019s case because he mistakenly thought that he had arranged for another attorney to complete Justin Thomas\u2019s representation without any additional fee. It was only upon speaking to Ms. Thomas in the line at the grocery store, he notes, that he knew that the matter had not been satisfactorily resolved. He claims that, after his three-month suspension, he was in a shaken frame of mind and not fully able to grasp his situation. The prior suspension of which Young failed to inform the Thomases, he states, was not the result of his behavior to a client but rather of his failure to respond to the disciplinary complaint. Therefore, he maintains, it is inconsistent and unduly harsh to consider his previous suspension as an aggravating factor that justifies the imposition of a suspension, rather than a reprimand, in the case at hand. Moreover, Young argues that, if his license is suspended, it will be extremely difficult for him to find other employment. This, he notes, will adversely affect his ability to repay Ms. Thomas the money he owes her. The Committee did not file a brief in response.\nWe initially observe that Young does not challenge the Committee\u2019s finding that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct but only the decision to suspend his license for six months. In reviewing appeals from the Committee, this court conducts a de novo review on the record and affirms actions taken by the Committee unless they are \u201cclearly against the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Walker v. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, 368 Ark. 357, 362, 246 S.W.3d 418, 422 (2007) (quoting Comm. on Prof'l Conduct v. Revels, 360 Ark. 69, 73, 199 S.W.3d 630, 632) (2004)) (citations omitted).\nWe turn then to consideration of the rules that Young violated. Rule 1.4(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct (2007) reads that \u201c[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.\u201d The Committee found in its order that Young violated this rule by accepting Justin Thomas as a client without informing him that Young would \u201calmost certainly be suspended from law practice a few days later for several months and be unable to represent Justin.\u201d Had he informed the Thomases of this fact, the Committee observed in its order, they could have saved the $3,000 which they \u201cpaid to Young for legal services he would not be able to render.\u201d\nRule 8.4(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct states that \u201c[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.\u201d The Committee found in its order that Young violated this rule by \u201cknowingly failing] to tell Linnie and Justin Thomas on March 22, 2004 that Young\u2019s law license was almost certainly about to be suspended for three (3) months only a few days later,\u201d by knowingly accepting $3,000 from Ms. Thomas despite his pending suspension, and by telling Ms. Thomas on May 31, 2006 that he would refund $2,500 to her but failing to make regular payments.\nThe suspension of an attorney\u2019s license to practice law for up to five years is one of the sanctions that the Committee is permitted to impose. Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Profl Conduct \u00a7 17(E)(2). Suspension is appropriate if the Committee finds that a lawyer has engaged in \u201cserious misconduct\u201d that does not warrant disbarment. Id. Included in the various types of conduct that constitute serious misconduct are (1) \u201cmisconduct involving] dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the lawyer\u201d and (2) misconduct by a lawyer whose \u201cprior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the lawyer\u2019s professional duties and responsibilities.\u201d Id. \u00a7 17(B)(3), (5).\nIn deciding what sanction to mete out, the Committee considers these factors:\nA. The nature and degree of the misconduct for which the lawyer is being sanctioned.\nB. The seriousness and circumstances surrounding the misconduct.\nC. The loss or damage to clients.\nD. The damage to the profession.\nE. The assurance that those who seek legal services in the future will be protected from the type of misconduct found.\nF. The profit to the lawyer.\nG. The avoidance of repetition.\nH. Whether the misconduct was deliberate, intentional or negligent.\nI. The deterrent effect on others.\nJ. The maintenance of respect for the legal profession.\nK. The conduct of the lawyer during the course of the Committee action.\nL. The lawyer\u2019s prior disciplinary record, to include warnings.\nId. \u00a7 19.\nWeighing these factors, the Committee\u2019s decision to suspend Young\u2019s license for six months was clearly supported by the preponderance of the evidence. The Committee found that Young took $3,000 from Linnie Thomas while knowingly withholding information that would almost certainly have caused her to retain another lawyer in Young\u2019s stead. By so doing, Young profited at the expense of Linnie Thomas, who eventually had to spend additional money to retain another attorney. This easily qualifies as serious misconduct involving \u201cdishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation.\u201d Id. \u00a7 17(B)(3).\nMoreover, Young had a previous disciplinary record that included (1) a three-month suspension for failing to respond to a complaint from a judge alleging that Young failed to appear for a client\u2019s scheduled court appearance, wrote a check for his client\u2019s bond on a closed account that purported to be Young\u2019s trust account, and failed to pay a contempt fine that was issued by the court; (2) a five-month consent suspension based on a complaint from a bankruptcy judge alleging that Young repeatedly filed deficient schedules, failed to appear for numerous hearings, failed to comply with court orders to pay fines of $2,000 and disgorge fees, wrote a check to disgorge fees that was returned for insufficient funds, and lied to the court eleven times about the status of his fee; (3) a warning for failure to file an appellate brief for a criminal client, resulting in dismissal of the appeal; and (4) a reprimand for allowing his nonlawyer wife to manage the firm trust account without proper training and supervision, resulting in his wife writing checks for personal obligations out of the trust account and depositing nonclient funds into the trust account and leading to five overdrafts of the trust account. This prior record indicates a \u201csubstantial disregard of the lawyer\u2019s professional duties and responsibilities.\u201d Id. \u00a7 17(B)(5).\nYoung\u2019s dishonest conduct and failure to communicate adequately with the Thomases led him to profit at the Thomases\u2019 expense. Whatever Young\u2019s state of mind at the time he took the money, it is clear that he knew of the pending suspension of his license, and his conduct cannot be considered merely negligent. Young\u2019s prior disciplinary record, in addition, demonstrates a substantial disregard of his professional duties and responsibilities.\nAffirmed.\nDanielson, J., not participating.\nThe Committee provides no reason for the substantial delay between the filing of the complaint and the letter sent by the Office of Professional Conduct.\nYoung was to retain $500 for the legal services he had performed prior to the suspension of his license.\nThree committee members voted to reprimand Young, while four voted to suspend his license for six months.\nOn June 28,2007, Young petitioned the Committee for a stay of its order pending his appeal to this court. The petition was granted on July 6,2007.\nYoung fails to explain the nature of this alleged inconsistency.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard Young, pro se appellant.",
      "Stark Lig\u00f3n, Executive Director, Committee on Professional Conduct, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Richard H. YOUNG v. Stark LIGON, Executive Director, Committee on Professional Conduct\n07-990\n283 S.W.3d 587\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 24, 2008\nRichard Young, pro se appellant.\nStark Lig\u00f3n, Executive Director, Committee on Professional Conduct, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0289-01",
  "first_page_order": 315,
  "last_page_order": 321
}
