{ "id": 8152044, "name": "MAMO TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. Artee WILLIAMS, Director, Department of Workforce Services", "name_abbreviation": "Mamo Transportation, Inc. v. Williams", "decision_date": "2008-11-13", "docket_number": "08-29", "first_page": "97", "last_page": "107", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "375 Ark. 97" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "289 S.W.3d 79" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "370 Ark. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5570319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/370/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. Dec. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "825 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477051 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 A.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4720506 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/140/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 P.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10411165 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/700/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 S.W.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10013394, 10013238 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/761/0660-02", "/sw2d/761/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ark. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140038 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/95/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ark. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3689470 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/374/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ark. App. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6143686 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/99/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-10-210", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3665473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/373/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ark. App. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/101/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ark. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5570319 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/370/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 A.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4720506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "observing that an employer's place of business includes not only the location of its offices, but also the entire area in which it conducts business" }, { "parenthetical": "observing that an employer's place of business includes not only the location of its offices, but also the entire area in which it conducts business" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/vt/140/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.W.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "862 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "115 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"where an employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the purpose of selling its product... that area is the place of business of the enterprise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "1 Ill.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5314965 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"where an employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the purpose of selling its product... that area is the place of business of the enterprise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 1126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"where an employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the purpose of selling its product... that area is the place of business of the enterprise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "144 Ill.Dec. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"where an employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the purpose of selling its product... that area is the place of business of the enterprise\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "198 Ill.App.3d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2475709 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "95 Ark. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140038 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/95/0194-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 946, "char_count": 21446, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2479897069861786e-07, "percentile": 0.9149465856889726 }, "sha256": "e98c1e73534cffc82c2fc3c4bbe0d0810f2e8edf2b1c93591c1ac16fac98b000", "simhash": "1:31ce9180ef3b97e6", "word_count": 3471 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:36:16.941269+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin and Danielson, JJ., concur.", "Brown, J., dissents.", "Corbin, J., joins." ], "parties": [ "MAMO TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. Artee WILLIAMS, Director, Department of Workforce Services" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Gunter, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from a decision of the Board of Review of the Arkansas Department of Workforce Services (the Board) finding that Appellant Mamo Transportation, Inc. (Mamo) is required to pay unemployment insurance taxes for services performed by drivers for wages because Mamo failed to meet the three-prong test set out in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-210(e) (Supp. 2007). We affirm the Board\u2019s decision.\nMamo is a Nevada corporation that provides a \u201cdrive-away\u201d service in which it transports larger vehicles from a point of origin to a point of destination. Mamo is headquartered in Osceola, Indiana and operates throughout the forty-eight contiguous states and Canada. Mamo contracts with drivers to drive the vehicles. It has dispatch offices in Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Arkansas. Mamo\u2019s safety director testified that Mamo has 316 \u201cindependent contractors\u201d on an active list. The driver calls Mamo if he or she wants to work driving a vehicle. The drivers do not contact customers directly, but provide services for customers obtained by Mamo. The price is negotiated between the driver and Mamo. If the driver makes the commitment to transport the vehicle, Mamo notifies the customer that a driver has been assigned to their load. Mamo gains a profit by paying the driver less than what the customer pays Mamo. Mamo does not have exclusive agreements with its drivers. The drivers pay for their own training, although Mamo ensures that federal safety requirements are met. The drivers are free to drive the route decided upon by the driver; they provide their own transportation once a run is completed, pay for fuel and other expenses and provide tools which might be necessary.\nSylvia Jones-Alien, a resident of Arkansas, entered into an \u201cIndependent Contractor Driver Service Agreement\u201d with Mamo. During her first ninety days driving for Mamo, Allen drove a 13'6\" truck under an 11'8\" bridge, causing $9,008 worth of damage to the truck. Mamo then terminated Allen\u2019s contract. On April 14, 2003, Allen filed a request for unemployment benefits. She indicated that she was an independent contractor on the unemployment forms. Mamo agreed that Allen was an independent contractor.\nUpon review, the Arkansas Department of Workforce Services (\u201cDepartment\u201d) determined that Mamo \u201cexercised sufficient direction and control over the drivers and other workers to the degree necessary to establish an employer/employee relationship.\u201d Mamo requested a fact-finding hearing, contending that the factual determination made by the Department in applying Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-210(e)(l), (2), and (3) was not supported by the facts and that the drivers and workers were not employees of Mamo. A hearing was conducted by the Board on October 19, 2004. The Board found that Mamo was a covered employer subject to the payment of unemployment insurance taxes because it failed to meet Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-210(e)(2).\nThe Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. See Mamo Transp. Inc. v. Director, Dept. of Workforce Services, 101 Ark. App. 68, 270 S.W.3d 379 (2007). We granted Mamo\u2019s petition for review on May 15, 2008. Upon a petition for review, we consider a case as though it had been originally filed in this court. Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008).\nOn appeal, Mamo argues that (1) the Board \u201cignored the plain, ordinary and common sense meaning of the language of the statute resulting in an absurd outcome not intended by the Arkansas legislature\u201d and (2) the contractors at issue were independent contractors not subject to Arkansas unemployment taxes. Mamo specifically argues that the Arkansas legislature did not intend for the language of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-210(e)(2) to describe every road and highway in the United States and Canada as a \u201cplace of business\u201d of Mamo. In response, the Department contends that the Board\u2019s decision is supported by substantial evidence and complies with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-10-210.\nWe affirm the decision of the Board of Review if it is supported by substantial evidence. Coker v. Director, 99 Ark. App. 455, 262 S.W.3d 175 (2007). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible there from in the light most favorable to the Board\u2019s findings. Id. Even if the evidence could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence presented. Id.\nIn this case, we are called upon to construe provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-210. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Ark. Comprehensive Health Ins. Pool v. Denton, 374 Ark. 162, 286 S.W.3d 698 (2008). The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. This court construes the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Id. However, this court will not give statutes a literal interpretation if it leads to absurd consequences that are contrary to legislative intent. Id. This court seeks to reconcile statutory provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Id.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 ll-10-210(e) states:\n(e) Service performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this chapter irrespective of whether the common law relationship of master and servant exists, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the director that:\n(1) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under his or her contract for the performance of service and in fact; and\n(2) The service is performed either outside the usual course of the business for which the service is performed or is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and\n(3) The individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.\nId. According to the statute, an employment relationship exists unless all three of the above elements are met. Here, the Board concluded that the first element was met, the second element was not met, and did not rule on the third element. Therefore, we are limited in our review to \u00a7 ll-10-210(e)(2).\nThe Board concluded that Mamo failed to meet the second requirement of \u00a7 ll-10-210(e) in that the course of business for both Mamo and the drivers is providing the delivery of vehicles, and Mamo\u2019s places of business consist of not only its office, but also the roadways on which the drivers transport the vehicles. On appeal, Mamo presents no argument that the Board was incorrect in finding that delivery of the vehicles was in the course of Mamo\u2019s business, so we will only address whether the Board erred in its finding regarding Mamo\u2019s place of business.\nLooking at the language of the statute, the second prong is not met unless the service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed. Mamo provides a \u201cdrive-away\u201d service for its customers by transporting various types of vehicles throughout the United States and Canada. Its business is to take vehicles from origin to destination. Therefore, the \u201centerprise for which the service is performed\u201d in this case is the transportation of vehicles. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1169 (7th ed. 1999) defines \u201cplace of business\u201d as \u201ca location at which one carries on a business.\u201d\nThe Board relied on Home Care Professionals of Arkansas, Inc. v. Williams, 95 Ark. App. 194, 235 S.W.3d 536 (2006), in making its determination that Mamo\u2019s places of business include the roadways. In Home Care Professionals, the court of appeals held that Home Care Professionals (HCP) failed to meet the second prong of the statute. HCP was a home-care referral service. HCP maintained a list of caregivers who were able to provide home-care services. Once HCP received a request for a service from a client, HCP would find a caregiver willing to perform the service. The caregiver would sign an independent contract. The client and caregiver would negotiate a schedule and the terms of the caregiver\u2019s engagement. Once the caregiver completed the service, the caregiver would turn in a time sheet and be paid by HCP the amount paid by the client minus HCP\u2019s referral fee. In holding that HCP\u2019s caregivers were not independent contractors, the court of appeals stated:\nIn regard to the place of business aspect of the second part of the test, an employer\u2019s place of business has been found to include not only the location of a business\u2019s office, but also the entire area in which a business conducts business. See Missouri Association of Realtors v. Division of Employment Security, 761 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. App. 1988); Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1985); and Vermont Institute of Community Involvement, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 436 A.2d 765 (Vt. 1981). More specifically, the representation of an entity\u2019s interest by an individual on a premises renders the premises a place of the employer\u2019s business. See Carpetland, [Carpetland U.S.A. v. Illinois Dep\u2019t of Employment Security, 201 Ill.2d 351, 776 N.E.2d 166 (2002)].\nHome Care Prof'ls, 95 Ark. App. at 199, 235 S.W.3d at 540-41. Other states with statutes almost identical to \u00a7 11-10-210 have addressed the issue of what constitutes a \u201cplace of business.\u201d In Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 825 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005), the appellate court of Illinois held that an employer\u2019s couriers were employees, rather than independent contractors, for the purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Act. The court stated:\nFinally, we reject CMS\u2019 claim that it is merely a broker of delivery service. This is essentially the same argument that was made by the limousine company and rejected in O\u2019Hare-Midway. Here, the usual course of business involved the pickup and delivery of packages by the couriers, similar to the pickup of passengers that was the usual course of business in O\u2019Hare-Midway. As we have already noted, the couriers\u2019 service is performed by transporting the packages, like the limousine passengers, from one location to another. Again, it stands to reason that the company\u2019s interests are represented during the performance of that service and that the place of business includes travel between one location and another. Therefore, the couriers perform their services on the roadways, which are, then, for purposes of section 212(B), the place of business. See O\u2019Hare-Midway, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 173 Ill. Dec. 171, 596 N.E.2d 795.\nChicago Messenger Serv., 825 N.E.2d at 328. Similarly, in O\u2019Hare-Midway Limousine Service v. Baker, 596 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), the Illinois Appellate Court found that, because chauffeurs represented the interests of the limousine company whenever they picked up passengers, the usual course of business was on the roadways traveled.\nThe Supreme Court of Wyoming also addressed the place-of-business issue in Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., 700 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1985), in which the court interpreted a statute similar to \u00a7 11-10-210. The court found that a taxicab company\u2019s business consisted of providing transportation to customers by leasing taxicabs to drivers. The court held that the taxicabs themselves must be considered the company\u2019s place of business because \u201cthe essence of Laramie Cabs\u2019 business is conducted in cabs between the customer\u2019s origin and destination, not in the company office.\u201d Laramie Cabs, 700 P.2d at 407.\nFor the purpose of defining terms under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-10-210, we hold that \u201cplace of business\u201d is the place where the enterprise is performed. An enterprise\u2019s place of business must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In Home Care Professionals, the home-care service was performed in the customer\u2019s home; in O\u2019Hare-Midway, the limousine service was performed on the roadways traveled; in Chicago Messenger Service, the service of transporting packages was performed on the roadways; in Laramie Cabs, the taxicab service was performed in the taxicab itself. Here, Mamo\u2019s enterprise, transporting vehicles, is performed in the vehicle itself between the point of origin and the point of destination. As in Home Care, the enterprise for which the service is performed takes place within the property of the customer. Under the facts in this case, we hold that, in addition to the physical locations of its dispatch offices, Mamo\u2019s places of business include the location of the transported vehicle.\nBecause Mamo has failed to meet its burden set out in \u00a7 ll-10-210(e), it is not exempt from paying unemployment insurance taxes on its drivers. The Board was correct in its decision that Mamo\u2019s drivers \u201cdo not perform their services outside of all the places of Mamo\u2019s business.\u201d However, we hold that Mamo\u2019s enterprise takes place inside the trucks, rather than on the roadways. Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by the Board, even though it announced the wrong reason. See Hardy v. Wilbourne, 370 Ark. 359, 259 S.W.3d 405 (2007).\nAffirmed.\nCorbin and Danielson, JJ., concur.\nBrown, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Gunter, Justice." }, { "text": "Paul E. Danielson, Justice,\nconcurring. I concur in the decision to affirm the Board\u2019s decision, but would do so using the same rationale as the Board. As evidenced by its own representative\u2019s testimony, Mamo is in the business of providing its clients transportation of the clients\u2019 vehicles. Thus, its enterprise for which the service is performed is, in fact, transportation.\nWhile Mamo has four main offices from which it dispatches drivers to provide Mamo\u2019s transportation service to its clients, it is my opinion that \u201call the places of business,\u201d in this case, would encompass the roadways on which Mamo\u2019s drivers travel. Nothing is unclear about the term \u201cplace of business.\u201d Indeed, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines the term as \u201c[a] location in which one carries on a business.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1187 (8th ed. 2004). That differs from a business\u2019s \u201cprincipal place of business,\u201d which is defined as \u201c[t]he place of a corporation\u2019s chief executive offices, which is typically viewed as the nerve center.\u201d Id. Accordingly, the term \u201call the places of business\u201d encompasses wherever the business\u2019s services are performed. Here, \u201call the places of business\u201d includes the roadways.\nIn the instant case, the service being provided by Mamo, transportation, necessarily takes place on the roadways or airways. Transportation, by its nature, does not occur in one physical location or place of business. It simply is a different creature from the typical business venture. Indeed, a \u201cplace of business\u201d determination will vary from case to case depending on the business in which the employer is engaged. Here, all the places of business includes the roadways, as found by the Board. See, e.g., Vermont Inst. of Cmty. Involvement v. Dep\u2019t of Employment Sec., 140 Vt. 94, 436 A.2d 765 (1981) (observing that an employer\u2019s place of business includes not only the location of its offices, but also the entire area in which it conducts business). Because there was substantial evidence to support the Board\u2019s decision, I would affirm.\nCorbin, J., joins.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Paul E. Danielson, Justice," }, { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice,\ndissenting. I write to draw the General Assembly\u2019s attention to the fact that confusion abounds in this case over what section ll-10-210(e)(2) means and over where the places of business of Mamo Transportation are for the enterprise of transporting large vehicles. Four justices apparently believe that all transporting vehicles used by all independent contractors contracting with Mamo are Mamo\u2019s \u201cplaces of business.\u201d Two justices interpret \u201cplaces of business\u201d even more expansively to include every inch of roadway where the transporting vehicle used by independent contractors is traveling. In other words, the entire road system traversed by every transporting vehicle is a place of business for Mamo. I interpret places of business to be those locations where Mamo actually conducts its business, which includes its headquarters in Indiana and its four dispatch offices.\nThough, admittedly, there is a conflict of authority in foreign jurisdictions, the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is persuasive to me in defining places of business. See Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of the Div. of Employment & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 2003). In Athol, the issue was whether unemployment compensation benefits should be paid to adult newspaper deliverers who delivered newspapers house to house and elsewhere. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the same \u201cplaces of business\u201d language as we have in our Code and denied benefits. The court had this to say:\nThe division\u2019s assertion that the News\u2019s \u201cplaces of business,\u201d for purposes of the second part oftheABC test,includes the geographic area tracked by all of the News\u2019s delivery routes, is illogical. The one decision cited by the division in support of its position, Richardson Bros. v. Board of Review of Dep\u2019t of Employment Sec., 198 Ill.App.3d 422, 144 Ill.Dec. 607, 555 N.E.2d 1126 (1990), concerned truck drivers who distributed garden plants to retail outlets, and not carriers who deliver newspapers to private homes. To the extent that language employed by the Illinois court suggests that a newspaper delivery route is a newspaper company\u2019s place of business for purposes of G.L. c. 151 A, we respectfully disagree. See id. at 430, 144 Ill.Dec. 607, 555 N.E.2d 1126, citing Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill.2d 328, 115 N.E.2d 898 (1953) (\u201cwhere an employing unit assigns a specific area to an individual for the purpose of selling its product... that area is the place of business of the enterprise\u201d).\nAthol, 786 N.E.2d at 372 n.11.\nSimilarly, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, interpreted this same language in connection with taxicab drivers who were independent contractors and dispatched from the business premises of Town Taxi. See Comm\u2019r of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Cod, Inc., 862 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). In holding that places of business did not include taxi cab routes, the court said:\nThe service performed by the drivers occurred outside the business premises ofTown Taxi. Although the taxicabs were stored and the dispatch system was operated at the business premises of Town Taxi, the drivers did not transport customers on those premises. Compare Althol Daily News, 439 Mass. at 179, 786 N.E.2d 365 (where carriers picked up newspapers from employer\u2019s distribution center and delivered them to individual houses, stores, bundle drops, or vending machines, \u201call of the carriers ma[d]e deliveries outside of premises owned by the [employer] or which could fairly be deemed its \u2018place of business\u2019 \u201d).\nTown Taxi, 862 N.E.2d at 435.\nNor does the court of appeals case in Home Health Care Professionals of Arkansas, Inc. v. Williams, 95 Ark. App. 194, 235 S.W.2d 836 (2006), give the majority the \u201ccover\u201d it would like. In that case, caregivers provided a fixed service at a fixed location, the patient\u2019s home, and the court of appeals held that the home locations were places of business of the Home Health Care enterprise. In the case before us, however, under the majority\u2019s interpretation, Mamo\u2019s places of business along any roadway would be all transporting vehicles for as long as it took the independent contractors to travel to their destinations. That interpretation is excessively broad and, to use the language of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, \u201cillogical.\u201d\nIt is clear to me that the General Assembly drew a distinction in section ll-10-210(e)(2) between where the service is being performed, which could include the roadways on the one hand, and \u201cplaces of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed,\u201d which are obviously the premises, on the other. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-210(e)(2) (Repl. 2002). Yet the majority opinion conflates the two, which adds to the confusion.\nAt oral argument before this court, counsel for the Department of Workforce Services admitted that this issue had been difficult for his agency and \u201ca tough one,\u201d as he put it. While providing unemployment benefits is a worthy purpose, the qualifying factors, it is submitted, should be established by the General Assembly and not by an overbroad and illogical interpretation by the courts.\nI respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robinson, Staley, Marshall & Duke, by: Thomas B. Staley, for appellant.", "Allan Pruitt, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MAMO TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. Artee WILLIAMS, Director, Department of Workforce Services\n08-29\n289 S.W.3d 79\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 13, 2008\nRobinson, Staley, Marshall & Duke, by: Thomas B. Staley, for appellant.\nAllan Pruitt, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0097-01", "first_page_order": 127, "last_page_order": 137 }