{ "id": 8154873, "name": "Roger and Ruth ANDERSON d/b/a Anderson Auto Salvage v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Anderson v. BNSF Railway Co.", "decision_date": "2009-01-30", "docket_number": "08-232", "first_page": "466", "last_page": "476", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "375 Ark. 466" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "291 S.W.3d 586" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "22 P.3d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "496 A.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4748276 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a declaratory-judgment action in state court to determine whether an easement for railroad purposes had been abandoned interfered with the ICC's authority to determine the issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/145/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 F. Supp. 2d 1005", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9109886 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that to the extent that a state-law claim sought to force CC & P to abandon the track in question, such claims were preempted by ICCTA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/265/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2342", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of STB final orders lies with the courts of appeals" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2321", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "judicial review of STB orders" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "694 N.W.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9018428 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "quoting ICCTA" }, { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/694/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)(A)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "(9)(A)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 F.3d 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185199 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.W.3d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298603 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "quoting the Commission's order" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ark. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5682827 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" }, { "page": "813" }, { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "813" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/361/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 F.3d 439", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9498585 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/267/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6236295 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 72", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12121785 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "STB has exclusive jurisdiction over railroad operations, tracks, and facilities" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ark. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3800042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/368/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ark. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3034897 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/364/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 25-15-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 944, "char_count": 23756, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20091171338560665 }, "sha256": "3565e1177f7049d39a8c3c6e193e504b9f4566afeac37b46146e75ccb17c5b63", "simhash": "1:851b4fb144a27289", "word_count": 3711 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:36:16.941269+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Roger and Ruth ANDERSON d/b/a Anderson Auto Salvage v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Elana Cunningham Wills, Justice.\nThis case requires the court to decide whether federal law preempts an order of the Arkansas State Highway Commission (Commission) forcing Burlington Northern Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) to reopen a private \u201cat-grade\u201d railroad crossing. We hold that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) preempts the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction in this instance; therefore, we vacate the Commission\u2019s order.\nThe private railroad crossing at issue in this case is located between the cities of Hoxie and Walnut Ridge and has been in existence for over eighty years. In 1999, Roger and Ruth Anderson entered into an agreement to purchase the property accessed by the crossing and began using the property for their salvage yard business, Anderson Auto Salvage. BNSF and the Andersons later began negotiations to enter into an \u201cAgreement for Private Crossing.\u201d BNSF drafted an agreement that, among other provisions: (1) granted the Andersons a license \u201cto construct, maintain, and use\u201d the crossing; (2) required the Andersons to pay BNSF $10,000; (3) required the Andersons to indemnify BNSF; and (4) required the Andersons to procure and maintain liability insurance in connection with the crossing. The draft agreement also provided that either party could terminate the license by serving the other party thirty-days\u2019 notice.\nThe Andersons refused to sign the agreement, and BNSF later posted notice that the crossing would be closed. After the Andersons contacted city officials in Walnut Ridge regarding the dispute, both the Walnut Ridge city attorney and the Andersons requested that the Commission hold a hearing on BNSF\u2019s proposed closing of the crossing. The Commission\u2019s counsel sent letters to BNSF asserting that an administrative hearing was required under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304(b) before BNSF could close the crossing. BNSF responded by contending that the Commission\u2019s authority to prevent it from closing a private crossing was preempted by federal law, and BNSF later barricaded the crossing.\nThe Commission held a hearing and ordered BNSF to reopen the crossing within ten days after it found that: the Commission\u2019s action was not preempted by ICCTA and was authorized by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304(b); BNSF merely held an easement in perpetuity for railway purposes over the Ander-sons\u2019 property; there were no unsafe conditions that supported BNSF\u2019s decision to close the crossing; and the crossing was the Andersons\u2019 only access to their property. Further, the Commission ordered BNSF to draft an agreement with the Andersons, modeled on an earlier 1921 agreement regarding the crossing that was submitted into evidence, including a provision that stated that \u201cRailway Company may seek to eliminate this crossing by requesting a hearing for that purpose, with notice to Licensee, before the Arkansas State Highway Commission.\u201d The Commission\u2019s order also prohibited BNSF from charging the Andersons a fee \u201cbecause no fee was recited in the 1921 agreement,\u201d and likewise prohibited BNSF from requiring the Andersons to procure and maintain \u201cinsurance of any kind.\u201d\nBNSF appealed the Commission\u2019s decision to the Craighead County Circuit Court, repeating its arguments before the Commission and asserting several procedural errors underlying the Commission\u2019s findings and order. Upon review, the circuit court vacated the Commission\u2019s order, holding that ICCTA preempted the Commission\u2019s authority over any matter in the case, including the safety issues raised by BNSF as well as \u201cthe terms and conditions which a railroad may impose in connection with permissive use of such private crossing.\u201d Additionally, the circuit court held that the Commission had essentially and unlawfully \u201cprejudged\u201d the issues underlying the dispute between BNSF and the Andersons and committed other procedural errors, as well as exceeded the Commission\u2019s constitutional and statutory authority by mandating the terms of the private crossing agreement.\nThe Andersons bring this appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in holding that the Commission\u2019s authority was preempted by ICCTA. The Andersons also argue that the circuit court erred for the following reasons: their property right in the private crossing was not a revocable license; the Commission properly allocated the burden of proof according to the hearing procedures set out under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304; substantial evidence supported the Commission\u2019s findings; and that any procedural errors \u201cdid not justify [the circuit court] declaring the hearing officers findings and conclusion void.\u201d\nWe review the Commission\u2019s order under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 25-15-201 to -218 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007). Review of administrative agency decisions is limited in scope. Ark. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Bixler, 364 Ark. 292, 219 S.W.3d 125 (2005). The appellate court\u2019s review is directed not to the decision of the circuit court but to the decision of the administrative agency. Id. The APA provides that a reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency\u2019s decision if the decision: (1) violates the constitution or a statute; (2) exceeds the agency\u2019s statutory authority; (3) is affected by an error of law; (4) is procedurally unlawful; (5) is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record; or (6) is arbitrary, capricious, or is an abuse of discretion. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212(h); Ark. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 (2007).\nThe primary question presented by this case is whether 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) of ICCTA preempts the Commission\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction to order BNSF to reopen a private crossing under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that state laws that \u201cinterfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution\u201d are invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. Under the principle of federal law supremacy, there are three ways that federal law can preempt state law: (1) where Congress makes its intent to preempt state law explicit in statutory language; (2) where state law regulates conduct in a field that Congress intends for the federal government to occupy exclusively; or (3) where there is an actual conflict between state and federal law. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990). Where a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, the focus of statutory construction is \u201con the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress\u2019 pre-emptive intent.\u201d CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).\nAs the title of the legislation implies, ICCTA abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission, while simultaneously creating the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to replace it and to perform many of the same regulatory functions. See Friberg v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2001). ICCTA contains an express preemption clause, stating as follows:\n(b) The jurisdiction of the Board over \u2014\n(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rides (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and\n(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,\nis exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.\n49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) (2000).\nThis court has addressed issues of federal preemption and ICCTA in two cases \u2014 Ouachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 361 Ark. 333, 206 S.W.3d 811 (2005) and 25 Residents of Sevier County v. Ark. Highway & Transp. Comm\u2019n, 330 Ark. 396, 954 S.W.2d 242 (1997). In the former, Ouachita Railroad brought an ejectment action against a married couple, the Harbours, alleging that they had wrongfully taken possession of the railroad\u2019s land and removed the company\u2019s railroad tracks. The defendant Harbours answered the complaint and counterclaimed, contending that they acquired the land through adverse possession and that Ouachita Railroad had abandoned the tracks.\nOuachita Railroad filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that \u201cthe STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the abandonment or discontinuation of use of the right-of-way, and that the STB\u2019s authority to regulate the matter preempted all state law relating to it.\u201d 361 Ark. at 338-39, 206 S.W.3d at 813. The chancery court issued a letter opinion, finding that the question of whether the property had been abandoned by the railroad could only be resolved by the STB, but the court retained jurisdiction to address state-law claims after the STB\u2019s final determination. As directed by the chancery court, the Harbours filed a petition with the STB requesting a waiver of the filing fee, which was declined. Ouachita Railroad then filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because the STB denied the Harbours\u2019 request to waive the filing fee, \u201csince the court had already determined that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the Harbours\u2019 counterclaim, it was appropriate for the court now to grant its motion for summary judgment.\u201d Id. at 339-40, 206 S.W.3d at 813. The chancery court denied the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Harbours\u2019 equitable defenses were within its jurisdiction, regardless of the abandonment issue.\nThe railroad then petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition, asserting that ICCTA preempted the chancery court\u2019s jurisdiction. Upon review, this court framed the question as \u201cwhether the Harbours\u2019 counterclaim against the railroad for abandonment and adverse possession of the railroad\u2019s right-of-way is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the STB.\u201d Id. at 343, 206 S.W.3d 816. The court held that \u201cSection 10501(b) clearly provides that the STB\u2019s jurisdiction over the abandonment of tracks is exclusive and preempts any remedies available under state law.\u201d Id. The court noted that it had previously acknowledged \u201cthe broad language of \u00a7 10501(b)\u201d and \u201cits preemptive effect\u201d in a case involving the closing of a railroad agency station or depot closings, 25 Residents of Sevier County, supra. Id. The court also cited cases involving the STB\u2019s predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), such as Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 319-23 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that Congress granted to the ICC exclusive and \u201cplenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate commerce, rail carriers\u2019 cessations of service on their lines.\u201d Turning to the Harbours\u2019 counterclaims involving adverse possession and other equitable defenses they asserted to establish a right to the land at issue, the Ouachita Railroad court held that these issues were also preempted under 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501, stating as follows:\nAs already noted, the ICC\u2019s, and now STB\u2019s, jurisdiction over the \u201cconstruction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of . . . tracks\u201d is exclusive. 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b)(2) (2000). Were the circuit court to quiet title over the land in favor of the Harbours based on their counterclaim of adverse possession or to acknowledge any right to the land by the Harbours, this would necessarily result in the acquisition of the right-of-way by the Harbours and in the discontinuation of the use of the same by the railroad. Such a determination clearly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, as demonstrated by the clear language of the statute as well as the case law cited above. . . .\nBecause any determination by the circuit court on the matter of title or any right to the land would interfere with STB\u2019s jurisdiction as provided for in the statute, we hold that the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction to determine the abandonment and adverse possession claims but also any equitable defenses asserted by the Harbours that seek to bestow upon them any right to the use of the land. It is the STB that has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.\nOuachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 361 Ark. at 345, 206 S.W.3d at 817.\nIn 25 Residents of Sevier County, supra, relied upon in Ouachita Railroad, a railroad filed an application with the Commission to close an agency station in Dierks, Arkansas, in order to consolidate operations with those in a nearby city. After the Commission filed notice of the proposed closing, which became effective ninety days later, twenty-five residents of Dierks filed a petition requesting that the Commission order the railroad to reopen the agency station. The Commission requested that the parties present briefs addressing the question of whether ICCTA preempted state jurisdiction of the discontinuation of railroad agency stations. Following a hearing, the Commission determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter, because the STB had held \u201cexclusive jurisdiction over \u2018transportation by rail carriers\u2019 as part of the interstate rail network\u201d and dismissed the residents\u2019 petition. 330 Ark. at 398-99, 954 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting the Commission\u2019s order). The Pulaski County Circuit Court affirmed the Commission.\nOn appeal, this court examined the language of 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) and first determined that, \u201c[cjlearly, the act covers \u2018transportation by rail carriers\u2019 and the discontinuation of their carriers\u2019 related facilities.\u201d Id. at 400, 954 S.W.2d at 244. The court then considered the question of whether the agency stations were \u201cfacilities\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 10501(b), and held as follows:\nGiven the broad language of the act itself, its statutory framework, and considering the recent decisions interpreting the act, we believe it is clear that Congress intended to preempt the states\u2019 authority to engage in economic regulation of rail carriers. The preemptive strike, we hold, includes regulation of agency station discontinuations. Accordingly, we conclude \u00a723-12-611, which gives the AHT Commission the authority to regulate such closings, is preempted by the ICC Termination Act of 1995.\nId. at 401, 954 S.W.2d at 244.\nAlthough this court held that the broad language of 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) preempted state court action in both Ouachita Railroad, Inc. and 25 Residents of Sevier County, neither case involved railroad crossings as in the present appeal, and ICCTA does not expressly mention railroad crossings. However, a recent decision by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involves railroad crossings, and it is instructive because it is in accord with this court\u2019s construction of ICCTA. In Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 534 F.3d 443 (2008), a property owner filed an action in state court, alleging that he had a property right in four railroad crossings, and sought an injunction to prevent Union Pacific from closing two of the crossings, and to force it to reopen two it had already closed. The preliminary-injunction motion and possessory action was removed and consolidated in federal district court, which held that the state-law claim was expressly preempted by ICCTA.\nUpon review, the Fifth Circuit framed the issue as \u201cwhether railroad crossings fit within the purview of \u2018transportation by rail carriers,\u2019 thereby evincing Congress\u2019 intent to preempt state-law claims relating to ownership of the closings.\u201d Id. at 446 (quoting 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b)).\nThe Franks court first recognized ICCTA\u2019s broad definition of \u201ctransportation\u201d as follows:\nThe ICCTA defines \u201ctransportation\u201d to include, inter alia: \u201ca locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use.\u201d\nId. (quoting 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10102(9)(A)). The Franks court then noted that the federal district court had held that crossings are within the STB\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction because ICCTA\u2019s definition of \u201ctransportation\u201d includes \u201cthe movement of passengers or property ... by rail,\u201d and \u201c[i]n that regard, the district court found crossings affect safety, drainage, and maintenance, which necessarily affect rail travel.\u201d Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed, rejecting the argument that, because \u201ccrossings\u201d were not explicitly listed in the ICCTA definition of \u201ctransportation,\u201d it evidenced Congress\u2019s intent to exclude crossings from the STB\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction. Instead, ICCTA\u2019s broad language and definition of transportation \u2014 to include \u201c \u2018property ... or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property or both, by rail\u2019 \u201d \u2014 clearly \u201cbelies the notion that Congress intended \u2018transportation\u2019 to include only items fisted in its definition.\u201d Id. (emphasis in original).\nAt issue here, as in Franks, is whether a state proceeding to reopen a closed railroad crossing falls within the STB\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction under the language of \u00a7 10501. The Andersons contend that it does not, and argue that this court should follow the North Dakota Supreme Court holding in Home of Economy v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, 694 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 2005). In Home of Economy, BNSF closed a private crossing on a spur fine that provided access from a road to property owned by the appellant. Flome ofEconomy filed suit against BNSF to reopen the crossing, alleging that it possessed an easement for access to the property. BNSF responded by claiming that it held easements by prescription, necessity, and estoppel. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because ICCTA vested the STB with exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of railroad operations. Id. at 841. The trial court specifically \u201cconcluded the closing of the grade crossing constituted regulation of rail transportation under the ICCTA, because the grade crossing affected rail cars going from State Mill and Elevator [Roads] and could also affect liability for accidents at the crossing.\u201d Id. Thus, the trial court held that the STB\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction preempted any state court action by Home ofEconomy.\nOn appeal, Home ofEconomy argued that the ICCTA only grants exclusive federal jurisdiction to the STB \u201cin those cases involving substantial economic impact on a railroad\u2019s operations.\u201d Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed, holding that \u201cIC-CTA does not explicitly preempt state law regarding grade crossings\u201d because \u201c[t]he preemption language in the ICCTA explicitly preempts many issues \u2018with respect to regulation of rail transportation,\u2019 but does not specifically refer to states\u2019 traditional police power regarding grade crossings.\u201d Id. at 846 (quoting ICCTA). Although the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that \u201csome courts have broadly construed Congress\u2019s preemption language in ICCTA and have concluded that language preempted state or local laws,\u201d it interpreted a selection of ICCTA\u2019s legislative history to reflect that Congress only intended to economically regulate the interstate railway system while leaving intact states\u2019 police power. Home of Economy, 694 N.W.2d at 844.\nThe Andersons\u2019 reliance on Home of Economy is misplaced. First, in contrast to Home of Economy, this court specifically noted the broad language and preemptive reach of 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) in Ouachita Railroad, Inc., supra, and 25 Residents of Sevier County, supra. More importantly, this court applied the language broadly to preempt state judicial and regulatory action, respectively, in those cases. Second, the Commission\u2019s order in this case clearly impacts BNSF\u2019s railroad operations and \u201ctransportation by rail carriers\u201d for purposes of ICCTA. The Commission ordered BNSF: (1) to reopen the private crossing within ten days; (2) to redraft a 1921 private crossing agreement to apply to the Andersons; and (3) that \u201c[n]o fee may be charged by the railroad for entry into this agreement with the Andersons, as no fee was charged in the 1921 agreement\u201d and \u201c[n]o insurance of any kind may be required by the railroad from the Andersons as no insurance was required in the original [1921] agreement.\u201d This action, as in Franks, necessarily impacts \u201ctransportation by rail,\u201d affecting both BNSF\u2019s economic interests and the movement of passengers or property. As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Franks, supra, ICCTA\u2019s definition of \u201ctransportation\u201d includes \u201cproperty ... or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use.\u201d 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10102(9)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).\nWe hold that ICCTA preempts the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction over this private railroad crossing dispute and we vacate the Commission\u2019s order. Federal law preemption deprives the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction under the facts presented in this case and invests exclusive jurisdiction in the STB. 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10501(b) (STB has exclusive jurisdiction over railroad operations, tracks, and facilities). Decisions of the STB may be appealed to the appropriate United States circuit court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2321(a) (2006) (judicial review of STB orders); 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2342(5) (2006) (exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of STB final orders lies with the courts of appeals).\nBecause we hold that the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction is preempted by ICCTA, the Anderson\u2019s remaining arguments are moot.\nCommission\u2019s order vacated.\nAn at-grade railroad crossing is on the same level of the railroad tracks, rather than over or under them.\nDepartment of Transportation (DOT) # 667982U.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-12-304(b) (Repl. 2002) provides:\n(1) It shall be the duty of the Highway Commission, or any representative thereof, to make a personal inspection of any designated place where it is desired that a road or street, either public or private, cross any railroad in this state.\n(2) Upon ten (10) days\u2019 notice as required by law and after a public hearing, the commission may make such order as in its judgment shall be just and proper. The order may provide for a crossing at grade, over or under the railroad, and shall be enforced as other orders by the commission.\nSee also Cedarapids, Inc. v. Chicago, Cent. & Pac. R.R. Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that to the extent that a state-law claim sought to force CC & P to abandon the track in question, such claims were preempted by ICCTA); Trustees of the Diocese of Vt. v. State, 496 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1985) (holding that a declaratory-judgment action in state court to determine whether an easement for railroad purposes had been abandoned interfered with the ICC\u2019s authority to determine the issue); City of Seattle v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 22 P.3d 260, 262 (Wash.Ct.App.2001) (stating that language of\u00a7 10501 grants the STB \u201cclear, broad, and unqualified\u201d jurisdiction over the statute\u2019s fisted activities).\nThe North Dakota Supreme Court cited H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793,807-08.", "type": "majority", "author": "Elana Cunningham Wills, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Eichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by: Christopher O. Parker, for appellants.", "Barrett & Deacon, by: John C. Deacon, Brandon J. Harrison, and Andrew H. Dallas, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roger and Ruth ANDERSON d/b/a Anderson Auto Salvage v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY\n08-232\n291 S.W.3d 586\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 30, 2009\nEichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by: Christopher O. Parker, for appellants.\nBarrett & Deacon, by: John C. Deacon, Brandon J. Harrison, and Andrew H. Dallas, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0466-01", "first_page_order": 496, "last_page_order": 506 }