{ "id": 8728436, "name": "Pelham et al. vs. Grigg et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Pelham v. Grigg", "decision_date": "1842-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "141", "last_page": "143", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "4 Ark. 141" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [], "analysis": { "cardinality": 325, "char_count": 5481, "ocr_confidence": 0.477, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3486890854313936e-07, "percentile": 0.6328270489901149 }, "sha256": "03693244078e5e7812a0c902f476740c8ca898ce579f89cc59b70bb75196e388", "simhash": "1:bb77d6893ce08ce2", "word_count": 958 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:55:34.553089+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Pelham et al. vs. Grigg et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "By the Court,\nDickinson, J.\nThe Court unquestionably erred, in not dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 suit for want of a proper bond for costs. The plaintiffs in the action, being non-residents, were required to file, in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in which suit was brought, the obligation of some responsible person, a resident of the State, who shall acknowledge himself bound to pay all costs which may accrue. Rev. St. 202. An obligation isa bond, and it must arise upon a good and valid consideration, between persons capable of contracting, and must be executed in the manner required by law. In this case, the party merely acknowledges himself bound to pay all costs which may accrue. Such an instrument is certainly not the kind of obligation contemplated by the statute. It contains no one requisite of a bond; at least, is fatally defective, as there is no obligee; and the instrument purporting to-be an obligation, cannot be binding.\nThe judgment reversed; and the Circuit Court instructed to dismiss the cause, for want of sufficient security for costs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Dickinson, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Walker, for the plaintiffs.", "Oldham, contra." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Pelham et al. vs. Grigg et al.\nThe obligation required to be filed for the payment of costs, in certain cases, must be a bond.\nA bond must arise upon a good and valid consideration, between persons capable of contracting, and be executed in the manner required by law.\nAn instrument under seal, without any obligee named, by which a person acknowledges himself bound to pay all costs which may accrue, is not suflicient under the statute.\nDebt, tried in the Benton Circuit Court, in May, A. D. 1841, before the Hon. Joseph M. Hoge, one of the Circuit Judges. Grigg & Elliott sued Pelham & Shepperd, and a writing under seal, signed by Williamson S. Oldham, was filed with the declaration, in these words: \u201c The plaintiffs in this suit being non-residents of the State of Arkansas, I acknowledge myself bound to pay all costs which may accrue in such action.\u201d The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, for want of a bond for costs, it being admitted that the plaintiffs were nonresidents. The motion was overruled, and final judgment entered for the plaintiffs. The defendants sued a writ of error.\nWalker, for the plaintiffs.\nThe statute requires the non-resident plaintiff, or some responsible person for him,to \u201cfile an obligation, by which he shall acknowledge himself bound to pay all the costs which may accrue in such action.\u201d Rev. St. p. 201.\nAn-obligation is \u201c a bond of right, binding us to another to give or do or refrain from doing something.\u201d Pothier on Obligation, 2. \u201cIt is the essence of all obligations, that there be, 1st, a cause from which the obligation arises; 2d, persons between whom it is contracted; 3d, something which is the object of it.\u201d ib. p. 4. In order to make a contract, there must be a person capable to contract, a person capable to be contracted with, a thing to be contracted for, and a consideration. 1 Comyn on Con. 3. The word obligation is a legal term, and has a fixed and definite meaning, and, in that sense, succeeding legislatures are presumed to have used it, when courts of law are called upon to give it a construction. Coke Lit. 172. The common-law meaning of an obligation is, \u201c a bond with a penalty.\u201d ib. 172. This Court, at the July term, 1840, in the case of Sabin vs. Hambleion, said: \u201c A covenant is defined to be an agreement between two or more persons, under seal,\u201d &c.\nIn Kentucky, upon a statute nearly similar, it has been decided, that the bond must be made payable to the defendant. Hard. Rep. 172. It is essential that it contain an accurate description of the cause of action, and of the parties; and that it be filed before the commencement of the suit.\nCoke defines an obligation to be a bond with a penalty; and, in Bac. Abr. title Obligation, it is said that a \u201c penal bond is an obligation, with a certain penalty mentioned in the bond, and debt is the only remedy.\u201d Debt would not lie on this instrument, and there is no penalty mentioned in it.\nOldham, contra.\nIt would be improper to name any particular person as obligee\", because the statute contains no such provision; and we are not authorized to go beyond the law. The obligation cannot be made to the defendant, because, in no event is he responsible for the plaintiff\u2019s cost, until judgment is rendered against him, in favor of the plaintiff; it cannot be made to the officers of court, by name, because there maybe witnesses and others equally interested, and who ought, by the same reasoning, to be made obligees,\nThe statute did not contemplate a common-law obligation; if it had, the person to whom the obligation should be made payable, would have been designated. It merely designed 45 an acknowledgment op some responsible, person,\u201d