{
  "id": 1893355,
  "name": "Molen and Wife v. Orr",
  "name_abbreviation": "Molen v. Orr",
  "decision_date": "1884-11",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "486",
  "last_page": "490",
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    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:40:20.267089+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Molen and Wife v. Orr."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Cockrill, C. J.\nThe theory of the appellants is, that there was a fatal variance between the cause of action alleged in the complaint, and that proved upon the trial. The case presented is this : The appellee sued the appellants to recover the amount of an account due him, as he alleged, for painting a hotel in Hot Springs, and also to enforce a mechanic\u2019s lien against the hotel premises. Upon the trial he proved that the work had been done by him and one Wirfs, who at the time was his partner; that before suit the partnership was dissolved, and Wirfs executed a formal assignment of this and all the other firm contracts to him and withdrew from the business. No objection was made to this testimony, and none to a want of proper parties, but the defendants undertook to avoid payment under an answer alleging that the work had been done by the partners in an unskillful manner, and that the full value of it had been paid by the defendant, Louisa.\nIf the action had been prosecuted in the name of the v firm as it stood when the work was done, there would ' have been no room for objection at any point. After the dissolution and assignment of his interest by one copartner to the other, the latter took all the rights of the firm and might have exercised them in the firm name for all purposes necessary to their enforcement, and for closing up the joint business. Busfield v. Wheeler, 14 Allen, 139; Holmes v. Shands, 26 Miss., 639.\nIf the objection that 'the former partner should be a party had been distinctly made, an amendment might have been allowed bringing him in. By failing to make the objection it was waived. Mans. Rev. St., sec. 5031; Yonley v. Thompson, 30 Ark., 399; Dodge v. N. Y. St. Ship Co., 37 How., Pr., 524.\nThat there was a variance between the proof and the allegations of the complaint there is no question ; but the j^teriality of the variance is not to be determined as at common law by the incoherence of the two statements on their face. It must be shown by the party alleging the variance that he has been misled to his prejudice.- (Mans. Rev. St, 5075; Newman on Pl. & Pr., 730, et seq.; Green Ib., 467) There was no pretense of surprise or of being misled in this case. Indeed the only fact in the proof that is not found in the pleadings is the dissolution of the co-partnership, and the release by one copartner to the other of his interest in the matter in controversy. This evidence was admitted without objection, and we must take it that the parties deemed the variance immaterial, or that they treated the complaint as amended to admit such evidence. Burke v. Snell, 42 Ark., 57; Green. Pl. and Pr., sec. 468; Manice v. Brady, 15 Abb. Pr. (O. S), 173; Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St., 598.\nSo long as the claim proved is within the \u201c general scope and meaning \u201d of the pleadings the variance cannot amount to a failure of proof (Mausf. Rev. St., sec. 5077), and it is apparent from the record that no other claim than the one proved was within the meaning of either the complaint or answer.\nThe appellants ask a reversal because their motion for a continuance was overruled; but this motion failed to show diligence in trying to procure the testimony of the absent witness, or that the testimony was anything more than cumulative. It was certainly no abuse of the court\u2019s discretion to overrule it.\nThe proof, however, fails to disclose any fact from which Joseph Molen\u2019s liability can be inferred. His wife seems to have controlled the hotel and made this contract in her own behalf in a business conducted by her, and the only exemption from liability claimed on her part was upon the theory that she had paid all that was justly due under the contract. Her answer admits that the necessary steps were taken to fix the mechanic\u2019s lien against her interest in the premises described. None was claimed against Joseph Molen\u2019s. He appears to have been a nominal party only. Upon the showing made, he should not have been a party at all. He denied the allegations of the \u25a0complaint, and it was error to render judgment against him.\nLet the judgment be affirmed as to Louisa Molen and her interest in the premises, and reverse and remand as to \u2022Joseph Molen.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Cockrill, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "G. W. Murphy for appellant.",
      "Sanders Husbands for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Molen and Wife v. Orr.\n1. Partnership: Dissolution: Transfer of partner\u2019s interest: Parties:\nWhen a partnership is dissolved and one partner assigns his interest in the partnership to the other the latter takes all the rights of the firm, and may exercise them in the firm name for all purposes necessary to their enforcement and for closing up the joint business. But an action may be maintained in his own name unless objection for want of the other as a party be distinctly made.\n2. Evidence : Variance from pleading.\nThe materiality of a variance between the proof and the pleading is not to be determined as at common law by the incoherence of the two statements on their face. The party alleging the variance must show that he has been misled to his prejudice.\n3. Practice in Supreme Court : Variance: Presumption.\nWhere testimony variant from the allegations of the pleading is admitted without objection this court will presume that the parties deemed the variance immaterial, or treated the complaint as amended to admit the evidence.\n4. Husband and Wipe : His liability on her contracts.\nA husband is not liable on a contract made by his wife in her own name for repairs on a hotel controlled and conducted by her.\nAPPEAL from Garland Circuit Court.\nHon. J. B. \u201cWood, Circuit Judge.\nG. W. Murphy for appellant.\nThere was a fatal variance between the complaint and the proof. The evidence showed that the work was done by Orr & Wirfs and not by Charles G-. Orr, and that it was done for Louisa Molen alone. Orr had no right to sue in his own name, and there was no proof that he was the successor of the firm. Gantt's Digest, sec. 4644; Acts 1877, p. %6; 1 Gr. Ev., secs. 58, 66.\nSanders Husbands for appellees.\nThe evidence shows that Orr was the successor of Orr & Wirf. Actions shall be brought in the name of the real party in i nterest. (Sec. 4469 Gantt\u2019s Digest.) This demand was assignable. (1 b., sec. 4077.) The objection as to variance could only be taken by demurrer or answer, and if not done all such objections are waived. (Ib., sees. 4664-7.) The other objections are too general. 89 Ark., 1$2."
  },
  "file_name": "0486-01",
  "first_page_order": 502,
  "last_page_order": 506
}
