{
  "id": 1902294,
  "name": "Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company v. Kimmons",
  "name_abbreviation": "Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad v. Kimmons",
  "decision_date": "1895-10-19",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "200",
  "last_page": "202",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "61 Ark. 200"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
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    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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    {
      "cite": "47 Ark. 321",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "48 Ark. 366",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1887759
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          "page": "370"
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    {
      "cite": "45 Ark. 295",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1892048
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        {
          "page": "297-8"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:14:10.612499+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company v. Kimmons."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Riddick, J.,\n(after stating the facts.) We think that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Without discussing that point, we pass to the question whether the court properly admitted testimony tending to show that the appellant failed to post notice of the animal killed. If the failure to post such a notice was a question at issue in the case, the evidence was proper; otherwise, not. \u201cOf all the rules of evidence,\u201d says Mr. Best, \u201cthe most universal and the most obvious is this \u2014 that the evidence adduced should be alike directed and confined to the matters which are in dispute, or which form the subject of- investigation. The theoretical propriety of this rule,\u201d he adds, \u201cnever can be matter of doubt, whatever difficulties may arise in its application.\u201d Chamberlayne\u2019s Best on E}v. sec. 251.\nThere was no written pleading filed by appellant, and we must, to determine the facts in dispute, look to the statement filed by plaintiff. As a rule, no formal pleadings are required in actions before, justices of the peace; but the plaintiff, in obedience to the statute, filed \u201ca short written statement of the facts\u201d on which his action was founded. In this statement there is no reference to a failure to post a notice of the animal killed. No such fact is alleged, and it was therefore not in issue. No such question was under investigation, and the testimony was irrelevant and improper, and should not have been admitted over the objection of the appellant.\nThe introduction of this evidence, and the charge of the court in reference thereto, caused the jury to assess-double damages against the appellant. The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial, unless the appellee shall within thirty days-enter a remittitur of eighteen dollars, under the rule in. such cases.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Riddick, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. D. Kenna and B. R. Davidson, for appellant. \u25a0",
      "L. H. McGill, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company v. Kimmons.\nOpinion delivered October 19, 1895.\nJustice\u2019s Court \u2014 Variance Between Pleading and Proof. \u2014 In an action in a justice\u2019s court to recover damages for killing an animal, evidence that the company failed to post notice of its killing, as required by the statute making it liable for double the value of the animal killed in case of such failure, is inadmissible where the \u201c written statement of the facts\u201d contains no reference to such failure.\nAppeal from Benton Circuit Court.\nEdward S. McDaniel, Judge.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nThis was an action for damages for killing a cow. The suit was brought before a justice of the peace. Omitting the caption, the statement of the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is as follows: \u201cThe plaintiff, R. D. Trout, states that on the 8th day of July, 1892, the said company\u2019s train killed a cow of his, valued by bystanders at the time to be worth twenty-five dollars or more; and claim sent into the company for the amount of twenty-five dollars at the time, on 16th day of July, 1892, and, no notice being taken of it, nor any part thereof being paid, he prays that he may have process issued for double that amount, fifty dollars, and judgment rendered as the law directs, and all his costs and damages that may accrue in this action.\u201d\nThe defendant company did not appear, and a'judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace in favor of plaintiff for the sum of fifty dollars. On a trial de novo in the circuit court on appeal, the plaintiff offered to introduce proof tending to show that the employees of the company had failed to post notice of the animal killed, to which testimony the defendant objected, on the ground that the plaintiff\u2019s statement of his cause of \u2022action contained no allegation that there had been a failure to post, and that it had no notice of such a claim. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the testimony, and further instructed the jury that a failure to post the notice required by the statute would render \u2022defendant liable for double damages, The proof showed the value of the cow to be from eighteen to twenty-five \u25a0dollars.\nE. D. Kenna and B. R. Davidson, for appellant. \u25a0\n1. The action was clearly brought under the act \u2022of March 13, 1885, and was tried on this theory, but the \u2022court allowed proof of double damages. Sand. &. H. Dig. sec. 6350. \u25a0 It is nec\u00e9ssary to allege that the animal was not posted. 45 Ark. 295, 297-8.\n2. An engineer is not required to look for stock off the track. 48 Ark. 366, 370.\n3. The evidence overcame the prima facie case, and -the verdict should have been for defendant. 47 Ark. 321; 41 id. 161; 40 id. 336.\nL. H. McGill, for appellee.\n1. The action was not based upon Sand. & H. Dig. \u2022sec. 6350.\n2. To obtain a continuance appellant should have \u25a0shown that the animal had been posted or that he believed such proof could be made by affidavits. Sand. & H. Dig. secs. 5839, 5842; 16 A. & E. Enc. Daw, pp. 532, 535, and notes.\n3. There is no error in the charge, and the evidence \u25a0supports the verdict."
  },
  "file_name": "0200-01",
  "first_page_order": 216,
  "last_page_order": 218
}