{ "id": 8724941, "name": "St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Stanfield", "name_abbreviation": "St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Stanfield", "decision_date": "1897-04-03", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "643", "last_page": "645", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ark. 643" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "14 S. W. Rep. 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "69 Ga. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 43197 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/69/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Am. Rep. 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "Am. Rep.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "75 Ga. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 57063 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/75/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ark. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727967 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/11/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Fed. Rep. 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6718874 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/40/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Tenn. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8536801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/95/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Tex. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex.", "case_ids": [ 2221336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex/78/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ark. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/41/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Am. Rep. 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "Am. Rep.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Kas. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N. Y. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 546175 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/86/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ga. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 57063 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/75/0444-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 352, "char_count": 4237, "ocr_confidence": 0.603, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6097660785056965e-07, "percentile": 0.8203238876088915 }, "sha256": "1600c2e4d1edbf8a9b753ce499855156a1886233c3d030e9655d264aabeb92f6", "simhash": "1:2ca999b0f8154475", "word_count": 756 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:35.777574+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Bunn, C. J., did not particpate." ], "parties": [ "St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Stanfield." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wood, J.\nThis suit was brought before a jtfstice of the peace for the alleged negligent killing of an \u201cIrish setter dog,\u201d valued at $95. Appellant' appeals from a judgment of the circuit court for $80. The demurrer to the complaint presents the question, \u201cIs the railroad liable for the negligent killing of the dog?\u201d\nUnder sec. 12, art. 22, of the constitution, and sec. 6349, Sand. & H. Dig., railroads are \u201cresponsible for all damages to property done or caused by the running of trains.\u201d Dogs are property. As was said by the supreme court of New York: \u201cLarge amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are largely the subjects-of trade and traffic. In many ways they are put to useful service, and, so far as pertains to their ownership as personal property, they possess all the attributes of other personal property.\u201d Mullaly v. People, 86 N. Y. 365. Much learning', ancient and modern, may be found in the books, more entertaining- than useful, upon the question as to whether dog's are the subject of larceny. At the common law they were not so regarded, for the reason, as assigmed by Mr. Blackstone, that they do not serve for food, have no intrinsic value, and are kept for the whim and pleasure of their owners. 4 Blackst. Com. 235; 2 Blackst. Com. 393.'\nFollowing the common law in this respect, the supreme court of Georgia held, in Jemison v. Southwestern Railroad, 75 Ga. 444, that railroads are not liable for the negligent killing of dogs. See also Wilson v. Ry. 10 Rich. Law (S. C.), 52. But the common law rule, even in cases of larceny, \u2018\u2018is extremely technical, and has no sound basis to rest upon.\u201d Mullaly v. People, supra. Except in cases of larceny, however, the dog was property at the common law, and the owner had his remedy by civil action for the loss or destruction of same. 4 Blackst. Com. 236. Such is the general doctrine in America. Harrington v. Miles, 11 Kas. 481; S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 355, and authorities cited.\nMoreover, under our statutes, and the decision of this court in Haywood v. State, 41 Ark. 479, it is evident that the doctrine of the common law as to the larceny of dogs could have no place. Secs. 1694-8, Sand. & H. Dig. We are unwilling to extend a doctrine, archaic and unsound even in criminal cases, to civil cases having no analogy. The- statute makes no exception as to dogs, and we can make none.\nWe find but few adjudications upon the question, and none with facts exactly similar. The supreme court of Texas supports our view in Hanks v. Ry. 78 Tex. 300. See, also, 3 Elliott, Railroads, sec. 1190; Fink v. Evans, 95 Tenn. 413; Jones v. Bond, 40 Fed. Rep. 281, S. C. 40 Am. & Fng. R. Cases, 191.\nSufficiency of motion for new trial.\nIf the appellant be liable at all, it is not contended that there was an error in the charge of the court, nor that the verdict was excessive. The evidence to sup-, port the verdict is sufficient here.\n2. The motion for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence is not sufficient, for the reason that it fails to state the facts upon which the court could determine that appellee had used due diligence. Bourland v. Skinner, 11 Ark. 671; Peterson v. Gresham, 25 id. 380; Merrick v. Britton, 26 id. 496; Runnels v. State, 28 id. 121.\nAffirmed.\nBunn, C. J., did not particpate.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wood, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sam H. West, and Gaughan & Sifford for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Stanfield.\nOpinion delivered April 3, 1897.\nDogs \u2014 Liability bor Kibbing. \u2014 Dogs are personal property for the negligent killing of -which a railway company is liable.\nNbw Triab \u2014 Sufficiency oB Motion. \u2014 A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is not sufficient where it fails to state facts showing that due diligence was used.\nThe dog is property.\nAppeal from Ouachita Circuit Court.\nCharles W. Smith, Judge.\nSam H. West, and Gaughan & Sifford for appellant.\nDogs were not property, except in a qualified and restricted sense, by the common law, and our statute has not changed the character of such property. A railroad is not liable for killing a dog unless it be done wantonly or maliciously. 75 Ga. 444; 58 Am. Rep. 476; 10 Rich. Daw, 52; 69 Ga. 447; 14 S. W. Rep. 691. A new trial should have been granted for newly discovered evidence, under secs.. 5842-3, Sand. & H. Dig. ." }, "file_name": "0643-01", "first_page_order": 661, "last_page_order": 663 }