{
  "id": 1909708,
  "name": "Boarman v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Boarman v. State",
  "decision_date": "1898-12-24",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "65",
  "last_page": "67",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "66 Ark. 65"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "10 Ark. 378",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "18 Ark. 179",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    },
    {
      "cite": "45 Ark. 861",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": -1
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    {
      "cite": "31 Ark. 676",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1879274
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "62 Ark. 514",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    },
    {
      "cite": "47 Ark. 492",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 Cal. 333",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cal.",
      "case_ids": [
        4384866
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
        "/cal/112/0333-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:19.950984+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Boarman v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Bunn, C. J.\nThis is an indictment for cutting down trees on the land in charge of A. J: Hemphill, an agent of the estate of J. J. Hemphill, and destroying and carrying the timber thereof, which, omitting merely the formal parts, is in these words: \u201cThe said A. R. Boarman, in the county and state aforesaid, on the 1st day of May, A. D. 1897, did unlawfully and wilfully enter upon lands belonging to the J. J. Hemphill estate, and cut down, destroy and carry away timber,\u201d etc. Trial and verdict against the defendant, hnd judgment accordingly.\nThe defendant filed his motion in arrest of judgment, alleging four several causes, to-wit: (1) \u2022 \u201cThat the indictment does, not sufficiently describe the land intended.\u201d (2) \u201cThat the indictment does not allege that the timber cut and carried away was standing or growing upon the said land.\u201d (3) \u201cThat the indictment does not allege the value of the timber.\u201d (4) \u201cBecause kthe indictment alleges that the defendant entered and cut and carried away timber, and the proof shows that one Wade cut said timber, without the consent or knowledge of the defendant.\u201d\nUnder the first head it is contended by the defendant that the expression \u201cland belonging to the J. J. Plemphill estate\u201d does not describe the land sufficiently. The land is alleged to be situate in the county and state wherein the indictment was found, and the only controversy under this heading seems to be as to whether or not describing lands as the property of an estate is sufficiently definite,\u2014that is, the indefiniteness is as to the ownership, and not as to the identity and locality of the land otherwise. Section 2080, of Sandels & Hills Digest, reads: \u201cWhere an offense involves the commission, or an attempt to commit, an injury to person or property, and is described in other respects with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injmred, or attempted to be injured, is not material.\u201d In construing a statute of California identically the same as the one quoted, the supreme court of that state, in People v. Smith, 112 Cal. 333, held (quoting from the syllabus) that \u201cthere is no substantial variance between a complaint for larceny, describing the property stolen as belonging to and being owned by the estate of a deceased person named, and an information describing it as belonging to and being owned by persons named as executor and executrix of the estate of such deceased person; and the description in the complaint cannot be held insufficient under the provisions of section 956 of the code [the section like ours], the offense being described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, and the alleged ownership being in effect in the estate of the deceased person.\u201d\nIn the case at bar there is no contention that the act is not sufficiently described otherwise in order to be identified. This objection is therefore not sound.\nAs to the second ground of motion, we think the allegation that the defendant cut down the timber sufficiently indicates that the timber was standing or 'growing, \u2018within the meaning of the statute, and the defendant must necessarily have known what was meant by that language.\nAs to the third ground, the statute seems to assume that \u201cstanding or growing timber\u201d is of some value; at all events, the act of cutting down, destroying and carrying away such timber is made the offense per se; and therefore there is no real necessity of alleging value or of proving the same.\nBut the proof shows that one Wade had contracted with defendant to cut timber on the lands of another, and by mistake had gone over the line and cut some ties on the Hemphill estate lands; and that he also was an independent contractor; and that he had cut said trees, if cut at all, without the knowledge or consent, and of course without the direction, of the defendant. The evidence is also to the effect that defendant, on hearing that the timber had been cut, offered to pay for the same; but this, we think, does not amount to an admission of responsibility on his part for the act of cutting the timber.\nJudgment reversed, and cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Bunn, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "A. B. Boarman, pro se.",
      "E. B. Kinsworthy and Jas. H. Stevenson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Boarman v. State.\nOpinion delivered December 24, 1898.\n1. Indictment for Trespass\u2014Allegation of Ownership.\u2014Under Sand. & H. Dig. \u00a7 2080, providing that an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall not be material, an indictment for cutting clown trees, and destroying and carrying away the timber thereof, is not defective in alleging the property as belonging to the estate of a deceased person. (Page 66.)\n2. Same.\u2014An allegation that defendant cut down timber sufficiently alleges that the timber was standing or growing. (Page 66.)\n3. Same\u2014Value of Trees.\u2014In an indictment for cutting down trees and destroying and carrying away the timber thereof it is unnecessary to allege or prove the value of such trees. (Page 67.)\nAppealed from Little River Circuit Court.\nWill P. Feazel, Judge.\nA. B. Boarman, pro se.\nThe indictment is defective because it does not use all the words of the statute descriptive of the offense, nor words equivalent thereto. 47 Ark. 492; 62 Ark. 514. The indictment should have stated that the timber was \u201cstanding or growing\u201d upon the lands of another. Sand. & H. Dig. \u00a7 1773. The indictment should also have stated the value of the timber. The indictment is defective further in that it does not describe the land sufficiently. The evidence does not sustain the verdict. To sustain a conviction of this kind, the accused must have actually procured or participated in the commission of the offense.\nE. B. Kinsworthy and Jas. H. Stevenson, for appellee.\nThe indictment follows the language of the statute, and is sufficient. The description of the land was sufficient. 31 Ark. 676. The allegation that defendant \u201ccut down\u201d the trees is sufficient, because it conveys the same meaning as to allege that the trees were \u201cstanding or growing.\u201d Sand. & H. Dig. \u00a7 2088. There areno accessories after the fact in misdei\u00f1eaiiors. 45 Ark. 861. His assenting to the crime by accepting its benefits makes him guilty as a principal. 18 Ark. 179; 10 Ark. 378."
  },
  "file_name": "0065-01",
  "first_page_order": 81,
  "last_page_order": 83
}