{ "id": 8722048, "name": "Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee District", "name_abbreviation": "Memphis Trust Co. v. Board of Directors", "decision_date": "1901-04-27", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "284", "last_page": "287", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 Ark. 284" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 S. W. 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "17 S. W. 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322331 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ark. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1327670 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/59/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Mo. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 929004 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/146/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Mo. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 973786 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/54/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Mo. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 972144 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/52/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0148-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 367, "char_count": 7336, "ocr_confidence": 0.48, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.217784356715935e-08, "percentile": 0.476862357612355 }, "sha256": "3f46bf0b77705e9b8f85238ff09f43700ac9f78bfe2aef02abbcd2028cba5756", "simhash": "1:6bff79a1fd616559", "word_count": 1190 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:09.426821+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee District." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Riddick, J'.,\n(after stating the facts). The only question presented by this appeal is whether the \u201cSt. Francis Levee District,\u201d or \u201cthe Board of Directors\u201d thereof, is a \u201cmunicipality,\u201d within the meaning of the provision of our constitution which prohibits a municipality from issuing interest-bearing bonds. The provision referred to declares that \u201cneither the state nor any city, county, town or other municipality in this state shall ever loan its credit for any purpose whatever; nor shall any county, city, town or municipality ever issue any interest-bearing evidences of indebtedness,\u201d except to provide for the payment of existing indebtedness. Const. Ark. art. 16, \u00a7 1.\nCounsel for appellant contends that the board of directors of the St. Francis Levee District is a municipality, and therefore, under the language of the constitution quoted, has no power to issue interest-bearing bonds. But the well-established legal meaning of the term \u201cmunicipality\u201d is a public corporation created for governmental purposes, and having local powers of legislation and self-government, \u2014 such, for instance, as an incorporated town or city. Rapalje & Lawrence\u2019s Law Diet.; Anderson\u2019s Law Dict.; Century Dict.; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309.\nNow, while every municipality is a public corporation, yet every public corporation is not a municipality, for, as defined above, a municipality is not only a public corporation; it is such a corporation created for governmental purposes, and having, to a large extent, local powers of legislation and self-government. An incorporated levee district, created for the sole purpose of constructing and maintaining a levee, is, like a municipality, a public corporation; but in respect to powers of self-government and legislation it falls far short, and in that regard is clearly distinguished from a municipality, such as an incorporated town or city. These are, to a certain extent, miniature governments, having legislative, executive and judicial powers; but a levee district has few if any such powers, and is not intended to have them, being only an agency created for a special and particular purpose.\nThe courts have often recognized the distinction between municipal corporations and these inferior corporations, such as levee districts, school districts, and the like. The distinction was pointed out by the supreme court of Missouri in State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, where the. court said that the term \u201cmunicipal corporation\u201d included only cities, towns and other like organizations with political and legislative powers for the local government and police regulation of the inhabitants thereof. In Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543-7, the same court held that the bonds of a levee district, payable out of assessments on lands of the district benefited by the levee, were not debts of a municipality, and did not come within the meaning of a provision of the state constitution limiting municipal indebtedness.\nThis court, in the case of Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148, had before it for consideration the question whether an improvement district in a city was a municipality, or the agent of one, and held that it was neither. Speaking in that case of the same section of the constitution we have now under consideration, the court said that the term \u201cmunicipality,\u201d as used in the constitution, meant a city or municipal corporation, and that, although the improvement district might be organized for a limited municipal purpose, yet it was not a municipal corporation. \u201cIt exercises,\u201d said the court, \u201cno legislative powers, and lacks many other essential characteristics of a corporation created for the government of a city or town.\u201d The same thing might be said of this levee district, the limited and inferior powers of which were recognized by this court in a recent case when the court spoke of it as a quasi corporation, and likened it to a school district. See Carson v. St. Francis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513. Also Dillon\u2019s Municipal Corp. (4th Ed.), \u00a7 22; Tied. Municipal Corp. \u00a7 3.\nOur conclusion is that neither the \u201cSt. Francis Levee District,\u201d nor the \u201cBoard of Directors\u201d thereof, is a \u201cmunicipality,\u201d within the meaning of the section of our constitution heretofore quoted. As before stated, the only defense set up to this action was that the board of directors of this district was in law a munie-pality, and therefore forbidden to issue interest-bearing bonds. But we are of the opinion that the defense is not tenable, and that the legislature had the power to authorize the issuance of the bonds. The answer was therefore insufficient, and the demurrer properly sustained.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Riddick, J'.," } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Watkins, for appellant.", "B. J. Williams and Norton & Prewelt, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Memphis Trust Company v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee District.\nOpinion delivered April 27, 1901.\nConstitutional Law \u2014 Municipality.\u2014Neither the St. Francis levee district, nor the hoard of directors thereof, is a \u201cmunicipality,\u201d within the meaning of Const. 1874, art. 16, \u00a7 1, prohibiting any county, city, town or municipality from issuing any interest-hearing evidences of indebtedness, except to pay an existing debt.\nAppeal from Pulaski Circuit Court.\nJoseph AY. MaRtin, Judge.\nSTATEMENT BY THE COURT.\nThe legislature of Arkansas in 1897 passed an act authorizing the Board of Directors of the St. Francis Levee District to issue bonds for the purpose of building and maintaining certain levees in said district. Afterwards the board of directors made a contract with the Memphis Trust Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee, whereby the Trust Company agreed to purchase of the board bonds to the amount of $10,000, and pay therefor par value with accrued interest. The contract to purchase was made on condition that the bonds were \u201cvalid obligations of the board of directors of the St. Francis Levee District.\u201d The Trust Company on investigation declined to take the bonds, on the ground that they were not valid. The board of directors tendered the bonds, and brought this action on the contract to recover their face value with interest. The Trust Company filed its answer, alleging in substance that the Board of Directors of the St. Francis Levee District is a municipality, and as such prohibited by the constitution of the state from issuing bonds or other interest-bearing evidences of indebtedness, and that for this reason the bonds offered by it were invalid, and not binding upon the board or district. The board filed a demurrer to this answer. On the hearing the circuit court sustained the demurrer, and, the Trust Company declining to amend, but standing on its answer, the court gave judgment against it for $10,935, that sum being the face value of the bonds with accrued interest. The Trust Company appealed.\nJohn H. Watkins, for appellant.\nThe board of directors in this case was a \u201cmunicipality,\u201d within the meaning of art. 16, \u00a7 1, of the constitution of Arkansas, and the bonds are invalid. And. Law Diet. \u201cMunicipality.\u201d Gf. 55 Ark. 148.\nB. J. Williams and Norton & Prewelt, for appellees.\nThe board of directors in this case was not a municipality, because it exercises none of the usual functions thereof. It. is merely the agent of the property owners, exercising powers delegated to it by the legislature; and hence the bond isssue is valid. 55 Ark. 148; S. C. 17 S. W. 702; 48 S. W. 629, 635." }, "file_name": "0284-01", "first_page_order": 302, "last_page_order": 305 }