{ "id": 1519151, "name": "Pinkerton v. Hudson", "name_abbreviation": "Pinkerton v. Hudson", "decision_date": "1908-10-12", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "511", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "87 Ark. 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 Ark. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1491117 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/80/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Col. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Col.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "103 Cal. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "90 Tenn. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 11264015 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/90/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Cal. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "43 Cal. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "83 Cal. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 1966253 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/cal/83/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Cal. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 2314275 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ad/23/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Pa. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "55 Ark. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1322245 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/55/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 L R. A. 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ark. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1491117 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/80/0254-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 10948, "ocr_confidence": 0.676, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.692585742150807e-07, "percentile": 0.9714738195161186 }, "sha256": "23d8bec23489f39a302bec156798d8b214be3a4c33e49a304e5252a7a2b37c8a", "simhash": "1:88e0add784ccc54b", "word_count": 1907 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:32.952897+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Pinkerton v. Hudson." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wood, J.,\n(after stating the facts). Upon the undisputed facts, appellant was entitled to his commission. While appellee shows that the understanding was that appellant was not to have his commission until the deal was clo\u00e1ed and the purchase money was paid, and that the commission was to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, yet it appears that appellant had furnished the purchaser, who entered into a contract with the appellee for the purchase of his land. Appellee, by entering into the contract with the purchaser furnished by appellant, accepted such purchaser as satisfactory. It is not pretended by appellee that the contract was unenforcible.\nThe law is well settled that \u201cwhere a real estate broker contracts to produce a purchased who shall actually buy, he has performed 'his contract by the production of one financially able, and with whom the owner actually makes an enforcible contract of sale. The failure to carry out that contract, even if the default be that of the purchaser, does not deprive the broker of his right to commissions.\u201d' Lunney v. Healey, 44 L R. A. 593. In note to the above case it is said: \u201cThe business of a real estate broker or agent, generally, is only to find a purchaser, and the settled rule as stated by the courts is that, in the absence of an express contract between the broker and his principal, the implication generally is that the broker becomes entitled to the usual commissions whenever he brings to his principal a party who is able and willing to take the property and who enters into a valid contract upon the terms then named by the principal, although the particulars may be arranged and the matter negotiated and completed between the. principal and the purchaser directly.\u201d (Citing numerous authorities.) There was nothing in the contract of appellee with appellant, taking appellee\u2019s statement of the contract as correct, that takes it out of the purview of the general doctrine above announced.\nIn the absence of a contract to the effect that appellant was to see that the purchase price was paid by the purchaser before any commission should be due him or before he could receive any commission, the duty of collecting the purchase money for the sale of the land would not devolve upon him. That was the duty of the seller, the principal, and not the broker. Therefore there was no consideration for the promise on the part of appellant to pay half the costs of the chancery suit, conceding that he made it. Such promise was voluntary on his part. But, if not, it was wholly collateral to the matter in controversy. Such a promise, unfulfilled, would not warrant appellee in refusing to.enforce the contract for the sale of his lands and in failing to pay appellant the commission he had earned when appellee entered into that contract with a purchaser whom appellant had furnished, and who was financially able to pay. The sale was. closed, so far as appellant was concerned, when an enforcible contract of that kind was executed.\nThe fact that appellant was postponed in his right to receive the commission until the purchase money was paid could not relieve appellee of the duty of collecting the money and paying appellant his commission out of it, when collected. And when appellee, by dismissing his suit in chancery to enforce the contract, virtually refused to collect the purchase money, fie immediately became liable to appellant for his commission.\nThe case cannot be differentiated in principle from the recent decision of .this court in Boysen v. Frink, 80 Ark. 254. See also Hill v. Jebb, 55 Ark. 574, where we said: \u201cThe employment of a broker to sell a tract of land constitutes a special agency, and when a sale is made the only purpose of the agency is accomplished.\u201d\nThe judgment of the court on the undisputed facts is contrary to law. It is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for new trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wood, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "T. C. Trimble, Jos. T. Robinson and T. C. Trimble, Jr., for appellant.", "C. B. Thweait and /. H. Harrod, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Pinkerton v. Hudson.\nOpinion delivered October 12, 1908.\n1. Real estate broker \u2014 right to commission. \u2014 Where a real estate broker contracted to furnish a purchaser of certain land, and did furnish one who was financially responsible and was accepted by the owner by entering into an enforcible contract with him, the broker is entitled to his commissions, although the purchaser failed to carry out his contract by paying the purchase money. (Page 510.)\n2. Same \u2014 duty to coelECT purchase money. \u2014 In the absence of a contract to the effect that the broker was to see that the purchase price was paid before he received his commission, the duty of collecting the purchase money devolved upon the vendor, and a promise by the broker in such case to pay half the costs incurred in compelling the purchaser to pay the purchase price was without consideration and not enforcible. (Page 510.)\n3. Same \u2014 reeusae oe principae to coeebct purchase money. \u2014 The fact that a real estate broker was postponed in his right to receive his commission until the purchase money was paid does not relieve the vendor of liability to pay such commission if, notwithstanding the purchaser was financially responsible, the vendor refused to collect the purchase money. (Page 511.)\nAppeal from Prairie Circuit Court, Southern District; Eugene Lankford, Judge;\nreversed.\nstatement by the court.\nThis suit was by appellant against appellee for commissions alleged to be due appellant by appellee for services in selling certain real estate.\nAppellant contended, and adduced evidence tending to prove, that his contract with appellee was in substance that he should procure a purchaser for certain lands of appellee, that the lands should be sold for fifteen dollars per acre, and that appellant procured such a purchaser, who bought appellee\u2019s lands at that price, and that appellant was to be paid for his services as broker in procuring the purchaser as commission the sum of $2 per acre, amounting to the sum of $740.\nAppellee admitted that appellant procured a purchaser with whom appellee entered into a contract for the sale of his lands on the following terms towit: $3,000 cash and the balance in two time notes of $1500 each. Under the terms of the contract appellee was to make warranty deed and furnish abstract of title. The purchaser deposited in the bank the sum of $3,000 in compliance with the contract. Appellee furnished an abstract, but the purchaser did not accept it, and refused to carry out the contract of purchase by paying over the three thousand dollars and the deferred payments. The deal was not consummated.\nAppellee brought suit in chancery against the purchaser for the specific enforcement of the contract of purchase, but after-wards dismissed the same.\nAppellee adduced evidence tending to prove that appellant agreed to pay one-half the cost of the chancery suit, if appellee would bring it, to enforce the contract for the sale of the land, but afterwards said that he would not pay any of the cost of the chancery suit if it should be decided against appellee, whereupon appellee dismissed the suit.\nAppellee adduced evidence to show that the understanding between him and appellant was that, after the land was sold and the purchaser had paid the money, then appellant was to get his money; that he was to get his money out of the proceeds of the sale.\nThe purchaser of the land was financially able to carry out the contract of purchase, and the title of appellee was good.\nThe court summed up the issues tg the jury in the following instruction: '\n\u201cThis is a case brought by Pinkerton against Hudson to recover commission for sale of land. There is no question as to the employment of. Mr. Pinkerton, as 'land agent, to sell this land as alleged, and you won\u2019t have to decide that; and it is shown that there was a purchaser brought by' Mr. Pinkerton to Mr. Hudson,' and a contract was entered into for the sale of the land, there is no question about that; but the sale fell through, and was never consummated, and there is n'o question about that. Mr. Pludson sold the land to somebody, and there is no question about that. Mr. Pinkerton claims that his agreement with Mr. Pludson was that he should sell the land for $15 an acre, out of which he was to get $2 an acre, there is no question about that; but Mr. Hudson claims that the agreement was that he was not to get his money until the sale was closed; that he was to get his money out of the money he got for the sale of the land. Mr. Pinkerton claims that was not the agreement. That will be the principal question for you to decide in this case \u2014 whether or not that was the agreement.\n\u201cThe law on this point is as follows: A real estate broker is entitled to a commission.\u201d\nOther instructions were given, but no error is predicated upon the law - declared by the lower court. The verdict and judgment were for appellee. A motion for a new trial assigning as error that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence, with other grounds, was overruled, and this appeal followed.\nT. C. Trimble, Jos. T. Robinson and T. C. Trimble, Jr., for appellant.\nUnder appellee\u2019s own testimony, as well as other undisputed facts in evidence, appellant earned and is \u2019 entitled to his commission. Pie procured the purchaser who was financially responsible, with whom the deal was consummated, and who entered into an enforcible contract. While the testimony shows that appellee\u2019s contention that the commission was not to be paid until after the purchase money was paid was a mere conclusion of his own, it is of little moment whether that conclusion is correct or not, since by his own act in dismissing the suit for specific performance he made it impossible for appellant to recover commission from the purchase money. It was appellee\u2019s duty to enforce the contract, and no part of appellant\u2019s duty to defray any of the expenses of the suit. 205 Pa. 241; 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 214; 102 id 348; 43 U.\" R. A. 604; 44 id. 593; 57 Cal. 225; 83 Cal. 629; 43 Cal. 311; 93 Cal. 149; 90 Tenn. 77; 5 Cur. Raw, 452, notes 44-47; 3 id. 543, note 18; id. 542, note 17; 103 Cal. 160; 5 Col. 174; 80 Ark. 254. '\nC. B. Thweait and /. H. Harrod, for appellee.\nThe verdict of the jury settles (1) that under the contract appellant was to get his commission out of the purchase money when paid, and (2) that it was not appellee\u2019s fault that the sale was not consummated; because these questions were plainly submitted to them by the instructions of the court. ' Another instruction directed the jury to find for appellant if they found that the suit for specific performance was dismissed without his consent. Boysen v. Brink, 80 Ark. 254, does not apply because in this c\u00e1se no sale was consummated, but that case declares the law contrary to appellant\u2019s contention. In that case it is held, when the commission is conditioned on payment of the price, it is the duty of the broker to furnish a customer able and willing to comply with the proposed terms of sale, before he is entitled to commission." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 528, "last_page_order": 533 }