{
  "id": 1513826,
  "name": "Jackson v. State",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. State",
  "decision_date": "1909-05-31",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "577",
  "last_page": "579",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "90 Ark. 577"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "73 Ark. 407",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "59 Ark. 121",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "192"
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    {
      "cite": "54 Ark. 586",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "595"
        }
      ],
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    {
      "cite": "59 Ark. 113",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1327711
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/59/0113-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:08.486087+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Jackson v. State."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hart, J.\nThe appellant, George M. Jackson was indicted by the grand jury of the circuit court for the Eastern District of Clay County for the crime of perjury. He obtained a change of venue to Greene County. In the circuit court of that county he was convicted, and his punishment fixed at one year in the State penitentiary. He has duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.\nPerjury in this case is assigned upon an affidavit for appeal, made by appellant, from a judgment rendered against him by a justice of the peace. It is admitted that the affidavit was made-in the form provided by subdivision one of section 4666 of Kirby\u2019s Digest.\nSec. 42, art. 7, -of our Constitution provides that \u201cappeals may be taken from the final judgments of the justices of the peace to the circuit courts under such regulations as are now, or may be, provided by law.\u201d\nHence the appeal is not a matter in the discretion of the court, but is a matter of right, when the statutory regulation is complied, with.\nSec. 4666 above referred to provides that \u201cthe applicant, or some person for him, shall make and file with the justice an affidavit that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay, but that justice may be done him.\u201d Thus it will be seen that the oath to be taken is promissory, that is, it contains a promise, and is in the nature of a declaration of good faith on his part. This construction is manifest from the language of the statute that the affidavit for appeal may be made by \u201cthe applicant or some person for him.\u201d Where the affidavit is made by some person for the applicant, it could be at most only the opinion of that person that the appeal was taken in good faith.\n\u201cTo constitute perjury, the matter sworn to must not only be false, but the accused must have sworn to it, knowing that it was false, in Other words, it must have been wilful and corrupt.\u201d Harp v. State, 59 Ark. 113.\nHence we do not think the good faith or state of mind of the \u201capplicant or other person\u201d is susceptible of that degree of proof requisite to constitute perjury. We are of the opinion, therefore, that perjury cannot be assigned upon the making of such affidavit.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hart, J."
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice BattrR\ndissents. He is Of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed and the cause be remanded for a new trial because the indictment did not set out the affidavit on which the perjury was assigned, and because it does not allege that the affidavit was made within thirty days, the time allowed_ by the statute for taking appeels from the judgment of justices of the peace.\nFor the reason that a majority of the judges are of the opinion that perjury can not be assigned upon an affidavit made' for appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, it is, by thew court, ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause dismissed.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. Justice BattrR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. W. Bandy,.for appellant.",
      "Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, C. A. Cunningham, Assistant, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Jackson v. State.\nOpinion delivered May 31, 1909.\nPerjury' \u2014 affidavit For appear. \u2014 A charge of perjury cannot be assigned upon an affidavit made for appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, to the effect that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay but that justice may be done the applicant; his bad faith not being susceptible of 'that degree of proof requisite to constitute perjury.\nAppeal from Greene Circuit Court; Prank Smith, Judge;\nreversed.\nW. W. Bandy,.for appellant.\nThe indictment is not clear and explicit enough to put defendant on notice. Nor does it allege that the affidavit on oath was such as the law authorizes. Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 \u00a7 4666, 1968; 54 Ark. 586; 24 Id. 595. It does not state that the affidavit was in writing. 2 Bish. Cr. Pr. \u00a7 912; 3 Wheeler, Cr. Cas. 180; 2 Wharton, Prec. 590-1. Nor does it allege that the affidavit for appeal was filed within thirty days.\n2. Descriptive matter in an indictment must be proved. 1 Bish. Cr. Prac. \u00a7 488.\n3. To constitute perjury, the matter must be false and sworn to knowing it to be false, i. e,, wilfully and corruptly. 59 Ark. 121; 32 Id. 192.\nHal L. Norwood, Attorney General, C. A. Cunningham, Assistant, for appellee.\n1. An affidavit is simply an ex parte statement reduced to writing and sworn to. 1 Words & Phr. p. 192.\n2. The verdict is amply sustained by the evidence. None of the other assignments of error are sustained by the record; no objections being made nor exceptions saved. 73 Ark. 407; 72 Id. 371."
  },
  "file_name": "0577-01",
  "first_page_order": 601,
  "last_page_order": 603
}