{ "id": 1511829, "name": "State v. Jones", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "1909-06-07", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "5", "last_page": "10", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "91 Ark. 5" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 S. W. 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "102 Ga. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 587408 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/102/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Mich. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1480680 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/112/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "150 U. S. 68", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "90 Mass. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "24 Ark. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "5 Ark. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "64 Ky. (1 Bush) 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "129 Cal. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 2049551 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/cal/129/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900464 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/38/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Conn. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 774689 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/68/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ark. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1890493 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/46/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Cal. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 2049551 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/129/0364-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 581, "char_count": 11243, "ocr_confidence": 0.667, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.292647081533823e-07, "percentile": 0.9581269023792507 }, "sha256": "747d680006df8adbac2f269cde146f740396f186ff5aff5f160d2e01ee0620e0", "simhash": "1:ee7de704b5a72ee2", "word_count": 1921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:42.866546+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Battue, J., dissenting." ], "parties": [ "State v. Jones." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCueroch, C. J.\nThe State appeals from a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to an indictment against defendant, J. W. Jones, charging him with having been accessory-after the fact to the crime of murder committed by one George Battles. The indictment alleges in substance that the said George Battles did kill and murder one Jarrett Johnson, and that the defendant, after said crime of murder had been committed and with full knowledge that said Battles had committed said crime, \u201cdid then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously harbor, protect, conceal and aid to escape the said George Battles,\u201d etc.\nThe statute of this State defining the crime of accessory after the fact is as follows: \u201cAn accessory after the fact is a person who, after a full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 1562.\nAnother section of the statute (1566) provides that \u201can accessory before or after the fact may be indicted, arraigned, tried and punished, although the principal offender may not have been arrested and tried, or may have been pardoned or otherwise discharged.\u201d\nThe learned circuit judge sustained the demurrer on the ground that the indictment failed to state an offense because it is not alleged therein that a judicial charge or accusation was pending against the principal, George Battles, at the time the defendant is alleged to have committed the acts which constituted the crime of accessory after the fact. In other words, that under the statute it is not a crime to knowingly harbor and protect a felon unless an indictment or other judicial proceedings be then pending against the principal for his apprehension or punishment.\nWe do not concur in this interpretation of the statute. Under the st\u00e1tutes of this State, either an officer or private person, with or without a warrant, \u201cmay make an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has committed a felony.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7\u00a7 2119, 2120. So, where a felony has been committed, the felon stands charged with the crime, and it is the duty of all persons who know or have reason to believe that he is guilty of a felony to arrest him! One who, Vvith a full lcnowledge that the crime has been committed, harbors and protects the felon, is guilty as accessory and may be punished as such, whether the principal offender be arrested or not. Any other view of the statute would permit a person to go unpunished who has been guilty of the most flagrant act of harboring and protecting a felon before a warrant of arrest could be procured or an indictment could be returned.\nIt is, of course, a well-settled rule of interpretation that when the Legislature uses words which have received a judicial interpretation, words which have a fixed and well-known legal signification, they are presumed to have been used in that sense, unless the contrary intention clearly appears. This court has said that \u201cit is dangerous to interpret a statute contrary to its express words where it is not obvious that the makers mean \u25a0 something-different from what they have said.\u201d Memphis & L. R. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 46 Ark. 159.\nBut it is equally well-settled that the language of a statute should be fairly and rationally interpreted so as to carry out the manifest intention of its framers. \u201cIn general, it may safely be said that when words in a statute are susceptible .of two constructions, of which one will lead to an absurdity, the other will not, the latter will be adopted.\u201d Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, 258.\nNow, the words \u201ccharged with,\u201d as applied \"to the perpetration of crime, cannot be said to have a well-known and established legal signification. Chief Justice Andrews, speaking for the Supreme Court of Connecticut, said: \u201cThe expression \u2018charged with/ as applied to a crime, is sometimes used in a limited sense \u2014intending the accusation of a crime which precedes a formal trial. In a fuller and more accurate sense, the expression includes also the responsibility for the crime.\u201d Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441.\nIn the search for the meaning of the lawmakers, it is proper to consider what at common law were the elements of this crime, and whether there was any intention to change by statute its elements. Professor Wharton defined the common-law offense of accessory after the fact as follows: \u201cAn accessory after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another, shelters, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the felon.\u201d Wharton on Homicide, \u00a7 67. Again, it is said by the same learned author: \u201cTwo things are laid down in the books as necessary to constitute a man accessory after the fact to the felony of another. First, the felony must be complete. * * * And, second, the defendant must know that the felon is guilty.\u201d Sec, 68, Id. The other law writers on the subject give the same definition. 3 Russell on Crimes, p. 145; Clark\u2019s. Crim. Law, \u00a7 49 (2nd Ed.) ; x Bishop on Crim. Law (8th Ed), \u00a7 692.\nNothing is said by any of these authors about the necessity for a legal charge or accusation against the felon before the crime of being an accessory after the fact can be committed, and we do not think that the Legislature by this statute intended to introduce a new element into this crime which would destroy its effectiveness.\nThe Supreme Court of California have taken the contrary view in construing a statute identical in its language (People v. Garnett, 129 Cal. 364); but, with due deference to that learned court, we are unable to agree to that interpretation.\nReversed and remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer.\nBattue, J., dissenting.\nMcCuuuoch, C. J.\nIn addition to the grounds of attack set forth in the original opinion, the defendant insists that the indictment is fatally defective in that it does not set forth specifically the facts showing that the defendant had knowledge of the alleged felony committed by George Battles, the principal offender. Reliance is placed upon the decision of this court in State v. Graham, 38 Ark. 519, where it was held that under a statute making it a misdemeanor for a justice of the peace \u201cwho, from his own knowledge or from legal information, knows or has reasonable grounds to believe, any person guilty\u201d of carrying a weapon, to fail or refuse to proceed against such person, an indictment against such officer must set forth the manner in which the knowledge or legal information was given. The indictment in that case merely alleged that the offending officer had legal information, without specifically stating the manner in which it was given. The gist of the offense was that the officer had failed to act after receiving legal information, and it was important to state in that indictment the manner in which this information was given.\nUnder the statute now under consideration, it is unimportant how the knowledge is received by the .alleged accessory; it is sufficient to constitute the offense if he knows, at the time he harbors and protects the felon, that the latter has committed the felony named in the indictment. Therefore, the statement in the indictment that he had full knowledge that the accused person had committed the crime was a statement of a fact, and not a mere conclusion.\nLearned counsel for appellant have renewed with much force their argument made on the point decided in the original opinion; but after a careful re-examination of the questions, we are convinced that a correct conclusion was reached in interpreting the statute.\nThe petition for rehearing- is therefore denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCueroch, C. J. McCuuuoch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, C. A. Cunningham, Assistant, for appellant.", "W. B. Sorrells and Bridges, Wooldridge & Gantt for appellee s." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "State v. Jones.\nOpinion delivered June 7, 1909.\n1. Accessories \u2014 liability.\u2014Under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 1562, defining an accessory after the fact as \u201ca person who, after full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime,\u201d one who, with full knowledge that a felony has been committed, harbors and protects the felon, is guilty as accessory after the fact, regardless of whether an .indictment or other judicial proceedings are pending against the principal for his apprehension or punishment or not. (Page 7.)\n2. Statutes \u2014 construction.\u2014When the Legislature uses words which have received a judicial interpretation, or which have a fixed and well-known signification, they are presumed to have been used in that sense, unless the contrary intention clearly appears. (Page 8.)\n3. Same \u2014 LEGISLATIVE INTENTION. \u2014 The language of a statute should be fairly and rationally interpreted so as to carry out the legislative intention ; and .if it is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will lead to an absurdity and the other hot, the latter will be adopted. (Page 8.)\n4. Same \u2014 construction oe criminal statute. \u2014 In construing a statute defining a crime, it is proper to consider what were the elements of the crime at common law and whether there was any intention on the part of the Legislature to change such elements. (Page 8.1\n5. Accessories \u2014 definition.\u2014An accessory after the fact at common law is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another, shelters, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the felon. (Page 8.)\n6. Same \u2014 concealment of crime \u2014 allegation of knowledge. \u2014 An .indictment against an accessory after the fact which alleges that he concealed a felon, having full knowledge that he had committed a felony, is not insufficient in failing to set forth specifically the facts showing that the defendant had knowledge of the alleged felony. (Page 9.)\nAppeal from Lincoln Circuit Court, Varner District; Antonio B. Grace, Judge;\nreversed.\nHal L. Norwood, Attorney General, C. A. Cunningham, Assistant, for appellant.\nThe court below misapprehended the meaning of the word \u201ccharge,\u201d as used in \u00a7 1562, Kirby\u2019s Digest. The Legislature evidently meant to use the word in its ordinary sense, and not in its legal signification. 1 Bish. Cr. Law, pp. 408-9-10; Clark, Cr. Law, p. 113; Endlich, Int. Stat., \u00a7 \u00a71 258, 264; Lewis\u2019 Sutherland on Stat. Int., \u00a7 \u00a7 389, 390, 392, 394; 129 Cal. 364; 92 Id. 590; 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 176; 34 N. Y. Shppl. 228.\nW. B. Sorrells and Bridges, Wooldridge & Gantt for appellee s.\nThe word \u201ccharge\u201d has a legal, definite meaning, and the court should so construe. Where a statute has such a meaning at common law, or in the written law, it will be presumed to be used in that sense. Lewis\u2019 Sutn. Stat. Const., \u00a7 398; Id. 399 ; Black, Int. Stat., p. 131; 5 Ark. 539; 46 Id. 159, 162; 26 A. & E. Enc. Law. (2 Ed.), p. 598; 24 Ark. 494; 59 Id. 244; 38 Id. 521 ; 90 Mass. 478; 20 Eed. Rep. 298, 308; 150 U. S. 68.\nPenal statutes are strictly construed, so that no case is held to be reached except such as are clearly within the spirit and letter of the law. 2 Hawkins, P. C. \u00a7 16; 38 Ark. 521; 129 Cal. 364.\nCharged evidently means accused of or charged with crime in a regular course of judicial proceeding. Webster; 129 Cal. 364; 20 Eed.- Rep. 298, 308; 150 U. S. 68; 1 A. & E. Ene. L., (2 Ed.) 481; 112 Mich. 251; 19 Kans. 4x7, 426; 102 Ga. 673; 74 S. W. 184; Black on Stat. Const, p. 132." }, "file_name": "0005-01", "first_page_order": 25, "last_page_order": 30 }