{ "id": 1546901, "name": "State v. Peyton", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Peyton", "decision_date": "1910-02-07", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "406", "last_page": "409", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ark. 406" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1524343 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/84/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ark. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727544 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/5/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Barb. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Barb.", "case_ids": [ 1948724 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/barb/50/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Conn. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 769753 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/conn/70/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Wis. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 11282418 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/wis/85/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Minn. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 8875562 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/minn/6/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ala. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 5466864 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ala/44/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Tex. App. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "White & W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "47 Tex. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "39 Tex. Cr. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex. Crim.", "case_ids": [ 4492208 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/tex-crim/39/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Tex. App., 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "White & W.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "79 Ark. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1495613 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/79/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ga. 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 599764, 599837 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/114/0861-02", "/ga/114/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Mass. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 713089 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/105/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ark. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1911608 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/53/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ark. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1495613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/79/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 373, "char_count": 5919, "ocr_confidence": 0.678, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6191469948799203e-07, "percentile": 0.8885853962914441 }, "sha256": "94a45d75cf8ffeababac512f7ec1c96c597affddbbc055ef03bef0a6637352c5", "simhash": "1:f7532710e2910aa8", "word_count": 1039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:33:20.707045+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "State v. Peyton." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulloch, C. J.\nThe State appeals from a decision of the circuit court of Jefferson County sustaining a demurrer to the following indictment (omitting caption) : \u201cThe grand jury of Jefferson County, in the name and by the authority of the State of Arkansas, accuse Arthur Peyton of the crime of rape, committed as follows, to-wit: The said Arthur Peyton, in the county and State aforesaid, on the seventh day of August, A. D. 1909, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, forcibly and feloniously make an assault on Laura Jones, and her, the said Laura Jones, did then and there feloniously and forcibly ravish and carnally know, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.\u201d\nThe objection urged against the indictment is that it does not contain an allegation that the act was committed against the will of the female. The crime of rape is defined by statute as \u201cthe carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 2005.\nIn Beard v. State, 79 Ark. 293, the indictment was in about the same language, omitting an express allegation that the act was committed against the will of the female; and we held that it was a good indictment when questioned for the first time on appeal, as the words in the indictment necessarily involved a charge that the act was committed against the will of the female. We declined to decide whether or not the indictment would be good on demurrer, though two of the judges, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that it was good. We now have to decide that question.\nOf course, it must be alleged in an indictment for rape that the act was committed \u201cagainst the will\u201d of the female, for that is an essential element of the crime. But the facts constituting the crime need not be charged in the precise words of the statute. If words are used which convey the same meaning, so as to charge all the essential elements of the crime, it is sufficient. The Criminal Code of Practice provides that \u201cthe words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in an indictment, but other words conveying the same meaning may be used;\u201d and that \u201cthe words used in an indictment must be construed according to their usual acceptation in common language, except words and phrases defined by law, which are to be construed according to their legal meaning.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 \u00a7 2241, 2242. The Code also contains the following provisions: \u201cThe indictment must contain: * * * a statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.\u201d Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 2243. \u201cThe indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom * * * that the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment on conviction, according to the right of the case.\u201d Section 2228. \u201cNo indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment or other proceeding thereon be affected by any defect which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.\u201d Section 2229.\nIn the Beard case we said that an allegation of an unlawful assault necessarily implied an allegation that the act was done against the will of the assaulted female. In addition to this, we have in the indictment the word \u201cravish,\u201d which means \u201cto seize\u201d or \u201cto snatch by force\u201d (Webster), and the allegation that the act was done forcibly. The words \u201cagainst her will\u201d have the same meaning in the definition of the crime of rape as the words \u201cwithout her consent,\u201d and proof that the act of sexual intercourse was committed without the consent of the female, as when she was unconscious and could not consent, is sufficient to sustain an allegation that it was done against her will. Harvey v. State, 53 Ark. 425; 1 Wharton, Crim. Law, \u00a7 556; Com. v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376.\nNow, when we consider, in the ordinary acceptation of those words, the charge that the accused did \u201cunlawfully\u201d and \u201cforcibly ravish and carnally know\u201d the female, there is no escape from the conclusion that the act is alleged to have been done \u201cagainst the will\u201d of the female, or without her consent, which has the same meaning. Any other interpretation of those words would do violence to their plain meaning. Jackson v. State, 114 Ga. 861.\nThe judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings under the indictment.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulloch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and Wm. H. Rector, Assistant, for appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "State v. Peyton.\nOpinion delivered February 7, 1910.\nRape \u2014 sufficiency of indictment. \u2014 An indictment for rape which charges that the accused did \u201cunlawfully\u201d and \u201cforcibly ravish and carnally know\u201d a certain female is sufficient on demurrer, though it fails to allege that the act was done against her will.\nAppeal from Jefferson Circuit Court; Antonio B. Grace, Judge;\nreversed.\nHal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and Wm. H. Rector, Assistant, for appellant.\n1. 79 Ark. 293, settles this case. The indictment was good before or after verdict, and the demurrer should have been overruled. The words \u201cforcibly\u201d and \u201cravish\u201d include \u201cagainst her will.\u201d Webster, Dict.; 17 Tex. App., 574; 1 Id. 90; 11 Id. 301; 39 Tex. Cr. App. 488; 47 Tex. 226; 7 Tex. App. 625; 44 Ala. 110; 12 Pa. (S. & R.) 69; 6 Minn. 279; 85 Wis. 203; 70 Conn. 104; 50 Barb. 128; 2 Wh. Cr. Law, \u00a7 1134; 3 Chitty, Cr. Law, 812.\n2. The omission of the words \u201cagainst her will\u201d did not tend to the prejudice of any substantial right of defendants. Kirby\u2019s Dig. \u00a7 \u00a7 2228-9, 2243; 5 Ark. 444; 19 Id. 613; 63 Id. 613 ; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr. 505; Wharton, Cr. Pl. & Pr. 261.\n3. The question may be raised the first time on appeal. 12 Cyc. 811-12.\n4. When the offense is stated with such certainty that the accused knows what he is called upon to answer and an acquittal thereon may be pleaded in bar, it is sufficient. 84 Ark. 487; 88 Id. 311." }, "file_name": "0406-01", "first_page_order": 428, "last_page_order": 431 }