{ "id": 1545411, "name": "Collins v. State", "name_abbreviation": "Collins v. State", "decision_date": "1910-02-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "94", "last_page": "96", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 Ark. 94" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 Ark. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1517101 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/88/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ark. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1527201 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/83/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1499144 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/77/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ark. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "88 Ark. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1517101 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/88/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ark. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1527201 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/83/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 276, "char_count": 4459, "ocr_confidence": 0.659, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0482681451391714e-07, "percentile": 0.5529386076176642 }, "sha256": "bd9bcb018b17803af8e93e0e27bf7fb0b6f3cac27dc06cb47e80b2a63ce798d3", "simhash": "1:0df2a7260ba38890", "word_count": 783 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:43.945658+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Collins v. State." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCulroch, C. J.\nAppellant\u2019s premises in the city of Tort Smith were, in September, 1909, raided under a search warrant, issued under the \u201cblind tiger\u201d statute, and about two dozen bottles of beer were found in the house. The character of the premises is not disclosed in the record, further than by the statement of one of the witnesses that the beer was found in the ice box in the dining room.\nIn the trial of appellant in the circuit court for violation of the \u201cblind tiger\u201d statute, it was proved by the testimony of the raiding officers that' the beer was found by them as indicated above, and that appellant admitted to them that she had a United States internal revenue license (so-called), or special tax stamp, denoting the payment of a special tax on liquor. The officers did not find the license or special tax stamp in the house, but testified that they asked appellant to produce it, and she declined to do so. This was all the testimony introduced which was material to the issue, and appellant rested her case without introducing any testimony. The court, among othei instructions, gave one over appellant\u2019s objection telling the jury that \u201cif the defendant had a government license that was in effect at that time, one that had not expired, that would be prima facie evidence against her.\u201d The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and judgment was entered accordingly; and appellant brings the case here for review.\nThe case is controlled by Peyton v. State, 83 Ark. 102, and Appling v. State, 88 Ark. 393. The mere issuance of a Federal stamp tax to one accused under the \u201cblind tiger\u201d statute of the clandestine sale of liquor does not make a prima facie case of guilt of a violation of -the statute, as it reads that if the same \u201cbe found therein\u201d \u2014 that is to say,, if it be found in the raided premises \u2014 it makes a prima facie case of guilt. The having of such a license or tax receipt may be received in evidence as indicating the purpose for which the liquor was held; but its possession does not make out a prima facie case unless it is found oji the premises owned or controlled by the accused. Appling v. State, supra.\nThe court therefore erred in instructing the jury that if the defendant had a government license it would be prima facie evidence against her. An instruction as to a prima facie case by reason of the Federal tax stamp would have been improper in this case, for there is no evidence that any such stamp was found. The most that the evidence established is that she had a stamp. There was enough evidence to1 go to the jury on the prima facie case established by reason of the finding of the liquor on the premises, but the jury may, under the circumstances, have believed that she kept the liquor for private use and not for sale, and the prima facie case in that respect might have been overcome. The instruction was therefore prejudicial.\nReversed and remanded for new trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCulroch, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bdwin Hiner, for appellant.", "Hal L. Norwood Attorney General, and W. H. Recwr, Assistant, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Collins v. State.\nOpinion delivered February 14, 1910.\n1. Liquors \u2014 unlawful sale \u2014 government license as evidence. \u2014 In a prosecution under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 5140 et seq., for violation of the \u201cblind tiger\u201d statute, evidence that defendant had a United States license or stamp tax is competent to show the purpose for which defendant kept liquor, but does not raise a presumption of guilt unless it is found on the premises owned or controlled by defendant. (Page 96.)\n2. Same \u2014 possession of liquor as evidence of guilt. \u2014 Where defendant\u2019s premises were searched under a search warrant, the finding of liquors thereon, under Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 5144. is made prima facie evidence that he was engaged in the illegal sale of liquors. (Page 96.)\nAppeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; Daniel Hon, Judge;\nreversed.\nBdwin Hiner, for appellant.\n1. There was no proof of any fact at issue in this cause. Statements by defendant that she had a government license are not evidence at all. The law requires that such license be \u201cfound\u201d on the premises.\n2. Bare possession of liquor is not prima facie evidence ol guilt. 85 Ark. 102.\nHal L. Norwood Attorney General, and W. H. Recwr, Assistant, for appellee.\n1. The admissions of a defendant are always admissible against him. It was competent to prove possession of a government license. Kirby\u2019s Digest, \u00a7 5144.\n2. The court properly charged the jury. A revenue license is prima facie evidence against the owner of the premises. 77 Ark. 143; 83 Ark. 102. See also 88 Ark. 393." }, "file_name": "0094-01", "first_page_order": 116, "last_page_order": 118 }