{
  "id": 2724498,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Frank Lopez, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lopez",
  "decision_date": "1957-01-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 34055",
  "first_page": "237",
  "last_page": "241",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 237"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "407 Ill. 210",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2640319
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/407/0210-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "327 Ill. 463",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5191613
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/327/0463-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "322 Ill. 434",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5172786
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/322/0434-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "3 A.L.R 1540",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "22 A.L.R. 1016",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "27 A.L.R. 357",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "63 A.L.R. 602",
      "category": "reporters:specialty",
      "reporter": "A.L.R.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "8 Ill.2d 116",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2716297
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/8/0116-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 451,
    "char_count": 6286,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.759,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.805373911410881e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9314131827762931
    },
    "sha256": "dc7a257d1bb0f8c1e078b44d4f4dcd696dc6fce8f00c52d1eae72a9cded91f90",
    "simhash": "1:fe333a30cb2ab8c9",
    "word_count": 1053
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:31.902736+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Frank Lopez, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Hershey\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Frank Lopez, was found guilty of selling and dispensing narcotics (marijuana) to a person under 21 years of age, and the court sentenced him to a term of 25 years to life imprisonment. Appearing pro se, he asks a reversal of this conviction.\nSeveral claims of error are made, including general assertions of constitutional violations, but those relied upon in argument are the following: (1) failure of court-appointed counsel to file a written motion for a new trial; (2) incompetency of counsel; (3) variance between the indictment and proof, plus the admission of improper evidence in the course of the proof; (4) prejudicial argument of the State\u2019s counsel; and (5) giving of an erroneous instruction.\nFirst, we find no prejudicial error in defense counsel\u2019s failure to file a written motion for a new trial. For his oral motion was sufficient to raise any cause for a new trial which might appear in the record. People v. Flynn, 8 Ill.2d 116.\nSecond, the defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by incompetency of counsel. The most serious point raised is that in cross-examining one of the investigating police officers, defense counsel brought out that the officer had questioned the State\u2019s principal witness, the purchaser, about the latter\u2019s use of heroin. This resulted, on redirect, in the officer testifying that the purchaser said he got that drug from the defendant also.\nIn appraising counsel\u2019s conduct, we must view it in the context of the trial. At that point, he was faced with a difficult situation. The evidence was squarely against his client, and with no favorable witnesses but the defendant himself held in reserve, the only chance for an acquittal was to discredit the State\u2019s witnesses, particularly the purchaser. Thus, it would appear, he attempted to paint the latter as an habitual drug addict; but, as aforesaid, this resulted merely in additional damaging evidence against the defendant. Yet the attempt was one of those calculated risks which counsel are called upon to take during the course of a trial, and while it did not produce an acquittal, neither did it demonstrate incompetency.\nWe are of the opinion that the defense counsel, a member of the Cook County Public Defender\u2019s staff, ably represented the defendant. And in view of the strong evidence of guilt, it does not appear that anything he could have done would have changed the result.\nThird, there was no variance between the indictment and proof. The first count of the indictment charged that the defendant \u201csold\u201d the marijuana, while the second count alleged that he \u201cdispensed\u201d it. This is precisely what the proof showed.\nThe claim of improper admission of evidence relates to testimony regarding sales by the defendant to the same purchaser on three previous occasions. While evidence of other offenses is ordinarily inadmissible, an exception is often recognized where the evidence tends to aid in identifying the accused as the person who committed the particular crime charged. (See, generally, 63 A.L.R. 602; 27 A.L.R. 357; 22 A.L.R. 1016; 3 A.L.R 1540.) In this case the principal witness for the State was the purchaser. He said he had seen the defendant, known to him only by the nick-name \u201cThe Killer,\u201d on three previous occasions, at which times he bought marijuana from him. The testimony was material to the identification, and is not rendered inadmissible because it also brought to the jury\u2019s attention evidence of three prior offenses. The liquor law violation cases, discussed in the above-cited annotations, are analogous.\nFourth, we do not believe the prosecutor injected prejudicial error into the trial by his closing argument. Referring to the defendant as \u201cThe Killer,\u201d a name by which he was known, the prosecutor went on to castigate him as a \u201cvicious, contemptible man * * * a destroyer of lives,\u201d adding: \u201cHe doesn\u2019t have to have horns on his head; he doesn\u2019t have to be carrying a pitchfork; he doesn\u2019t have to wear a dark and sinister look. Oh, no \u2014 right before you, right before you today, you see a dope seller. You see a man' who destroys, who tears apart, who tears the living soul out of human beings.\u201d And going on in a similar vein about the evils of the narcotics traffic, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney told the jury that \u201call of the men\u2019s clubs and women\u2019s clubs\u201d were watching \u201cto see what you are going to do about dope * * * to see what your response is, whether you are going to let \u00e1 man like this go out and destroy more lives * *\nCareful scrutiny of the prosecutor\u2019s argument discloses that in a few isolated instances he may have transcended the bounds of legitimate argument. But we must be mindful of the considerable latitude permitted in closing argument. For example, there was evidence that the defendant sold a narcotic drug in violation of law, and it is common knowledge that the illegal drug traffic is a serious menace to society. It was proper to argue on the evil results of such a crime and urge fearless administration of the law. (People v. Beil, 322 Ill. 434; People v. Pargone, 327 Ill. 463.) Moreover, reversal is not warranted unless it appears that the acts complained of influenced the jury in a manner that resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused. (See, generally, 15 I.L.P., Criminal Law, sec. 929.) Here the jury returned a just verdict; indeed, it was the only reasonable conclusion to reach upon the basis of the evidence adduced.\nFinally, the defendant assigns error in the giving of an instruction which informed the jury of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. However, this is a stock instruction and was properly submitted to the jury. See People v. Long, 407 Ill. 210.\nThe judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Hershey"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Frank Lopez, pro se.",
      "Latham Castle, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John Gutknecht, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Irwin D. Bloch, John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, and William L. Carlin, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 34055.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Frank Lopez, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed January 24, 1957.\nFrank Lopez, pro se.\nLatham Castle, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John Gutknecht, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Irwin D. Bloch, John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, and William L. Carlin, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0237-01",
  "first_page_order": 237,
  "last_page_order": 241
}