{ "id": 3160888, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GARY G. ROLFINGSMEYER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rolfingsmeyer", "decision_date": "1984-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 58659", "first_page": "137", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 137" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 553", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200055 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997079 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474979 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2553794 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191830 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 735", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532082 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 P.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10421678 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/666/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524661 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Cal. Rptr. 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "583 P.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "22 Cal. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2282118 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/22/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121800 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Harv. L. Rev. 489", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168959 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S. Ct. 371", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 1175402, 1175285 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386-87" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0262-01", "/us/285/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 U.S. 262", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175402 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 2438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "77 L. Ed. 2d 1322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 961", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11337445, 11337158, 11337071, 11337233, 11337310 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0961-05", "/us/461/0961-02", "/us/461/0961-01", "/us/461/0961-03", "/us/461/0961-04" ] }, { "cite": "272 U.S. 312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1501261 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/272/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6140617 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0319-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 17544, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.169561737600338e-07, "percentile": 0.9397206169162758 }, "sha256": "0933e0f0f3f114c3a439bc68ba7ca8c0b0c8d1bf37ac443c32f1c83f3638e565", "simhash": "1:f5af92175e8c9336", "word_count": 2924 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:10.294516+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GARY G. ROLFINGSMEYER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn November 14, 1982, defendant, Gary Rolfingsmeyer, was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(2)). At the police station, the \u201cImplied Consent Warning\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 953/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c)), which warns a driver that a refusal to submit to a so-called breath test will result in a six-month suspension of his motor vehicle driver\u2019s license, was read to him. The police officer then asked him to take the test, and he refused.\nOn December 8, 1982, the defendant filed a motion attacking the constitutionality of sections 11 \u2014 501.1 and 11 \u2014 501.2(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(c)). Previously section 11 \u2014 501.1 had provided a driver with the right to consult an attorney prior to deciding whether to take a breath test (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 953/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a)(3)), but this provision had been eliminated from the section (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 953/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a)). Section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) provides that evidence of a defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to a breath test \u201cshall be admissible\u201d at the defendant\u2019s civil or criminal trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 953/2, par. ll-501.2(c).\nOn December 13, 1982, the circuit court of Clinton County entered a judgment captioned \u201cOrder Striking Certain Portion of Ch. 953/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(c).\u201d The order read:\n\u201cThis cause coming on to be heard, the Court strikes the words \u2018or criminal action\u2019 from Chapter 953/2 Section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) finding that portion unconstitutional.\u201d\nIt did not state the ground of unconstitutionality. A direct appeal was taken by the People under Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)).\nOur State, as most States have done, has adopted an \u201cimplied consent\u201d statute to assist in determining whether motor vehicle drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol. Section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, in the part pertinent here, provides:\n\u201c(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of Section 11 \u2014 501.2, to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person\u2019s blood if arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar provision of a local ordinance. ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).)\nSection 11 \u2014 501.2(c) further provides:\n\u201c(c) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under the provisions of Section 11 \u2014 501.1, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person under the influence of alcohol, or other drugs, or combination of both was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(c).)\nThe defendant states that the trial court\u2019s judgment was correct because (1) section 501.2(c) is contrary to the separation-of-powers provision of the Constitution of Illinois and (2) the section violates an accused\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination under the constitutions of the United States and Illinois.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.2(c) offends the separation-of-powers clause of our constitution because, the defendant contends, the legislature improperly invaded the judicial authority by providing that evidence of a refusal of a breath test shall be admitted at a trial. This contention fails, for it is clear that \u201cthe legislature of a State has the power to prescribe new and alter existing rules of evidence or to prescribe methods of proof.\u201d (People v. Wells (1942), 380 Ill. 347, 354. See also People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 560; People v. Buford (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 46, 53.) Examples of this are section 115 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 5 (business records)), section 115 \u2014 5.1 of that code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 5.1 (coroner\u2019s records)), section 115 \u2014 7 of that code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7 (evidence of rape victims\u2019 prior sexual conduct)), and section 8 \u2014 1901 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 1901 (evidence of defendant\u2019s payment of plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses)).\nSection 11 \u2014 501.2(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code simply provides that an accused\u2019s refusal to submit to a breath test shall be admissible as evidence at his trial, and it is not violative of the separation-of-powers clause.\nThe second contention of the defendant is that section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) violates his privilege against self-incrimination under article I, section 10, of the Constitution of Illinois. The defendant maintains that he has the right to remain silent, and that the statute allows the State to use his silence against him.\nThe defendant misstates the question involved. The Supreme Court addressed what the question is in South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748, 103 S. Ct. 916. There, the court considered an implied-consent statute very similar to our statute. The court, in upholding the legislation, relied upon its decision in Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826. There the court declared constitutional the use of a State-compelled blood test to detect alcohol, holding that a blood test was physical evidence and not communicative evidence that could violate an accused\u2019s right to remain silent. The court in Neville held that, under Schmerber, a driver has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test, and the State could have compelled drivers to submit to the test. The court held that because a driver has no right to refuse, evidence of his conduct in refusing can properly be admitted at his trial.\nNeville is applicable here. Section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) simply provides a statutory consequence of a driver\u2019s refusal to agree to a breath test. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the right to remain silent does not mean that a driver has a right to refuse a breath test. Consequently, evidence of a refusal is not constitutionally protected. The court hr Neville observed, too, that the basis of an implied-consent statute is that by using the public highways, the scene of millions of deaths and injuries, a driver has implicitly consented for reasons of public safety to submit to a breath test. Section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) does not offend the fifth amendment.\nNor does it offend our own constitution. There is nothing in the proceedings of the constitutional convention to indicate an intention to provide, in article I, section 10, protections against self-incrimination broader than those of the Constitution of the United States. (See 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1376-80.) The record of proceedings reflects a general recognition and acceptance of interpretations by the United States Supreme Court. There had been proposals to alter the language of the section that were \u201cdesigned primarily to have the language of the self-incrimination clause perhaps reflect the substance of some court decisions on this subject,\u201d but the bill of rights committee, speaking through Delegate Bernard Weisberg, decided that \u201cwhichever phrasing were to be put into *** section 10, that the existing state of the law would remain unchanged.\u201d 3 Proceedings 1376-77.\nWe need not consider the additional claim of the defendant that he had a right to be advised by the police that he had a right to consult with an attorney on whether he should take the test. That question is, of course, outside the scope of the trial court\u2019s judgment and is not before us. The trial court held simply that section 11 \u2014 501.2(c), which concerns only the admissibility of a defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to a breath test, was unconstitutional. In any event, the defendant refused to take the test, and it is difficult to ascertain the pertinency here of the right-to-counsel question.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the circuit court of Clinton County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WARD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON,\nspecially concurring:\nAlthough I agree with the court\u2019s conclusion as well as with much of what is said in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority\u2019s statement that in interpreting the self-incrimination clause contained in article I, section 10, of our State Constitution, we are bound to automatically follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the comparable provision contained in the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution. As justices of the highest court of the State of Illinois we take an oath of office to faithfully uphold the provisions of the State Constitution. We cannot delegate that duty to anyone \u2014 not to the legislature, nor the Governor, nor to any Federal court.\nThe majority assumes that a guarantee in the bill of rights of our State Constitution has the same content as the comparable guarantee in the Federal Constitution unless there is some indication to the contrary in the proceedings of the constitutional convention. This presumption is the reverse of the correct one and inverts the proper relationship between the State and Federal constitutions. The bill of rights in article I of the Illinois Constitution is the basic guarantee to our citizens of their civil liberties. Until the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, our citizens had very few Federal rights that were enforceable against their State government. The due process clause of that amendment only requires that the States recognize basic civil liberties that are \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty\u201d (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152) and \u201cwhich He at the base of aU our civil and poHtical institutions\u201d (Hebert v. Louisiana (1926), 272 U.S. 312, 316, 71 L. Ed. 270, 273, 47 S. Ct. 103, 104). Although the United States Supreme Court has by now held that most of the guarantees in the Federal Bill of Rights apply to the States through the due process clause, in some instances considerations of federalism \u2014 which do not influence us \u2014 may counsel that court to delay before adopting a novel interpretation of the Constitution which will broadly expand the individual liberties guaranteed by the Federal government. (Cf. McCray v. New York (1983), 461 U.S. 961, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1322, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun and PoweH, JJ., on denial of certiorari).) \u201cIt is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may *** serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.\u201d New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932), 285 U.S. 262, 311, 76 L. Ed. 747, 771, 52 S. Ct. 371, 386-87 (Brandeis and Stone, JJ., dissenting).\nThere is no evidence in the record of proceedings of the Illinois constitutional convention to indicate that the framers of article I, section 10, intended to limit the content of the self-incriminatio'n clause to the precedents of the United States Supreme Court. In adopting nearly the same language as the broadly worded guarantee of article II, section 10, of the 1870 Constitution and in rejecting attempts to revise this language in order to codify certain precedents, the convention implicitly endorsed the open-ended balancing process traditionaUy used by courts to give content to the broad language of the constitutional guarantees contained in the biH of rights. In a closely related context, Delegate Elmer Gertz, chairman of the bill of rights committee of the sixth Illinois constitutional convention, expHcitly embraced this proposition:\n\u201cWe don\u2019t have closed minds here. We are simply trying to resolve these knotty problems; and in an area where, when you take the specific language of the Federal Bill of Rights or our bill of rights or any other bill of rights, the language seems to say something, and then the cases interpret sometimes beyond the language in interpreting the community mores and a growing sense of what constitutes justice \u2014 what constitutes due process of law\u2014 that\u2019s the process that\u2019s going on, and it isn\u2019t going to stop with our proceedings. Unfortunately, there are sometimes half-way times when you recognize that something has to be done, and you are not quite sure what ought to be done. Whenever we weren\u2019t quite sure what ought to be done, we refrained from doing anything.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1379.)\nDelegate Bernard Weisberg\u2019s declaration that, under any of the proposed alternative drafts of article I, section 10, \u201cthe existing state of the law would remain unchanged\u201d is consistent with the views expressed by Delegate Gertz. (3 Proceedings 1377.) His statement indicates that the framers did not intend to overrule any particular court decisions in this area, but, as I read his statement, at the same time it did not reject further development of the law by this court or by the Supreme Court of the United States.\nIn fulfilling our obligation to interpret and apply the Illinois Constitution we are obliged to broadly balance the basic principles contained in that document, and in doing so we are not limited by precedents of the United States Supreme Court. (See Cooper v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 58, 62, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 734, 87 S. Ct. 788, 791; see also State v. Neville (S.D. Mar. 14, 1984), No. 13260; Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).) Of course, when we believe that a decision of that court \u201cachieves a fair balance between [the relevant] competing objectives\u201d (People v. Smith (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422), we may choose to follow it. However, when a majority of the United States Supreme Court has adopted an interpretation of the Bill of Rights that we believe is insufficiently ample to effectively implement those guarantees, we are not frozen by it in interpreting the comparable provisions of our State Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Exline (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 150, 157 (Goldenhersh and Simon, JJ., dissenting) (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317, does not state the law under the Illinois Constitution); People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, does not state the law under the California Constitution); People v. Sporleder (Colo. 1983), 666 P.2d 135 (Smith v. Maryland (1979), 442 U.S. 735, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99 S. Ct. 2577, does not state the law under the Colorado Constitution); People v. Langen (N.Y. 1983), 34 Crim. L. Rptr. 2142 (United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157, does not state the law under the New York Constitution).\nProfessor Paul Kauper, then of the University of Michigan, put it this way to the delegates to our constitutional convention:\n\u201c[A] state supreme court is free to give the freedoms recognized in the state constitution a reach that transcends interpretations given the fundamental rights by the United States Supreme Court. A state is free to develop its own higher standards.\u201d P. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and Purpose, in Con-Con: Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention 23-24 (S. Gove & V. Ranney eds. 1970).\nBecause the language of the seh-incrimination clause in the Hlinois Constitution is almost identical to the comparable clause in the Federal Constitution, it does not follow it must have the same content. The similar language in the two constitutions indicates that the intention was to protect the same interests; consequently in many instances as in this case, but not in all cases, it can be expected that both constitutions will be interpreted in the same way. Nevertheless, what five United States Supreme Court justices decide is only a binding interpretation of the Federal Constitution. It is the nature of the Federal system that we, as the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, are sovereign in our own sphere; in construing the State Constitution we must answer to our own consciences and rely upon our own wisdom and insights. \u201cIf we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.\u201d New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1931), 285 U.S. 262, 311, 76 L. Ed. 747, 771, 52 S. Ct. 371, 387 (Brand\u00e9is and Stone, JJ., dissenting).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Phillip McQuillan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Michael B. Weinstein, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Stephen E. Norris and Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.", "R. Edward Veltman, Jr., of Crain, Cooksey, Veltman & Pursell, Ltd., of Centralia (Michael E. Reed, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 58659.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GARY G. ROLFINGSMEYER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 1, 1984.\nRehearing denied March 30, 1984.\nSIMON, J., specially concurring.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Phillip McQuillan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Michael B. Weinstein, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Stephen E. Norris and Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.\nR. Edward Veltman, Jr., of Crain, Cooksey, Veltman & Pursell, Ltd., of Centralia (Michael E. Reed, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0137-01", "first_page_order": 149, "last_page_order": 159 }