{
  "id": 3161229,
  "name": "CLARA DALRYMPLE, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Champion Furnace Company, Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dalrymple v. Industrial Commission",
  "decision_date": "1984-03-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 58191",
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    "id": 8772,
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    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:23:10.294516+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CLARA DALRYMPLE, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Champion Furnace Company, Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe claimant\u2019s employer, Champion Furnace Company (Champion), has appealed from a judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County which set aside findings of the Industrial Commission on the ground that they were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOn May 10, 1977, the claimant, Clara Dalrymple, when lifting cartons in the shipping department of Champion, made a twisting motion and experienced pain in her lower back. She continued to work and did not report the incident to her employer until the following day. On the next day, she visited her family physician, Dr. Lorin Whittaker, and complained of pain in the lower back and right knee. Dr. Whittaker also noted that the claimant reported \u201coccasional back trouble prior to the accident.\u201d Dr. Whittaker prescribed analgesics and muscle relaxants and ordered X rays of the affected areas.\nThe X rays proved to be negative but the claimant\u2019s pain persisted. Dr. Whittaker referred her to Dr. Dennis Garwacki, a neurologist. Dr. Garwacki, in his neurological examination, found that the claimant had a \u201cdiminished right knee jerk\u201d and a \u201cdecreased pin prick\u201d in the lower right leg. Dr. Garwacki preliminarily diagnosed the condition as a \u201cright L4 root lesion\u201d and recommended hospitalization for physical therapy. The claimant first declined to be hospitalized and reported some improvement. Later she experienced increased pain and was admitted to St. Francis hospital in Peoria, where an electromyography was performed. The results of this were not compatible with an L4 lesion. A \u201clumbar myelogram\u201d taken was inconclusive. Nevertheless, Dr. Garwacki continued to feel that the claimant\u2019s reports of pain were compatible with an L4 root lesion, and that her twisting accident could have caused or aggravated the condition. Dr. Garwacki then consulted Dr. Richard Flores, who diagnosed the condition as an L4 or L5 root lesion, but he was uncertain whether the claimant\u2019s twisting incident caused the condition.\nThe claimant was discharged from the hospital on July 6, 1977, and at that time Dr. Garwacki noted that she was \u201csymptomatically improved.\u201d The claimant sought no medical treatment until she began treatment at the Jefferson Street Clinic in Peoria because of a soreness in her right leg and hip. Clinic records noted that a few weeks later the claimant \u201cfelt pretty good.\u201d On August 19, 1977, she reported to the clinic that she \u201calmost slipped and fell\u201d the day before, and was experiencing increased pain.\nThe claimant then returned to Dr. Garwacki and reported further pain closer to the tailbone and numbness in the lower right leg. She was again treated with muscle relaxants. One month later she was still reporting pain, but Dr. Garwacki could not make any objective findings. She was referred to Dr. Flores for \u201ctranscutaneous nerve stimulation\u201d of the lower back. Two weeks later, the claimant reported \u201cfairly good relief,\u201d but still experienced pain upon sitting and driving a car. Later, she was fitted with a back brace and obtained a transcutaneous nerve stimulator unit. Dr. Flores saw her on several occasions throughout December and January, and she was still reporting pain. During that period she was given heat and ultrasound therapy on an outpatient basis. On February 1, 1978, the claimant was reported to be \u201ctotally asymptomatic as far as her back was concerned, with the exception of small soreness occasionally in the middle of the lumbosacral joint.\u201d In April 1978, the claimant was hospitalized for 18 days for physical therapy. Up to the time of the arbitration hearing, she reported chronic lower-back pain. Dr. Garwacki stated that in his opinion the claimant was not able to return to her former work but added that this opinion was based solely on her subjective reports of pain.\nAn arbitrator awarded the claimant 75 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and 40 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits representing 20% permanent loss of use of her right leg. After taking additional testimony, the Industrial Commission modified the award on May 16, 1980, reducing the permanent partial disability award from 40 weeks of benefits to 20 weeks or to 10% permanent loss of use of the right leg. The claimant sought review, and on April 28, 1981, the circuit court held on certiorari that the decision of the Commission in regard to permanent disability was \u201cagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d The court set aside the finding as to permanent partial disability and further ordered that \u201c[t]his cause be remanded to the Industrial Commission for reconsideration of the Award, and the taking of further evidence, if necessary, and the entering of an Award of partial permanent disability consistent with the evidence and consistent with this Court\u2019s findings.\u201d\nOn remand, the Industrial Commission heard additional oral argument, but no new evidence was introduced. On July 12, 1982, the Commission entered a new finding, changing the award from 10% permanent loss of use of the right leg to 4% of the whole person. The monetary amount of the permanent partial disability compensation was not affected by the changed finding.\nThe circuit court again granted certiorari and, setting aside the Commission\u2019s award as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, entered its own award:\n\u201cPay to the petitioner the sum of $93.87 per week for a period of 100 weeks, as provided in section 8(d)2 of the Act, for the reason that the injuries sustained caused the permanent disability of 20% of the petitioner.\u201d\nThe employer appealed from this order to this court under Rule 302(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)).\nThe employer contends that the findings of the Commission were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the circuit court improperly substituted its own interpretation of the evidence.\nIt is apparent that the claimant did have a back ailment; making the factual determinations required here was not, however, without difficulties. The testimony raised issues of credibility, of causation, and of aggravation of preexisting injuries. The claimant did not report the accident the day it occurred. Her family physician, who examined her first, spoke of \u201coccasional back trouble prior to the accident,\u201d although she denied at the arbitrator\u2019s hearing making this statement. On the issue of causation, no physician could testify with medical certainty that the \u201ctwisting accident\u201d was the sole cause of, or an aggravating factor in, her back condition. Too, there was the question of an injury subsequent to the accident. The claimant testified that she \u201cslipped\u201d in August 1977, and the medical records showed that she reported additional pain after this incident.\nAll of these questions represented questions of fact for the Industrial Commission to determine. It is the responsibility of the Commission to judge the credibility of witnesses (Campbell v. Industrial Com. (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 210, 218; Veritone Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 97, 104; Riteway Plumbing v. Industrial Com. (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 404, 408), to resolve whether \u201cthere is a causal connection between the claimant\u2019s injuries and the employment\u201d (Domagalski v. Industrial Com. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 228, 236), and to determine whether the injuries are an aggravation of a preexisting condition (Caradco Window & Door v. Industrial Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 92, 99; Ross v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 258, 261). In making these determinations it is within the province of the Commission to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and determine the weight the evidence is to be given. A. O. Smith Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 240, 246.\nWe cannot say that the original award by the Industrial Commission of 20 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits was not a product of reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Even if this court, or a circuit court, might have drawn different inferences from the evidence, \u201cthis court will not disregard or reject permissible inferences drawn by the Commission *** nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the Commission unless its findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Castaneda v. Industrial Com. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 338, 341.\nWe consider that the Commission\u2019s findings in the first award were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that the circuit court substituted its own inferences for those of the Commission.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed, and the award of the Industrial Commission of May 16,1980, is reinstated.\nJudgment reversed; award reinstated.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WARD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "McConnell, Kennedy, Quinn & Johnson, Chartered, of Peoria (Robert H. Jennetten and Michael J. O\u2019Leary, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Warren E. Danz, P.C., of Peoria (Richard G. Leiser, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 58191.\nCLARA DALRYMPLE, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Champion Furnace Company, Appellant).\nOpinion filed March 23, 1984.\nMcConnell, Kennedy, Quinn & Johnson, Chartered, of Peoria (Robert H. Jennetten and Michael J. O\u2019Leary, of counsel), for appellant.\nWarren E. Danz, P.C., of Peoria (Richard G. Leiser, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0278-01",
  "first_page_order": 290,
  "last_page_order": 295
}
