{ "id": 3156678, "name": "In re ROBERT HAYS (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert Hays, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hays", "decision_date": "1984-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 58724", "first_page": "314", "last_page": "321", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 314" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "472 Pa. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1727760 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/472/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 N.M.L. Rev. 791", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2961666 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581269 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3025721 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3356617 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558473 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0686-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 10459, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.142828124969226e-07, "percentile": 0.9112199205436301 }, "sha256": "3a5bba00b5df2cc22fc707e259f696aece6ee3393a966365c17e9582e0fc8e64", "simhash": "1:d93a186b495d3cba", "word_count": 1692 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:05.233628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ROBERT HAYS (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert Hays, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE \"WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe circuit court of Macon County declared Robert Hays to be a person subject under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 100 et seq.) to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. The appellate court reversed, with one judge dissenting (115 Ill. App. 3d 686), and we granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (87 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nOn October 11, 1982, Robert Hays, 19 years old, voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric unit of Mercy Hospital in Urbana. He had been voluntarily admitted there on nine previous occasions over the preceding four years. The day following his admission, he twice refused to take medication. He threw a phone at security guards, became physically resistive, and had to be physically restrained and given medication. After being restrained, he told a nurse that he wanted to die. He later became quiet and did not cause further disturbance.\nAfter this incident, the hospital petitioned the circuit court to have Hays declared a person subject to involuntary admission under article VI of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 9I\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 600 et seq.). This was done, it was said, in order to transfer Hays to an institution with better facilities for his treatment.\nOn the evening following Hays\u2019 outburst, a physician executed the first certificate required under section 3\u2014 602 for an involuntary commitment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 602). Hays was transferred that night to the Adolph Meyer Health Center in Decatur, a State facility. The next day the second certificate, which the statute requires to be executed by a psychiatrist, was prepared. At a hearing in the circuit court of Macon County, Hays was formally declared a person subject to involuntary admission.\nThe record shows that Hays was discharged from the Meyer facility on December 20, 1982, and though the question has not been raised by the parties, it is proper to comment on the question of mootness. We consider that review of the circuit court\u2019s action is appropriate, as the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the \u201ccollateral consequence\u201d exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Garcia (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 500, 502-03.\nThe single question presented is whether a petition for involuntary commitment of a voluntarily admitted patient may properly be brought when the patient has not made a request to be discharged. The State contends that there is no prohibition in the Code against a hospital\u2019s initiating a petition for involuntary commitment against a voluntary patient. The State argues that if a private hospital could not so proceed, there would be no way to transfer an \u201cunsuitable\u201d patient to another facility.\nThe appellate court has answered the question in the negative. (In re Meyer (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 871; People v. Hill (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 638; In re Clement (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 574.) In Clement the court said:\n\u201cWe hold that a voluntary patient under the Code has an unqualified right to request to leave a Department facility at any time. Absent such a request by the patient, the Department may not infringe on this right by the institution of commitment proceedings. Only when the voluntary patient exercises his right and submits a written notice of his desire to leave may the Department exercise its right to file a petition for involuntary commitment.\n[Clement] was committed in a manner not authorized by statute. He entered the hospital as a voluntary patient, and the subsequent commitment, with its accompanying stigma, deprived him of his right to request to leave without due process.\u201d 34 Ill. App. 3d 577, 577.\nArticle III of the Code provides for the admission and discharge of adults in mental health facilities. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 100 et seq.) An adult may be admitted \u201cvoluntarily\u201d into a facility upon the filing of an application and the facility\u2019s acceptance of the patient as \u201cclinically suitable.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 400.) The application must contain a statement of the patient\u2019s right under the statute to a discharge, and the facility must orally inform him upon admission of this right. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 401.) Section 3 \u2014 403 sets out this right to discharge:\n\u201cA voluntary patient shall be allowed to be discharged from the facility at the earliest appropriate time, not to exceed 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after he gives any treatment staff person written notice of his desire to be discharged unless he either withdraws the notice in writing or unless within the 5 day period a petition and 2 certificates conforming to the requirements of paragraph (b) of Section 3 \u2014 601 and Section 3 \u2014 602 [which pertain to involuntary commitment] are filed with the court. Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall order a hearing to be held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, and to be conducted pursuant to Article IX of this Chapter. Hospitalization of the patient may continue pending further order of the court.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 403.\nThe Code also sets out the procedure for emergency involuntary commitment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 9IV2, par. 3 \u2014 600 et seq.) First a petition must be brought stating that \u201chospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person or others from physical harm.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 9I\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 601.) In addition, two certif- \u2022 icates stating that involuntary commitment is necessary must be secured in order for the petition to be heard by the court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, pars. 3 \u2014 602, 3 \u2014 610.) The first certificate must accompany the petition and have been executed by a \u201cphysician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist.\u201d The second must have been prepared by a psychiatrist, and its submission is required before the court shall conduct a hearing.\nThese provisions relating to involuntary commitment do not make reference to proceeding against a voluntarily admitted patient. The reference is found only in the sections on voluntary commitments. As set out above, section 3 \u2014 403 states that a voluntarily committed patient must be released within five days after an unrevoked written notice of his desire to be discharged \u201cunless *** within the 5 day period a petition [for involuntary commitment] and 2 certificates *** are filed with the court.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 403.) Thus, in the case of a voluntarily admitted patient, involuntary-commitment proceedings must be preceded by a voluntary patient\u2019s request for discharge.\nA voluntary admission serves an important purpose and generally is considered to be the preferred method of commencing treatment of mental illness. \u201cThe advantages of voluntary admissions flow from the absence of compulsion in the initiation of psychiatric treatment. Psychiatric evidence indicates that a patient who recognizes his condition and voluntarily undertakes therapy is more likely to be rehabilitated than one upon whom treatment is forced.\u201d (Developments in the Law, Civil Commitments of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1399 (1974); see also Comment, Temporary Detention of \u201cVoluntary\u201d Patients by Hospital Authorities: Due Process Issues, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 791, 792-93 (1982).) The benefits of voluntary admission, however, \u201care less likely to be realized and persons who recognize their need for hospitalization are less likely to seek it if *** they then can be subjected to involuntary commitment without a significant change in their condition, the perception of their condition, or their willingness to be hospitalized.\u201d Appeal of Niccoli (1977), 472 Pa. 389, 399, 372 A.2d 749, 754.\nThe rights given voluntarily admitted patients under our code show a legislative intent to encourage voluntary admissions. An important means of encouraging voluntary submission to treatment for mental problems is to grant voluntary patients the right to request their discharge. Of course, the public must be protected from persons dangerous because of mental illness. Accordingly, the Code provides that a voluntary patient who requests discharge may nevertheless be subject to an involuntary commitment if he is deemed to be dangerous to himself or others. Section 3 \u2014 403, which we set out above, provides that in this one instance an involuntary petition may be brought against a voluntarily-admitted patient within the five-day period prescribed in the statute following his request for discharge.\nWe hold, therefore, that the statutory rights of Robert Hays arising from his voluntary admission were violated.\nThe Code does not directly address the situation in which the condition of a voluntarily committed patient deteriorates to the extent that he is unable to request discharge or understand his right to do so. While a State facility may transfer a patient to another State facility when it is deemed \u201cclinically advisable,\u201d a private institution may not invoke these provisions of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91\u00bd, pars. 3 \u2014 908 to 3 \u2014 910; see also In re Clement (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 574.) However, if the condition of a patient voluntarily admitted to a private facility has deteriorated so that he cannot be adequately cared for at the facility and he is unable to request discharge, the facility may notify public mental health authorities and release the patient into their custody to permit the instituting of an involuntary-commitment proceeding. If the legislature deems that a different procedure should be followed under those circumstances, it can enact specific legislation to meet the problem.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE \"WARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Basil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Mark L. Rotert and Ellen M. Flaum, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Robert J. Biderman and Rebecca L. White, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Jeff M. Plesko, of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Carbondale, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 58724\nIn re ROBERT HAYS (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert Hays, Appellant).\nOpinion filed June 6, 1984.\nNeil Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Basil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Mark L. Rotert and Ellen M. Flaum, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Robert J. Biderman and Rebecca L. White, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nJeff M. Plesko, of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Carbondale, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0314-01", "first_page_order": 326, "last_page_order": 333 }