{ "id": 3139322, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MELODY MANGOLD, Appellant, v. DAVID FLIEGER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Mangold v. Flieger", "decision_date": "1985-05-24", "docket_number": "No. 60781", "first_page": "546", "last_page": "552", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 546" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "436 U.S. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490667 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "1696-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441220 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2548183 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0604-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 434, "char_count": 8160, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1238369680012991e-07, "percentile": 0.7649129350784544 }, "sha256": "43584a6f96dd60ee868796790c54a002e43c879b226c62e2914b49f503ecf7d0", "simhash": "1:01a3f71248154c46", "word_count": 1375 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:30.136819+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MELODY MANGOLD, Appellant, v. DAVID FLIEGER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RYAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a paternity action brought against the defendant, David Flieger, pursuant to the provisions of the Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 1354). The complaint was filed in Tazewell County, where the mother and the child now reside. The defendant resides in Colorado and was served with process in that State. He filed a special limited appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the Illinois court and moved to quash service of process. The circuit court denied the motion to quash but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to our Rule 308 (87 Ill. 2d R. 308). The appellate court reversed the ruling of the circuit court and held that the Illinois court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was improper because of a lack of minimum contact between the defendant and Illinois. (125 Ill. App. 3d 604.) We granted leave to appeal. We now affirm the decision of the appellate court.\nIn her complaint the mother states that she and the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse during a two-month period while in New Jersey. The child was born in New Jersey approximately nine months later. The mother and child have since moved to Illinois. The complaint shows that the defendant paid $200 toward the support of the child approximately one month before the filing of the action.\nThe defendant filed an affidavit in support of his motion to quash, stating that he is not a resident of Illinois and has never resided in Illinois. The affidavit also states that the defendant has not paid any support to the mother while she has resided in Illinois.\nThe State argues that the circuit court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was proper pursuant to the Illinois\u2019 \u201clong arm\u201d statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 209). The long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident Of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:\n* * *\n(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State.\u201d\nThe State, citing Poindexter v. Willis (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, contends that the defendant\u2019s failure to support his alleged child constitutes \u201cthe commission of a tortious act\u201d in Illinois within the meaning of the long-arm statute.\nFor the purpose of this appeal we need not decide whether a failure to support constitutes \u201cthe commission of a tortious act.\u201d The fact that a defendant\u2019s acts fall within the terms of the long-arm statute does not necessarily mean the exercise of jurisdiction over him is proper. Rather, the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with due process, and in this case it is not. See Boyer v. Boyer (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 331, 340-41.\nDue process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contact with the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u201ctraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d (International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158.) An essential criterion of jurisdiction is whether the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s acts are such that it is reasonable and fair to require him to conduct his defense in the forum State. Kulko v. California (1978), 436 U.S. 84, 92, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, 141, 98 S. Ct. 1690,1696-97.\nIn Boyer v. Boyer (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 331, this court was presented wdth a factual situation similar to that in the present case. In Boyer the nonresident defendant\u2019s ex-wife filed suit in the circuit court of Madison County to enroll and modify her Georgia divorce decree and to collect arrearages in child support and maintenance payments due under the decree. The couple was living in Georgia at the time of the divorce, and the wife thereafter moved to Illinois. The husband was still a resident of Georgia and was served with process in that State. He filed a special limited appearance in Illinois challenging the jurisdiction of the Illinois court and moved to quash service of process.\nThe wife in Boyer argued, as does the State in the present case, that the husband\u2019s' failure to support the family pursuant to the divorce decree constituted \u201cthe commission of a tortious act within this State\u201d within the meaning of the long-arm statute. In Boyer, as in the present case, this court declined to rule on the long-arm issue because it found that the defendant lacked sufficient minimum contact with Illinois to make the exercise of jurisdiction over him consistent with due process. In holding that the husband lacked the requisite minimum contact this court stated that \u201cthe quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s activities in Illinois were not such that it would be reasonable and fair to require him to conduct his defense here.\u201d Boyer v. Boyer (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 331, 340.\nIn the present case, as in Boyer, the defendant\u2019s activities are not such that it would be fair and reasonable to require him to defend an action here. The defendant\u2019s only contact with Illinois is that the child he allegedly fathered and its mother now reside in Illinois. The State argues that we should assume that the support payment made a month before the complaint was filed was made while the mother and child were residing in Illinois, although the complaint does not allege as such. We do not feel that the sending of a support payment into Illinois is sufficient to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant proper.\nThe State argues that the Boyer decision is inapplicable to the present case because the plaintiff in Boyer could proceed against the nonresident defendant pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1201 et seq.) In Boyer this court pointed out that the plaintiff was \u201cnot left at a severe disadvantage\u201d by our ruling because she could proceed under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Boyer v. Boyer (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 331, 341.) The acknowledgment of this fact, however, does not mean that this court was deciding the case on the basis of who would be placed at a greater disadvantage by our decision. Rather, the case was decided by the traditional rules of due process. As stated in Boyer:\n\u201c[A]n orderly and fair administration of the law requires protection against being compelled to answer claims brought in distant States with which the defendant has little or no association, and in which he would be faced with an undue burden in making his defense, keeping in mind that lawsuits can be brought on frivolous demands and groundless claims. It should not lie within the choice of the plaintiff to engage in \u2018forum shopping,\u2019 nor should the defendant be required to defend in any and all jurisdictions wherein the wife may choose to maintain her action.\u201d Boyer v. Boyer (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 331, 341.\nThe reasoning of the Boyer decision is applicable to the present case. The circuit court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction was improper because the defendant lacks sufficient minimum contacts within Illinois to make it fair and reasonable to require him to defend the action here. Thus, the appellate court was correct in reversing the circuit court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to quash service of process.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the decision of the appellate court reversing the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to quash is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RYAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bruce W. Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin, (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Scott Graham, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for appellant.", "Donald K. Birner, of Pekin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 60781.\nTHE PEOPLE ex rel. MELODY MANGOLD, Appellant, v. DAVID FLIEGER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed May 24, 1985.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bruce W. Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin, (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Scott Graham, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Gerry R. Arnold, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for appellant.\nDonald K. Birner, of Pekin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0546-01", "first_page_order": 558, "last_page_order": 564 }