{ "id": 3127069, "name": "FREDMAN BROTHERS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Fredman Bros. Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "1985-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 61255", "first_page": "202", "last_page": "215", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3102262 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2683096 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436041 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2472578 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/394/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877564 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2766964 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415144 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906409 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3116477 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/1108-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469810 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640772 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3102819 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/165/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4985753 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/293/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2583030 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098230 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "6-7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5068044 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" }, { "page": "519-20" }, { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/295/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475860 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 940", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6440640, 6441984, 6441188, 6441290, 6441885, 6442096, 6441009, 6440819, 6440916, 6442200, 6441627, 6441725 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0940-01", "/us/434/0940-10", "/us/434/0940-05", "/us/434/0940-06", "/us/434/0940-09", "/us/434/0940-11", "/us/434/0940-04", "/us/434/0940-02", "/us/434/0940-03", "/us/434/0940-12", "/us/434/0940-07", "/us/434/0940-08" ] }, { "cite": "553 F.2d 549", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 970809 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/553/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2553774 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2702383 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2570642 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489563 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2998997 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0479-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 711, "char_count": 19028, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.830766906231059e-06, "percentile": 0.9941778458898569 }, "sha256": "a15251b575416b7f6e740e5c25a0954c230aca1fb9f5266b92a37cd9501b40b9", "simhash": "1:e9b6d4b9e15994d3", "word_count": 3089 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:34.159568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FREDMAN BROTHERS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RYAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case we must determine the effect that a motion for rehearing before an administrative agency had on the requirement of section 4 of the Administrative Review Act (now section 3 \u2014 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014103)) that an action to review a final administrative decision shall be filed within 35 days of the decision. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co., Inc. (Fredman Brothers), filed an action for judicial review of a final tax assessment 87 days after the assessment was issued, but only 35 days after a request for an administrative rehearing was denied by the Department of Revenue (the Department).\nThis case began with an audit of Fredman Brothers by the Department in March 1979. The Department issued a notice of tax liability to Fredman Brothers on August 30, 1979, for taxes due under the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 440 et seq.) from January 1976 through December 1978. Fredman Brothers protested the amount of liability, and an administrative hearing was held to determine the correct figure. The result was the Department\u2019s issuance of a \u201cfinal assessment\u201d of $12,403.78 in taxes, penalties, and interest on August 24, 1981. Pursuant to section 4 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 443), Fredman Brothers filed a request for a rehearing of the assessment on September 24, 1981. The Department denied the request on October 15, 1981.\nOn November 19, 1981, 87 days after the \u201cfinal assessment\u201d was issued but only 35 days after the rehearing request was denied, Fredman Brothers filed an action in the circuit court of Peoria County for judicial review of the assessment. The action was filed pursuant to the provisions of section 12 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 451). The Department filed a motion to dismiss based on the portion of section 12 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act which provided for dismissal and entering of judgment against the taxpayer if he failed to post a sufficient bond within 20 days of filing his action. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 451.) The circuit court found that Fredman Brothers had not complied with this provision as of December 11, 1981, 21 days after the complaint was filed. The court accordingly dismissed the action and entered judgment against Fredman Brothers.\nFredman Brothers appealed, and the appellate court reversed. (Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1982) 110 Ill. App. 3d 479.) The cause was remanded to the circuit court \u201cwith directions that Fredman be granted a review.\u201d 110 Ill. App. 3d 479, 481.\nOn remand, the Department filed a motion to dismiss because the complaint for review had not been filed in the circuit court within 35 days after the final tax assessment. Section 12 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 451) expressly provided that the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) governed all proceedings for judicial review of final tax assessments. Section 4 of the Administrative Review Act in turn provided that \u201c[ejvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 267; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014103.) The Department argued that the \u201cfinal assessment\u201d constituted a final administrative decision, despite Fredman Brothers\u2019 request for a rehearing, and that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Fredman Brothers had not filed its action within 35 days of being served with this final administrative decision as required by the Administrative Review Act. The circuit court agreed and again dismissed the case.\nFredman Brothers appealed this second dismissal, arguing that the Department had waived the 35-day provision by not raising the issue on the first appeal. It also argued that the 35-day filing period did not begin to run until the Department denied the request for a rehearing; thus its action was timely filed.\nThe appellate court, reviewing this case, for a second time, found, with one justice dissenting, that the circuit court did not err in ordering the second dismissal of Fredman Brothers' complaint. (129 Ill. App. 3d 38, 43.) The appellate court noted that its direction in its previous remand to the circuit court to grant a review on the merits, \u201cwas, of course, based on the assumption that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject matter.\u201d (129 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40.) The court noted that the 35-day filing period had previously been held to be a jurisdictional requirement. (129 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40.) The circuit court\u2019s consideration of the dismissal motion was held proper, since \u201clack of jurisdiction of the *** subject matter \u2018can be raised at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d (129 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40.) The dissenting justice was of the opinion that the requirement that the complaint for administrative review be filed within 35 days was a statute of limitation which had been waived and not a jurisdictional requirement. The appellate court found Fredman Brothers\u2019 action barred by its failure to file its complaint for administrative review within the 35-day jurisdictional limit. (129 Ill. App. 3d 38, 42.) We granted Fredman Brothers leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nFredman Brothers contends that the 35-day period prescribed in the Administrative Review Act is not jurisdictional but is mandatory and subject to waiver.\nIn determining whether the 35-day filing provision is jurisdictional, we must recognize that a significant distinction exists between statutes of limitation and statutes that both confer jurisdiction on a court and fix a time within which such jurisdiction may be exercised. Statutes of limitation only fix the time within which the remedy for a particular wrong may be sought. (See Smith v. Toman (1938), 368 Ill. 414, 420.) They \u201care procedural in nature (see Orlicki v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342; Hilberg v. Industrial Com. (1942), 380 Ill. 102; see also Kalmich v. Bruno (7th Cir. 1977), 553 F.2d 549, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 940, 54 L. Ed. 2d 300, 98 S. Ct. 432) and are not designed to alter substantive rights ***.\u201d Wilson v. Bishop (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 364, 373.\nOn the other hand, \u201cstatutes which create a substantive right unknown to the common law and in which time is made an inherent element of the right so created, are not statutes of limitation.\u201d (Smith v. Toman (1938), 368 Ill. 414, 420.) Such a time period \u201cis more than an ordinary statute of limitations\u201d (North Side Sash & Door Co. v. Hecht (1920), 295 Ill. 515, 519); it \u201cis a condition of the *** liability itself and not of the remedy, alone. *** It goes to the existence of the right itself.\u201d (295 Ill. 515, 519-20.) Such a provision is a condition precedent to the plaintiff\u2019s right to seek a remedy. (North Side Sash & Door Co. v. Hecht (1920), 295 Ill. 515, 520; Demchuk v. Duplancich (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 1, 9.) Such statutes set forth the requirements for bringing the right to seek a remedy into existence. They do not speak of commencing an action after the right to do so has accrued. They are jurisdictional, not mandatory.\nSubject matter jurisdiction is conferred on courts by the Constitution or by legislative enactment. (Knaus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1937), 365 Ill. 588, 592.) Article VI, section 9, of the 1970 Constitution provides: \u201cCircuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction ***. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 9.) This court has held that when a court is in the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it and the court has no powers from any other source. (Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com. (1920), 293 Ill. 62, 65-66.) In the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, if the mode of procedure prescribed by statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court. See Demchuk v. Duplancich (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7; Avdich v. Kleinert (1977), 69 Ill. 1, 6; Fitzgerald v. Quinn (1896), 165 Ill. 354, 360.\nThe Administrative Review Act was \u201can innovation and departure from the common law, [and] the procedures it establishes must be pursued ***.\u201d (Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1950), 407 Ill. 588, 595.) Section 2 of the Act specifically provides that any other mode of review heretofore available shall not be employed. Section 2 also provides that unless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner provided therein, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining a judicial review. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 265; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014102.\nIn the present case the circuit court was exercising special jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Administrative Review Act. The provisions of that act referred to above clearly demonstrate that the filing of the complaint for administrative review within the time period specified is a jurisdictional requirement and that judicial review of the administrative decision is barred if the complaint is not filed within the time specified.\nThis construction coincides with this court\u2019s previous statement regarding this 35-day limit in Glaseo Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 346. There, we noted that when the plaintiff \u201cfiled its complaint within 35 days after it received a copy of the Department\u2019s decision [citation] the circuit court *** was properly vested with jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff\u2019s appeal ***.\u201d (86 Ill. 2d 346, 351.) The construction we have placed on the 35-day filing requirement also agrees with the construction given this provision by the appellate court. See People ex rel. Olin Corp. v. Department of Labor (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1111; Hoffman v. Department of Registration & Education (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924; Cartmell v. Department of Public Aid (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 685, 686; Varnes v. Lentz (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 806, 810.\nWe must now determine whether Fredman Brothers\u2019 action was within the 35-day period. Fredman Brothers maintains the Department\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment\u201d was not a final decision until Fredman Brothers\u2019 request for rehearing was denied.\nTwo provisions regarding rehearings are set forth in section 1 of the Administrative Review Act. Where \u201ca statute or a rule\u201d of an administrative agency allows an application for rehearing only if it is filed \u201cwithin a specified time (as distinguished from a statute which permits the application *** to be filed at any time before judgment *** against the applicant ***), and an application *** is made, no administrative decision *** shall be final *** until such rehearing *** is had or denied.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014101.) On the other hand, \u201cif the particular statute permits an application for rehearing *** to be filed with the administrative agency for an indefinite period of time after the administrative decision has been rendered (such as permitting such application to be filed at any time before judgment by the administrative agency against the applicant ***), then the authorization for the filing of such application for rehearing *** shall not postpone the time when the administrative decision as to which such application shall be filed would otherwise become final, but the filing of the application for rehearing *** shall constitute the commencement of a new proceeding before such agency ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3-101.\nFredman Brothers\u2019 application for rehearing was governed by section 4 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 443). In regard to an application for rehearing, the section provided that, \u201c[a]fter the issuance of a final assessment, *** the Department, at any time before such assessment is reduced to judgment, may *** grant a rehearing *** upon the application of the person aggrieved.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 443.\nThe interaction of these statutes clearly indicates that the tax assessment levied against Fredman Brothers constituted a final administrative decision as soon as it was mailed. The provision for rehearing in section 4 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 443) falls squarely within the second provision of section 1 of the Administrative Review Act regarding rehearings (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014101). Under this provision, Fredman Brothers\u2019 application for a rehearing was the commencement of a new proceeding before the Department. It did not postpone the time when the \u201cfinal assessment\u201d became a final administrative decision.\nFredman Brothers relies on People v. Scudder Buick, Inc. (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 388, to argue that the Department\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment\u201d was not a final administrative decision until Fredman Brothers\u2019 request for rehearing was denied. In Scudder Buick this court held that after an application for rehearing the Department\u2019s review of an assessment \u201cwould not become final for purposes of appeal under the Administrative Review Act until the rehearing was either had or denied. [Citation.]\u201d (47 Ill. 2d 388, 392.) However, Scudder Buick dealt with an action for judicial review of a property tax assessment (47 Ill. 2d 388, 389), and the Department\u2019s rule involved expressly provided that an \u201capplication for rehearing shall *** be filed *** within five (5) days ***.\u201d (47 Ill. 2d 388, 391-92.) Thus, the case fell within the first provision of section 1 of the Administrative Review Act regarding rehearings quoted above and not the second provision of section 1 which governs our case. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014101.) Therefore, the statement in Scudder Buick has no application in the present case.\nFredman Brothers also argues that this construction of the Administrative Review Act allows an aggrieved party to seek judicial review before he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Fredman Brothers points out several cases where this court required that a plaintiff exhaust such remedies before seeking judicial review. (See, e.g., Graham v. Illinois Racing Board (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 566; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350). However, this court has recognized an exception to this doctrine \u201cwhere multiple remedies exist before the same administrative agency and at least one has been exhausted ***.\u201d (76 Ill. 2d 566, 573; see also Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358; Herman v. Village of Hillside (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 396, 407-08.) Here, Fredman Brothers\u2019 multiple remedies consisted of a hearing on its assessment before the Department and a new, separate proceeding consisting of its request for a rehearing before the Department. Fredman Brothers exhausted the first remedy; the Department could give no further relief in this proceeding. Fredman Brothers could also pursue a second remedy before this same agency by way of a rehearing. In the second part of section 1 of the Administrative Review Act quoted above it is specifically provided that the filing of an application on rehearing shall constitute the commencement of a new proceeding before the agency. Allowing judicial review without requiring Fredman Brothers to exhaust all of the multiple remedies did not violate the exhaustion doctrine.\nIn considering a similar argument, this court has previously recognized that section 1 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 264; now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014101) \u201cexpresses the legislative purpose that judicial review is not to be barred by the power of an administrative agency to reconsider its decision after judicial review has been initiated.\u201d Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 266, 272.\nFredman Brothers argues that the trial court erred in not granting a review on the merits as mandated by the appellate court\u2019s first opinion in this case. (110 Ill. App. 3d 479, 481.) Fredman Brothers contends that, by dismissing the action a second time, the circuit court did not comply with the appellate court\u2019s mandate. We disagree.\nWhen the appellate court reversed the circuit court of Peoria County and remanded the cause, it specified that Fredman Brothers \u201cbe granted a review ***.\u201d (110 Ill. App. 3d 479, 481.) The appellate court\u2019s reversal was conclusive only on the issue of whether the bond requirement of section 12 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 451) was applicable to Fredman Brothers\u2019 case. The question of the circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction, based upon the timely filing of a complaint for administrative review, was not involved in the case and was not raised until the case was remanded to the circuit court.\nSubject matter jurisdiction gives the right to hear and determine causes. (Sweitzer v. Industrial Com. (1946), 394 Ill. 141, 148.) It has been held that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally. (City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 108; Jarrett v. Jarrett (1953), 415 Ill. 126; Dorr-Wood, Ltd. v. Department of Public Health (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 170, 173.) Therefore the circuit court\u2019s consideration of the Department\u2019s motion raising the question of subject matter jurisdiction following remand from the appellate court was proper. Once the circuit court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it had no right to hear the case, and it did not err in not expressly following the mandate of the appellate court.\nFor the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RYAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Herbert I. Fredman, of Collinsville, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Eugene P. Schmittgens, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 61255.\nFREDMAN BROTHERS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.\nOpinion filed November 21, 1985.\nHerbert I. Fredman, of Collinsville, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Eugene P. Schmittgens, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0202-01", "first_page_order": 214, "last_page_order": 227 }