{ "id": 3126521, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. KATHLEEN CAROL BOYT, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Boyt", "decision_date": "1985-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 61229", "first_page": "403", "last_page": "419", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 403" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "17 Hous. L. Rev. 753", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Hous. L. Rev.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "614 F.2d 360", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1401545 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/614/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138191 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 F.2d 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 654932 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/739/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 F.2d 606", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 613390 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/742/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 504", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203373 ], "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "444" }, { "page": "2548" }, { "page": "507-08" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2546" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2546" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "2548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "1712" }, { "page": "242-44" }, { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "1711-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172366 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "260-61" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "497-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857997 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812072 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3490629 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138191 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451-52" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0441-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 970, "char_count": 25615, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.599898241800546e-07, "percentile": 0.8876648793037741 }, "sha256": "db9071fa4bb0c1d9a73cd8f8de4763cadb65cb9d0a39ab6f5c4527959033a783", "simhash": "1:cbbe432c63c2c638", "word_count": 4139 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:34.159568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. KATHLEEN CAROL BOYT, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Kathleen Carol Boyt, was indicted by a Kane County grand jury for two counts of armed robbery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142.) Subsequently, in September 1983, defendant filed a motion to enforce a plea agreement allegedly entered into between herself and the State. Under the claimed agreement defendant was to testify against her codefendant, Johnny Banks. In exchange for her testimony, defendant was to receive a'\u2019reduction of the charges, six months in the county jail, treatment in a residential drug program, and probation. Before the agreement could be consummated, Banks pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and was sentenced to seven years in prison. Thereafter the State was unwilling to abide by the agreement, contending that no agreement .ever existed and, alternatively, that defendant was not entitled to specific enforcement. Defendant stated in the circuit court and on appeal that she is willing to enter a guilty plea in accordance with the plea agreement.\nThe circuit court determined that a valid agreement existed and ordered specific enforcement of the plea agreement. The State refused to comply with the circuit court\u2019s order, and as a result, on November 7, 1983, the circuit court dismissed the indictments against defendant. The appellate court concluded that the circuit court\u2019s factual finding as to the existence of the plea agreement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, it held that dismissal of the indictments was \u201ctoo expansive and not constitutionally mandated.\u201d (129 Ill. App. 3d 1, 20.) Accordingly, it reversed the circuit court\u2019s order and remanded for further proceedings. Thereafter, we granted defendant leave to appeal (87 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nThree issues are raised on appeal: (1) Was the circuit court\u2019s order of dismissal appealable by the State pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1))? (2) Was the circuit court\u2019s finding that a valid plea agreement existed against the manifest weight of the evidence? and (3) Assuming a valid agreement existed, was defendant entitled, under the circumstances of this case, to specific enforcement of the plea agreement?\nThe evidence as to the existence of the agreement and its terms consists primarily of the narrative statements given by defendant\u2019s trial counsel and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney at the October 4, 1983, hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to enforce the plea agreement. An assistant public defender, Judith M. Brawka, related that sometime in June 1983, she was assigned by her superiors to represent defendant. She immediately began an investigation of the case and defendant\u2019s background. This investigation included an evaluation of defendant by Treatment Alternative to Street Crimes, Inc., which operates a drug-abuse rehabilitation program. According to Brawka, the evaluation revealed that defendant was a drug addict but ineligible for the program because she was charged with a violent crime, i.e., two counts of armed robbery. In addition to the drug evaluation, Brawka referred defendant to the Kane County Diagnostic Center for a diagnostic evaluation.\nAfter the case was continued for discovery purposes and completion of the diagnostic evaluation, Brawka approached Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John Barsanti on August 3, 1983, and initiated plea negotiations on defendant\u2019s behalf. At that meeting, Brawka gave Barsanti a copy of defendant\u2019s diagnostic evaluation and explained that defendant was willing to testify against Banks. She proposed that defendant plead guilty to reduced charges, receive \u201csome type of county jail time,\u201d and be placed in a drug-rehabilitation program in exchange for the testimony against Banks. She also told Barsanti that the Elgin police department, which had arrested defendant, did not oppose such a disposition. Barsanti, according to Brawka, responded that the proposal \u201csounded good to him.\u201d However, Barsanti told her that he was unwilling to agree to the proposed terms while the Banks\u2019 case was still pending. He explained to Brawka that defendant would have no incentive to testify against Banks if he agreed to the proposed disposition at that time. Brawka agreed that Barsanti\u2019s concern was reasonable. She told him that she was \u201cgoing on vacation anyway,\u201d and stated that maybe he could \u201chave something more definite or set a trial date and we will see what happens when I get back on August 22nd.\u201d\nUpon returning to work on August 22, 1983, Brawka discovered that during her absence Banks had pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and had been sentenced to seven years in prison. She contacted Barsanti and requested that defendant be allowed to plead guilty in accordance with the agreement made August 3. According to Brawka, Barsanti asked her, \u201cDid we have a plea offer or a plea bargain?\u201d Brawka responded that she thought that they had reached an agreement with regard to the disposition of defendant\u2019s case. She also told Barsanti that she had informed defendant by letter that an agreement had been made. Barsanti then asked Brawka to recite the terms of the agreement. Brawka stated that, according to her understanding of the plea agreement, defendant was to receive six months in the county jail, treatment at a residential drug program and probation on a \u201ccharge of robbery or two charges of robbery ***.\u201d Barsanti stated that he would have to check with his superiors. The next day, on August 23, Barsanti told Brawka that his office was unwilling to agree to the terms outlined by Brawka, but would agree to a three-year prison sentence if defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery. Brawka stated that she requested that Barsanti\u2019s superiors reconsider their decision, but they refused to agree to any other terms.\nBrawka also related that sometime between August 3 and August 22, 1983, Barsanti engaged in plea negotiations with Banks\u2019 defense attorney. According to Brawka, Barsanti informed Banks\u2019 attorney \u201cthat if the case were to go to trial, that the State would use Kathleen Voight\u2019s [sic] testimony.\u201d\nBarsanti stated that he had engaged in plea negotiations with Brawka concerning the disposition of defendant\u2019s case but disagreed with Brawka\u2019s conclusion that an agreement had been reached. He recalled that after Brawka presented him with a copy of defendant\u2019s diagnostic evaluation they engaged in an \u201cinformal discussion concerning the agreement.\u201d After listening to Brawka\u2019s proposal, he stated that \u201cwe probably could do something like that.\u201d He also stated that he never told Banks\u2019 attorney that he had made an agreement with defendant. He said he told Banks\u2019 attorney only that he \u201chad her [defendant\u2019s] testimony, if needed.\u201d\nDefendant testified at the October 4 hearing that she discussed the terms of the plea agreement with Brawka on more than one occasion. Defendant\u2019s understanding of the agreement was that she would be allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges, serve some \u201cCounty time,\u201d and be placed in a drug-rehabilitation program, in exchange for her testimony against Banks. Defendant stated that she assented to the terms of the agreement as they were described to her by Brawka.\nInitially we consider whether the trial court\u2019s order of dismissal was appealable under this court\u2019s Rule 604(a)(1) (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nThe record discloses that the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to enforce the negotiated plea agreement on November 3, 1983. Immediately thereafter, the following colloquy took place between the court, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Barsanti, and Assistant Public Defender Brawka:\n\u201cMR. BARSANTI: Your Honor, I have talked this over with our appellate prosecutors. What we want to do, Judge, is we\u2019re going to refuse to enter into the agreement and I think the remedy as laid out in the other cases is for the Court to dismiss the charge and \u2014 because we\u2019re going to file a Notice of Appeal. ***\nTHE COURT: What about contempt? Don\u2019t I have the contempt powers? I can put someone in jail, either you or whoever is telling you not to abide by my ruling.\nMR. BARSANTI: I\u2019ll go, Judge.\n***\nMS. BRAWKA: Respectfully, I don\u2019t think that\u2019s the appropriate remedy.\nTHE COURT: I understand.\nMS. BRAWKA: I talked to the State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office and they indicated under the current case law the Court does not have the power to reduce charges to accept reduced pleas. And if the State refused to comply with the order, then under the inherent power of the Court to dismiss because of due process violations the Court is authorized to dismiss the charges and then the State can take an appeal from that order.\nTHE COURT: Are you saying, Mr. Barsanti, that you\u2019re refusing to proceed?\nMR. BARSANTI: Right.\nTHE COURT: Then in that case the charges against Kathleen Boyt in General Number 83 CF 480 and 83 CF 481 will be dismissed.\u201d\nFollowing the court\u2019s decision, the State requested that the court vacate its dismissal order so as to afford the State additional time in which to reconsider its decision not to comply with the court\u2019s order directing specific enforcement of the plea agreement. On November 7, 1983, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Thomas Sullivan informed the court that the State was still unwilling to comply with the court\u2019s November 3 order. As a result, the court dismissed the charges against defendant.\nRule 604(a)(1) provides:\n\u201cWhen State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114\u20141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).\n'Hie court, in construing Rule 604(a)(1), has held that the rule was not intended to reduce the State\u2019s right of appeal to only those grounds enumerated in section 114\u20141 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 114\u20141) of the statute. (People v. Lawson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 449, 455.) Rather, the State has the right to appeal from \u201cany judgment the substantive effect of which resulted in the dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint.\u201d People v. Love (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 436, 439.\nThe judgment of the circuit court in the present case certainly had the substantive effect of dismissing the indictments against defendant, and, as such, the State\u2019s right to appeal the circuit court\u2019s order normally would not be open to question. Defendant maintains, however, that dismissal of the indictments was \u201cobtained by the State\u201d and, as a consequence, she contends that the circuit court did not enter an \u201cadverse\u201d judgment from which the State could appeal. She asserts that it was error for the appellate court to deny her motion to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal. We disagree.\nThe record shows that the State vigorously contested the existence of the plea agreement and defendant\u2019s right to specific enforcement. Following the court\u2019s order directing specific enforcement of the agreement, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney informed the court that the State was unwilling to comply with the ruling. At that time, he suggested that dismissal of the indictments was an appropriate sanction for refusal to comply with the court order. However, as the appellate court correctly observed, dismissal was suggested only as an alternative sanction to imprisonment or a fine. At all times the assistant State\u2019s Attorney indicated a willingness to be jailed as a contemnor for refusing to comply with the order. Moreover, after the assistant State\u2019s Attorney expressed his willingness to go to jail, defense counsel told the court that imprisonment was an \u201cinappropriate remedy.\u201d She suggested that the court was \u201cauthorized to dismiss the charges\u201d so that the \u201cState can take an appeal from that order.\u201d Thus, as the record shows, dismissal of the indictments was intended by the circuit court to be a sanction against the State for its refusal to abide by the court\u2019s order of specific enforcement. The dismissal was adverse to the State and appealable under Rule 604(a)(1). We turn, therefore, to the merits of the case.\nDefendant argues that there was a valid plea agreement between herself and the State. She maintains that the State\u2019s repudiation of the agreement constituted a denial of due process, which can only be remedied by allowing her to obtain specific enforcement of the agreement.\nIt is well established that a defendant is entitled to remedial relief when a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement after the defendant has pleaded guilty. (Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495.) In Santobello the defendant pleaded guilty in a New York court to possession of gambling records in the second degree after the prosecutor promised to make no recommendation as to the sentence. At the sentencing hearing some months later, the prosecutor\u2019s successor, unaware of the plea agreement, recommended that the defendant receive the maximum sentence, which the judge imposed. The Supreme Court vacated the New York judgment, holding that when a guilty plea \u201crests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.\u201d (404 U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499.) The court remanded the case to the New York court to determine whether the defendant was entitled under the circumstances to the relief he sought, i.e., withdrawal of his guilty plea, or to specific enforcement of the plea agreement.\nThe present case, of course, differs from Santobello because the defendant here never actually pleaded guilty in reliance on the prosecutor\u2019s promise. The prosecutor\u2019s promise was withdrawn before a plea could be entered. There are key distinctions between the two situations. By pleading guilty an accused waives important constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one\u2019s accusers. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712.) Due process requires certain safeguards to be afforded to an accused who pleads guilty, including an on-the-record inquiry by the judge accepting the plea that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered. (395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-80, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-13.) Thus, when the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant has pleaded guilty on a false premise, and it cannot be said that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. However, where a prosecutor withdraws from a plea agreement prior to the actual entry of the guilty plea by defendant, the same due process concerns are not necessarily implicated. Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 104 S. Ct. 2543.\nIn Mabry, the defendant\u2019s murder conviction was set aside. The prosecutor then offered to recommend a certain sentence if the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. When defendant\u2019s attorney informed the prosecutor that defendant accepted the offer, the prosecutor immediately replied that the offer had been withdrawn. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a second plea agreement. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his acceptance of the prosecutor\u2019s first plea proposal created a constitutional right to have that agreement specifically enforced. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to specific enforcement of the first agreement. The court noted that the defendant\u2019s guilty plea \u201cwas in no sense induced by the prosecutor\u2019s withdrawn offer\u201d and, as such, defendant' was not denied due process. (467 U.S. 504, 510, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2548.) The court explained:\n\u201cA plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.\u201d (467 U.S. 504, 507-08, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 442, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546.)\nSee also Spann v. Wainwright (11th Cir. 1984), 742 F.2d 606; United States v. Carbone (2d Cir. 1984), 739 F.2d 45.\nAfter considering the above authorities, we do not agree that due process requires specific enforcement of the present agreement. Even if it is assumed that the State accepted defendant\u2019s plea proposal, its later repudiation of the agreement is of no constitutional significance. The State\u2019s refusal to abide by the agreement did not deprive defendant \u201cof liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest\u201d (Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 507, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 442, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546), since she did not plead guilty to any charge in reliance on the agreement. The defendant, although understandably disappointed, was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s refusal to consummate the agreement. She did not provide the State with any new information, confess guilt, testify or otherwise incriminate herself in reliance on the State\u2019s promise.\nDefendant argues that Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 104 S. Ct. 2543, is inapposite because the agreement there was fully executory whereas here it was \u201cpartially executed.\u201d That is, she maintains that the State received the benefit of its bargain when it exploited the agreement by telling Banks\u2019 attorney that it \u201chad her [defendant\u2019s] testimony, if needed.\u201d She asserts that since the State received the benefit of its bargain, due process requires that it fulfill its promise to defendant. We disagree. The concern of due process is \u201cthe manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty.\u201d (Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504, 511, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 445, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2548. See also Spann v. Wainwright (11th Cir. 1984), 742 F.2d 606, 607.) Thus, the fact that the State may have received some benefit from the defendant\u2019s promise is irrelevant, unless the defendant can claim that she was deprived of her liberty in some fundamentally unfair way by conferring the benefit on the State.\nDefendant also contends that this court\u2019s decision in People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441, requires specific enforcement of the agreement between herself and the State. In Starks, the defendant submitted himself to a polygraph examination allegedly based on a representation by the State that an armed-robbery charge would be dismissed if the defendant passed the test. The defendant passed the polygraph examination, but the State refused to dismiss the charge. This court held that if there was an agreement the defendant was entitled to have it specifically enforced. The decision\u2019s rationale was that specific enforcement of the agreement in Starks was necessary because the defendant had \u201csurrendered his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination\u201d by submitting himself to the polygraph examination. (106 Ill. 2d 441, 451.) Here, in contrast, the defendant has surrendered nothing. As such, her reliance on Starks is misplaced.\nPlea bargaining plays an important role in our criminal justice system. It leads to prompt disposition of cases, preserves finite judicial and financial resources, and allows the State to focus its prosecutorial efforts where they are most needed. This list is not exhaustive, and there are certainly other benefits to plea bargaining. (See Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 432, 92 S. Ct. 495, 497-98.) Therefore, plea bargaining, when properly administered, is to be encouraged. However, to require specific enforcement here, where a requisite contingency was not met, would only deter prosecutors from engaging in plea negotiations altogether and create disputes about the existence and content of plea bargains. Virgin Islands v. Scotland (3d Cir. 1980), 614 F.2d 360, 364-65; 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 605 (1984) & 38 (Supp. 1985); Comment, Constitutional Constraints on Prosecutorial Discretion in Plea Bargaining (1980), 17 Hous. L. Rev. 753, 771-73.\nTherefore, consistent with the dictates of the due process clause, we hold that defendant is not entitled to specific enforcement of the plea agreement. Accordingly, we need not determine whether a plea agreement actually existed. Because we deny specific enforcement, we conclude that the circuit court erred in dismissing the indictments against defendant.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK,\ndissenting:\nIn this case the circuit court found that a valid plea agreement existed between the State and the defendant and it ordered specific enforcement of that agreement. The appellate court held that the circuit court\u2019s finding that a valid plea agreement existed was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A majority of this court now affirms the appellate court but holds that even if an agreement existed, which it states it \u201cneed not determine\u201d (109 Ill. 2d at 417), the agreement is not enforceable because defendant Boyt never entered a guilty plea and therefore \u201cwas not prejudiced by the State\u2019s refusal to consummate the agreement\u201d (109 Ill. 2d at 415). I cannot agree with this reasoning.\nI do not believe the defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441, is misplaced as the majority states. In Starks, we held that the defendant, by submitting to a polygraph examination, surrendered his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, giving adequate consideration for the State\u2019s promise to dismiss the charges against him. This court stated:\n\u201cWhen a prosecutor enters into an agreement of this kind he has doubts about a defendant\u2019s guilt. If the defendant fails the polygraph examination, such doubts may be removed and a faltering investigation can be revitalized. A prosecutor is less likely to agree to concessions after a defendant\u2019s failure of a polygraph examination. He also knows that if the defendant fails the polygraph examination and then takes the stand at trial the defendant may wilt under the pressure of intense cross-examination. Additionally, there is no way of assuring that the test results will not come to the judge\u2019s attention; therefore, a defendant may be compelled, as a practical matter, to elect a jury trial. The test results may also strengthen a judgment of conviction resulting in imposition of a longer sentence or delay in parole.\u201d 106 Ill. 2d 441, 451-52.\nI believe our decision in Starks supports an opposite result in the instant case, as the defendant contends. In the instant case it is stated:\n\u201cThe State\u2019s refusal to abide by the agreement did not deprive defendant \u2018of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest\u2019 [citation omitted], since she did not plead guilty to any charge in reliance on the agreement.\u201d 109 Ill. 2d at 415.\nThe majority further states:\n\u201cThe defendant, although understandably disappointed, was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s refusal to consummate the agreement. She did not provide the State with any new information, confess guilt, testify or otherwise incriminate herself in reliance on the State\u2019s promise.\u201d 109 111. 2d at 415.\nI cannot agree with this assessment of the facts in this case. I believe defendant Boyt\u2019s promise to testify can be analogized to the defendant\u2019s submission to a polygraph examination in Starks. It is evident that the defendant\u2019s promise alone was valuable to the State, since the State was able to use it to compel codefendant Banks to plead guilty. Although defendant Boyt did not give the State any \u201cnew information\u201d per se, her willingness to testify was the new information needed to breathe new life into the case. Also, in agreeing to testify, the defendant did incriminate herself. Although she may not have been confessing guilt, she was at least confessing her presence and knowledge of the crime. Like in Starks, the defendant herein surrendered her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which I believe was adequate consideration entitling her to specific enforcement of the plea agreement.\nIt is essential that people participate in plea bargaining because, as the majority states, \u201c|p]lea bargaining plays an important role in our criminal justice system\u201d (109 Ill. 2d at 416). Because plea bargaining does play such an important role, it is essential that people believe these agreements are entered into with sincerity. Therefore, it is unjust to allow the State to renege on its agreement with this defendant after taking the \u201cbenefit of the bargain.\u201d Fundamental fairness requires that the State uphold its end of the bargain. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nGOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK," } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Robert Hirschhorn and Michael F. Braun, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Scott Graham, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 61229.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. KATHLEEN CAROL BOYT, Appellant.\nOpinion filed December 3, 1985.\nRehearing denied February 4, 1986.\nCLARK, C.J., and GOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., dissenting.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Robert Hirschhorn and Michael F. Braun, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Scott Graham, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0403-01", "first_page_order": 415, "last_page_order": 431 }