{ "id": 5538801, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LARRY E. DAVIS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Davis", "decision_date": "1986-04-04", "docket_number": "No. 61596", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "63", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 55" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911203 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 P.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10435589 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/657/1263-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Kan. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 513541 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" }, { "page": "1053" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/223/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 So. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9645691, 2548495 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/314/0322-01", "/ala/294/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ala. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 2544692, 2546957, 2548495 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/294/0763-02", "/ala/294/0763-03", "/ala/294/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 So. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9645633, 1744359 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/314/0318-01", "/ala-app/55/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ala. App. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala. App.", "case_ids": [ 1744359 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/55/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Cal. Rptr. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. Supp. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6041109 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/64/Supp. 43-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.W.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9954061 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/607/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11035152 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/459/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ind. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1756008 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/233/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Neb. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2627871 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/190/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2592027 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/362/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3229932 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/187/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891828 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3434974 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 727, "char_count": 12871, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.231876571930888e-07, "percentile": 0.6058426572360011 }, "sha256": "28093cfb856cae6ed0978799a283b71c547c6986f3d6382d15bfe99b3e0ad595", "simhash": "1:ba0393b1e68c24de", "word_count": 2131 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:02.041464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LARRY E. DAVIS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Larry Davis, was charged by criminal information with two counts of bribery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 33\u20141) and one count of theft by deception (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(b)(1)) in the circuit court of Winnebago County. At the close of evidence, the court directed verdicts on the two counts charging the defendant with the bribery of a Department of Corrections counselor, Curtis Lee Cottrell, but the jury found the defendant guilty of theft by deception. The defendant was sentenced to 5 years\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed (131 Ill. App. 3d 264), and we granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal under our Rule 315 (94 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nThe question presented is whether a conviction for theft by deception was proper without proof that the victim transferred the property to the accused in reliance on the defendant\u2019s deceptive conduct.\nThe undisputed evidence was that the defendant, while an inmate at the Sheridan Correctional Center, was told by a counselor at the prison, Curtis Lee Cottrell, that he could be released before the completion of his sentence if Cottrell were to use his influence on the defendant\u2019s behalf. The defendant, who was serving concurrent two-year sentences for theft and parole violations, was released after serving eight months. (An official of the Department of Corrections explained the defendant\u2019s early release. He testified that the defendant was released through the \u201cforced release\u201d program through which eligible inmates are released before completing their sentences in order to relieve overcrowding at the institution.)\nOn the evening of his release the defendant received a phone call from Cottrell in which Cottrell demanded $2,000 in payment. The defendant was unable to make the payment, but he and Cottrell agreed that Davis would contact inmates at Sheridan and offer an early release for payment of an agreed-upon amount. Davis wrote to Kenneth Sanders, an inmate and acquaintance at the correctional center, suggesting that he could arrange Sanders\u2019 release for $4,000. (The record makes no mention of censorship of mail of inmates.) Sanders apparently informed the defendant to contact Ethel Roberts, a friend who was overseeing the rental of Sanders\u2019 house and apartments while he was in prison.\nThe defendant telephoned Roberts on at least three occasions, each time telling her that Sanders wanted her to pay the defendant $4,000 for his release. Roberts testified that she did not believe the defendant was capable of arranging an early release for Sanders and stated that she considered Davis to be a \u201cphony.\u201d She did, however, tell Sanders that the defendant had contacted her and also notified agents of the Department of Law Enforcement of the defendant\u2019s proposal. Sanders had already turned over Davis\u2019 letter to a guard at the prison.\nAgents from the Department arranged to accompany Roberts to a meeting with Davis at a Rockford motel. The agents prepared to videotape the meeting from a van parked outside the motel and to record any conversations with the defendant by means of microphones hidden in Robert\u2019s clothing. The video and audio tapes were received into evidence and played for the jury.\nThe evidence, including the tapes, showed that Cottrell drove the defendant to the motel parking lot where Davis met Roberts and agent Ronald Andrei, who was posing as Roberts\u2019 son-in-law. (Cottrell remained in his car and did not participate in the meeting. He subsequently resigned from the Department of Corrections after he was suspended and recommended for discharge. The record does not disclose the criminal proceedings, if any, brought against Cottrell.) Davis represented to Roberts and Andrei that his uncle was a Federal judge in Chicago and a close friend of the Governor. He said that his uncle would be able to arrange \u201ca full pardon\u201d for Sanders. The representations were, of course, false. He said that his uncle had arranged for the defendant\u2019s early release, and that Sanders could similarly be released upon payment of $5,000. Agent Andrei questioned the defendant as to when Sanders would be released, why the demand had been increased to $5,000, and whether Davis was certain the scheme would be successful. Andrei and Roberts expressed approval of the arrangements, and Andrei, satisfied that sufficient evidence had been obtained, signaled to other agents in the area to move in and arrest the defendant. Before they did, Davis accepted from Andrei an envelope containing $1,150 in marked currency.\nOne commits theft by deception when he \u201cknowingly *** [ojbtains by deception control over the property of the owner\u201d and \u201cintends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(b)(1).) Deception, as defined in section 15\u20144 for application to the theft provisions of our criminal code (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 16, Committee Comments, at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1977)), \u201cmeans knowingly to create or confirm another\u2019s impression which is false and which the offender does not believe to be true ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 15\u20144(a).) The plain language of section 15\u20144 makes clear that an accused must create or confirm a false impression in his victim in order to satisfy the legislative definition of deception. Contrary to the appellate court\u2019s holding here, it is obvious that one would not be able to create or confirm a false impression in a person who knows that the accused\u2019s representations are false. Consequently, reliance by the victim on the defendant\u2019s deceptive conduct must be proved under our statute to permit a conviction of theft by deception.\nApart from this analysis of the statute, decisional authority requires the conclusion that the victim must have relied on the defendant\u2019s representations.\nThe ancestor of the theft-by-deception statute is the statute which stated the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses. (People v. Gordon (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 282, 285.) Decisions under an ancestor or prior statute will be followed unless the language of the later statute shows a contrary legislative intendment. (1A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 22.30, at 265 (1985).) In Simmons v. People (1900), 187 Ill. 327, this court considered the sufficiency of an indictment charging the defendant with obtaining property by false pretenses when, the defendant pointed out, the indictment failed to allege that the victim relied on the defendant\u2019s misrepresentation. The defendant in Simmons had caused the owner of a tract of land to sign a deed conveying the land to him by falsely representing to the owner that he was the agent for an investment syndicate. The court, in concluding that the motion to quash the indictment should have been sustained, held that to constitute the offense it was necessary that the property be obtained by means of the false pretenses, though the statute did not explicitly require this. 187 Ill. 327, 330-31.\nThe holding in People v. Gruber (1935), 362 Ill. 278, is supportive of Simmons in regard to requiring reliance on the false representation. There the defendant was convicted of obtaining a signature to a written instrument by false pretenses, an offense closely similar to obtaining property by false pretenses. The defendant made the hardly persuasive argument that the false invoices which he used to divert payments for his own use were too remote in time from his actually obtaining the fruits of his fraud, and consequently his misrepresentations were not such as to deceive the victim. This court held that \u201cthe real point [was] not the remoteness in time of making, but the causal connection between such representations and the obtaining of the property by means of them.\u201d 362 Ill. 278, 288.\nThese decisions conform to the general holding that the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses requires a showing that the intended victim relied on the defendant\u2019s misrepresentations and was deceived. State v. Hauck (1973), 190 Neb. 534, 209 N.W.2d 580; Knopp v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 435, 120 N.E.2d 268; Harwei, Inc. v. State (Ind. App. 1984), 459 N.E.2d 52; City of Kansas City v. Fritz (Mo. App. 1980), 607 S.W.2d 837; People v. Lorenzo (1976), 64 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 43, 135 Cal. Rptr. 337; Lambert v. State (1975), 55 Ala. App. 242, 314 So. 2d 318 cert. denied (1975), 294 Ala. 763, 314 So. 2d 322; see also W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law sec. 90, at 659-60 (1972); Clark & Marshall, Crimes sec. 12.23, at 815 (6th ed. 1958).\nWe have not examined the question, but other jurisdictions have held that reliance on the misrepresentations must be shown for a conviction of theft by deception. In Kansas the offense is defined as\n\u201cany one of the following acts done with intent to deprive the owner permanently of the possession, use or benefit of the owner\u2019s property:\n(b) Obtaining by deception control over property.\u201d (Kan. Stat. Ann. sec. 21-3701(b) (1977).)\nThe defendant in State v. Finch (1978), 223 Kan. 398, 573 P.2d 1048, had switched sales tags from dresses which were on sale to two higher priced dresses he wished to purchase. He was allowed to pay the sales-tag price and take the dresses, even though the cashier had been notified of the defendant\u2019s deception. He was arrested outside of the store. The court, in reversing his conviction of theft by deception, stated:\n\u201c[I]n order to convict a defendant of theft by deception *** the state must prove that the defendant with the required intent obtained control over another\u2019s property by means of a false statement or representation. To do so the state must prove that the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 223 Kan. 398, 404, 573 P.2d 1048, 1053.\nThe Supreme Court of Utah reached the same conclusion in State v. Jones (Utah 1982), 657 P.2d 1263. The court construed the theft-by-deception statute, under which a person commits the offense \u201cif he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof\u201d (Utah Code Ann., sec. 76\u20146\u2014405(1) (1978)), to require reliance by the victim as an element of the offense. The court, in upholding the conviction, stated:\n\u201cIt is clear from the face of the statute that reliance by the victim is an element of the crime of theft by deception. In context, obtaining property \u2018by deception\u2019 can only mean \u2018by means of deception.\u2019 Deception, followed by transfer of property to the deceiver does not add up to theft by deception without the causal element of reliance.\u201d 657 P.2d 1263, 1267.\nThus, from decisions as well as from a literal reading of the statute, we judge that, as in prosecutions for obtaining property by false pretenses, the prosecution must show under our theft-by-deception statute reliance by the victim on the deceptive conduct.\nThe State states that in the event we hold that the victim\u2019s reliance on the deceptive conduct is a prerequisite to conviction for theft by deception, under Rule 615(b)(3) (87 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(3)), we should reduce the conviction to one for attempted theft. The defendant concedes that \u201c[t]he State did, in fact, prove [him] guilty of attempted theft beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d The propriety of the State\u2019s contention is illustrated in W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law sec. 90, at 660 (1972):\n\u201c[F]or false pretenses it is required that the victim pass title to his property in reliance upon the swindler\u2019s misrepresentation.\nThus if the victim, although he passes title, does not believe the misrepresentation, the crime is not committed. He may pass title, though knowing the defendant to be lying, in order to be able to prosecute him for the crime; but the prosecution for the completed crime (though not for the attempt) must fail for lack of the element of reliance.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, substitute a judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted theft by deception (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 2\u20149(b), 8\u20144; see also People v. Elmore (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 10), and remand the cause to the circuit court of Winnebago County for sentencing.\nJudgments reversed; judgment entered here; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Mary Kay Schick, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Marcia L. Friedl, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 61596.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LARRY E. DAVIS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed April 4, 1986.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Mary Kay Schick, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Marcia L. Friedl, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 67, "last_page_order": 75 }