{ "id": 5539312, "name": "BOARD OF CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS OF THE AMERICAS, INC., Appellant, v. J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. v. Johnson", "decision_date": "1986-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 61862", "first_page": "542", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 542" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715038 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779997 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780023 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441090 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2842750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857505 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2761438 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334663 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780023 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2761438 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334663 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0125-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 726, "char_count": 15870, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.7012027652552775e-07, "percentile": 0.8929258037823827 }, "sha256": "770666b13b607241136a35aa20afc8f638775cad41ade3034034d41d8adab98e", "simhash": "1:9fabc5b31455f0c2", "word_count": 2455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:02.041464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BOARD OF CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS OF THE AMERICAS, INC., Appellant, v. J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, the Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas, Inc. (Board), is a not-for-profit corporation that issues certificates to safety professionals who pass examinations it conducts. In October 1981, the Board purchased land in Savoy, Illinois, on which it constructed its corporate office. In August 1982, the Board applied for a partial real estate tax exemption, which was denied by the Champaign County board of review in March 1983. The Illinois Department of Revenue affirmed the denial. On review of the Department\u2019s decision, the Director of the Department again denied the Board\u2019s request for a tax exemption.\nThe Board then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Champaign County. The circuit court held that the legislative exemption for property used for \u201cmechanical\u201d purposes in section 19.10 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of article IX, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, sec. 6); that the record supported the Department\u2019s finding that the Board\u2019s property was not used exclusively or primarily for charitable or educational purposes; and that the denial of a tax exemption to the Board did not violate equal protection. The circuit court thus affirmed the Department\u2019s decision and entered a judgment against the Board. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (103 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), the Board appealed directly to this court from the circuit court\u2019s order declaring the statutory exemption for property used for mechanical purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) unconstitutional.\nAccording to its articles of incorporation, the Board was established by the American Society of Safety Engineers in 1969 \u201c[f]or charitable, scientific, and educational purposes and to promote the advancement of safety through the issuance of a certificate to any individual competent to be designated as a \u2018Certified Safety Professional\u2019 ***.\u201d The Board is now sponsored by four organizations: the American Society of Safety Engineers, the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the Systems Safety Society, and the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.\nTo achieve its purposes, the Board offers an examination twice a year at 25 to 30 locations throughout the United States and overseas. The exam is prepared in conjunction with another organization known as the Professional Examination Service and consists of two parts: a core exam covering six areas of knowledge (basic and applied sciences, safety-program management and evaluation, fire prevention and protection, equipment and facilities, environmental agents, and systems product safety), and an advanced exam leading to certification as a \u201csafety professional\u201d in one of five categories (comprehensive practice, engineering, management, systems safety, or products safety). The core exam may be taken by any applicant who has achieved the required academic training in the field of safety and has at least one year of professional safety experience. If an applicant is currently a registered professional engineer or is certified by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene or the American Board of Health Physics, the core exam is waived. Only a person who has passed the core exam or who meets the criteria for waiver may take the advanced exam and be certified as a \u201csafety professional.\u201d The Board charges a fee to take an exam, to retake a section that an applicant has failed, and to renew a certification.\nThere are currently about 5,500 safety professionals in good standing residing in all 50 States and 16 foreign countries, 358 of whom live in Illinois. In addition to the preparation and administration of the exams, the Board maintains a library of standards and publications relating to the safety profession and publishes a newsletter three times a year.\nThe Board contends that its property is exempt from taxation because its activities fall within the statutory exemption for property used for school \u201cor other educational purposes\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.1). Relying on Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125, the Board argues that a taxpayer need not be a school offering classroom instruction to qualify for an exemption for \u201ceducational purposes,\u201d and that, like the taxpayer in American Medical Colleges, the Board uses its property to improve educational standards in its field, to publish newsletters, to administer examinations, and to maintain a library of relevant material.\nHowever, the Board\u2019s reliance on American Medical Colleges is misplaced. The holding in that case was that an organization that is created by tax-exempt institutions that join together to function more efficiently is also entitled to an exemption. (See Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125, 129.) In the present case, the organizations that sponsor the Board are not themselves tax exempt. Moreover, since the State does not license or register safety professionals, the Board\u2019s'activities do not \u201c \u2018substantially lessen[ ] what would otherwise be a governmental function and obligation.\u2019 \u201d (Milward v. Paschen (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 302, 308.) The Board cannot claim an exemption for activities that would not entitle its sponsors to an exemption. Thus, the Board does not meet the requirements for an exemption for property used for educational purposes.\nSimilarly, the Board\u2019s contention that it is entitled to a tax exemption because its property is used exclusively for charitable purposes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.7) must fail. The criteria for determining whether an organization qualifies for this exemption as set out in Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 149, 156-57, include the requirements that the organization benefit the public at large, reduce the burdens of government, and derive its funds from public and private charity. However, the Board\u2019s activities benefit primarily a particular class of people, namely safety professionals, and only indirectly the general public. Moreover, the public benefits of the activities of the members of the safety profession are the result of services rendered by those members, who would perform the same function with or without Board certification. Further, the Board\u2019s activities do not reduce the State\u2019s burdens since, as noted above, the State does not license or register safety-professionals. Finally, the Board derives its funds from examination and renewal fees, and not from public or private charity.\nThe Board next contends that the legislative exemption for property used for \u201cmechanical\u201d purposes in section 19.10 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.10) is constitutional and applicable to its property. According to the Board, the word \u201cmechanical\u201d has historically denoted \u201cscientific\u201d or \u201crelated to the study of engineering.\u201d Because its primary function consists of certifying persons educated in various fields of science and technology, the Board argues that its property falls within the statutory exemption for property used for \u201cmechanical\u201d purposes. Further, the Board argues, the respondents have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality that must be accorded to legislative enactments (Livingston v. Ogilvie (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 9, 12), and have failed to sustain their burden of showing that the statute is invalid (Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255).\nHowever, statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed strictly in favor of taxation (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 390), and the party claiming an exemption has the burden of proving clearly and conclusively that the property in question falls within both the constitutional authorization and the terms of the statute under which the exemption is claimed (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 390; People ex rel. Kelly v. Avery Coonley School (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 113, 115). In the present case, the Board has not met its burden.\nArticle IX, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only *** property used exclusively for *** school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, sec. 6.)\nThe language used to describe property that is eligible for exemption with appropriate legislation does not authorize an exemption for \u201cmechanical purposes.\u201d In International College of Surgeons v. Brenza (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 141, this court struck down a legislative exemption for property used for \u201cphilosophical\u201d purposes. Similarly, we hold an exemption for property used for \u201cmechanical\u201d purposes invalid because such an exemption exceeds the scope of article IX, section 6, of our constitution. Even if \u201cmechanical purposes\u201d is deemed a subcategory of \u201cscientific purposes,\u201d the exemption is still invalid because the constitution does not authorize an exemption for property used for scientific purposes, either.\nFinally, the Board argues that denying its claim to a tax exemption violates equal protection because it is similarly situated to other organizations that have been granted tax-exempt status. However, in the cases cited by the Board, the court found that the taxpayers were entitled to a constitutionally authorized statutory exemption. In this respect, the Board is not similarly situated to those organizations, and its equal protection argument must therefore fail.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK,\ndissenting:\nAs an institution of justice in a government of laws and not men, this court derives its respect from the soundness of reasoning and correct application of precedent in its decisions. The majority holds that the Board does not qualify for a tax exemption for property used for school or \u201cother educational purposes\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 120, par. 500.1). I cannot agree with today\u2019s decision, for it rests upon a foundation that bristles with obvious and profound analytical error.\nIn my judgment the Board stands in a position analogous to the plaintiff in Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125, where this court held that the statutory exemption for property used for school or other educational purposes was satisfied. The Board, like the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges, utilizes its property to develop and improve educational standards in its field and curricula at various colleges and universities in Illinois, publishes newsletters, administers examinations, and maintains a library.\nNotwithstanding the substantial similarity in educational activities performed by the Board and the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges, the majority states that the Board has misplaced its reliance on American Medical Colleges. According to the majority, American Medical Colleges does not support the Board\u2019s position because \u201c[t]he holding in that case was that an organization that is created by tax-exempt institutions that join together to function more efficiently is also entitled to an exemption.\u201d 112 Ill. 2d at 546.\nAlthough the holding of American Medical Colleges is quite clear, it certainly is not to be found in today\u2019s majority opinion. The majority\u2019s recital of the rule of law purportedly announced by this court in American Medical Colleges is a misstatement of the true holding and law of that case. Contrary to the majority\u2019s assertion, there is no discussion whatsoever in American Medical Colleges regarding the tax status of the organizations that created the plaintiff. Nowhere in the opinion did this court state that the plaintiff was entitled to tax exemption because its creators were tax-exempt institutions. In fact the opinion never even mentions who ereated the plaintiff.\nIn American Medical Colleges, this court focused not upon the taxing status of the entities creating or sponsoring the plaintiff, but upon the use made of the property in dispute. In rejecting the contention that tax exemption should be limited to property where classes are conducted or courses are taught, this court plainly stated: \u201cThe test is use, not ownership or proximity to classroom work.\u201d (17 Ill. 2d 125, 128). Recognizing that tax-exemption provisions must be strictly construed in favor of taxation (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 390), the court concluded that there could be no doubt that the plaintiff\u2019s services in improving educational standards satisfied the property-use test. 17 Ill. 2d 125,129.\nIn underscoring the fact that plaintiff was not precluded from tax exemption for not offering a course of study, the court observed that the \u201cfunctions to which plaintiff\u2019s property is devoted are identical to those which would afford exemption if conducted separately by the member institutions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Association of American Medical Colleges v. Lorenz (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 125, 129.) The court did not, however, find that the plaintiff\u2019s member institutions were tax exempt. That question was not even before the court. Too, it is not before this court to decide, as it does in a single conclusory sentence, that \u201cthe organizations that sponsor the Board are not themselves tax exempt.\u201d (112 Ill. 2d at 546.) That the inquiry focuses solely on the functions for which the organization uses its property, without regard to its sponsors, is again evident in this court\u2019s statement in American Medical Colleges that \u201c[w]here the functions themselves qualify for exemption it does not matter that.they are performed by a separate organization [e.g., the plaintiff] rather than by the respective member institutions.\u201d (17 Ill. 2d 125, 129.) Further, the majority\u2019s conclusion that the Board \u201ccannot claim an exemption for activities that would not entitle its sponsors to an exemption\u201d (112 Ill. 2d at 546) flies in the face of the fact that virtually the same activities qualified the plaintiff in American Medical Colleges for a tax exemption for property used for educational purposes.\nCiting Milward v. Paschen (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 302, 308, the majority also concludes that because the State neither licenses nor registers safety professionals, the Board\u2019s activities do not \u201c \u2018 \u201csubstantially lessen[ ] what would otherwise be a governmental function and obligation.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (112 Ill. 2d at 546.) However, the majority fails to acknowledge that this court eschewed any application of the aforementioned test in American Medical Colleges, which, in full context, previously required that a private organization provide \u201ca course of study which substantially lessen[ed] what would otherwise be a governmental function and obligation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 387, 392.) Clearly, this is no longer a prerequisite for exemption since American Medical Colleges holds that an organization which otherwise satisfies the property-use test need not offer a course of study.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard A. Puglisi and Mary G. Gorski, of Champaign, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee J. Thomas Johnson.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Champaign (Trisha Crowley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Beverly Jean Munds." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 61862.\nBOARD OF CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS OF THE AMERICAS, INC., Appellant, v. J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue, et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed June 6, 1986.\nCLARK, C.J., dissenting.\nBernard A. Puglisi and Mary G. Gorski, of Champaign, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee J. Thomas Johnson.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Champaign (Trisha Crowley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Beverly Jean Munds." }, "file_name": "0542-01", "first_page_order": 554, "last_page_order": 563 }