{ "id": 5542218, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT H. BARRIOS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Barrios", "decision_date": "1986-09-17", "docket_number": "No. 62673", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "278", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2882811 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2891168 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907985 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3263206 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2799906 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428859 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152711 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193460 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3411607 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2493104 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/386/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565900 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0197-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 801, "char_count": 18724, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0612089492268946e-07, "percentile": 0.7565668886487205 }, "sha256": "381190e78a818b630d183469f080d3f2b95a10e80f32c37943e58af577ec6bec", "simhash": "1:b54296d3165585eb", "word_count": 3128 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:01.218648+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT H. BARRIOS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Carroll County, the defendant, Vincent H. Barrios, was convicted of falsely stating on a driver\u2019s license application that his license or privilege to drive was not revoked, and of driving with a revoked license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95^2, par. 6 \u2014 303.) He was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years on the perjury conviction and 364 days for driving on a revoked license. The appellate court affirmed (136 Ill. App. 3d 197), and we granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal under our Rule 315 (103 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nThe evidence shows that on April 23, 1984, Deputy Sheriff Dave Dyson observed the defendant, with whom he was acquainted, driving an auto, while in the company of Barbara Kellam. Believing that the defendant\u2019s license had been revoked, Dyson by car radio requested a license check on Vincent H. Barrios, with a birthdate of September 30, 1937. (The birthdate was on file at the sheriff\u2019s office.) When the check showed that the Secretary of State had revoked the license, Dyson stopped the defendant. He produced an Illinois driver\u2019s license issued March 13, 1984, and Dyson then ran another license check using the file number stamped on the license the defendant exhibited. The check showed that license to be valid. Informing the defendant of the discrepancy, Dyson ordered him to proceed to the sheriff\u2019s office. The license the defendant produced, issued on March 13, 1984, showed September 30, 1941, as the defendant\u2019s birthdate.\nAt the sheriff\u2019s office, the defendant, who had been accompanied by Kellam, showed papers pertaining to driving privileges in Iowa. As they did not concern driving privileges in Illinois, Dyson rechecked the status of the defendant\u2019s driving privileges with the Secretary of State under the 1937 and the 1941 birthdates. That showed that the defendant had both a revoked and a valid license under the respective birthdates. The defendant was at that time charged only with the offense of driving with a revoked license in violation of section 6\u2014 303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 6-303).\nWhen Dyson requested abstracts of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s licenses, the Secretary of State forwarded a certificate which stated that \u201can 0[r]der of Revocation, was entered against the driving privileges of Vincent H. Barrios, DOB: September 30, 1937, *** on May 14, 1980, and said Revocation is in effect as of this date,\u201d that is, June 25, 1984. Accompanying the certificate was a copy of the order of revocation resulting from the defendant\u2019s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, and an order of extension stating that the May 14, 1980, revocation had been extended to May 20, 1982, due to the defendant\u2019s conviction for driving while his license was revoked. The defendant admits his license was never reinstated under the provision of section 6 \u2014 208(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 208(b)).\nOn April 30, 1984, a criminal information was filed against the defendant charging the offense of perjury (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 2) for knowingly and falsely responding \u201cNo\u201d to the following question on his March 13,1984, driver's license application:\n\u201cIs your drivers [sic] license or privilege to obtain a license suspended, revoked, cancelled or refused in this or any state? (If answer is \u2018yes\u2019, give date, reason, state, etc. below.)\u201d\nThe record shows that Wanda Stewart, service clerk at the Chadwick Driver\u2019s Facility (the facility), testified that on March 9, 1984, the defendant applied for a driver\u2019s license. For identification, the defendant produced an Iowa driver\u2019s license bearing a birthdate of September 30, 1941, and an Iowa Department of Transportation form. Being unfamiliar with the Iowa form, Stewart consulted her supervisor, Doug Queckboerner, to insure that the defendant \u201cwas cleared in Iowa.\u201d After doing so, Stewart asked the defendant whether his name and birthdate as shown on the Iowa license were correct; the defendant responded \u201cYes.\u201d Stewart entered the information on the application. Stewart then proceeded to process the application, beginning with asking the defendant whether his license or privilege to obtain a license was suspended or revoked. The defendant replied \u201cNo.\u201d The application, however, could not be completed until the defendant had a physician complete a State medical form because he had stated that he suffered from epilepsy. On March 13, the defendant returned to the facility with the medical form completed. After answering the remaining questions, the defendant signed the application at Stewart\u2019s request, affirming the correctness of the information he had provided. The defendant signed the application directly under the portion of the application which read:\n\u201cI HEREBY AFFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION I HAVE FURNISHED IN THIS APPLICATION FOR LICENSE IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.\u201d\nThe State, as evidence of the defendant\u2019s knowledge that his license and privilege to obtain a license were revoked, introduced a transcript from a November 1983 proceeding in Illinois in which the defendant was charged with driving on a revoked license. The judge read the following portion of the transcript to the jury, overruling the defendant\u2019s objections that the transcript was \u201chighly prejudicial [and] *** not necessarily probative,\u201d and improperly introduced into evidence his commission of prior crimes.\n\u201cTHE COURT: You are charged on March of \u201882 with driving while your license was revoked and no valid registration ***. Do you have a driver\u2019s license in Illinois at this time?\nMR. BARRIOS: No, I have a \u2014 I don\u2019t \u2014 I have an Illinois driver\u2019s license.\nTHE COURT: Do you know your privilege to drive in the State of Illinois is revoked?\nMR. BARRIOS: No, I don\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m telling you it is. ***\n* * *\nTHE COURT: Do you have any idea why your license is revoked?\nMR. BARRIOS: I would imagine \u2014 I really don\u2019t know unless it was\u2014\nTHE COURT: Could it be for a drunk driving conviction?\nMR. BARRIOS: That\u2019s what I said it could be for\u2014 OMVI [operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated] conviction. I do have my license back and I had my bond SR22 filed. I do have my driver\u2019s license back in Iowa.\nTHE COURT: Did you advise the Iowa authorities you were revoked in Illinois?\nMR. BARRIOS: Yes, I did. I had to do the whole thing over again. I had to get a special permit, take both tests over again, and some kind of special fee.\nTHE COURT: The Secretary of State advises you are presently revoked in Illinois, your driving privilege.\nMR. BARRIOS: Then I\u2019m totally unaware of that. I\u2019m aware of it now.\u201d\nThe judge then informed the jury that the transcript \u201cwas offered for the sole and limited purpose of showing knowledge of the defendant of his status as a driver.\u201d\nThe defendant testified that in 1980 his Illinois and Iowa driver\u2019s licenses had been revoked upon convictions for driving while intoxicated; however, he said, in 1983 he obtained an Iowa driver\u2019s license. He stated that in 1981 he had received a notice from the Secretary of State that his Illinois license was revoked; but he believed that such revocation was in effect only until sometime in 1982, after which time he thought he was eligible to reapply for an Illinois license. He testified that in March of 1984 he applied at the facility for an Illinois driver\u2019s license. He said he informed Wanda Stewart that his Illinois driver\u2019s license had been revoked earlier, but that he now had a valid Iowa license. After checking with her supervisor, Stewart told him that as long as he met the requirement for reinstating his license in Iowa, that was sufficient to reinstate his Illinois license. Furthermore, he testified that for a number of years he did not know that 1941 was his year of birth. While in Iowa he obtained a birth certificate and that was the reason that his Iowa license bore 1941 as the year of birth. However, when committed to jail in Illinois, he gave 1937 as the year of birth because, he said, it was immaterial to him which year was indicated.\nKellam corroborated the defendant\u2019s testimony that Stewart and Queckboerner informed him that possession of a valid Iowa license would qualify him to apply for an Illinois license.\nStewart and Queckboerner, however, denied that the defendant had informed them that his Illinois license had been revoked, and that if he had done so, further investigation would have been required. Too, both denied telling the defendant that having a valid Iowa license was sufficient to obtain a license in Illinois.\nConsidering the evidence, we judge that the defendant was shown to have been guilty of penury beyond a reasonable doubt. Perjury is committed when a person, under oath or affirmation required by law, \u201cmakes a false statement, material to the issue or point in question, which he does not believe to be true.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 2(a); In re Obartuch (1944), 386 Ill. 323, 332; People v. Toner (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 688, 692.) A conviction for perjury will not lie when a person truthfully answers a question subject to various interpretations. (People v. White (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 416, 420; People v. Watson (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 649, 651.) A question requiring a yes or no answer \u201cmust be stated in such a precise way as not to require interpretation or construction by those who are required to answer them under oath.\u201d People v. White (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 416, 421.\nThe question asked of the defendant concerning revocation is plainly stated and requires no interpretation. An applicant is called upon simply to answer yes or no to the question whether either his license or privilege to obtain a license is suspended or revoked.\nThe record properly shows that the defendant\u2019s license and privilege to obtain a license were revoked at the time of application, and that the defendant knew of that revocation. Once a person\u2019s license or privilege to drive is revoked, it may not be automatically restored. (Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 391; People v. Turner (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 183, 186.) Under the Code, reinstatement of a license or privilege may be effected only in the following manner:\n\u201cAny person whose license or permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked shall not be entitled to have such license or permit or privilege renewed or restored. However, such person may make application for a license as provided by Section 6\u2014 106 of this Act:\n(1) If the revocation was for a cause which has been removed, at any time; or\n(2) After the expiration of 1 year from the date of revocation, and upon payment of the reinstatement fee ***.\nIn either event, the Secretary of State shall not issue such license unless and until he is satisfied after investigation of such person that to grant the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways will not endanger the public safety or welfare.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95372, par. 6-208(b).)\nSection 6 \u2014 106(b) in part provides:\n\u201cEvery application shall state the name, social security number, zip code, date of birth, sex, and residence address of the applicant; briefly describe the applicant; state whether the applicant has theretofore been licensed as a driver, and, if so, when and by what state or country, and whether any such license has ever been can-celled, suspended, revoked or refused, and, if so, the date and reason for such cancellation, suspension, revocation or refusal; shall include an affirmation by the applicant that all information set forth is true and correct; and shall bear the applicant\u2019s signature ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6-106(b).\nThe evidence showed that, by certification of the Secretary of State, a notice of revocation and an order of extension were mailed to the defendant on May 8, 1980, and July 14, 1981, respectively. The notice of revocation read:\n\u00ab*** IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any and all Illinois drivers licenses or permits issued to such person, the privilege of obtaining a license as well as the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this State, be and are hereby REVOKED, effective this date, [May 14, 1980] ***.\u201d\nThe order of extension stated:\n\u00ab*** IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that you will be ineligible to apply for the restoration of your driving privileges for an additional period of one year or until May 20, 1982.\u201d\nThe defendant admitted receiving both of these documents.\nConsidering the plain language of the notice of revocation and the order of extension, the defendant\u2019s admission that he received these documents, and his admission that his license was not reinstated according to the requirements of the Code, we judge that the record clearly shows that the defendant, at the time of application, knew that his license and privilege to obtain a license were revoked. The truthful answer to the application\u2019s question was not no, but yes.\nThe defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court read into evidence the transcript from the November 18, 1983, proceeding. He argues on appeal that admission of the transcript denied his right to confront witnesses; that the transcript was inadmissible hearsay; and that the judge\u2019s reading of the transcript was prejudicial, in that a jury is readily susceptible to being influenced by the trial judge (citing People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99).\nAt trial the defendant objected to the admission of the transcript on the grounds that the transcript was highly prejudicial, not probative, and made inappropriate reference to two prior charges against him. Objections at trial on specific grounds, of course, waive all other grounds of objection. (People v. Jones (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 300, 307.) The defendant has waived the right to object on the grounds he now asserts on appeal.\nIn any event, there was no error in the admission of the transcript. The defendant\u2019s admission of receiving the orders of revocation and extension demonstrated clearly that at the time of application he knew that his license and privilege to obtain a license were revoked. We would observe that the trial court carefully instructed the jury that the transcript was admitted into evidence solely for the purpose of showing the defendant\u2019s knowledge as to the status of his driving privileges. It should be added that the defendant, on oral argument and in his briefs, admits here that he did not take the steps under the Code to reinstate his license.\nThe defendant argues that the trial court abused discretion in imposing a four-year sentence on his perjury conviction. He maintains that a \u201clengthy\u201d sentence is appropriate \u201conly in aggravated circumstances such as giving false testimony in major trials, not for being untruthful on a driver\u2019s license application.\u201d In arguing that the sentence is disproportionate to the offense, he states, by way of comparison, that the sentence he received for armed robbery in 1965 was five years and that his other convictions resulted in fines or jail terms of 30 days or less.\nThe defendant relies upon City of Evanston v. Connelly (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 890, where the defendant was sentenced to 45 days in jail for driving on a revoked license obtained by falsely stating his driving privileges had never been revoked or suspended. That decision is distinguishable. The defendant in Connelly was convicted only of driving with a revoked license, not of perjury. Driving with a revoked license is a Class A misdemeanor, calling for a sentence of \u201cany term less than one year\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014 3(a)(1)); perjury is a Class 3 felony, calling for a sentence of \u201cnot less than 2 years and not more than 5 years\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-l(a)(6)). Too, in Connelly there is no mention of a prior criminal history. The defendant here has a remarkable record: 10 convictions for driving either without a valid license, no license, or with a revoked or suspended license, petty theft, grand larceny, two assault convictions, numerous intoxication offenses, armed robbery, embezzlement, and two convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol. Lastly, the defendant, as the trial court found, lied persistently under oath.\nIt has been consistently held by this court that \u201cwhere it is claimed that the punishment imposed is excessive, although within the limitations prescribed by the legislature, that sentence should not be disturbed unless it is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly in excess of the proscriptions of section 11 of article II of the [1870] Illinois constitution which requires that all penalties should be proportioned to the nature of the offense. The trial court is normally in a superior position during the trial and the hearing in aggravation and mitigation to make a sound determination as to the punishment to be imposed than are courts of review.\u201d People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 239, 251-52, citing People v. Hampton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 41, and People v. Taylor (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 417; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11.\nOur affirmance of the defendant\u2019s conviction for perjury, and his admitted failure to have his license reinstated as required by the Code, make it unnecessary to address the defendant\u2019s contention that his conviction for driving while his license was revoked should be reversed. See People v. Turner (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 183, 187 (this court held that a revoked license is restored only upon compliance with the provisions of the Code and not by fraudulently reapplying for a license under an assumed name); City of Evanston v. Connelly (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 890, 892-93 (the appellate court upheld the defendant\u2019s conviction for driving while his license was revoked on the ground that in applying for a new license the defendant falsely stated that his driving privileges had never been revoked or suspended).\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James S. Williams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Mt. Carroll (Kenneth R. Boyle, William L. Browers, and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 62673.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VINCENT H. BARRIOS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 17, 1986.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied December 1, 1986.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James S. Williams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Mt. Carroll (Kenneth R. Boyle, William L. Browers, and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 293, "last_page_order": 306 }