{ "id": 5542454, "name": "In re MICHAEL GEORGE CHERONIS, Attorney, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "In re Cheronis", "decision_date": "1986-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 63237", "first_page": "527", "last_page": "537", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 527" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516292 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857919 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469377 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493936 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122603 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142057 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538384 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493135 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123130 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074610 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167229 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5358816 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0459-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 697, "char_count": 16637, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.477501357029525e-07, "percentile": 0.807178719685974 }, "sha256": "652409df5dc3d67b3a0c13f0846302e68eab7ddf94f2a993c4599a567bc2aa71", "simhash": "1:3b734836381ba008", "word_count": 2634 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:01.218648+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MICHAEL GEORGE CHERONIS, Attorney, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint against the respondent, Michael G. Cheronis, on June 19, 1984, alleging that the respondent failed to preserve the identity of client funds and wrongfully commingled and converted client funds. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the respondent failed to pay over to a client funds to which the client was entitled, engaged in conduct involving fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and moral turpitude, and prejudiced or damaged a client during the course of a professional relationship. Following a hearing, the Hearing Board found that the respondent commingled his client\u2019s funds with his own. Concluding that the respondent\u2019s conduct was not dishonestly motivated, the Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be censured.\nThe Administrator filed exceptions to the report and recommendation of the Hearing Board with the Review Board of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The Review Board found that, on the basis of the facts admitted by the respondent, the respondent had both commingled and converted client funds. The majority of the Review Board recommended that the court suspend the respondent from the practice of law for six months. Two members of the Review Board stated that they would recommend a one-year suspension. The respondent filed in this court exceptions to the recommendation of the Review Board.\nThe respondent was licensed to practice law on November 27, 1972. In late 1980 or early 1981, the respondent undertook the representation of John Venturella, who was a defendant in two criminal proceedings. Following the advice of respondent, on August 3, 1982, Venturella pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Cook County to one of the charges against him. While discussing the plea, Venturella and respondent agreed that respondent would retain, as his fee, one half of the $4,500 that was to be returned to Venturella from Venturella\u2019s $5,000 bond deposit. Respondent agreed to hold Venturella\u2019s half of the bond refund for him until Venturella was released from prison. Because he was unable to obtain cigarettes for Venturella before Venturella was incarcerated, respondent sent Venturella $100 for prison commissary.\nThereafter, upon receiving a check for the bond refund from the clerk of the circuit court, respondent deposited the check into his combined business and personal bank account on August 21, 1982. This account, which was not a client escrow or trust account, was used for personal and business obligations. Within three weeks of depositing the bond money into his account, the respondent had overdrawn the account.\nWithin a month or two after receiving the bond refund and depositing it in his account, the respondent received a letter from Venturella instructing him that respondent was to pay $250 of the bond refund to a person to whom Venturella was indebted; the letter instructed that the balance of Venturella\u2019s portion of the bond refund was to be paid over to Venturella\u2019s father. Respondent wrote to Venturella in January 1983, stating that \u201cthe first $500 is on the way.\u201d Earlier that month or late in the preceding month, the respondent had learned that Venturella had, on November 29, 1982, filed with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission a charge against the respondent in connection with not tendering the funds. (See Rules of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, Rules 2(b), 52.) Respondent admitted before the Hearing Board that, although he paid the $250 debt from Venturella\u2019s funds, he did not forward any portion of the balance of the money to Venturella\u2019s father.\nAfter Venturella was released from incarceration in the early months of 1983, he visited respondent\u2019s office to arrange representation in another matter, and the subject of the bond refund was discussed. Subsequently, respondent paid Venturella $150 on March 11, 1983, and paid him $878.50 on March 28, 1983. Although the respondent was uncertain of the exact date, he repaid Venturella the balance of the amount owed him in the succeeding few months. In addition to having retained respondent to represent him in another matter soon after his release, Venturella has retained respondent to represent him on two other occasions since filing the complaint in the present case; Venturella also referred clients to the respondent for representation after the complaint was filed.\nThe respondent testified before the Hearing Board that, at the time he agreed to represent Venturella, Venturella stated that he would also pay respondent\u2019s fee for representing Venturella\u2019s codefendant, Sonny Cales. Venturella subsequently repudiated the agreement to pay respondent\u2019s fee for representing Cales. Although the record does not indicate when the agreement was repudiated, the respondent stated that his fee for representing Cales amounted to $1,375. The respondent submitted that he had not attempted to collect this fee from either Venturella or Cales, and that he did not intend to pursue the fee in the future. The respondent admitted, rather, that Venturella was entitled to the entire $1,900 remaining with the respondent after the respondent had given $100 to Venturella for prison commissary and paid Venturella\u2019s $250 debt.\nThroughout the period of the respondent\u2019s representation of Venturella, the respondent was beset with severe financial difficulties. He and his wife had invested in a 13-unit apartment building; this investment failed, and the respondent and his wife lost both the apartment building and their home to creditors. Between the time of the deposit of Venturella\u2019s refund check and the final payment to Venturella, respondent\u2019s business account, the account into which the bond refund check had been deposited, was overdrawn on approximately 19 occasions. The account respondent maintained jointly with his wife was also overdrawn on occasion. During February of 1983, the respondent filed for bankruptcy, listing approximately $500,000 in debts.\nIn addition, during 1982 through 1984 the respondent and his family experienced great emotional distress. The respondent stated before the Hearing Board that he had received three phone calls in January, 1982, threatening his death. In connection with the death threats, there was, according to the respondent, an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap respondent\u2019s wife and two of their children. Respondent submitted that he and his wife received periodic counseling from a clinical psychologist in order to adjust to these troubling circumstances.\nThe respondent testified before the Hearing Board that, until he received the complaint against him in the present case, he was not aware that the Code of Professional Responsibility required attorneys to maintain clients\u2019 funds separately from their own. The respondent had on occasion, however, held clients\u2019 funds for them in a safety deposit box, apparently unaware that this practice has been described by this court as highly unprofessional. In re Lingle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 459.\nSoon after receiving notice that Venturella had filed a complaint against him with the Disciplinary Commission, the respondent examined the Code and opened and maintained a separate client trust fund account. The respondent conceded that this trust account had shown a negative balance in a few instances, but indicated that the overdrafts were in small amounts and existed for very short periods of time. The respondent explained that the overdrafts resulted from bank charges and from bank deposits being made late in the day which were not credited to his account until after checks drawn on the account had already been presented for payment. No check issued to a client from this account had ever been returned for lack of sufficient funds in the account.\nThe Hearing Board, in its written report, noted that the respondent admitted every allegation in the Administrator\u2019s complaint, except the conclusions that the respondent had violated various provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based upon the respondent\u2019s testimony, the Hearing Board found that, until Venturella filed the complaint, the respondent was not familiar with the requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility regarding segregation of client funds, and had never had a clients\u2019 trust account. At the hearing, the respondent admitted his noncompliance with the Code, and regretted his error. Two attorneys called as character witnesses on behalf of the respondent testified that the respondent had an excellent reputation for honesty and integrity. The Hearing Board found that the respondent made full restitution to his client, had no prior disciplinary difficulties, and has done substantial amounts of pro bono work. The Hearing Board found that the respondent\u2019s actions constituted improper commingling of client funds; the board concluded, however, that the respondent had no dishonest motive underlying his conduct. Accordingly, the Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be censured by this court. The Administrator filed exceptions to the report and recommendation of the panel.\nOn the basis of the facts established before the Hearing Board, the Review Board concluded that the respondent had both commingled and converted his client\u2019s funds. Although the Review Board questioned whether the respondent knew of the requirement that client funds be segregated, the Review Board agreed that dishonesty was not a motivating factor in the respondent\u2019s actions. The Review Board recommended to this court that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. Two members of the review panel recommended a one-year suspension.\nThe facts admitted by the respondent demonstrate that during the period in question the respondent both commingled and converted his client\u2019s funds. The respondent ignored the duty imposed by Rule 9 \u2014 102(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (103 Ill. 2d R. 9\u2014 102(a)) to deposit his client\u2019s trust fund in a separate, identifiable trust account. The respondent conceded that not only was the balance of the account in which the money was held for Venturella below the amount respondent owed Venturella, but that the account was often overdrawn. The respondent converted his client\u2019s funds when he allowed the balance in the account in which the client\u2019s funds were held to become less than the amount owed the client. (See In re Young (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 98; In re Clay ter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276; but see In re Freel (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 263.) In addition, the respondent failed to send his client\u2019s funds promptly as requested, and required a period of time to make complete restitution to the client.\nAlthough the respondent explained to the Hearing Board that he was unaware of the Code of Professional Responsibility requirement that client\u2019s funds must remain segregated, his lack of knowledge does not excuse his conduct. A common maxim holds that ignorance of the, law is no excuse, and this is particularly true in a case where the person who claims lack of knowledge of a relevant directive is a practicing attorney. It is a paramount obligation of each member of the bar to study the Code of Professional Responsibility and abide by its terms and principles. This court has stated repeatedly that commingling or conversion of clients\u2019 funds will not be countenanced. (See, e.g., In re Young (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 98; In re Cohen (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 133; In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215; In re Grant (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 247; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276.) Commingling and conversion are grounds for suspension (In re Cutrone (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 261; In re Webb (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 360), or, absent mitigating circumstances, disbarment (In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248; In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7).\nWhile each case of attorney misconduct is unique and requires an independent evaluation of its relevant circumstances (see In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215), predictability and fairness require consistency in the sanctions imposed for similar conduct. (In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318.) The respondent contends that In re Young (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 98, is closely analogous to the present case and mandates censure here. In Young, the respondent received from a client approximately $3,200 to be held in escrow. The respondent deposited the money in his personal business account, rather than in a client\u2019s trust account or an escrow account. The balance in the account fell below the amount owed the client, and at least once the account was overdrawn. Finding that the respondent had commingled and converted his client\u2019s funds, this court ordered the respondent censured. Several mitigating factors weighed against a more severe sanction: there was a bona fide dispute between the client and other parties to a real estate transaction which justified the attorney\u2019s retention of his clients\u2019 money, the attorney had not had a dishonest motive, the attorney was candid with the Hearing Board and demonstrated a re.pentant attitude, and the attorney had sufficient other assets to repay the money to his clients. See In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215.\nIn the present case, the respondent admitted that he had never had a clients\u2019 account or an escrow account. The respondent commingled his client\u2019s funds with his own, and converted these funds to his own use. Commingling and conversion of client funds, even absent a dishonest motive, present a substantial risk of harm to the client (see In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276), especially if committed at a time when the attorney is experiencing severe financial difficulties. Unlike in Young, the respondent here knew that he was in significant danger of bankruptcy. By commingling and converting his client\u2019s funds, the respondent jeopardized the client\u2019s ability to recover money rightfully his, and made the client\u2019s ability to obtain the funds subject to the respondent\u2019s questionable ability to pay. When the client finally inquired in person about the money owed him, the respondent did not immediately tender the funds to the client in a lump sum, but paid his debt to the client in installments over a period of months. Because the respondent put his client at substantial risk, in light of respondent\u2019s financial difficulties, of not being able to recover funds entrusted to the respondent, we believe the respondent\u2019s conduct warrants a period of suspension. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 35-37 (1986).\nThe Administrator argues that this court\u2019s decisions in In re Bloom (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 250, and In re Bizar (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 127, support a lengthy suspension of the respondent. We do not agree. In Bloom and Bizar, this court suspended for one year attorneys who commingled and converted client funds. In both cases, however, the conduct underlying the suspensions was more egregious than the respondent\u2019s conduct in the instant case, as the clients in Bloom and Bizar were forced to obtain separate counsel to collect funds rightly due them from their original attorneys. In addition, money was withheld from the clients for years, and required substantial efforts to recover.\nA number of mitigating factors weighing in the respondent\u2019s behalf suggest that a period of suspension shorter than that imposed in Bloom and Bizar is appropriate here: the hearing and review boards found no dishonest motive; the respondent cooperated fully with the Administrator and the Hearing Board, readily producing all documents requested and admitting all improper acts of which he was accused; the respondent expressed remorse over his misdeeds and promptly opened a client trust account; the respondent has made full restitution to the client; and the respondent has performed a great deal of pro bono legal work and had a good reputation in the community. In addition, we find significant the fact that the client who filed the complaint against the respondent promptly retained him for three additional matters, and referred others to the respondent for representation.\nFor the reasons indicated, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.\nRespondent suspended.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "William F. Moran III, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.", "William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and David J. Walker, of counsel), for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 63237.\nIn re MICHAEL GEORGE CHERONIS, Attorney, Respondent.\nOpinion filed December 19, 1986.\nWilliam F. Moran III, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.\nWilliam J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and David J. Walker, of counsel), for respondent." }, "file_name": "0527-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 565 }