{ "id": 3179946, "name": "CARLA STEWART, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., et al., Appellants.)", "name_abbreviation": "Stewart v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1987-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 62345", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "347", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141517 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146759 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141137 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112615 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121664 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112615 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472704 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465119 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-40" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112615 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 704, "char_count": 17052, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0856334830537341e-06, "percentile": 0.985178286456083 }, "sha256": "1be362192976e18c8fbfe9ea459e30566bb7bf57bf5e6d39bc7c1750d4b1aa01", "simhash": "1:89f606d465ef6e0a", "word_count": 2769 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:46:45.751499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CARLA STEWART, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., et al., Appellants.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff\u2019s husband died as a result of work-related injuries while employed by defendant, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. An Industrial Commission arbitrator decided that the decedent\u2019s death benefits should be distributed among the plaintiff (Carla Stewart) and the decedent\u2019s four children from a previous marriage who lived with their natural mother (Nancy Roberts). Plaintiff petitioned the Commission for review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision, and then remarried while the matter was still before the Commission on review and while the decedent\u2019s children were still receiving benefits. The Commission ruled that under this court\u2019s interpretation of section 7(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a)) in Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181, plaintiff\u2019s remarriage did not affect her right to continuing benefits.\nOn appeal, the circuit court of Vermilion County ruled that section 7(a) should be construed to entitle plaintiff to receive only a lump sum equal to two years\u2019 compensation. The Industrial Commission Division of the appellate court reversed the circuit court, concluding that the plain and unambiguous words of the statute entitled plaintiff to continuing benefits since her remarriage occurred while the decedent\u2019s children were still receiving benefits. (135 Ill. App. 3d 661.) A majority of the judges of the appellate court having joined a statement that this case involves a substantial question that warrants consideration by this court, we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Ride 315(a) (103 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nSection 7(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn the event of the remarriage of a widow or widower, where the decedent did not leave surviving any child or children who, at the time of such remarriage, are entitled to compensation benefits under this Act, the surviving spouse shall be paid a lump sum equal to 2 years compensation benefits and all further rights of such widow or widower shall be extinguished.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a).\nPlaintiff contends that the decision in Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181, holding that the statute provides for lifetime benefits to a widow if she remarries while any child of the decedent is entitled to benefits, is dispositive in this case. However, the widow in Interlake was the natural mother of the decedent\u2019s children and was responsible for their care and support, whereas the widow in the present case is the decedent\u2019s second wife and is not responsible for the decedent\u2019s children. Interlake therefore does not govern this case.\nIf we were to apply the holding in Interlake to this case, moreover, it would yield an absurd result. Such an application would appear to require that a first wife whose husband dies childless lose her widow\u2019s benefits if she remarries. A second wife, however, whose deceased husband is survived by children of a former marriage to whom the widow has no responsibility, would receive lifetime benefits if she remarries while any of the decedent\u2019s children is eligible for benefits, but lose her benefits if she remarries after the decedent\u2019s youngest child reaches 18. So anomalous a result demonstrates that at least a latent ambiguity exists in the statute.\nThe very fact that the remarriage provision of the statute is stated in the negative in itself creates an ambiguity. The provision does not state what is to occur in the event that a surviving spouse remarries if the decedent left children who are eligible for benefits at the time of such remarriage; it only states what is to occur if the decedent did not leave children who are eligible for benefits at the time of the surviving spouse\u2019s remarriage. In applying the negative language of the statute in Interlake the court decided that the lump-sum settlement provisions did not apply to a widow who remarried while her children, who were also the decedent\u2019s, were eligible for benefits. In this case it remains for us to decide, since the statute does not expressly state, what is to occur in the context of the facts presented here.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. (People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141.) In determining what that intent is, the court may properly consider not only the language used in a statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. (City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 341; Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, 373.) In construing a statute, the court must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316.\nThe legislature apparently neglected to consider the consequences of the remarriage provision of section 7(a) in the context of facts such as those presented by this case. A reading of section 7(a) as a whole indicates that the primary evil the legislature intended to remedy was the hardship to families whose principal wage earner dies leaving a financially dependent spouse, especially when the surviving spouse is left with minor children to raise as a single parent. The statute presumes the surviving spouse\u2019s dependency upon the decedent, but where there are no dependent children, the surviving spouse\u2019s right to receive benefits terminates upon remarriage. The lump-sum provision of section 7(a) is cl\u00e9arly intended to lessen the disincentive to remarriage that would result from a flat cutoff of benefits. See 2A A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation sec. 64.42 (1983).\nThe statute does not cut off benefits to the surviving spouse upon remarriage where there are minor, dependent children, however, undoubtedly because the children\u2019s care and support continues to be the surviving parent\u2019s, and not the step-parent\u2019s, responsibility. Only if the decedent\u2019s children have reached majority prior to a remarriage does the presumption of the surviving parent\u2019s dependency upon the decedent end in the event of remarriage. While it is true that section 7(a) does not specifically provide an exception to its scheme of benefits for surviving spouses who, like plaintiff in this case, are not responsible for the care and support of the decedent\u2019s dependent children, the intent of the legislature to distinguish between surviving spouses who have dependent children to raise and those who do not is clear. Certainly the legislature did not intend a windfall to surviving second spouses who remarry but who have no responsibility to the decedent\u2019s children that is not available to first spouses where there are no children or to second spouses who do not remarry until after the decedent\u2019s children, to whom they have no financial responsibility, reach majority.\nWe therefore construe the remarriage provision of section 7(a) to require a lump-sum settlement for a widow who, having no responsibility for the care or support of the decedent\u2019s minor children, remarries. Consequently, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission with directions to enter a lump-sum award equal to two years\u2019 compensation.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed; cause remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WARD,\ndissenting:\nI join in Justice Goldenhersh\u2019s dissent.\nI would add that the majority avoids the embarrassment of disclosing that this court no fewer than four times has unsuccessfully sought to convince the legislature of the unwisdom of the provision that we are again considering. Under our constitution\u2019s direction (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 17) that the supreme court make legislative recommendations to the General Assembly, this court in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 urged that \u201cSection 7(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be reconsidered.\u201d Each year the court set out in detail the provisions of the statute and described the court\u2019s holding in Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181. In our last recommendation we referred specifically to the case now before us and to the appellate court\u2019s holding that under section 7(a) the plaintiff was entitled to continuing benefits. This of course followed the interpretation of this court in Interlake. The General Assembly, however, was not swayed by these persistent recommendations.\nThis court, in interpreting a statute has held:\n\u201cWhere the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court\u2019s statement of the legislative intent.\u201d Miller v. Lockett (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483.\nSutherland on Statutory Construction (1984 revision) cites the holdings that \u201clegislative inaction following a contemporaneous and practical interpretation is evidence that the legislature intends to adopt such an interpretation.\u201d (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 49.10, at 407 (4th ed. 1984).) Sutherland states further: \u201cWhere action upon a statute or practical and contemporaneous interpretation has been called to the legislature\u2019s attention, there is more reason to regard the failure of the legislature to change the interpretation as presumptive evidence of its correctness.\u201d (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 49.10, at 408 (4th ed. 1984).) Here the interpretation in Interlake has been formally called four times to the legislature\u2019s attention. The disregard by the legislature is to me a long and clear signal that the holding in Interlake expresses the legislative intention. I fear that some will say, however incorrectly, that the majority\u2019s holding reflects a nearly obsessive effort to reach a result that the majority considers wiser than that intended by the legislature.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE WARD," }, { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH,\nalso dissenting:\nI dissent. In a display of clairvoyant skills worthy of the Barnum and Bailey Circus in its heyday, the majority has ascertained the true intent of the legislature in the enactment of section 7(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a)). By means of this heretofore unrevealed ability to discern legislative intent, the application of two newly created rules of statutory interpretation, and the failure to follow established rules of statutory construction, the majority has completely distorted the plain and unambiguous language of section 7(a).\nThe first new rule promulgated by the majority for the interpretation of statutes is that the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the application of a clearly stated unambiguous statute may effect a result deemed by the majority to be \u201canomalous\u201d \u201cdemonstrates that at least a latent ambiguity exists in the statute.\u201d 115 Ill. 2d at 340.\nThe second rule is that the statement of a provision in the negative renders the statute ambiguous. The rationale, as stated by the majority, is:\n\"The very fact that the remarriage provision of the statute is stated in the negative in itself creates an ambiguity. The provision does not state what is to occur in the event that a surviving spouse remarries if the decedent left children who are eligible for benefits at the time of such remarriage; it only states what is to occur if the decedent did not leave children who are eligible for benefits at the time of the surviving spouse\u2019s remarriage.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 115 Ill. 2d at 340.\nThis court has repeatedly stated the general rule applicable here. In Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, the court said:\n\u201cThe language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. \u2018It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.\u2019 Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer [1960], 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.\u201d 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139-40.\nThe majority pays lip service to this concept but, citing City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, and People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, in support of its newly cited rules, proceeds to \u201cascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d (115 Ill. 2d at 341.) The cases cited by the majority are not in point. People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, involved a statute which this court stated was \u201c \u2018reasonably susceptible\u2019 to both interpretations urged.\u201d (94 Ill. 2d 138, 141.) City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, involved a statute which could be interpreted in two ways and required construction in order to determine whether an appointment to fill a vacancy was properly made. The court there stated that the judicial role is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to give it effect, and in so doing it will examine the entire statute, assuming that it first finds an ambiguity which requires construction. Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, makes it clear that, absent an ambiguity, there is no need for construction.\nThe statute here involved provides:\n\u201cIn the event of the remarriage of a widow or widower, where the decedent did not leave surviving any child or children who, at the time of such remarriage, are entitled to compensation benefits under this Act, the surviving spouse shall be paid a lump sum equal to 2 years compensation benefits and all further rights of such widow or widower shall be extinguished.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a).)\nThere is no ambiguity nor is there any indication that the General Assembly intended that there be any difference in the situation of a widow who was the mother of the surviving children and a widow who was not.\nSection 7(a) provides for an award of benefits and provides for an exception to the right to receive benefits in a single specific situation. The majority disregards the long-established rule that \u201can expression of certain exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all others.\u201d (People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 191, 199.) Had the General Assembly intended the result conjured up by the majority, it would have been a simple matter to include the exception in the statute.\nSection 7(a) was considered in Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181. The court said:\n\u201cIt is obvious that Interlake\u2019s argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute. The statute provides for the payment of death benefits until the widow dies, or until the children reach 18, whichever is later. If, however, the widow remarries when none of the decedent\u2019s children are entitled to compensation, she is to receive a lump sum of two years\u2019 compensation and then her rights are extinguished. Under the language of the section, Frieda, as the decedent\u2019s widow, is entitled to benefits until she dies, because she did not remarry at a time when none of the decedent\u2019s children were entitled to support. There simply is no provision in the statute for terminating a widow\u2019s benefits upon remarriage when there remain minor children entitled to support.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 95 Ill. 2d 181, 191.\nThe conclusion reached by the majority concerning the alleged failure to consider the consequences of the statute is extraordinary. Its comments concerning the presumption upon which the statute, as amended by the majority, is purportedly based, are pure conjecture. Ordinarily, comments of this nature in an opinion are supported by citations to legislative journals or transcripts of debates, not, as here, by pure speculation.\nThe effect of the majority opinion is to engraft on a plainly stated unambiguous statute an exception which, had it intended to do so, could have been easily stated by the General Assembly.\nThe appellate court correctly construed the statute and its judgment should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH," } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Jenkins and Deena H. Froehle, of Gunn & Hickman, P.C., of Danville, for appellant Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.", "Charles J. Devens, of Manion, Janov, Edgar, Devens & Fahey, Ltd., of Danville, for appellant Nancy Roberts.", "Dukes, O\u2019Rourke, Stewart, Martin & Helm, Ltd., of Danville (John F. Martin, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 62345.\nCARLA STEWART, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., et al., Appellants.)\nOpinion filed January 30, 1987.\nWARD and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., dissenting.\nJohn B. Jenkins and Deena H. Froehle, of Gunn & Hickman, P.C., of Danville, for appellant Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.\nCharles J. Devens, of Manion, Janov, Edgar, Devens & Fahey, Ltd., of Danville, for appellant Nancy Roberts.\nDukes, O\u2019Rourke, Stewart, Martin & Helm, Ltd., of Danville (John F. Martin, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 347, "last_page_order": 357 }