{ "id": 3179637, "name": "NORA E. DULDULAO, Appellee, v. SAINT MARY OF NAZARETH HOSPITAL CENTER, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center", "decision_date": "1987-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 62737", "first_page": "482", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 482" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2957721 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889328 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 F. Supp. 440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7858129 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/607/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 F. Supp. 1178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 470107 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/610/1178-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 F. Supp. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3824101 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/624/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 F. Supp. 619", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3551110 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/560/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 F. Supp. 876", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3652953 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/582/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5606601 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5309315 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 P.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10414469 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/704/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 P.2d 1081", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Wash. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1137171 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/102/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 P.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10439874 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/636/1063-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.W.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9965036 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/627/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 N.W.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10672016 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/332/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Or. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2154766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/281/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 P.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10457371 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/569/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ohio App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6707260 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/20/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 A.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.J. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1351805 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/99/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Nev. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 4854458 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/99/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Neb. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2992618 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/215/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.W.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9959600 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/693/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.W.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "630-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.W.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 Mich. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1950983 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/408/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Md. App. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2265710 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/61/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 A.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7912880 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/493/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Idaho 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4394415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/98/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 A.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Conn. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. App.", "case_ids": [ 12254360 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-app/5/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 P.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10417841 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/684/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Cal. Rptr. 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Cal. App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2055625 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/116/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ariz. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 722493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/141/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 F. Supp. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3612705 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/574/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 F. Supp. 353", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3636565 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/578/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 F. Supp. 1154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3721895 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/599/1154-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 F. Supp. 66", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3810458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/622/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 F.2d 428", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 57360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/728/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.W.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9942939 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/644/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Pa. Super. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 588384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/320/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Kan. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 88173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/220/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ind. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind. App.", "case_ids": [ 1395964 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind-app/167/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 So. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9525124 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/427/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 A.2d 1095", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8011985 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/446/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 So. 2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9550965 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/425/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 F. Supp. 76", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1454093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/434/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564121 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0763-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1086, "char_count": 21113, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.929609746340351e-06, "percentile": 0.9983211376416155 }, "sha256": "43707619fd53d341d1a406b197b18fda7510d1a6a1e432f56582ebeacde684a6", "simhash": "1:96d25ce3f1dba4b4", "word_count": 3268 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:46:45.751499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NORA E. DULDULAO, Appellee, v. SAINT MARY OF NAZARETH HOSPITAL CENTER, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Nora E. Duldulao, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging that defendant, St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, discharged her from its employ in violation of the terms of an employee handbook. Plaintiff claimed that the handbook, distributed by defendant, created enforceable contractual rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion but granted defendant\u2019s motion, entering judgment in favor of defendant. The appellate court reversed both rulings. (136 Ill. App. 3d 763, 765-66.) This court allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (103 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nDefendant raises four issues for review: (1) Did the employee handbook in this case create contractual terms binding defendant to a particular procedure for terminating plaintiff\u2019s employment? (2) Did defendant in fact terminate plaintiff\u2019s employment in accordance with the provisions of the employee handbook? (3) Did the appellate court improperly reverse the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment? and (4) Did the appellate court err in deciding the case without oral argument?\nDefendant initially hired plaintiff in 1968, and rehired her in 1970 when she returned from a brief stay in the Philippines. In 1971 she was promoted to head nurse, and in 1972 she was named staff development coordinator of the department of nursing. She served in this position until September 14, 1981, when defendant reorganized several of its departments. Plaintiff became human resources development coordinator, a position which she claims was identical to her previous position. Defendant, however, submitted the affidavits of supervisors who claim that plaintiff\u2019s new position included new duties and responsibilities. On December 11, 1981, plaintiff was given a sheet entitled \u201cProbationary Evaluation\u201d and also a \u201cFinal Notice\u201d informing her that she was terminated as of the end of the day. Both sheets listed essentially the same alleged infractions:\n\u201cUnsatisfactory performance was demonstrated by the failure to properly monitor the Legal Implications of Documentation seminar and the Patient Education seminar. Further unsatisfactory performance was demonstrated by failure to follow instructions regarding CPR recertification and monitoring of the Patient Education Seminar.\u201d\nPlaintiff claims that her termination violated procedural rights she had by virtue of an implied contract with defendant. The terms of this contract, plaintiff claims, are to be found in an employee handbook distributed by defendant. Defendant first published an employee handbook before plaintiff was rehired in 1970. The record before us does not reveal the contents of this initial employee handbook other than the fact that it required two weeks\u2019 notice for the dismissal of probationary employees. Plaintiff\u2019s deposition reveals that she did not discuss the contents of this handbook during her rehiring interview in 1970, although she became aware of it some time after returning to work, and subsequently used it in training sessions for new employees.\nIn 1975 defendant published a revised employee handbook. At the beginning of this handbook is the following note, signed by Sister Stella Louise, president of the hospital:\n\u201cN.B. The Personnel Policies of Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center are presented in this booklet in a summarized form. Further details regarding any policy may be obtained by consulting the master file in the Personnel Department.\nIt is then necessary that every employee of Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center be well informed on hospital policy and other pertinent information that will assist him in directing his total efforts toward the best patient care possible. A booklet containing hospital and personnel policy is given to each employee. As a new policy change is finalized, a copy will be given to every employee to be read and placed in his booklet. If a policy needs clarification, your Supervisor or Department Head will be happy to assist you in its interpretation.\nPlease take the time to become familiar with these policies. They are designed to clarify your rights and duties as employees. Your observance of these policies will produce a safe and pleasant environment in which to work and assure you a respected place in Saint Mary\u2019s family of employees.\u201d\nAmong other things the 1975 handbook modified the previous policy which had required two weeks\u2019 notice for dismissal of a probationary employee. The 1975 handbook, as amended by a policy statement finalized on June 18, 1981, provided that \u201c[a]n employee may be terminated without notice but for just cause during the initial probationary period.\u201d The probationary period was to last 90 days, unless \u201cextended up to 180 days by the department head for just cause.\u201d Once an employee successfully completed the probationary period he or she was to become a \u201cpermanent employee.\u201d Permanent employees could be terminated only with \u201cproper notice and investigation.\u201d The amendments to the handbook provided that \u201c [permanent employees are never dismissed without prior written admonitions and/or investigation that has been properly documented.\u201d Except in the case of extremely serious offenses the handbook required three warning notices before a permanent employee could be dismissed.\nThe contractual status of employee handbooks has been the subject of a great deal of litigation in recent years. Several courts have rejected the notion that an employee handbook or manual can ever create binding contractual obligations. (See, e.g., Uriarte v. Perez-Mo lina (D.D.C. 1977), 434 F. Supp. 76 (applying D.C. law); White v. Chelsea Industries, Inc. (Ala. 1983), 425 So. 2d 1090; Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc. (Del. 1982), 446 A.2d 1095; Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp. (Fla. App. 1983), 427 So. 2d 266; Shaw v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1975), 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775; Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co. (1976), 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779; Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hospital (1983), 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466 A.2d 1084; Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), 644 S.W.2d 536.) However, the overwhelming majority of courts considering the issue have held that an employee handbook may, under proper circumstances, be contractually binding. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King (10th Cir. 1984), 728 F.2d 428 (applying Oklahoma law); Lincoln v. Sterling Drug, Inc. (D. Conn. 1985), 622 F. Supp. 66 (Connecticut law); Barger v. General Electric Co. (W.D. Va. 1984), 599 F. Supp. 1154 (Virginia law); Smith v. Teledyne Industries, Inc. (E.D. Mich. 1984), 578 F. Supp. 353 (Ohio law); Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (D. Colo. 1983), 574 F. Supp. 805 (Colorado law); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital (1984), 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170; Pugh v. See\u2019s Candies, Inc. (1981), 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917; Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group (Colo. App. 1984), 684 P.2d 264; Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (1985), 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64; Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District (1977), 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54; Wyman v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc. (Me. 1985), 493 A.2d 330; Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc. (1985), 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield (1980), 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880; Pine River State Bank v. Mettille (Minn. 1983), 333 N.W.2d 622; Enyeart v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. (Mo. App. 1985), 693 S.W.2d 120; Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center (1983), 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388; Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad (1983), 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261; Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. (1985), 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257; Forrester v. Parker (1980), 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191; Bolling v. Clevepak Corp. (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 113, 484 N.E.2d 1367; Langdon v. Saga Corp. (Okla. Ct. App. 1976), 569 P.2d 524; Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co. (1978), 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356; Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing, Inc. (S.D. 1983), 332 N.W.2d 275; Hamby v. Genesco, Inc. (Tenn. App. 1981), 627 S.W.2d 373; Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College (Utah 1981), 636 P.2d 1063; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1984), 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081; Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks (Wyo. 1985), 704 P.2d 702.\nThis court has never specifically addressed the issue of employee handbooks. Our appellate court, however, has addressed the issue several times, with conflicting results. In Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, the court held that an employee manual, which was introduced after the employee began working and was written with input from the employees, created enforceable contractual rights. However, in Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technology (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, the court distinguished Carter and held that the handbook in question was not binding because it was given to the employee when he first began work and was not specifically \u201cbargained for.\u201d (78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121-22.) Still another appellate decision, Kaiser v. Dixon (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 251, rejected Sargent and held that an employee manual may be binding notwithstanding that it was not \u201cbargained for.\u201d\nFederal courts applying Illinois law have reflected the split in our appellate court. Two Federal cases have followed Sargent. (See Enis v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. (N.D. Ill. 1984), 582 F. Supp. 876; Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (N.D. Ill. 1983), 560 F. Supp. 619.) However, since Kaiser, several Federal courts applying Illinois law have followed Kaiser as the better reasoned approach. See, e.g., Pelizza v. Reader\u2019s Digest Sales & Service Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1985), 624 F. Supp. 806; Kufalk v. Hart (N.D. Ill. 1985), 610 F. Supp. 1178; Pudil v. Smart Buy, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1985), 607 F. Supp. 440.\nNearly all courts agree on the general rule, that an employment relationship without a fixed duration is terminable at will by either party. Those courts which hold that an employee handbook can never create enforceable job security rights appear to apply this general rule as a limit on the parties\u2019 freedom to contract. The majority of courts, however, interpret the general \u201cemployment-at-will rule\u201d as a rule of construction, mandating only a presumption that a hiring without a fixed term is at will, a presumption which can be overcome by demonstrating that the parties contracted otherwise. We agree with the latter interpretation.\nWe find particularly persuasive the opinion of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille (Minn. 1983), 333 N.W.2d 622, which analyzed an employee handbook in terms of the traditional requirements for contract formation: offer, acceptance, and consideration (333 N.W.2d 622, 625). In Pine River an employee handbook was distributed to the plaintiff several months after he began working for defendant. (333 N.W.2d 622, 624.) The handbook contained a section entitled \u201cJob Security\u201d which described the generally secure nature of employment in the banking industry. (333 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 & 626 n.2.) The court held that this section of the handbook did not constitute an offer because it contained no definite promises. (333 N.W.2d 622, 630.) The handbook, however, also contained a section entitled \u201cDisciplinary Policy,\u201d which stated that \u201c[i]f an employee has violated a company policy, the following procedure will apply ***\u201d (333 N.W.2d 622, 626 n.3), followed by a step-by-step process of progressive discipline ending with \u201c[d]ischarge from employment for an employee whose conduct does not improve as a result of the previous action taken\u201d (333 N.W.2d 622, 626 n.3). The court held this to be a specific offer for a unilateral contract \u2014 the bank\u2019s promise in exchange for the employee\u2019s performance, i.e., the employee\u2019s labor. (333 N.W.2d 622, 630.) By performing, the employee both accepted the contract and provided the necessary consideration, and thus the bank\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff without the benefit of the progressive disciplinary procedures constituted a breach of the employment contract. 333 N.W.2d 622, 630-31.\nFollowing the reasoning in Pine River, we hold that an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are present. First, the language of the policy statement must contain a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Second, the statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy statement. When these conditions are present, then the employee\u2019s continued work constitutes consideration for the promises contained in the statement, and under traditional principles a valid contract is formed.\nApplying the above principles to the case at bar it is apparent that the document entitled \u201cEmployee Handbook\u201d created an enforceable right to the particular disciplinary procedures described therein. The amended handbook states that \u201c[a]t the end of 90 calendar days since employment the employee becomes a permanent employee and termination contemplated by the hospital cannot occur without proper notice and investigation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) It states that permanent employees \u201care never dismissed without prior written admonitions and/or an investigation that has been properly documented\u201d (emphasis added), and that \u201cthree warning notices within a twelve-month period are required before an employee is dismissed, except in the case of immediate dismissal.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The reservation as to \u201cimmediate dismissal\u201d does not detract from the definiteness of the offer, because that term is well defined. An \u201cimmediate dismissal\u201d justifies dismissal \u201cwithout notice for a grave and valid reason,\u201d and the list of examples of grave offenses includes such offenses as \u201cMistreatment of a patient,\u201d \u201cFighting on hospital premises,\u201d \u201cUnauthorized Possession of Weapons,\u201d and \u201cReporting to work under the influence of intoxicants.\u201d The handbook also lists offenses which are specifically not subject to immediate dismissal, such as \u201cDeliberate Violation of Instructions,\u201d \u201cUnwillingness to Render Satisfactory Service,\u201d and \u201cUnauthorized Absence.\u201d An employee reading the handbook would thus reasonably believe that, except in the case of a very serious offense, he or she would not be terminated without prior written warnings. Furthermore, the handbook creates rights even for probationary employees who may be terminated \u201cwithout notice but for just cause.\u201d\nMoreover, the handbook contains no disclaimers to negate the promises made. In fact, the introduction to the handbook states just the opposite, that the policies in the handbook \u201care designed to clarify your rights and duties as employees.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, the handbook language is such that an employee would reasonably believe that after the expiration of the initial probationary period the progressive disciplinary procedure would be part of the employer\u2019s offer.\nFinally, it is undisputed that defendant gave the handbook to plaintiff and intended that plaintiff become familiar with its contents. In fact, a significant part of plaintiff\u2019s duties as an employee consisted of instructing new employees on the contents of the handbook. There is no question but that plaintiff continued to work with knowledge of the handbook provisions. Under these circumstances the handbook\u2019s provisions became binding on the employer.\nA more difficult question is whether or not defendant complied with the provisions of the handbook. It is undisputed that plaintiff had been working for more than 90 days and was receiving benefits only available to \u201cpermanent\u201d employees. Defendant, however, claims that plaintiff had been transferred to a new position, and therefore reverted to probationary status. In support of this argument defendant cites an amendment to the handbook, finalized on September 3, 1981, which states that \u201c[a]ll promotions and transferred employees must successfully pass a designated probationary period.\u201d This provision means, defendant argues, that once plaintiff had been transferred she could be terminated without the benefit of the progressive disciplinary procedures required for permanent employees.\nWe disagree. The handbook states that an employee may be terminated without notice during the \u201cinitial probationary period\u201d (emphasis added), a period which ends \u201c[a]t the end of 90 calendar days since employment.\u201d There is nothing in the policy statement on transfers to indicate that an employee serving a \u201cdesignated probationary period\u201d loses the right to progressive disciplinary procedures which vested when the employee successfully passed the \u201cinitial probationary period.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In addition, in distinguishing between \u201cpermanent\u201d and \u201cprobationary\u201d employees for disciplinary purposes the handbook notes that only \u201cpermanent\u201d employees are eligible for employee benefits. It is undisputed that plaintiff continued to receive vacation pay and other benefits after the September 14, 1981, reorganization, as she had following her prior promotions. In fact, plaintiff\u2019s supervisors at the hospital claimed in their depositions that plaintiff, upon transfer, had occupied a hybrid \u201cpermanent probationary\u201d status.\nMoreover, the policy statement on transfers and promotions specifically states that its purpose is to \u201cprovide employees with approved promotional or transfer opportunities.\u201d The statement provides a procedure which begins with the posting of vacant positions and the employee\u2019s filing of a \u201cRequest for Transfer Form.\u201d The policy statement thus appears to apply only to voluntary transfers, and it is undisputed that plaintiff\u2019s transfer was not voluntary.\nAmbiguous contractual language is generally construed against the drafter of the language (Weiland Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. Whitney (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 105, 116; Cedar Park Cemetery Association, Inc. v. Village of Calumet Park (1947), 398 Ill. 2d 324, 333), and in the absence of evidence to the contrary we must conclude that the \u201cdesignated probationary period\u201d does not divest an employee of rights vested at the end of the \u201cinitial probationary period.\u201d We must also conclude that the designated probationary period applies only to employees who request transfer or promotion. It is clear that plaintiff\u2019s alleged infractions did not fit into the category of extremely serious offenses warranting \u201cimmediate dismissal,\u201d and it is undisputed the plaintiff did not receive the progressive disciplinary procedures normally required for permanent employees in a nonimmediatedismissal situation. Since defendant can point to no reason why plaintiff would not be entitled to the progressive disciplinary procedures, other than the reasons we have rejected above, we must agree with the appellate court that the failure to provide plaintiff with the required process violated her contractual rights.\nDefendant also argues that the appellate court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff because the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment was not a final and appealable order. Standing by itself the denial of a motion for summary judgment might not be final and appealable. However, when, as in this case, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion as well as denying plaintiff\u2019s motion, the resulting order became final because it entirely disposed of the litigation. The cause was thus appealable in. its entirety. Therefore it was not improper for the appellate court to reverse the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion.\nFinally, defendant argues that the appellate court erred in failing to allow oral argument. In support of this argument defendant cites People v. Barker (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 201. However, Barker merely held that the appellate court may not decide a case by summary order without the benefit of either briefing or oral argument. (59 Ill. 2d 201, 203-04.) In the case at bar the appellate court was fully briefed, and we can discern no rule, statute, or constitutional provision which creates a specific right to oral argument.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed insofar as it reversed the orders of the circuit court. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County with directions to enter summary judgment for the plaintiff and for such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (James E. McFarland, Tom H. Luetkemeyer and Keith E. Graham, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lonny Ben Ogus and Carl M. Walsh, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 62737.\nNORA E. DULDULAO, Appellee, v. SAINT MARY OF NAZARETH HOSPITAL CENTER, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 30, 1987.\nRehearing denied March 30, 1987.\nHinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (James E. McFarland, Tom H. Luetkemeyer and Keith E. Graham, of counsel), for appellant.\nLonny Ben Ogus and Carl M. Walsh, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0482-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 504 }