{ "id": 5542942, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EDGAR HOPE, JR., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hope", "decision_date": "1986-02-21", "docket_number": "No. 58462", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126650 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3436830 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046232 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123281 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780613 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861206 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "91-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121913 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092442 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5514997 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 21723, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.645978198524215e-07, "percentile": 0.9272056015620987 }, "sha256": "8db93ac7a776bb428795f6d550408723ec78867570e1cf1f216c1403fb4050d8", "simhash": "1:b262f788e84c6d2a", "word_count": 3612 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:28:20.574768+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EDGAR HOPE, JR., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the' opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Edgar Hope, Jr., and a codefendant, Alton Logan, were charged with murder, attempted murder and two counts of armed robbery stemming from an armed attack on two security guards in a McDonald\u2019s restaurant on Chicago\u2019s south side. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, both defendants were found guilty of the charges against them. Hope had a prior conviction for a murder that had actually occurred subsequent to the murder in the case at bar. He had not yet been arrested for the murder in this case when he committed the subsequent murder. During the sentencing phase of the trial which resulted in his prior conviction, the State had presented evidence of defendant\u2019s involvement in the murder in the instant case. The State did not use this evidence as a qualifying factor to support the defendant\u2019s eligibility for the death penalty since he already qualified for another reason, but instead used it in the aggravation stage of the sentencing hearing to demonstrate the defendant\u2019s alleged propensity to commit criminal offenses. In this case, Hope\u2019s prior conviction was used as a qualifying factor making him eligible for the death penalty pursuant to section 9\u2014 1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(3)); therefore, the State requested a death penalty hearing. The jury which convicted the defendant also sat at the sentencing phase. The jury found that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty, that there were the necessary aggravating factors (over the age of 18 and with a prior conviction for murder), and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude the imposition of death. Therefore, Hope was sentenced to death. In his direct appeal before this court, the defendant alleges that numerous errors occurred throughout the proceedings.\nAt about 8 p.m. on January 11, 1982, two McDonald\u2019s restaurant security guards, Alvin Thompson and Lloyd Wyckliffe, were on duty. Each guard was carrying a firearm. From where Thompson and Wyckliffe were seated they could see customers placing orders. They could also see employees working behind the counter, including the cashier, Antonette Dawson. Shortly after 8 p.m., the security guards noticed a disturbance at Dawson\u2019s cash register involving a black male and black female customer. The male was placing large orders with Dawson and then changing the orders. (Thompson, Dawson, and another employee,\" Charles Trent, later identified Hope as the customer causing the disturbance.)\nDawson motioned to the security guards. They got up and walked toward her. When the security guards were about five feet from the counter where the defendant was causing the disturbance, another man came into the restaurant and yelled something. At this time, Thompson was about three feet from the door and was looking at the man who entered. (At trial, Thompson identified this man as Alton Logan, the codefendant.)' Logan then pulled a sawed-off shotgun from under his coat and fired it into Wyckliffe\u2019s chest, causing his death.\nHope then knocked Thompson to the floor and pointed a gun at him. Logan took Wyckliffe\u2019s weapon, and Hope took Thompson\u2019s weapon. Hope told Thompson not to look at him and started to pull the trigger. Thompson raised \u25a0 his left arm to. cover his face and turned his head. At this point, Thompson heard the defendant\u2019s gun discharge and felt a bullet drive into his left arm. The two perpetrators then ran out of McDonald\u2019s.\nOn February 5, 1982, the defendant was arrested in connection with another murder in which he was alleged to have shot a police officer. The arresting officer testified that he recovered a gun from the defendant at that time. At the trial Thompson then identified that gun as the one that was taken from him at the McDonald\u2019s incident. The State connected Hope and Logan to the incident by the identification testimony of the three eyewitnesses, Thompson, Dawson, and Trent, and by testimony which showed that the defendant was in possession of Thompson\u2019s stolen gun a few weeks after this incident. Thompson, Dawson and Trent all made in-court, photographic and lineup identifications of the defendants.\nIn addition to the aforementioned witnesses, the State also called the decedent\u2019s wife to testify. She told the jury about their family, the ages of their children, and identified a photograph of the family.\nAlthough the defendant did not testify, his mother testified that she had never seen Logan before the trial, and she described the defendant\u2019s appearance, including two prominent scars and his hoarse voice, which were not mentioned by the State\u2019s witnesses. Codefendant Logan testified in his own behalf and stated that he was at home at the time of the incident. Other witnesses corroborated his testimony. Logan also testified that he did not know the defendant.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty against both defendants on all charges. Hope and Logan had separate sentencing hearings. At the defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the jury found that Hope, being over the age of 18 and with a prior conviction for murder, was eligible for the death penalty and that there were not mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty from being imposed.\nDue to our holding in this case we need only address the following issues: (1) whether the defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing; (2) whether the circuit court.erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence concerning the family of the deceased victim; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe defendant argues that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because two or three jurors had either seen or heard news reports regarding his conviction and death sentence in another case.\nThe portion of the death penalty statute which is applicable in this case states:\n\u201cA defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of murder may be sentenced to death if:\n* * *\nThe defend\u00e1nt has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate premeditated acts.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(3).\nTherefore, under this statute, it is permissible for the jury to have knowledge during the sentencing hearing that the defendant was previously convicted of murder. However, it is not permissible that the jury know that due to that conviction he was sentenced to death. See People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1.\nAt the beginning of the trial, the judge denied the defendant\u2019s request to sequester the jury. Instead, the trial judge admonished the jurors not to read or listen to any news media reports concerning the case. However, the judge withdrew his admonishment by stating: \u201cAnd as far as reading the papers, it won\u2019t make any difference \u2014 make any difference now or watching television. Okay. See you tomorrow.\u201d This statement came at the sentencing hearing, after two State witnesses had testified, but before seven other State witnesses and the defense witnesses testified.\nThe following day, February 17, 1983, defense counsel renewed his motion to sequester the jury and requested that an inquiry be made of the jurors to determine if they had been exposed to the news reports indicating that the defendant had a prior death sentence. The inquiry disclosed that some jurors had read or heard the news reports:\n\u201c[THE COURT]: Let me ask you did' any of you see anything in the newspapers or on television about the case?\nYes? Raise your hand that did. Anybody see anything? Yes, or read anything?\nYou might have noticed some of the reports were erroneous. That\u2019s why I always tell people not to listen to the radio or television because you do get a lot of erroneous reports. You must decide this case strictly Upon what you hear in Court, not what you hear in [sic] television because both of it was erroneous and they add things and everything else. Nobody says the news media has to be accurate. They\u2019re not accurate. Decide the case on what you heard here because the things you see in the newspa-' pers, a lot of the times, it\u2019s wrong.\u201d\nWhile defense counsel stated that \u201capproximately four or five jurors\u201d raised their hands in response to the above inquiry, the trial judge stated that \u201ctwo or three\u201d jurors did so. Thereafter, defense counsel requested that the jurors be questioned individually. The request was denied, and no further inquiry was made of the jurors.\nIn requesting that an inquiry be made of the jurors, defense counsel pointed out that \u201call, I believe, all television stations and all major news indicated that Mr. Hope was' under a previous death sentence.\u201d In support thereof, counsel submitted as part of the record two newspaper articles from February 17, 1983, which stated that the defendant had a prior death sentence:\n\u201cHope was sentenced to death in October for the Feb. 5, 1982, murder of police rookie James Doyle, who was gunned down on a crowded CTA bus.\u201d (Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 17, 1983, at 82, col. 2.)\n\u201cHope already h\u00e1s been sentenced to die in the electric chair for the murder last year of Chicago police officer James Doyle, who was shot to death on a CTA bus on the South Side.\u201d Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1983, at 13, col. 1.\nBecause the news reports contained specific information about the defendant\u2019s prior death sentence and because at least two or three jurors read or heard those reports, it is evident that certain jurors had knowledge of the defendant\u2019s prior death sentence. The defendant cites People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1, for the proposition that such knowledge is reversible error.\nOn the other hand, the State argues that such knowledge was admissible in the second stage of a sentencing hearing where the focus is on the character and record of the accused. Thus, the State further alleges that the defendant\u2019s citation of Davis is \u201cclearly inapposite\u201d to this case. The State asserts that Davis only holds that such evidence is inadmissible at the eligibility stage of the sentencing hearing.\nIn Davis the court stated that during the first stage of the sentencing hearing:\n\u201c[T]he question for the jury to determine is whether, on the basis of a statutory aggravating factor, defendant is eligible to receive the death sentence; not whether, in light of his character or record, he should receive this penalty. That defendant received the death sentence for a prior murder has absolutely no relevance to the issue of whether he is eligible to receive that penalty for the instant offense.\u201d (97 Ill. 2d 1, 26.)\nThe Davis court was specifically concerned about the first stage of the sentencing hearing because that is when the evidence was introduced, but a complete reading of Davis indicates that such evidence should never be admitted since it went on to state:\n\u201cMore importantly, as noted by defendant, introduction of this evidence may well have improperly influenced the jury\u2019s decision in two respects. In determining his eligibility for the death penalty, the jury was aware that another jury had previously resolved the identical issue adversely to defendant. If a juror was uncertain as to whether \u2022 defendant was qualified for the death sentence, the knowledge that 12 other people determined he was could have swayed the juror\u2019s verdict in favor of death.\nFurther, the jury\u2019s awareness of defendant\u2019s prior death sentence would diminish its sense of responsibility and mitigate the serious consequences of its decision. Assuming that defendant was already going to be executed, the jurors may consider their own decision considerably less significant than they otherwise would.\u201d 97 Ill. 2d 1, 26.\nFurthermore, in the case at bar, the sentencing hearing was not bifurcated and, thus, the \u201ctwo or three\u201d jury members utilized their knowledge of Hope\u2019s prior death sentence at the entire sentencing hearing \u2014 including the eligibility stage.\nThis court has noted in the past that a high standard of procedural accuracy is required in determining whether or not the death penalty will be imposed. (See People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 502.) The possibility that the jury, even one member, may have sentenced the defendant to death on the basis of an irrelevant, highly prejudicial and nonstatutory aggravating factor constitutes reversible error. See People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1.\nThe second issue is whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence at the guilt phase of the trial concerning the family of the deceased. We must determine whether this evidence constituted a prejudicial error depriving the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. If it did, his conviction must be reversed.\nA defendant\u2019s guilt must be established by legal and competent evidence. This court has consistently condemned the admission of evidence that the deceased left a spouse and a family. Evidence of this nature has no relationship to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but normally serves only to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. (People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 439, 453; People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 83, 91; People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371; People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 334, 340.) From these cases has evolved this maxim:\n\u201c[Wfhere testimony in a murder case respecting the fact that the deceased has left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is.presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error unless an objection thereto is sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence. In like manner we have held that jury argument by the prosecution which dwells upon the decedent\u2019s family or seeks to relate a defendant\u2019s punishment to the existence of family is inflammatory and improper. People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601; People v. Dukes 12 Ill. 2d 334.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371.)\nIn Bernette, it was also stated, \u201c[T]he irrelevancy and highly prejudicial nature of such evidence is so well established, that it [is] the duty of the court in a murder case to [refuse] it [the evidence] on its own motion.\u201d 30 Ill. 2d 359, 372.\nHowever, \u201c[c]ommon sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in. most cases, they leave behind family members.\u201d (People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 415.) Thus, every mention of a deceased\u2019s family does not per se entitle the defendant to a new trial. (People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 322.) In certain instances, depending upon how this evidence is introduced, such a statement can be harmless; this is particularly true when the death penalty is not imposed. See People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 83, 91-92.\nTherefore, in order to address the issue before us, we must view the evidence that was introduced by the State concerning the family of the deceased victim.\nPrior to trial, the defendant\u2019s counsel made a motion in limine to prohibit the State from presenting evidence concerning the families of the victims; this motion was denied.\nThroughout the guilt phase of the defendant\u2019s trial, the prosecutor made reference to and elicited testimony regarding the decedent\u2019s family. The first reference to the decedent\u2019s family was the prosecutor\u2019s opening statement:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: [0]n January 11, 1982, two members of our community, a man by the name of Lloyd Wyckliffe and Alvin Thompson, in the early evening hours, left their homes and their families to go to a place of employment.\u201d\nThe second reference to the victim\u2019s family was during the prosecutor\u2019s direct examination of Wyckliffe\u2019s widow. She was allowed to testify over the objection of defense counsel:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: Mrs. Wyckliffe, what did. your family consist of on January 11,1982?\n[MR. LOGAN\u2019S COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.\n[JUDGE]: Overruled.\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: Myself and three children and him.\n[PROSECUTOR]: And the children\u2019s ages?\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: The oldest is 10, 6 and 3.\n[PROSECUTOR]: And all three were your children, ma\u2019am?\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: Yes.\n[PROSECUTOR]: And were any of those children stepchildren to your husband?\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: Yes, my oldest son.\n[PROSECUTOR]: But the remaining two children were children of you and Mr. Wyckliffe?\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: Yes.\n[PROSECUTOR]: Mrs. Wyckliffe, I hand you what\u2019s marked for identification as People\u2019s Exhibit Number 1. Ma\u2019am, is that a photograph showing you, your husband, and two of your children and, specifically, your husband as he appeared alive?\n[MRS. WYCKLIFFE]: Yes.\u201d\nThe prosecutor did not limit his questions pertaining to the victim\u2019s family to the aforementioned, but continued by asking another State\u2019s witness to identify the previously cited photograph.\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: At this time, Mr. Thompson, I show you what\u2019s been marked as People\u2019s Exhibit Number 1 for identification. Do you recognize what is portrayed in that photograph, sir?\n[MR. THOMPSON]: That\u2019s Lloyd Wyckliffe, his wife, Vernita, and two of her children.\u201d\nNot only was the photograph identified by Wyckliffe\u2019s widow and Thompson, but it was allowed, over defense counsel\u2019s objection, to go to the jury room.\nThe fourth and final time the prosecutor referred to the decedent\u2019s family was in his closing argument:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: Little did Lloyd Wyckliffe know that when he said good-bye to his wife, that would be the last time he saw her alive as he went to work.\u201d\nExamination of the record reveals that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were not invited by the defense, and we believe that the testimony regarding the surviving members of the deceased\u2019s family was an improper appeal to the emotions of the jurors. The State may comment unfavorably on the evil effects of crime and urge a fearless administration of the law (People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350, 360); however, remarks which include intentional references to the victim\u2019s family are not permissible. See People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359.\nThe evidence concerning the decedent\u2019s family was not brought to the jury\u2019s attention incidentally, rather it was presented in a series of statements and questions in such a method as to permit the jury to believe it material. (People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371.) If any doubt existed as to its materiality, it was removed when defense counsel\u2019s objections were overruled. In overruling the objections the prejudicial effect was amplified. See People v. Faysom (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 517, 522.\nThe questions about the victim\u2019s family had no relevance to the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. The only purpose these questions could, serve is to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury, \u201cand to arouse in them anger, hate and passion.\u201d (People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 334, 340.) The extent to which such inflammatory questions affected the jury in its conviction and in its vote to impose the death penalty will never be known. But the defendant, no matter how reprehensible his crime, \u201cbe he a sinner or a saint, has the right to expect that his fate will be fixed with reference only to the circumstances of the crime with which he is charged\u201d (People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 601, 606), uninfluenced by the circumstance that the decedent\u2019s widow has been left to live alone with children of tender ages as the result of the murder.\nAs previously stated, the holding reached in each case dealing with reference to a murder victim\u2019s family will depend upon how such reference comes about. For example, in the recent case before our court of People v. Adams (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 102, we held that it was not error for the prosecutor to have remarked that on the day of the murder the victim\u2019s \u201cwife loved him enough to call him.\u201d In finding that such a remark was incidental, we distinguished that case from People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359. In Bernette, the defendant\u2019s conviction was reversed because there were numerous references throughout direct testimony and argument to the jury regarding the murder victim\u2019s young children. We believe the case at bar is analogous to Bernette.\nFinally, the defendant has asserted that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we find the evidence here to have been sufficient to sustain the convictions. We therefore find no impediment to a new trial. See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309.\nFor the reasons.given, the defendant\u2019s conviction is reversed and the sentence of death is vacated. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial and sentencing hearing.\nJudgment reversed; . sentence vacated; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Gary S. Rapaport and Robert E. Davison, all of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Mark L. Rotert, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Joan S. Cherry and Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 58462.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EDGAR HOPE, JR., Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 21, 1986.\nCharles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Gary S. Rapaport and Robert E. Davison, all of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Mark L. Rotert, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Joan S. Cherry and Peter D. Fischer, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 275, "last_page_order": 289 }