{ "id": 3188712, "name": "In re WILLIAM KENNER HARRIS, Attorney, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "In re Harris", "decision_date": "1987-09-21", "docket_number": "No. 64774", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "124", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898730 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098230 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146793 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 668, "char_count": 13140, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.436057418262789e-08, "percentile": 0.2780515389121142 }, "sha256": "d124462f3e12af8a62f4acc115a1b795fc3624a48913522e7235c7b19c46b4df", "simhash": "1:f764a121485dff69", "word_count": 2119 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:30.594263+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re WILLIAM KENNER HARRIS, Attorney, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe are confronted in this instance with the case of the officious intermeddler.\nWilliam Harris, the respondent, practices in Macomb, and he was retained on May 12, 1979, by Mary Sullivan and Harold Adkins. Grace Sapienza, the sister of Sullivan and Adkins, had died intestate in Michigan, and the respondent was retained to establish his clients\u2019 heirship and rights to a portion of the residue of Sapienza\u2019s estate. The entire residue amounted to $4,763.84, of which some $500 to $600 might go to each of the respondent\u2019s two clients. In 1978, that residue had been assigned to the State of Michigan by escheat. The respondent contends that he took on the representation after being informed by his clients that they had met no success in their attempts to retain other attorneys. According to the respondent, he told his prospective clients that he would require a very long time to do the work, to which they purportedly replied that the respondent could proceed at his own pace and take all the time he desired. An agreement was struck to compensate the respondent with a 20% contingent fee of the amount recovered by Sullivan and Adkins (i.e., a total possible fee of $200 to $240), all expenses and costs to be advanced by the respondent.\nIn September 1981, charges were filed with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) against the respondent by Priscilla Hutchins, a resident of Chehalis, Washington, and niece of Sapienza. Hutchins\u2019 charges, which do not appear in the record, complained that the respondent had failed to answer her letters and telephone calls, that he had failed to answer correspondence from the Michigan Attorney General\u2019s office, and generally that the respondent had done nothing in this case. The respondent replied to Hutchins\u2019 charges denying that he had received any written correspondence from her and asserting that he had \u201cassembled considerable information as to the heirship of Grace Sapienza\u201d and hoped to conclude the matter \u201cas soon as possible.\u201d In June 1982, the respondent wrote to the ARDC that he was \u201ccontinuing to work\u201d on the case. He notified the ARDC that: \u201cIt does not appear that there is much money in the estate and it is necessary for me to make out-of-pocket advances in order to obtain the necessary documents. I hope to be able to conclude the matter this summer and am working diligently toward that end.\u201d\nA year later the respondent informed the ARDC that he would need at least three more months to complete the matter. Fourteen months later he informed the ARDC that he hoped to have it concluded in one more month. Three months after that letter, in December 1984, the respondent wrote that he was \u201csecuring documentation in the form of birth certificates, death certificates and affidavits to establish the relationship of the presumptive heirs to decedent and to exclude the existence of other persons with equal or closer degrees of kinship. *** I expect to secure the necessary birth certificates, death certificates, and affidavits within the near future and will provide you a current report one (1) month from the date of this letter.\u201d Three days after receipt of the last letter, the inquiry board voted a complaint.\nIn count I, the Administrator of the ARDC alleged that respondent\u2019s conduct in failing to take action on his retainer constituted: (i) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1\u2014 102(a)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (107 Ill. 2d R. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.)) (ii) neglect of a legal matter in violation of Rule 6 \u2014 101(a)(3); (iii) \u201cfailing to be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments\u201d in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(1)(B); (iv) failure to perform a contract for professional services in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(2); (v) damaging a client in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(3); and (vi) conduct tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute. In a second count, the Administrator alleged that respondent made false statements in his letters to the Administrator when the respondent asserted that he was pursuing the Sapienza matter and would conclude the matter in short order, and that those false assertions constituted: (i) conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 1 \u2014 102(a)(4); (ii) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 1 \u2014 102(a)(5); (iii) making a false statement in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 102(a)(5); and (iv) conduct tending to bring the profession into disrepute.\nWhen the Hearing Board convened, the respondent failed to appear. Contacted by telephone, he informed the Board that he was preparing for a jury trial and had two days earlier mailed a motion to continue his hearing. In that conversation the respondent admitted all facts in the Administrator\u2019s complaint, saying that the Hearing Board had all the facts before it and \u201cmight as well decide.\u201d The Board did. On count I, the Board found every infraction alleged, except that the respondent had damaged his clients in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(3); on count II, the Board found a violation of Rule 1 \u2014 102(a)(4) and action tending to bring the courts and legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 90 days.\nThe respondent filed exceptions with the Review Board, attaching affidavits from both of his clients. Each client corroborated the respondent\u2019s assertion that in entering into the contract for legal services it was agreed and understood that the respondent would take a long time to bring the matter to a close. Furthermore, Sullivan and Adkins each swore under oath \u201cthat William K. Harris has always been entirely honest and forthright in his dealings *** and that his professional reputation as a lawyer is of the highest degree.\u201d They both acknowledged that they were satisfied with the respondents legal services in regard to the Sapienza estate, stated their wishes that the respondent continue to represent them in that matter, and concluded that if they had any need for legal representation in the future they would retain the respondent and would also recommend him to others. Notwithstanding his clients\u2019 obvious regard for the respondent\u2019s abilities and conduct, the Review Board adopted the conclusions of the Hearing Board and concurred in recommending suspension for 90 days.\nAddressing ourselves to count I of the Administrator\u2019s complaint, regarding the respondent\u2019s supposed neglect, we are immediately confronted with an inconsistency in the complaint. The Administrator has charged violations of Disciplinary Rules 6 \u2014 101(a)(3) and 7\u2014 101(a)(1)(B). The former states: \u201cA lawyer shall not *** neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 6 \u2014 101(a)(3).) Conversely, the latter rule says that lawyers should not, in the course of rendering zealous representation, advocate their clients\u2019 interests through such unreasonable conduct as \u201cengaging in offensive tactics,\u201d \u201crefusing to accede to reasonable requests\u201d and (the charge in this case) \u201cfailing to be punctual.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 7 \u2014 101(a)(1).) On the one hand, then, the respondent\u2019s conduct in this matter is allegedly neglectful of his clients, while on the other hand it is allegedly overly zealous representation through the use of dilatory tactics. Given the tenor of the Administrator\u2019s arguments, we do not think he means to suggest that the respondent has been unreasonably forceful in advancing his clients\u2019 interests, and there are no grounds for finding a violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(1)(B).\nNeither does the record support a charge of failure to carry out a contract of employment for the rendition of legal services, in violation of Rule 7 \u2014 101(aX2). The only evidence as to the content of respondent\u2019s contract is found in his clients\u2019 affidavits, where they state that the respondent\u2019s unhurried approach to the Sapienza matter was contemplated in their contract. Furthermore, the Administrator has made no attempt to discover the contents of the respondent\u2019s agreement with his clients in order to prove his allegation, so any charge that the respondent has not performed as the parties agreed is only a shot in the dark. Now that the respondent, through his clients\u2019 affidavits, has acquitted the Administrator\u2019s duty of producing some evidence (In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 410, 416), it appears that the Administrator\u2019s shot was wide of the mark.\nWe are left, then, with an unusual case in which there is a charge of neglect without any showing of prejudice to respondent\u2019s clients or any complaint by those clients. Disciplinary Rule 6 \u2014 101(a)(3), prohibiting lawyers from neglecting legal matters entrusted to them, is motivated by fears of prejudicing clients\u2019 interests, causing clients needless anxiety and frustration, reducing public confidence in the legal profession and interfering with the administration of justice. (Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 comment (1984).) Those concerns are not implicated by the respondent\u2019s conduct in this case: the Hearing Board found no prejudice to the interests of Sullivan and Adkins, the clients are apparently content and there is no showing that respondent\u2019s languid representation has derailed or complicated the administration of justice in Macomb County, Michigan.\nAdditionally, Sullivan\u2019s and Adkins\u2019 difficulty in obtaining counsel indicates that potential fees to be garnered from a favorable distribution of the Sapienza estate did not justify the work and risk involved, except perhaps under the conditions of respondent\u2019s contract. We do not deprecate the virtues of speed, but given the choice between dispatch without legal representation and legal representation without dispatch, the clients\u2019 choice is easily understood and should not be usurped in the name of maintaining ethical standards at the cost of depriving these clients of legal counsel. That Sapienza\u2019s officious niece was dissatisfied with the lawyer her relatives chose to retain is a matter of the utmost indifference to this court, as it should have been to the Administrator.\nWithout evidence that respondent\u2019s delay has prolonged this matter beyond the bounds allowed by his clients and permitted by Michigan law, we do not believe that the unique facts in this case establish a violation of Canon 6. Had the Administrator bothered to interview respondent\u2019s clients, he might have found evidence that the clients had been misled or actually prejudiced. Alternatively, the Administrator might have satisfied himself that no disciplinary action was warranted. We have to wonder, therefore, why the clients\u2019 views were never sought. Moreover, as this court has noted, if the court were to create a duty to nonclients it would \u201cclearly create conflict-of-interest situations.\u201d (Pelham v. Griesheimer (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (finding that an attorney that represents one spouse in a dissolution proceeding owes no duty to the children of the litigants).) Because Hutchins might have claims to the Sapienza estate that conflict with those of respondent\u2019s clients, the Administrator\u2019s failure to investigate these charges by interviewing Sullivan and Adkins is even more puzzling. Confounding delay with neglect, the Administrator has failed to establish a violation of any disciplinary rules in count I of his complaint.\nRegarding count II, in which the Administrator claims to have been misled by the respondent\u2019s repeated assurances that the matter was being pursued and on the brink of success, we find no evidence of wrongdoing. The Administrator does not claim that respondent made deceptive statements of past events, but that respondent\u2019s stated expectations did not come true. There has been no showing of deceptive intent, however, and the letters are clearly puffed expectations that should have been understood as such. Also, the letterhead of respondent\u2019s stationery discloses that his two partners in the law firm of Harris and Harris, William R Harris and Edwin L. Harris, apparently died during the representation of these clients. Doubtless those deaths have affected the respondent personally and have likely increased respondent\u2019s work load as the sole remaining lawyer in the firm. That factor should not have been ignored.\nWe question, therefore, whether respondent\u2019s conduct in making those communications can be accurately described as deceptive. As the Administrator urges count II only as a factor in aggravation of the allegations of count I (see In re Anglin (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 261) already rejected in this opinion, we need not answer this question. It is the order of this court that the complaint be dismissed.\nComplaint dismissed.\nJUSTICE CUNNINGHAM took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E Moran III, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.", "William Kenner Harris, of Macomb, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 64774.\nIn re WILLIAM KENNER HARRIS, Attorney, Respondent.\nOpinion filed September 21, 1987.\nCUNNINGHAM, J., took no part.\nWilliam E Moran III, of Springfield, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.\nWilliam Kenner Harris, of Macomb, pro se." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 153, "last_page_order": 160 }