{ "id": 3188512, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. KELVIN JEROME HOUSTON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Houston", "decision_date": "1987-10-05", "docket_number": "No. 64168", "first_page": "194", "last_page": "202", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 194" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103080 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464889 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532023 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045347 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572134 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "987" }, { "page": "988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0982-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 656, "char_count": 13376, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6028296026721922e-07, "percentile": 0.684172706594091 }, "sha256": "704cfb5ae8eb1b8bc3321898e428709b8454220846699bd35d94e83c72d3a5b2", "simhash": "1:a2aa66a5e62728fd", "word_count": 2269 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:30.594263+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. KELVIN JEROME HOUSTON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Kelvin Jerome Houston was convicted in the circuit court of Macon County of theft over $300 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1) and was originally sentenced to probation for one year. Subsequently, several motions to revoke his probation were filed against him. The motion at issue here charged the defendant with burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1) and theft by knowingly exerting unauthorized control over property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(1)). The trial judge decided that the charge was proved, revoked the defendant\u2019s probation, and sentenced him to a term of 30 months\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed (146 Ill. App. 3d 982), and we granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nDefendant, accompanied by Keith Box and one or two other men, visited the premises of Sun Control in Decatur on Friday, July 19, 1985, shortly before closing time. Mark Kaylor, an employee of the store, testified that Keith inquired about automobile window tint and sunroofs while the others stood by listening. Kaylor was in the office the entire time the men were present and stated that at no time did any of them handle the two sunroofs that were on display. The office is not large, and Kaylor was able to keep \"an eye on the roofs while talking to Keith. The defendant was four to five feet from the sunroofs during the discussion between Kaylor and Keith. Although everything was in order when Sun Control closed that evening, when the store owner arrived at 8 the next morning, a window had been broken out and the two display sunroofs and a box of window tint were missing. Two months after the burglary the store owner observed Keith with what appeared to be some of the stolen tint on his car windows.\nJames Box, Keith\u2019s brother, testified that he saw the sunroofs at another person\u2019s house on the Wednesday following the burglary, that the defendant had them wrapped in towels, and that the defendant offered to sell them to him for $50. Keith was also present at the time. James denied telling a police detective that he had never seen the sunroofs or that he saw them only earlier in the week, on Saturday or Sunday.\nKeith\u2019s girlfriend, Teresa Scheuster, testified under a grant of immunity. She said that on July 19 at around 5:30 p.m., she had driven to Springfield along with the defendant, Keith and another woman and returned the following morning about 2:15. She first dropped the defendant at his apartment, and then let Keith off. Around 5 or 6 o\u2019clock on the afternoon of the 20th, she saw the defendant and Keith at a park. Keith opened the trunk of his car, and the defendant showed her two sunroofs covered with towels. The defendant asked her if she wanted one as a gift, and she declined. On July 26, Scheuster and Keith went to a third person\u2019s house, and Keith came out carrying the sunroofs and put them in the trunk of his car. He then took them to his brother James\u2019 house. The defendant was present when the roofs were placed in James\u2019 house. The following day, July 27, Keith removed them from his brother\u2019s home and put them in the trunk of Scheuster\u2019s car. Keith and Scheuster then picked up the defendant, and shortly thereafter, the police stopped the car. Although she hid the trunk key on Keith\u2019s orders, Scheuster allowed them to search the car, and the sunroofs were discovered.\nFollowing his arrest, the defendant told Detective George Lebo that he did not know anything about the property in the car, but admitted he had looked at some sunroofs at Sun Control a week or so earlier. He denied ever handling or touching the roofs at Sun Control. Lebo, however, matched a thumbprint on the larger sunroof to the defendant. Lebo had also interviewed James Box. James told him that he had never seen the sunroofs, but indicated that on Saturday or Sunday afternoon of the prior week, the defendant had discussed the roofs with him.\nAnother police officer also interviewed the defendant later on July 27. The defendant told him that he had talked to Keith Box and wanted to revise the statement he gave to Detective Lebo because he recalled that he had handled the sunroofs and that he and Keith had passed them back and forth while they were at Sun Control on July 19. This revised statement was made before the officer confronted him with the thumbprint.\nThe defendant testified that he had handled the sunroofs when he, Keith and another man went to Sun Control on July 19. He had returned from Springfield at 3 or 4 a.m. on the 20th and went to bed. He denied committing the burglary or attempting to sell or give away the sunroofs. At the conclusion of the defendant\u2019s testimony, the trial judge found that the charge had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.\nThe appellate court believed that this court\u2019s decision in People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415, required reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding. Housby formulated a three-part test for determining whether an instruction, which advised the jury in a burglary case that the defendant\u2019s guilt could be inferred from his exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property, violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The point of the Housby test is to ensure that an instruction does not permit the jury in a criminal case to infer the defendant\u2019s guilt of burglary from circumstances which do not warrant such an inference. (People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 12.) The presumption \u201cmust not undermine the factfinder\u2019s responsibility at trial, based on the evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d County Court v. Allen (1979), 442 U.S. 140, 156, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 791, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224.\nApart from the fact that the standard of proof is lower in a probation revocation proceeding \u2014 making it unlikely that the Housby factors could be imported without change into this context \u2014 nothing in the record here suggests a Housby-type due process concern. There was, of course, no jury instruction in this proceeding tried by a judge. Nor is there anything to show that the judge inferred the offenses merely from the defendant\u2019s possession of the sunroofs. To the contrary, when the defendant requested a directed verdict on the basis that, under Housby, mere possession of recently stolen items was insufficient to show that he committed burglary, the judge expressly rejected the suggestion that the evidence only showed such possession.\nThe appellate court majority\u2019s reliance on Housby was therefore misplaced. The question here is not whether the defendant has been deprived of due process (see People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 13), but whether the trial judge\u2019s finding that the defendant violated his probation is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Cooper (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 509, 514.\nThe appellate court held that the evidence did not show that the defendant possessed the sunroofs at any time. It rejected the testimony of James Box and Scheuster, who said defendant offered to transfer the property to them, on the ground that their credibility \u201cwas seriously impeached.\u201d (146 Ill. App. 3d 982, 987.) The appellate court also felt that the defendant\u2019s explanation of how his thumbprint came to be on one of the stolen items was reasonable and overcame any inference of guilt which the thumbprint would otherwise create. The appellate court \u201cbelieve[d] defendant to be a victim of circumstances.\u201d 146 Ill. App. 3d 982, 988.\nThe appellate court exceeded its authority in reweighing the evidence and rejudging the credibility of the witnesses. \u201cThe trial judge, who is in a superior position to weigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, was entitled to draw reasonable inferences and reach conclusions to which the evidence lent itself. *** The mere fact that a reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion had it been the trier of fact is insufficient to serve as a basis for reversal.\u201d People v. Cooper (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 509, 514.\nJames Box apparently lied to the police when he initially said that he had never seen the sunroofs, and his original statement differed from his testimony concerning when the defendant discussed the roofs with him. James\u2019 and Scheuster's actions were not above reproach and both had personal interests which aligned them to Keith rather than the defendant. Scheuster, however, was given immunity for testifying against both the defendant and Keith, and her testimony here was highly inculpatory of Keith as well. In any event, the trial judge had ample opportunity to assess the credibility of all the witnesses and obviously believed Mark Kaylor, James Box, and Scheuster instead of the defendant. The appellate court erred in rejecting the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses.\nOn the basis of the evidence introduced, the trial judge could have found that the defendant, Keith Box and at least one other man visited Sun Control shortly before closing on July 19, that Keith discussed sunroofs with Kaylor while the defendant listened, and that the defendant never touched either sunroof at that time. Sometime before 8 o\u2019clock the next morning a break-in occurred, and the two display sunroofs and a box of window tint were taken. The defendant had no substantiated alibi for his whereabouts between 2 or 3 o\u2019clock on the morning of July 20 and the time the burglary was discovered. Later in the day, defendant offered to give Scheuster one of the sunroofs, and sometime that week he offered to sell them to James Box. The defendant was present when the sunroofs were transferred from Keith\u2019s car to James\u2019 house on July 26. The defendant was a passenger in Scheuster\u2019s car when police apprehended them the next day and found the sunroofs in the trunk. The defendant\u2019s thumbprint was on one of them. The defendant\u2019s claim that he had passed the sunroofs back and forth with Keith Box during the visit to Sun Control was a reversal of his previous statement to police, was made only after consulting with Keith, and was contradicted by the Sun Control employee. The trial judge therefore would have been justified in concluding the defendant was lying about his role in the incident.\nContrary to the defendant\u2019s argument, this evidence does not merely show that he possessed the stolen sunroofs. It showed in addition that he was present at the scene just hours before the burglary occurred, attempted to dispose of the property as if he had as good a claim to it as Keith Box, and lied to police about the events of July 19. Given the testimony that the defendant did not touch the roofs on July 19 and the fact that the sunroofs were wrapped with towels when they were observed by James, Scheuster and Detective Lebo, the trial judge could have also concluded that the defendant\u2019s thumbprint could only have been made at the time of the burglary. Despite the absence of direct evidence that he broke into the store, we believe these circumstances were sufficient to permit the trial judge\u2019s finding. While a different result might obtain in a criminal trial, in this probation revocation proceeding the judge only had to be persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the burglary. People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447.\nThe same evidence also supported a finding of theft by the knowing exercise of unauthorized control over property with intent to permanently deprive the owner. The motion to revoke probation charged the defendant with theft on or about July 27, the day he, Keith Box and Scheuster were stopped by police. Although the defendant does not allude to it in this court, he argued at trial that there was no evidence that he personally exercised control over the sunroofs on that date. The State responded, and we agree, that the exertion of control during the previous week was sufficient to sustain the charge and that the variance was not fatal. People v. Alexander (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 73.\nThe defendant suggests that Keith Box exerted more control than he did over the stolen items. While this may be true, it does nothing to avail the defendant. The fact that Keith may have also been guilty of burglary and theft does not exonerate the defendant. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and that of the circuit court of Macon County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.\nJUSTICE CUNNINGHAM took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jeffrey K. Davison, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Judith H. Schlessinger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 64168.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. KELVIN JEROME HOUSTON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 5, 1987.\nCUNNINGHAM, J., took no part.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jeffrey K. Davison, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Roma J. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Mark L. Rotert and Judith H. Schlessinger, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0194-01", "first_page_order": 230, "last_page_order": 238 }