{ "id": 3193584, "name": "RONALD K. HARRIS, JR., Appellee, v. AL WALKER, d/b/a Ky-Wa Acres, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Harris v. Walker", "decision_date": "1988-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 64994", "first_page": "542", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 542" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130572 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538842 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473636 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2766827 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682045 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112739 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993974 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515594 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2885228 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5556686 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638849 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574515 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "Heiple, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0384-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 688, "char_count": 11744, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.971761337754474e-07, "percentile": 0.9787257867157506 }, "sha256": "061bdf727599fdce7f0ccb474b5df24ee8da283995321340e0d7ea4ff70d50ab", "simhash": "1:e09eab31a54635b5", "word_count": 1926 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:46:47.539423+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RONALD K. HARRIS, JR., Appellee, v. AL WALKER, d/b/a Ky-Wa Acres, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Ronald K. Harris, Jr., was injured when he fell off a horse he had rented from the Ky-Wa Acres riding stables, owned and operated by the defendant, A1 Walker. Filing a two-count personal injury action in Bureau County circuit court, plaintiff based count I upon section 16 of the Animal Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 8, par. 366), and grounded count II on a common law negligence theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence that plaintiff signed and fully understood an exculpatory agreement. Based on this release and plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony that he read and understood its terms before signing it, the circuit judge granted the defendant\u2019s motion, ruling that the release barred both counts in plaintiff\u2019s suit.\nOn appeal, the Appellate Court, Third District, reversed the judgment and remanded to the circuit court for trial. A brief review of the three separate opinions filed by the three-judge panel demonstrates how divided the court\u2019s decision was. One of the appellate court judges holding for reversal stated that the exculpatory contract could not release defendant from liability under the Animal Control Act because it violated the State\u2019s public policy inherent in the Act. Another judge, concurring only in the reversal, opined that the Animal Control Act was not applicable, but that plaintiff had pled allegations of fraud sufficient to abrogate the release from negligence liability. The dissenting judge suggested that the only question on appeal was whether the release violated public policy, and he concluded that \u201cthe statute does not appear to be intended to protect the person who voluntarily encounters a known risk and agrees in writing to assume the risk.\u201d (152 Ill. App. 3d 384, 388 (Scott, J., dissenting).) This split decision is in conflict with Clark v. Rogers (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 591 (finding that the legislature did not intend to preclude assumption of risk defense to Animal Control Act claim in case where plaintiff was injured by horse she was hired to train), and Vanderlei v. Heideman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 158 (ruling that the Act was not intended to abolish the defense of assumption of the risk in suit brought by horseshoer against owner of horse that kicked him). Exercising our discretion under Rule 315(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 315), we granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nCount I. The Animal Control Act Claim\nSection 16 of the Animal Control Act, on which plaintiff\u2019s first count is based, provides:\n\u201cIf a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 8, par. 366.)\nThe legislative history of the statute leads us to conclude that our legislature did not intend to create a statutory cause of action for a renter of a horse like the plaintiff in this case. The original version of this statute was passed in 1949 and applied only to dogs. (Ill Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 8, par. 12d.) The apparent purpose of the legislation was modest: to reduce the burden on dog-bite plaintiffs by eliminating the \u201cone-bite rule\u201d \u2014 the common law requirement that a plaintiff must plead and prove that a dog owner either knew or was negligent not to know that his dog had a propensity to injure people. Beckert v. Risberg (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 44, 46.\nEnacting the Animal Control Act in 1973, the legislature amended this \u201cdog-bite statute\u201d to cover \u201cother animals.\u201d We have found nothing, nor has plaintiff cited anything, that suggests that the underlying purpose of this amendment should not be as narrowly construed as that of its predecessor statute.\nIn deciding whether the plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under the statute, we start from our well-established presumption that a statute that represents a departure from the common law should be narrowly construed in favor of those who are subject to the statute\u2019s operation. (In re W.W. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 53, 57; Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 213, 220.) Accordingly, we believe that the legislature intended only to provide coverage under the statute for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal poses to them. This interpretation is consistent with the emphasis the statute places on lack of provocation and plaintiff\u2019s peaceable conduct in a place in which he is legally entitled to be.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s relationship to the defendant in this case excluded the plaintiff from the coverage of the statute. Plaintiff rented the horse from defendant\u2019s stable and claimed to fully understand and accept the risks of horseback riding. By establishing this relationship, the plaintiff took himself out of the class of persons the legislature intended to protect. We therefore hold that where a person rents a horse and understands and expressly accepts the risks of using the horse, he cannot recover damages from the person who rented the horse to him under section 16 of the Animal Control Act.\nCount II. Negligence\nThough the plaintiff apparently conceded that exculpatory contracts generally insulate defendants from liability on common law negligence claims (152 Ill. App. 3d at 387), we reaffirm that under certain circumstances exculpatory contracts may act as a total bar to a plaintiffs negligence claim. We start from our often-repeated axiom that \u201c[p]ublic policy strongly favors freedom to contract [citation], as is manifest in both the United States Constitution and our constitution.\u201d (McClure Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 68, 72.) Regarding contracts that shift the risks of one\u2019s own negligence to another contracting party, the general rule is to enforce exculpatory contracts \u201cunless (1) it would be against a settled public policy of the State to do so, or (2) there is something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agreement.\u201d (Jackson v. First National Bank (1953), 415 Ill. 453, 460; see also O\u2019Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 436, 437; Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 82, 87.) More recently, we observed that exculpatory clauses are not favored and must be strictly construed against the benefit-ting party, particularly one who drafted the release. Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 378, 395.\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s sign-in sheet contained the following release agreement:\n\u201cYour signature below indicates that you have read the posted rules and will abide by them. Also, your signature shall release Ky-Wa Acres and employees of any liabilities you may incur while on the premises or for any injury which may result from horseback riding. If your signature is not reliable please do not sign or ride.\u201d\nIn addition, the prominently posted rules stated that riders rode at their own risk. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he was an experienced rider and that he understood the release he signed. Just as this court has noted that the racing of automobiles entails certain risks of injury that are obvious to experienced drivers (Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 82, 86), so too horseback riding involves various risks of injury that are plain to experienced riders. As the court stated, \u201c[t]he parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence which resulted in plaintiff\u2019s accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clause inoperable.\u201d (Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82, 86.) The court also concluded that when the parties adopt broad language in a release, it is reasonable to interpret the intended coverage to be as broad as the risks that are obvious to experienced participants. Even if the release in this case is strictly construed against the defendant, its terms are broad enough to cover the situation at issue here. We believe that only the most inexperienced of horseback riders would not understand that under certain circumstances a horse may become spooked or \u201cside-shocked\u201d and cause a rider to fall from the horse. Yet plaintiff was an experienced rider who claimed to understand the release he signed.\nOur review of the record and search for public policies that might be violated by the enforcement of this release have failed to uncover any policy reasons not to hold this release effective. In fact, we note that the legislature has dealt with liability for injuries caused by animals in the Animal Control Act, and they did not choose to preclude the use of exculpatory contracts. In sum, we do not find any public policy in conflict with upholding the defendant\u2019s contractual release from negligence liability.\nIn addition to finding no public policy that is offended by enforcing the exculpatory contract here, we see nothing in the relationship between the contracting parties that suggests that the exculpatory agreement should not be enforced. This is not a case where the plaintiff is in an unequal bargaining position. Again, Schlessman is instructive, for in that case it was stated, \u201c[w]hile it is obvious that plaintiff would not have been allowed to use the racetrack had he not signed the release, plaintiff was under no economic or other compulsion to sign the release in order to engage in amateur auto racing.\u201d (Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d at 87.) Similarly, this plaintiff voluntarily chose to enter into a relationship with the defendant whereby plaintiff agreed to accept the risks associated with horseback riding. Therefore, the plaintiff \u201c \u2018will not be heard to complain of a risk which he has encountered voluntarily, or brought upon himself with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger.\u2019 \u201d Vanderlei v. Heideman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162-63, quoting Prosser, Torts 523 (4th ed. 1971).\nClarification is also required with regard to one of the appellate court judges\u2019 suggestion that plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint alleged fraud \u201csufficient to vitiate what would otherwise be a valid release.\u201d (152 Ill. App. 3d at 387 (Heiple, J., specially concurring).) In order to state a cause of action for fraud, we require plaintiffs to allege that defendant made a false representation of a material fact knowing or believing it to be false and thereby intending to induce plaintiff to act. (Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 243, 249.) Count II of the amended complaint alleges only negligence, that \u201cdefendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known [that the horse] had a propensity to become \u2018side-shocked,\u2019 creating an unreasonable dangerous condition to the person riding said horse.\u201d We do not consider this to be an allegation that defendant knowingly misrepresented to the plaintiff the dangers inherent in horseback riding or peculiar to the horse he rented in an effort to induce plaintiff to sign the release.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and affirm the decision of the circuit court.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Francis J. Lynch and Gary S. Schwab, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Anthony C. Raccuglia & Associates, of Peru (Louis L. Bertrand, of counsel), and Sherman, Gray & Lloyd, of Chicago (Thayne D. Gray and Kurt D. Lloyd, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 64994.\nRONALD K. HARRIS, JR., Appellee, v. AL WALKER, d/b/a Ky-Wa Acres, Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 11, 1988.\nFrancis J. Lynch and Gary S. Schwab, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.\nAnthony C. Raccuglia & Associates, of Peru (Louis L. Bertrand, of counsel), and Sherman, Gray & Lloyd, of Chicago (Thayne D. Gray and Kurt D. Lloyd, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0542-01", "first_page_order": 554, "last_page_order": 563 }