{ "id": 3201543, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LOWELL MADISON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Madison", "decision_date": "1988-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 64584", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3462746 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173748 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465119 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 U.S. 360", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166003 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "881" }, { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/359/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3533223 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697-98" }, { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493109 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6198339 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "647" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199658 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "1542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 594", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313625 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3135012 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 340", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131469 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "1165" }, { "page": "349-50" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 F. Supp. 582", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5607853 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/518/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 F.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1908853 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/721/1072-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715874 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 U.S. 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6137701 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/267/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168334 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "1981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027286 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-71" }, { "page": "582-86" }, { "page": "2037-41" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "2037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543054 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3496893 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340163 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 217", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163406 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0217-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1011, "char_count": 24622, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.143670039042912e-07, "percentile": 0.8622072174864249 }, "sha256": "cd660196d2ff3ae5e96d730ee0925a4cab0fd71b42c0c8ef6ce5f91a98b6b8fa", "simhash": "1:fa3b108aaa913cb2", "word_count": 4003 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:54.036698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LOWELL MADISON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 17, 1984, defendant was charged with 26 counts of possession of a motor vehicle certificate of title with incomplete assignment, in violation of section 4\u2014 104 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95%, par. 4 \u2014 104). At trial, the circuit court of Iroquois County granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of the incomplete titles because the evidence resulted from an illegal search and seizure, and subsequently dismissed the case. The appellate court for the third district affirmed. (149 Ill. App. 3d 592.) We allowed the State\u2019s appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (107 Ill. 2d 315(a)).\nDefendant was the owner and operator of Madison Salvage Yard in Iroquois County. Defendant\u2019s neighbors complained about the yard to the State\u2019s Attorney, who in turn alerted the Secretary of State\u2019s office. The complaints concerned the condition of the premises. Following this notice, two Secretary of State police officers went without a search warrant to defendant\u2019s salvage yard to conduct an inspection. The officers inventoried the vehicles in the yard and reviewed defendant\u2019s business records, whereupon they discovered 26 vehicle certificates of title with incomplete assignments of title. Defendant was given a receipt for the 26 titles, and the officers took them into their possession. Although defendant cooperated with the officers and did not object to the inspection, he did not give the officers permission to seize the 26 titles.\nLicensed salvage yards are regulated under chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Article IV of chapter 5, entitled \u201cRecords Required to be Kept\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, pars. 5 \u2014 401 through 5 \u2014 404), specifies the business records yards must keep, details the State\u2019s right to inspect these records, and outlines the possible consequences for failure to keep required records. Section 5 \u2014 403 permits authorized representatives of the Secretary of State, including police officers, to perform inspections of the records and premises of salvage yards for the purpose of determining the accuracy and completeness of the required records. No warrant is required to initiate or conduct these inspections, but subsection (6) provides that:\n\u201cIn the event information comes to the attention of the individuals conducting an inspection that may give rise to the necessity of obtaining a search warrant, and in the event steps are initiated for the procurement of a search warrant, the individuals conducting such inspection may take all necessary steps to secure the premises under inspection until the warrant application is acted upon by a judicial officer.\" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 5-403(6).\nThe issue presented by this case is whether, when police officers have discovered evidence of a crime during the course of a lawful administrative inspection conducted pursuant to section 5 \u2014 403 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 5 \u2014 403), the officers must obtain a warrant before seizing the evidence. The State argues that the trial and appellate courts erroneously interpreted the warrant requirement of section 5 \u2014 403, and therefore the evidence seized by the officers in this case should not have been suppressed. The State contends that officers should not be required to obtain a warrant before seizing evidence of criminal violations uncovered during an administrative inspection.\nThere has been no question raised as to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the inspections, or to the specific requirements and restrictions imposed therein on administrative inspections. Thus, our decision in this case does not turn on any fourth amendment analysis, but only upon an interpretation of our State statute.\nUnder the regulatory scheme created by the legislature in section 5 \u2014 401 et seq., the Secretary of State police officers were authorized to conduct a warrantless inspection of defendant\u2019s salvage yard for the limited purpose of checking the accuracy and completeness of defendant\u2019s records. To determine whether the officers were entitled to seize evidence discovered during the inspection, however, we must turn to the language of the statute. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts \u201cmust ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intention in enacting the statute. In doing so courts must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. *** \u2018 \u201cThis is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Maloney v. Bower (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 473, 479, quoting Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139; Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.\nThe language of section 5 \u2014 403(6) is not so vague as to preclude understanding of and adherence to its plain meaning. Nothing in the statute permits seizure of records or other evidence uncovered as a result of an inspection. As we read it, the plain language of the statute contemplates that officers obtain a warrant before seizing any evidence discovered during the course of an inspection. Any information uncovered that could serve as the basis for criminal prosecution makes obtaining a warrant necessary because gathering evidence for criminal prosecutions is outside the narrow scope of authority \u2014 to check the accuracy and completeness of records\u2014 given the State to conduct administrative inspections. It is a fundamental premise of both State and Federal law that in the absence of exigent circumstances or some other exception to the warrant requirement, no evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution may be sought or seized without a lawful warrant. (Frank v. Maryland (1959), 359 U.S. 360, 365, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877, 881, 79 S. Ct. 804, 808 (\u201cevidence of criminal action may not *** be seized without a judicially issued search warrant\u201d).) Therefore, any evidence seized by police officers without a warrant during an administrative inspection under section 5 \u2014 403 is evidence seized outside the officers\u2019 limited authority under the statute and must be excluded. Thus, we agree with our appellate court that \u201cwhen the officers discovered the certificates with incomplete assignments, they should have obtained a search warrant before attempting to seize them. This they failed to do, thereby rendering the seizure of the certificates unlawful.\u201d 149 Ill. App. 3d 592, 596; see also People v. Potter (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 693, 697-98 (\u201c[I]f within 24 hours information is uncovered [in an administrative inspection] which might give an officer probable cause to believe an offense has been committed, a search warrant should be obtained before any further searching or seizing is attempted\u201d).\nThe State argues that requiring a police officer to obtain a warrant to seize evidence where the evidence has already been uncovered in the course of a valid administrative search would be \u201csuperfluous\u201d because under these circumstances the warrant requirement serves no useful purpose. The State concludes that the legislature could not possibly have intended to require a warrant for seizure of evidence in such cases.\nWhat the State essentially seeks is an interpretation of the statute that in effect reads out the language requiring a warrant after discovery of criminal evidence. We cannot endorse such an interpretation, however, as the legislature\u2019s inclusion of that language must be deemed to be intentional, and we will not interpret a statute to render meaningless its clear language. \u201c \u2018 \u201cThere is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151-52, quoting People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Building Center, Inc. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 365, 371.) If there were no statutory language requiring a warrant, this would be a different case and we might find the search and seizure conducted here unobjectionable under current fourth amendment doctrine. (See Michigan v. Clifford (1984), 464 U.S. 287, 294, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484, 104 S. Ct. 641, 647 (\u201cIf evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course of a valid administrative search, it may be seized\u201d); Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 739, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 512, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (\u201c[I]f, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately\u201d).) But where, as here, a State statute imposes additional restrictions on the manner in which warrantless searches are to be conducted, we cannot ignore the language of the statute or interpret it in such a way as to render the restrictions meaningless.\nAlthough the plain language of the statute compels our decision in this case, and therefore we need not turn to the legislative history of the statute for guidance, we note that the legislative history proffered by the State in support of their argument does not demonstrate a legislative intent to permit seizures in the course of administrative inspections. In fact, in explaining the bill to members of the Senate, Senator Chew stated that:\n\u201cThis is a bill that was designed by the Motor Vehicle Laws, and it deals with auto theft and chopshops plus parts. And it merely allows the Secretary of State or his nominee to make unannounced inspections to ascertain whether any parts on the premises were stolen or do not have ... the proper *** number on them and that\u2019s all it does.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1982, at 41.\nIn response to questions, Senator Chew made clear that the inspection authorized by the statute \u201cis not a search, it\u2019s just an inspection to ascertain the kind of parts that are on the premises.\u201d (82d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1982, at 42.) Further, he stressed that:\n\u201cI don\u2019t want the word search to overcast the inspection. It isn\u2019t necessary to have a search warrant to inspect. If you were there to search the place, in the sense of searching, it\u2019s necessary to have a warrant, so any time a search is to be had, the judge would have to issue ... a search warrant *** and what we\u2019re trying to do is to give the Secretary of State\u2019s Office the authority to go in and inspect, not search but inspect, their records to ascertain whether there are stolen auto parts on the premises. Now the legal proceedings subsequently to the fine or not to fine would be followed according to law *** it is an inspection and not a search.\u201d (82d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 1982, at 43-44.)\nThis legislative history illustrates the legislature\u2019s intention that the purpose of inspection be narrowly limited to checking records, and not to include the general authority-including the authority to seize evidence \u2014 given to police in conducting searches. It also makes clear that judicial approval would be necessary to expand an inspection conducted pursuant to the statute beyond its narrowly drawn purposes.\nFurthermore, contrary to the State\u2019s assertions that the warrant requirement is meaningless in this context, we find that it serves a useful purpose. As originally enacted, the statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections contained no guidelines concerning how the inspections were to be conducted and no limits on the discretion of the State in making inspections. Both this court and the Federal district court held the statute unconstitutional under the standards established in Donovan v. Dewey (1981), 452 U.S. 594, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 101 S. Ct. 2534. (People v. Krull (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 107, 116, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1987), 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160; Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner (N.D. Ill. 1981), 518 F. Supp. 582, affd in part & vacated in part (1983), 721 F.2d 1072.) The statute was then amended to include safeguards designed to limit State officials\u2019 discretion by restricting the manner in which warrantless inspections could be conducted. The State concedes that the current statute is strictly limited and that the requirements of section 5 \u2014 403(6) are safeguards for conducting warrantless inspections. The constitutionality of the statute as amended has been upheld. (Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner (7th Cir. 1983), 721 F.2d 1072.) Given this background, we do not find it inconceivable that the legislature enacted section 5 \u2014 403(6) to serve a useful function: to protect against the possible abuses of administrative searches by requiring that the neutral judgment of a magistrate or judge be obtained before allowing Stat\u00e9 officers to seize evidence of criminal activity uncovered during inspections.\nNeither can we accept the State\u2019s contention that the appellate court\u2019s decision in People v. Potter (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 693, authorizes unlimited warrantless search and seizure under the statute for the first 24 hours of an administrative inspection. Potter simply requires that if an inspection has gone on for 24 hours, the State must then obtain a warrant before any further search is authorized. The fact that a warrant is required under these circumstances does not, however, carry the negative implication that through the first 24 hours of an inspection the State has carte blanche to search and seize as it wishes. As we read it, the statute requires a warrant whenever evidence of a criminal violation is uncovered, prior to seizure of that evidence.\nThe State also argues that the statute\u2019s requirement of a warrant serves no fourth amendment purpose. Although we decide this case on purely statutory grounds, we note that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is \u201c \u2018to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u2019 \u201d (Illinois v. Krull (1987), 480 U.S. 340, 347, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 373, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1165, quoting United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613.) In failing to obtain a warrant before seizing the certificates of title in this case, the police officers acted in defiance of a State statute. This is precisely the type of situation in which application of the exclusionary rule works to deter future police misconduct and preserve the protections of the fourth amendment. Thus it is clear that the trial and appellate court decisions excluding the evidence furthered the purpose underlying the fourth amendment\u2019s exclusionary rule.\nThe State\u2019s reliance on an exigent-circumstances rationale for the warrantless search is also erroneous. Application of an exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement will be made only where the situation, considering all the facts, necessitated immediate action by the police. The State has failed to bring any facts to our attention that indicate any exigent circumstances existing when the officers seized defendant\u2019s certificates of title, and we agree with the appellate court that there is no evidence that the officers had insufficient time to get a search warrant before the courthouse closed. The cases cited by the State in support of application of an exigent-circumstances exception, Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, and Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975, were both based on the differences between searches of automobiles and searches of homes or offices. As stated in Chambers, \u201cthe opportunity to search [a vehicle] is fleeting since a car is readily movable.\u201d (Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 90 S. Ct. at 1981.) Obviously, the rationale justifying search and seizure of vehicles in these cases cannot be construed to justify the seizure of evidence in the salvage yard in this case.\nThe State next argues that even if the evidence seized in this case is subject to exclusion, it should not be excluded due to the good-faith or plain-view exceptions to the exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court recognized a \u201cgood faith\u201d exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405, and expanded that exception in Illinois v. Krull (1987), 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160. In Leon, the Court held that evidence seized on the authority of a search warrant later found to be invalid need not be excluded if the police officer\u2019s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. The Court reasoned that to exclude evidence under these circumstances would not serve the basic purpose of the rule \u2014 deterring police misconduct \u2014 because at the time of the search and seizure the police officer was acting as a reasonable police officer should.\nOn the same rationale, the Court in Krull extended the good-faith exception to situations in which a police officer conducts a search and seizure under the authority of a statute later found to be unconstitutional:\n\u201cUnless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law. If the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as written.\u201d Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 375,107 S. Ct, at 1167.\nObviously, Leon and Krull are not controlling here, as the police officers in this case were relying neither on an invalid warrant nor on a statute later held to be unconstitutional. Instead, the State argues that we should extend the good-faith exception to situations where a police officer reasonably relies on his own interpretation of a valid statute in conducting a search and seizure, when that statute is later judicially interpreted to prohibit such seizure.\nWe reject the State\u2019s argument because under Leon and Krull the officer\u2019s good faith alone is not sufficient to validate the search and seizure; the officer must also be acting on the authority of a seemingly valid warrant or statute. Here, there is no such reliance, but quite the opposite. The officers were acting in defiance of, not reliance on, the language of a statute limiting the authority of officers to inspection of the premises and a records check for accuracy and completeness.\nMoreover, to adopt the extension of the good-faith exception proposed by the State would essentially eviscerate the exclusionary rule as it is currently enforced. Police officers would be encouraged to defy the plain language of statutes as written in favor of their own interpretations in conducting searches and seizures. Such a proposal, giving the police unlimited authority to conduct searches and seizures until specifically restricted by the legislature or the courts, is fundamentally at odds with the central purpose of deterring police misconduct which underlies the exclusionary rule.\nThe State\u2019s reliance on the plain-view doctrine is similarly misplaced. Under the doctrine, evidence seized by officers in the absence of a warrant is nevertheless admissible if three conditions are met. First, police must be properly on the premises through a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the police must discover the evidence inadvertently, not knowing in advance the location of the evidence. Finally, it must be immediately apparent that the item observed may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 464-71, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582-86, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037-41 (plurality opinion); People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 29, 51-52 (seizure valid where police lawfully on premises and items seized were in plain view); People v. House (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 298, 300-02 (three requirements of the plain-view doctrine outlined).) The State argues that we should extend the plain-view exception to the circumstances of this case. This court has never applied the doctrine to facts even remotely similar to those in this case, and we see no reason to do so now.\nWe agree with the appellate court that a lengthy analysis under the plain-view doctrine is not necessary where, as here, the officers were searching for precisely the objects found. Certificates of title contained within defendant\u2019s records, although coming into the view of the officers during the course of the inspection, cannot be seriously considered as having been in \u201cplain view,\u201d and discovery pursuant to a deliberate search of these records can hardly be deemed inadvertent. As the Supreme Court noted, \u201cit is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 582, 91 S. Ct. at 2037.\nFinally, even if we were to find that under the language of section 5 \u2014 403 a warrant was not necessary for seizure of the titles discovered during the inspection, under the facts of this case the evidence would still be ex-cludable. One of the police officers who conducted the search testified that the inspection was in response to a complaint concerning the condition of defendant\u2019s premises. When asked, \u201c[The complaint] had nothing to do with car titles, did it?\u201d the officer responded, \u201cNo, Sir, it did not.\u201d\nOne of the fundamental principles of administrative searches is that the government may not use an administrative inspection scheme as a pretext to search for evidence of criminal violations. (See Michigan v. Tyler (1978), 436 U.S. 499, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 98 S. Ct. 1942; Donovan v. Dewey (1981), 452 U.S. 594, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 101 S. Ct. 2534; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973), 413 U.S. 266, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535; Abel v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668, 80 S. Ct. 683.) Thus, if \u201cthe primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity\u201d a search warrant based on probable cause must be obtained. (Michigan v. Clifford (1984), 464 U.S. 287, 294, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484, 104 S. Ct. 641, 647.) Here, the search was initiated not for the purpose of inspecting the records, as authorized by the statute, but in response to complaints about the condition of the premises. The clear implication is that the police were conducting the inspection as a pretext for placating defendant\u2019s neighbors or in order to find criminal violations.\nIn People v. Potter (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 693, our appellate court faced a similar situation. There, the State\u2019s Attorney had received information that defendants (used-car dealers) had sold cars with their odometers turned back. Because there was insufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant for defendant\u2019s dealership, the State\u2019s Attorney instead conducted a warrantless administrative search under section 5 \u2014 403. Evidence of altered odometers was uncovered, and defendants were indicted. The appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s suppression of evidence discovered in the inspection. By comparing the purpose of the statute \u2014 to combat the trade in stolen vehicles and parts\u2014 with the purpose underlying the search conducted of the dealership, the court concluded that the inspection was merely pretextual and that even \u201cthe most charitable reading of these statutes cannot validate the searches in question.\u201d 140 Ill. App. 3d at 697.\nSimilarly, the administrative inspection in the present case was not implemented in order to further the purposes of the statute, but merely in response to neighbors\u2019 complaints unrelated to the purpose of the statute. Evidence obtained as the result of such an abuse of the authority to inspect given by the statute and without the \u25a0warrant contemplated by the statute is clearly inadmissible against defendant.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Tony Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (Kenneth R Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Ronald E. Boyer, of Watseka, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 64584.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LOWELL MADISON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 11, 1988.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied April 5, 1988.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Tony Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (Kenneth R Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRonald E. Boyer, of Watseka, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 207, "last_page_order": 223 }