{ "id": 5550939, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DONALD PARKER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Parker", "decision_date": "1988-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 65036", "first_page": "204", "last_page": "216", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 204" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865750 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156867 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959147 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474979 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489868 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408379 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2939771 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427013 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141517 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146647 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188213 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" }, { "page": "271" }, { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575702 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164191 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782877 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "2300" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "2300" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "2301" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364905 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "1883" }, { "page": "1542" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192526 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0029-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 793, "char_count": 19296, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.0746287997229275e-07, "percentile": 0.9086531685824154 }, "sha256": "7341921515dde3859a1c4f394a72c79030806f956cd4d516db6c23f39d2926d5", "simhash": "1:f897e85d607a56ed", "word_count": 3208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:47.075041+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DONALD PARKER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, the defendant, Donald Parker, was convicted of the offense of sexual relations within families. The trial judge imposed a $1,000 fine and sentenced the defendant to 30 months\u2019 probation conditioned upon his serving a one-year term of periodic imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction (152 Ill. App. 3d 732), and we allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nAt the trial, the defendant\u2019s stepson, who was 18 years old at the time of the offense, testified that on December 31, 1985, he twice performed oral sex on the defendant, once in the early evening and once at approximately midnight. He further testified that such behavior had been going on since he was in fifth or sixth grade. A police officer also testified that on January 3, 1986, in response to questioning, the defendant admitted that his stepson had performed oral sex on him. The victim\u2019s mother testified that she married the defendant on July 19, 1976, and that the defendant had never adopted the victim.\nThe appellate court found that the statute under which the defendant was convicted (Sexual Relations Within Families, section 11\u201411 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411)) was ambiguous. The court stated that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of a defendant and reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction because it believed that any interpretation of the statute, as enacted, required the court to speculate as to the statute\u2019s meaning. 152 Ill. App. 3d at 735.\nThe statute in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial provided:\n\u201cSexual Relations Within Families, (a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he or she:\n(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12 \u2014 12 of this Code; and\n(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: (i) Brother or sister, either of the whole blood or the half blood; or (ii) Father or mother, when the child or stepchild, regardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption, was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed.\n(b) Sentence. Sexual relations within families is a Class 3 felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 11.\nThe State argues that the appellate court improperly held that the statute does not apply to a stepparent-stepchild relationship. The State contends that the language of the statute is clear, and that the legislature intended in section 11 \u2014 11 to cover all parent-child and stepparent-stepchild relationships where the child or stepchild is over 18 years old.\nThe defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual relations within families because the statute does not prohibit such conduct between a stepparent and stepchild over the age of 17. The defendant contends that the language of the statute is ambiguous and that because penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants, the appellate court correctly held that the statute was not applicable to him. The defendant further argues that the legislature did not intend to include the stepparent-stepchild relationship under the statute and that the subsequent amendment of the statute created a change in law, indicating that at the time of his conviction, the statute did not embrace the stepparent-stepchild relationship.\nSection 11 \u2014 11 in effect at the time of the trial punished conduct which was not previously punished under an earlier version (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411). Before being amended in 1984 (Pub. Acts 83\u20141067, 83\u20141117), section 11 \u2014 11 only prohibited sexual conduct between a brother and sister without reference to age. By amending section 11 \u2014 11 in 1984 to punish not only sexual conduct between brothers and sisters but also sexual conduct between persons who know they are the parent or stepparent of another person who is over 18 years of age, the legislature created a new offense: sexual relations within families. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411.) Sexual conduct between any person and their \u201cdaughter\u201d or \u201cstep-daughter\u201d or \u201cson\u201d or \u201cstepson\u201d was previously punished only if the child was under the age of 18. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11\u201410.\nPointing to the 1984 acts which amended section lili, the defendant argues that the legislature did not intend to include stepparent-stepchild relationships within the purview of the statute. The 1984 amendments (Pub. Acts 83\u20141067, 83\u20141117) created not only the offense of sexual relations within families (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411), but also created the offenses of criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201413 through 12\u201416.) The term \u201cfamily member\u201d was broadly defined for purposes of these four offenses and includes in the definition the words \u201cstep-grandparent\u201d and \u201cstep-parent,\u201d along with \u201cstep-child.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u201412(c).) The defendant argues that because the legislature limited this definition to sections 12\u201412 through 12 \u2014 18 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201412 through 12\u201418), the legislature intended to exclude the stepparent-stepchild relationship from the offense of sexual relations within families.\nThe fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271; People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 15.) In determining legislative intent, the court should consider not only the language of the statute, but also the \u201creason and necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained.\u201d (Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 271 (quoting People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316).) We find it significant that the legislature, in amending section 11\u201411, rewrote the statute to protect both a \u201cchild\u201d or a \u201cstepchild\u201d over the age of 18 from an act of sexual penetration by a \u201cperson [who] knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** child or stepchild.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411(a)(2).) The words \u201cfather or mother\u201d are a partial description of persons who know they are related to their children or stepchildren. Although not enunciated in the statute in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial, stepparents are clearly within the group of persons covered by the statute if they know that the victim is their stepchild. As former section 11\u201411 applied only to a brother-sister relationship (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411) and the former aggravated incest statute applied only to children and stepchildren under 18 years of age (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11\u201410), the legislature, in creating the offense of sexual relations within families, obviously intended to punish not only sexual conduct among family members under the age of 18 (prohibited under section 12\u201413 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u201413)), but also family members who engage in sexual conduct with their children or stepchildren over the age of 18. The object and purpose of the law, to prohibit acts of sexual penetration by people who know that they are related to their children or stepchildren, would be narrowed if the statute were read to exclude the stepparent-stepchild relationship. Because stepparents are clearly within the group of persons covered by the statute if they knew that the other person was their stepchild, we believe the legislature intended section 11 \u2014 11 to include \u201cstepparents,\u201d even though that specific word was not included. Moreover, if the intent and purpose of the legislature can be determined from a statute, \u201cwords may be modified, altered, or even supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with the legislative intention.\u201d (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543, quoting Community Consolidated School District No. 210 v. Mini (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 382, 386; see also People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358 (\u201cThe judiciary possesses the authority to insert language into a statute that has been omitted through legislative oversight\u201d).) It is clear that the legislature intended the statute to apply to stepparents, and we believe therefore that stepfathers and stepmothers are included within the purview of the statute.\nOur conclusion is further buttressed by the subsequent amendment of section 11\u201411 in 1986, which may be an appropriate source in determining legislative intent. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543; People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358.) The version of section 11\u201411 in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial was amended, effective August 15, 1986 (Pub. Act 84 \u2014 1280), and the pertinent part of the statute now in effect reads:\n\u201c(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** (iii) Stepfather or stepmother, when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 38, par. 11\u201411(a)(2).\nAlthough the defendant correctly notes that an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed, \u201cthe presumption is not controlling [citations] and may be overcome by other considerations.\u201d (People v. Nunn (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248.) The circumstances surrounding the amendment should be considered and:\n\u201cIf they indicate that the legislature intended only to interpret the original act, the presumption of an intention to change the law is rebutted. Usually, an amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law, but no such purpose is indicated by the amendment of an ambiguous provision.\u201d (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 563.)\nThe 1986 amendment of section 11 \u2014 11 is consistent with our interpretation of section 11 \u2014 11 in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial. Although we do not believe that section 11 \u2014 11 in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial is ambiguous, we believe that the legislature did not intend by the 1986 amendment to create a new offense not punishable by the prior statute. As our earlier discussion pointed out, the legislature, in the 1984 amendments to section 11 \u2014 11, intended to punish conduct which was previously unpunished and further intended to prohibit stepparents, as well as parents, from engaging in sexual conduct with their stepchildren over the age of 18. The amendment simply provides a fuller description of persons who know that they are related to their children or stepchildren. The language in Youngbey indicates that usually the amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law. We do not believe that the legislature should be precluded from later clarifying an already unambiguous law to confirm its earlier intent, without being held to have thereby intended to change the law. We believe, therefore, that the amendment, by adding the words \u201cstepfather\u201d and \u201cstepmother,\u201d did not substantively change the law, but provided a fuller description of the group of persons who know they are related to their child or stepchild.\nThe defendant argues that the language of the statute creates an ambiguous and irreconcilable conflict; the term \u201cstepchild,\u201d he argues, cannot be reconciled with the phrase, \u201cregardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption.\u201d The defendant correctly notes that \u201chalf-blood\u201d refers solely to brothers or sisters and is an inapplicable reference to \u201cstepchild.\u201d (See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 157 (5th ed. 1979).) Because the term \u201chalf-blood\u201d also cannot be applied to the term \u201cchild,\u201d its inclusion in the statute does not create any ambiguity. The words \u201clegitimacy\u201d and \u201cwhole blood\u201d are also an inapplicable reference to the word \u201cstepchild,\u201d as they can only describe the relationship of a child to its parents or a child to its siblings. The words \u201cchild\u201d and \u201cstepchild\u201d are separated by the word \u201cor,\u201d however, and the modifying provisions do not have to apply to both subjects. Further, if the intent of the legislature is determined, \u201cwords may be declared mere surplusage to give effect to the legislative intent.\u201d People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534, 543.\nThe defendant argues that because stepparent-stepchild marriages are not expressly prohibited under section 212 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 212), the legislature could not have intended to include such a relationship under the offense of sexual conduct within families. Because we are not presented with the question, we decline to address this issue other than to note that we do not believe that the fact that the legislature has not expressly prohibited stepparent-stepchild marriages under the marriage statute evinces a legislative intent to exclude stepparents from an otherwise prohibited relationship.\nThe defendant asserts that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and that nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against a defendant beyond the obvious and literal meaning of the statute. (Citing People v. Christensen (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 321; People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205.) He contends, therefore, that because the statute is ambiguous, it must be resolved in his favor.\nWhile penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of an accused, they must not be construed so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature. (People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271; People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543; see A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction \u00a759.06, at 35 (4th ed. 1986).) It is obvious from a reading of the statute under which the defendant was convicted that the legislature intended to prohibit acts of sexual penetration, as defined in the statute, when the person who commits the act knows that the other person is related as a child or stepchild.\nBecause the defendant was proven guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK,\nspecially concurring:\nAlthough I agree with the decision reached by the majority, I do not agree that it is necessary to rely on the subsequent legislative amendment to the statute. As I noted in my dissent in People v. Hicks (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 29, there is an inherent problem in attempting to interpret legislative intent based on the subsequent action of a later legislature. (119 Ill. 2d at 39.) The continually changing membership of the legislature \u201cimpels us to seek \u2018intent\u2019 in the objective words of its statutes, as informed by our own judgment and common sense, rather than in the inevitably subjective thoughts of individual members.\u201d 119 Ill. 2d at 39.\nThe statute here in question is printed in the majority opinion (123 Ill. 2d at 207-08). We are confronted with the interpretation of this specific statute in effect in 1985; the fact that it was subsequently amended, absent a finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, need not impact our decision.\nWhile the State argues that the meaning of the statute is clear, the defendant alleges that the language is ambiguous. While the statute may be imprecisely drafted, I do not believe that it is void due to ambiguity or vagueness. What is required of a penal statute is that it convey a \u201csufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.\u201d United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 8, 91 L. Ed. 1877,1883, 67 S. Ct. 1538,1542.\nJustice Marshall noted in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294, that as long as we are \u201c[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.\u201d (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29, 92 S. Ct. at 2300.) Grayned involved interpretation of a Rockford antinoise ordinance which restricted activities which \u201ctend to disturb the peace\u201d around a school. In upholding the ordinance, the Court noted that it was \u201cclear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits\u201d (408 U.S. at 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 229, 92 S. Ct. at 2300) and that it served as fair notice to those to whom it was directed. In so holding, the Court recognized that the ordinance \u201cmay not be as precise\u201d as other statutes which the Court had upheld but that it \u201cclearly \u2018delineates its reach in words of common understanding.\u2019 \u201d 408 U.S. at 112, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 230, 92 S. Ct. at 2301.\nI turn now to applying the Grayned principles to the statute here in question, being also cognizant of the necessity of strictly construing criminal statutes in favor of the accused. (People v. Foster (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 48, 55.) The question thus becomes one of whether, within common understanding and practices, the defendant was sufficiently warned that his activities were proscribed by the statute.\nOne of the activities which the statute prohibits is sexual relations within families when the person \u201cknows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** Father or mother, when the child or stepchild *** was 18 years of age or over.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411(2).) Both children and stepchildren are protected by this statute. A person is not a stepchild in a vacuum \u2014 it is a relationship created between two people. To speak of a stepchild in a family setting implies the existence of a stepparent. When confronted with an implication in statutory language, \u201c[t]he usual standard used to interpret a statute *** is *** to determine if the statute embraces such consequential applications and effects as are necessary, essential, natural or proper.\u201d (2A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction \u00a755.03, at 602 (4th ed. 1984).) The mere existence of the person referred to as a stepchild necessarily, naturally and properly implies the existence of a stepparent. The protection afforded the stepchild may not be removed merely because the legislature was not as precise in its use of language as one might have wanted. Imprecision does not equate with ambiguity nor does it necessitate reliance on subsequent statutory amendments.\nFor these reasons, I specially concur.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Terence M. Madsen and Gary H. Schwartz, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gerald P. Ursini, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Frank W. Ralph, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 65036.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DONALD PARKER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 20, 1988.\nCLARK, J., specially concurring.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Terence M. Madsen and Gary H. Schwartz, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, John X. Breslin and Gerald P. Ursini, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Frank W. Ralph, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0204-01", "first_page_order": 214, "last_page_order": 226 }