{ "id": 5556971, "name": "In re RONALD SHERMAN SAMUELS, Attorney, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "In re Samuels", "decision_date": "1989-02-02", "docket_number": "No. 65944", "first_page": "509", "last_page": "532", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 509" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1 Ill. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 435748 ], "year": 1798, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/1/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161126 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098485 ], 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A panel of the Hearing Board found against respondent on seven of the eight counts and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. The respondent filed exceptions to the Hearing Board\u2019s report and recommendation. The Review Board concurred in the Hearing Board\u2019s report and recommendation. The respondent filed exceptions with this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(eX5) (107 Ill. 2d R. 753(eX5))..\nRespondent was licensed to practice law in this State in May 1969. From 1977 to the present, respondent has been a partner with the law firm of Washington, Ken-non, Hunter & Samuels. In 1982 and 1983, five of respondent\u2019s clients, Lee Jones, Roosevelt Long, Jesse Robinson, James Ellis and Audrey Gant Holmes, filed separate complaints with the ARDC. The clients alleged that during a six-year period between 1977 and 1982, respondent had undertaken to represent them in various matters and had neglected their cases. The facts surrounding each client\u2019s complaint are set forth below.\nLee Jones was involved in an automobile accident on January 1, 1977. Thereafter Jones consulted with and retained respondent to represent him in a suit against the driver of the other car involved. Respondent filed suit on Jones\u2019 behalf in the circuit court of Will County on December 21, 1977 (Jones v. Morris (Will Co. Cir. Ct.), No. W77 \u2014 B\u20147216\u2014M). While the case was pending Jones received a settlement check in the amount of $467.51 from the other driver\u2019s insurer. Respondent and Jones agreed that the settlement was inadequate and decided to continue with the lawsuit. Jones turned the check over to respondent who kept it in his file. Jones contacted respondent periodically about the status of his case and was told that the case was proceeding.\nIn 1979 Jones asked respondent on several occasions to dismiss the suit and to give him the settlement check, because in Jones\u2019 opinion the case was taking too long and he wanted the money. Respondent refused to turn over the check unless Jones paid him $600 for services rendered and costs. Jones declined to do this. Respondent then explained his costs and fees to Jones and convinced Jones to continue with the case. In August 1982, over four years after the suit had been filed, Jones again asked respondent about the status of his case. In response to his client\u2019s inquiry, respondent called the clerk of the court and learned that Jones\u2019 case had been dismissed the previous year. A month later, respondent informed Jones of the dismissal. Although respondent noted on Jones\u2019 file folder that he told Jones he would attempt to have the case reinstated, respondent testified that he never took any steps to reinstate or refile the case. Respondent also admitted that he never returned the check from the insurance company to Jones.\nRoosevelt Long was seriously injured in a fire that occurred in his apartment on November 14, 1976. While he was in the hospital, his wife, Julia Long, consulted Mr. Hunter, a partner in respondent\u2019s law firm, about filing a suit against Wallace Reid, Jr., one of the owners of the apartment building, and Home Investment Company, the management company. Mr. Hunter died in February 1977. The Longs then consulted with and retained respondent to handle the matter.\nWallace Reid died in September 1977. Mrs. Long telephoned respondent\u2019s firm and left a message for respondent reporting that Reid had died. Respondent makes no claim that he did not receive the message concerning Reid\u2019s death. Reid\u2019s estate was admitted to probate on October 14, 1977 (In re Estate of Wallace Reid, Jr. (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.), No. 77 \u2014 P\u20148222), at which time letters of office were issued. For three consecutive weeks in October and November 1977, the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin published the notice of death of Wallace Reid, stating that claims not filed within six months after the issuance of letters would be time-barred as to the inventoried estate. On March 3, 1978, the executor submitted an inventory of the estate listing its assets in excess of $370,000.\nOn August 1, 1978, respondent filed a $1 million personal injury suit on Long\u2019s behalf in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County naming Home Investment Company and Reid\u2019s estate as joint defendants. (Long v. Home Investment Company and Estate of Wallace Reid by Heritage Standard Bank, Executor (Cook Co. Cir. Ct.), No. 78 \u2014 L\u201415340.) Two days later, on August 3, 1978, over nine months after the issuance of letters, respondent filed a claim against the estate. The lawsuit was dismissed for want of prosecution on August 13, 1981, when respondent failed to appear at a court call, but was refiled in July 1982 (No. 82 \u2014 L\u2014 14197). Reid\u2019s estate was closed on October 30, 1981, after Long\u2019s suit against the estate had been dismissed and before it was refiled.\nThroughout this period, Long made numerous attempts to contact respondent by telephone and wrote to respondent on several occasions about the matter. Respondent met with the Longs on September 17, 1982. At this meeting, respondent told the Longs that he had been unsuccessful in locating defendant Home Investment. Respondent further informed the Longs that if he was unable to find that defendant in the near future he would not pursue the case.\nDissatisfied with respondent\u2019s handling of his case, Long retained another attorney, and respondent withdrew from the matter in February 1983. In June 1983, the court granted the motion of the estate\u2019s former executor to dismiss it as a party to the personal injury action, leaving only Home Investment Company as a defendant in the tort case. The former executor\u2019s motion had asserted that the executor could no longer be sued since Long\u2019s claim against the estate had not been timely filed and the estate was properly closed. Long\u2019s new attorney was successful in obtaining a $450,000 judgment against Home Investment on Long\u2019s behalf. However, because Long\u2019s new attorney was unable to discover any assets of Reid\u2019s estate which had not been included in the inventory, Long\u2019s petition to reopen the estate was denied on the grounds that his claim had not been filed within six months of the issuance of letters as required by section 18 \u2014 12 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. IIOV2, par. 18 \u2014 12). No evidence was presented that Long has been able to collect any portion of the $450,000 judgment against Home Investment. From the record it appears that the only money Long received as a result of the suit was $88,260 in settlement of a legal malpractice action against respondent and his firm.\nAnother of respondent\u2019s clients, Jesse Robinson, was transferred from his position as an electrical worker at the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) to that of a ticket agent on August 16, 1978. Robinson subsequently filed complaints, with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), regarding the transfer against both his employer, the CTA, and his union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). Robinson retained respondent and paid him $250 to represent him at the FEPC fact-finding hearings on the complaints and to advise him of his legal options. After adverse initial determinations, respondent filed a request for reconsideration of the CTA complaint with the FEPC. Respondent, however, did not request the FEPC to reconsider the IBEW complaint. In early 1980, the FEPC rendered a final decision on both complaints adverse to Robinson.\nRobinson then retained respondent to prosecute his actions against the CTA and IBEW in Federal court. Respondent explained to Robinson that the FEPC would refer the charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the EEOC would issue a right-to-sue letter. Respondent told Robinson that once he received the letter he would file the lawsuit.\nBetween March 1980 and November or December 1980, Robinson paid respondent $1,500 to represent him. Although the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter in May 1980, respondent claimed throughout the disciplinary proceedings that he was unaware of this fact. Respondent\u2019s claim that he did not know of the right-to-sue letter was substantiated by the Robinson case file folder, on which respondent noted in August 1980 that there was no right-to-sue letter and that no cas\u00e9 was pending. Respondent, however, told Robinson in August 1980 that the lawsuit was proceeding and further informed him in September 1980 that he had received the right-to-sue letter. Respondent and Robinson again talked in November 1980. At that time, respondent told Robinson that the lawsuit would take a while. After Robinson made the final payment on the retainer, respondent told him that suit had been filed and that they were waiting for a court date. Respondent apparently did nothing after receiving his fee, and Robinson\u2019s action was never filed. In December 1987, this court allowed respondent\u2019s motion to supplement the record with the right-to-sue letter which respondent found in his files in May 1987.\nAnother client, James Ellis, was discharged from his job at W.R. Brown Company, in October 1981. On November 5, 1981, Ellis filed a complaint with the EEOC contesting the discharge. On December 21, 1981, Ellis consulted with and retained respondent to represent him, and at that time paid respondent $750 towards a $3,500 retainer. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on January 29, 1982. Respondent did not file suit within 90 days of receiving the letter, as required by title VII (42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e \u2014 5(f)(1) (1982)). Although respondent did file a complaint in Federal district court on Ellis\u2019 behalf on May 4, 1982 (Ellis v. W.R. Brown Co. (N.D. Ill.), No. 82 \u2014 C\u20142771), that portion of the suit which was based on title VII (42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e et seq. (1982)) was found to be time-barred because it was not filed within 90 days. The remaining portions of the suit were dismissed, in part, because respondent failed to comply with discovery. This failure also resulted in orders assessing Ellis with $554.10 in costs and attorney fees. Respondent testified that he believed that he paid part of this amount himself and that he told Ellis to pay the rest.\nThe final client whose case respondent was alleged to have.neglected was Audrey Gant Holmes. Holmes was named as the executrix of her father\u2019s estate. On April 8, 1981, Holmes retained respondent and paid him $1,400 to represent her as executrix in the probate proceedings. To satisfy the terms of the will it became necessary to sell the decedent\u2019s real estate. Problems developed in disposing of the property and the complications resulted in delay in filing the final accounting. One of the parties named in the will complained to the ARDC about the delays that had occurred. The estate was finally closed on November 19,1985.\nAfter investigating the complaints, the Administrator filed an eight-count complaint against respondent in July 1985. The Administrator alleged that the conduct charged in each count violated Rule 6 \u2014 101(aX3) (neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him); Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(1) (intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client); Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment); and Rule 7 \u2014 101(a)(3) (intentionally causing damage to a client). In addition, count IV charged that respondent\u2019s conduct as to Jesse Robinson also violated Rule 2 \u2014 106(c)(1) (failure to reduce a contingent-fee agreement to writing) and Rule 1\u2014 102(a)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Counts VI and VII charged that respondent\u2019s conduct as to James Ellis also violated Rule 1 \u2014 102(a)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); Rule 7 \u2014 106(c)(7) (intentionally or habitually violating an established rule of procedure); and Rule 6 \u2014 101(a)(2) (handling a matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances). 107 Ill. 2d R. 1\u2014 101 et seq.; see also Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (rev. 1977).\nPrior to his hearing, respondent filed numerous motions with the Hearing Board. Among them, in September 1985, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in which he claimed the charges against him were barred by the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13\u2014 202.) Then in January 1986, respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing primarily that (1) the charges against him constituted an ex post facto application of the disciplinary rules, and (2) the complaint was deficient in that it failed to plead the elements of a legal malpractice action. Both motions were denied. After the motions were denied, one member of the panel assigned to hear respondent\u2019s case became involved in litigation with respondent\u2019s law firm. As a result, another member of the Hearing Board was assigned as a replacement in February 1986.\nIn August 1986, a panel of the Hearing Board conducted the hearing. Based on the evidence presented, the Hearing Board concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that respondent had neglected the cases of Lee Jones, Roosevelt Long, Jesse Robinson and James Ellis in violation of Rule 6 \u2014 101(aX3). The Board found that respondent\u2019s defense to the Administrator\u2019s case consisted mainly of argument, unsupported by testimony or evidence. The Hearing Board then stated that a pattern of consistent neglect was shown and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. The Hearing Board found that no ethical misconduct had occurred in the case of Audrey Gant Holmes and made no findings of misconduct with respect to the other rules respondent was charged with violating.\nRespondent then filed exceptions with the Review Board to the Hearing Board\u2019s report; the Administrator filed no exceptions. The Review Board concurred in the Hearing Board\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law. A majority of the Review Board also concurred in the recommended one-year suspension. Two members of the Board believed that the misconduct warranted a two-year suspension. Respondent filed in this court exceptions to the Review Board\u2019s report and recommendations. The Administrator, however, has not filed exceptions to the Review Board\u2019s report. Thus, only the alleged violations of Rule 6 \u2014 101(aX3) regarding clients Jones, Long, Robinson and Ellis are before the court.\nRespondent now raises numerous arguments challenging the validity of the Hearing and Review Boards\u2019 determinations. Before addressing these contentions individually, we believe it appropriate in this case to make some general observations about respondent\u2019s arguments before this court. Here, as throughout the disciplinary proceedings, respondent has, for the most part, avoided the merits of the Administrator\u2019s case. Moreover, several of respondent\u2019s arguments are either totally unsupported or only minimally supported by citation of authority. One of respondent\u2019s \u201carguments\u201d consists of a string of quotations from various sources unaccompanied by any explanation as to how the statements are applicable to his case. Finally, we note that the authority respondent does provide is frequently lacking in relevance. In spite of these deficiencies, we have examined each of respondent\u2019s claims and find them all without merit.\nFirst, respondent contends that, because the conduct in question took place more than two years before the Administrator filed the complaint, it is barred by the statute of limitations contained in section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202). Respondent claims that by looking at the plain meaning of the language of the statute, it becomes apparent that the statute controls attorney discipline proceedings.\nBy its language, this statute governs \u201cactions for damages.\u201d Attorney discipline proceedings, are not civil actions for damages, and the statute relied on by respondent has no application to this case. Attorney discipline proceedings are sui generis resulting from this court\u2019s inherent power to regulate the practice of law. As such, they are neither civil nor criminal in nature, and are governed solely by this court\u2019s rules and decisions. See In re Mitan (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 229, 246; In re Loss (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 186, 192-93; see also In re Application of Day (1899), 181 Ill. 73.\nIn its decision in In re Teichner (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 88, 95, this court stated that \u201c[tjhere is no statute of limitations governing our disciplinary proceedings,\u201d and that only delay which can be shown to \u201chave prejudiced the respondent\u2019s ability to present a substantial defense\u201d will bar such proceedings. Respondent argues that the preamble to the ARDC rules, which states that it is the Commission\u2019s policy to handle disciplinary matters as expeditiously as possible, overruled this court\u2019s decision in Teichner, and that the statute of limitations now applies to disciplinary proceedings. As an agency of this court, the ARDC is empowered to make rules that are not inconsistent with the rules of this court (107 Ill. 2d R. 751(e)). The rules of the ARDC, however, do not overrule this court\u2019s decisions. Respondent has not argued before this court that his case was prejudiced by any delay in the proceedings, and we reject his contention that the Administrator\u2019s complaint was barred by time.\nSecond, respondent argues that he cannot be disciplined for conduct occurring prior to this court\u2019s adoption of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (see 79 Ill. 2d R. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) on July 1, 1980. Respondent contends that to do so would violate both the Federal and State constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a710, cl. 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a716.\nThe ex post facto clauses prevent this State from enacting any law \u201c \u2018which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.\u2019 \u201d (Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 28, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 22, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964, quoting Cummings v. Missouri (1867), 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26, 18 L. Ed. 356, 364; see also Coles v. County of Madison (1826), 1 Ill. 154, 155.) The Federal and Illinois ex post facto clauses, however, apply only to retroactive measures which are either criminal or penal in nature. Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648, 650; In re Marriage of Semmler (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 130, 135.\nIn Illinois, attorney discipline proceedings are neither criminal in nature nor intended to punish. As the court stated in In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382, 395:\n\u201c \u2018The first purpose of a proceeding to discipline a member of the bar is to protect members of the public, to maintain the integrity of the legal profession and to safeguard the administration of justice from reproach.\u2019 [Citations.] \u2018Punishment is not the object. The object of such an inquiry is to determine whether the attorney is a proper person to be permitted to practice his profession.\u2019 \u201d\nTherefore, because the purpose of attorney discipline is not penal, the prohibition against ex post facto laws has no application to such proceedings. See, e.g., In re Craven (1930), 178 La. 372, 151 So. 625; Braverman v. Bar Association (1956), 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473; In re Sparrow (1935), 338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W. 401; In re Leifer (1978), 63 A.D.2d 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d 1; Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Association v. Drewry (1934), 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282; In re Brown (W. Va. 1973), 197 S.E.2d 814; In re Rabideau (1981), 102 Wis. 2d 16, 306 N.W.2d 1.\nEven if the ex post facto clauses were applicable to disciplinary proceedings, respondent\u2019s argument would still fail. Prior to this court\u2019s formal adoption of attorney discipline rules, this court found that the Illinois State Bar Association\u2019s Code of Professional Responsibility constituted a safe guide for professional conduct, and that an attorney could be disciplined for not observing its provisions. (In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567, 571; In re Krasher (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 121, 129.) That code states that \u201c[a] lawyer shall not *** [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him.\u201d (Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 6 \u2014 101(A)(3) (rev. 1977).) In this case, the Hearing and Review Boards concluded that respondent had neglected four legal matters entrusted to him. Because attorneys were prohibited from and suspended for such conduct prior to 1980 (see In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567), respondent\u2019s contention that he is now being disciplined for conduct that was proper when it occurred is without merit.\nThird, in which respondent apparently confuses burden of proof with standard of proof, respondent asserts that the Hearing Board applied the wrong standard of proof in deciding the case by making him prove that he was not guilty. A review of the Hearing Board\u2019s report shows that the Hearing Board employed the correct standard when it determined that the Administrator proved respondent guilty of neglect by clear and convincing evidence. (107 Ill. 2d R. 753(c)(6).) Moreover, the Hearing Board merely stated that respondent\u2019s failure to adduce evidence in his defense caused the proof of neglect to go unrebutted; it did not indicate that respondent bore the burden of proof.\nFourth, respondent argues that, because one of the panel members developed a conflict of interest with respondent\u2019s firm, the panel\u2019s rulings on his prehearing motions were tainted. For this reason, respondent contends that the hearing panel should have reviewed all prior rulings on every motion filed by respondent. The only motions which respondent now argues were wrongly decided, however, concerned (1) the statute of limitations, (2) the ex post facto application of the rules, and (3) the Administrator\u2019s failure to plead the elements of a civil malpractice action. Because, if for no other reasons, we have already rejected respondent\u2019s arguments on the first two issues and will likewise dispose of the third, we find respondent\u2019s argument to be without merit.\nFifth, respondent contends that the Administrator\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove that he neglected any of the matters entrusted to him by Jones, Long, Robinson or Ellis. Regarding Lee Jones\u2019 case, respondent claims that he was not proved guilty of misconduct in that (1) the Administrator failed to plead and prove the elements of a legal malpractice action and (2) Jones asked him \u201cto drop\u201d the case. Both theories are untenable.\nIn support of his first argument, respondent has relied exclusively on inapplicable malpractice cases. In accordance with Supreme Court Ride 753(b) (107 Ill. 2d R. 753(b)), it is necessary only that the Administrator allege and prove facts constituting a violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, not those required for a civil negligence action. (See In re Mason (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 163, 169.) As to respondent\u2019s second claim, Lee Jones testified that he and respondent never agreed that respondent would discontinue work on the case. While Jones did say that he had told respondent that he wanted to accept the insurance check and to forget the lawsuit, respondent refused to turn over the check and convinced Jones to continue with the case. The Hearing Board found that Jones had never authorized respondent not to pursue his claim. In considering any challenge to the factual findings of the hearing panel, this court has stated that because the hearing panel is able to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, judge their credibility and weigh conflicting testimony, the factual findings of the hearing panel are entitled to the same deference as the findings of any initial trier of fact. (See, e.g., In re Anglin (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 531, 538; In re Wigoda (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 154, 158-59.) The hearing panel\u2019s finding on the Jones matter is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and we see no reason to disturb that finding.\nNext, respondent contends that the evidence concerning the Roosevelt Long matter was insufficient to prove respondent\u2019s neglect of the case since, according to respondent, it showed that (1) respondent was only a supervising attorney and that he had entrusted the Long case to a subordinate and (2) the Longs eventually obtained a $450,000 judgment.\nWe need not decide here whether respondent\u2019s professional responsibility to Long would have been different had respondent been responsible for supervising a subordinate attorney rather than handling the case himself. (See In re Weinberg (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 309, 315.) The Hearing Board found, and the record supports the finding, that respondent was personally responsible for Long\u2019s case. Both Mr. and Mrs. Long testified that it was respondent to whom they entrusted their case. As we have said before, we give substantial deference to the hearing panel\u2019s findings of fact where witnesses\u2019 credibility is at issue.\nRespondent\u2019s second contention fails as well. Although another attorney ultimately obtained a substantial judgment for Long, respondent failed to file a probate claim against the estate of the deceased defendant, Wallace Reid, within the statutory period. Moreover, respondent did not offer any evidence to justify his delay. Respondent\u2019s late filing foreclosed Long from a possible source of collecting the judgment later obtained by another attorney and constituted neglect of the matter while respondent represented Long. Respondent\u2019s neglect of the Long case cannot be excused by the later success of another attorney. Moreover, we note that no evidence has been presented to indicate that Long has collected on the judgment.\nRespondent likewise argues that the evidence does not support the finding that he was guilty of neglecting Jesse Robinson\u2019s claims against the CTA and IBEW. We disagree. The testimony and documentary evidence show that respondent agreed to represent Mr. Robinson in both claims, that he was paid $1,500 to do so, yet, after receiving this amount, he did nothing to pursue the matters. In his brief, respondent insists that he never agreed to represent Mr. Robinson against the IBEW. This argument fails for two reasons. Not only was this factual issue resolved against respondent by the Hearing Board panel, a finding supported by the record, but the argument also does nothing to explain why respondent failed to pursue the CTA claim.\nRegarding the finding of neglect in the Ellis matter, respondent argues that the dismissal of, and subsequent bar to, a portion of Ellis\u2019 claim was unimportant because they could prosecute the same claim under another statute. Neglect which causes delay and forecloses a possible basis for recovery is still neglect, despite the fact that a client might possibly recover under some other theory. Respondent\u2019s failure to proceed under the statute he initially selected was not shown to be a tactical choice between various methods of suit or theories of recovery, but was instead the result of respondent\u2019s inattention to his client\u2019s case.\nRespondent argues further that he was not guilty of neglecting the Ellis matter since it was Ellis\u2019 fault that discovery requests were not answered. Respondent claims that Ellis failed to provide him with necessary information on six or seven occasions; Ellis, however, testified that he always gave respondent the information and documents requested. The Hearing Board found Ellis\u2019 testimony to be credible on this point and rejected respondent\u2019s version of events. Again, we find no reason to disturb the Board\u2019s determination concerning the witness\u2019 credibility.\nFinally, respondent argues that a one-year suspension is an unduly harsh sanction for his actions. In determining the appropriate discipline in a given case, we must consider the nature of the violations, as well as the circumstances surrounding the misconduct. Thus we begin by restating the proposition that \u201cneglect of a legal matter is in itself sufficient ground for suspension\u201d (In re Houdek (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 323, 327), and by recognizing that suspension is often the sanction imposed (see, e.g., In re Harth (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 281; In re Guilford (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 495; In re Houdek (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 323; In re Johnson (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 441; In re Berkos (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 408; In re Levin (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 205; In re Levinson (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 486; In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494; In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567; but see In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293; In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69). In each case where an attorney has been suspended for neglect of a legal matter, the length of the suspension has depended on the aggravating and mitigating factors.\nIn mitigation respondent argues that none of his clients were injured by his conduct. The facts of the case simply do not support this contention. Each of the four clients was prejudiced as a result of respondent\u2019s inattention. Jones\u2019 personal injury claim is now barred due to respondent\u2019s failure to refile it. Long\u2019s case was substantially delayed and he was foreclosed from a possible source of recovery on a $450,000 judgment. Although respondent compensated Long in the sum of $88,260, this amount is only a fraction of the judgment amount. Robinson, after paying respondent $1,500, lost the right to pursue his claim against the CTA. Although in December 1986 Robinson, with the aid of another attorney, filed suit in Federal court against the union, this action was delayed over, six years because of respondent\u2019s neglect. Finally, Ellis, after paying respondent a substantial retainer, lost the right to pursue his title VII claim. In addition, Ellis was assessed attorney fees, only a portion of which were paid by respondent.\nRespondent next suggests that, because he was found guilty of neglecting only four cases out of the 14,000 he claims to have supervised during the six-year period in question, he is undeserving of suspension for the four cases he neglected. Accepting as true respondent\u2019s assertion that he supervised or handled 14,000 cases between 1977 and 1982, we nevertheless find his argument unpersuasive.\nRespondent\u2019s argument asks that we infer that his other clients were well-served, a question not before us. Assuming for the moment that the inference might otherwise be warranted, we note that at oral argument before the court, respondent stated:\n\u201cThe reason we can have 14,000 cases is because the cases are $600 here, $300 here. You cannot proceed in those kinds of cases in the same way that you can if you got a $150,000 case. If you are going to do justice by your client, you have got to do the best you can, make your adjustments and move on.\u201d\nIf respondent was willing to neglect Long\u2019s personal injury claim in which a $450,000 judgment was obtained by his successor attorney, one might question whether the $300 and $600 cases, referred to by respondent, received more careful attention. We also find troublesome the implication in respondent\u2019s remarks that there is some cut-rate version of our rules which permits an attorney to agree to represent a client in a matter and then \u201cmove on\u201d when the case fails to meet his or her expectation.\nRespondent further cites in mitigation several pro bono and professional activities. While we do consider participation in such activities in mitigation (In re Lenz (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 445, 454), we also note that an attorney\u2019s primary responsibility is to his client, and that involvement in professional and public service organizations is no substitute for the conscientious and zealous representation of one\u2019s clients. (See In re Weston (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 431, 438.) Lastly, respondent points out that he has not been charged with previous misconduct, and that no corrupt motive or moral turpitude was involved in the present cases.\nIn aggravation, we find that during a six-year period respondent undertook to represent four clients and subsequently neglected the matters that they entrusted to him. A pattern of neglect weighs heavily in favor of a period of suspension. (See, e.g., In re Levin (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 535, 541-42; In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567, 573.) Respondent\u2019s conduct was also aggravated by his repeated misrepresentations to his clients about the status of their cases. See In re Houdek (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 323, 327; In re Levinson (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 486, 490.\nFinally, respondent\u2019s lack of cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings indicates substantial discipline is warranted. Prior to the hearing, respondent repeatedly filed frivolous requests and meritless motions which appear solely calculated to delay the proceedings. At the hearing, respondent insisted on arguing irrelevant issues and questioning his clients\u2019 veracity and sanity while failing to support his accusations with any credible evidence. Respondent, to this day, continues to belittle his clients and their cases, and to blame those who worked for him for the neglect. Respondent still believes he acted properly in each of the four cases, which does not inspire confidence that respondent is ready to recognize his duty as an attorney and to conform his conduct to that required by the profession.\nWhile this court strives for consistency in the imposition of discipline (In re Berkos (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 408, 413), we recognize that, given the unique facts of each case, we will rarely confront a matter which is precisely analogous to a prior decision. With this limitation in mind, we have examined our prior decisions involving attorney neglect and find that In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567, provides a close analogy to the present case. There, on three occasions after agreeing to represent clients and accepting money for fees or costs, the attorney neglected to perform or complete legal services and became inaccessible to his clients. The court found, however, that the attorney did not act out of corrupt or dishonest motives and suspended him for one year.\nHaving considered the circumstances of this case, as well as our previous decisions, we accept the recommendation of the Hearing and Review Boards. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.\nRespondent suspended.\nSTAMOS and CALVO, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary K. Foster, of Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.", "Ronald S. Samuels, respondent pro se, and Donald Hubert, all of Chicago, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 65944.\nIn re RONALD SHERMAN SAMUELS, Attorney, Respondent.\nOpinion filed February 2, 1989.\nRehearing denied April 3, 1989.\nSTAMOS and CALVO, JJ., took no part.\nMary K. Foster, of Chicago, for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.\nRonald S. Samuels, respondent pro se, and Donald Hubert, all of Chicago, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0509-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 542 }