{ "id": 5564516, "name": "In re A MINOR, Whose Name is Omitted (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. The Daily Journal of Kankakee, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Daily Journal of Kankakee", "decision_date": "1989-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 66013", "first_page": "247", "last_page": "270", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "408 U.S. 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782863 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174956 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123481 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "1047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L. Ed 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 U.S. 494", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1148067 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/341/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 F.2d 201", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1238201 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/183/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 546", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11644191 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "1245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 51", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525226 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 415", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11733776 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "1578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168412 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179887 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "2803" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2803-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 829", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2526 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 F.2d 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1112058 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/522/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3317316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3359929 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/216/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538463 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "242-50" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "244, 245", "parenthetical": "\"gag order\" requires \"specific findings\" of a serious and imminent threat supported by \"substantial evidence,\" not merely a finding of a possibility of harm" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3593739 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607376 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/50/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474584 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2572301 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/77/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2594320 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/68/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5207811 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2940177 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045753 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 596", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192549 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602-03" }, { "page": "254-55" }, { "page": "2617-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183161 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "2904" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3518342 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175706 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399-400" }, { "page": "540" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639509 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3171639 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313175 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166554 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114522 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092172 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994157 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188381 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695151 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79, 380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649972 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "Heiple, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180397 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0097-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1560, "char_count": 39735, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7641475921857743e-06, "percentile": 0.9937986732044995 }, "sha256": "5924cc480eab7967f3bea81117e83336506030b4131385bb328967b878d31e28", "simhash": "1:8633f16aaa5445ec", "word_count": 6644 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:06.297541+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re A MINOR, Whose Name is Omitted (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. The Daily Journal of Kankakee, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe case poses the question of whether a newspaper which learns through ordinary reportorial techniques of the identity of a minor charged in a closed criminal proceeding may be forbidden from reporting that information once it has entered the public domain. We hold on the authority of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), 443 U.S. 97, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399, 99 S. Ct. 2667, that \u2014 at least in the absence of a serious and imminent threat to the minor\u2019s welfare which cannot be obviated by some other, less speech-restrictive means \u2014 such an order contravenes the Federal and Illinois Constitutions. The answer to the question, therefore, is no.\nDuring the course of a juvenile proceeding in the circuit court of Iroquois County, the circuit court entered two orders: the first prohibiting appellant, The Daily Journal of Kankakee, from publishing the name of a minor, who had been charged in connection with a fatal shooting, and the second banning appellant from the courtroom during future hearings in the case unless it agreed to comply with the first order. During the course of challenging these orders in the circuit court, appellant notified the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 19 (107 Ill. 2d R. 19), of a challenge to the constitutionality of section 1 \u2014 20(6) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701 \u2014 20(6)). The Attorney General then entered his appearance in the case under Rule 19 for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Act. After the circuit court denied the appellant\u2019s motion to vacate the two orders, appellant appealed to the appellate court, pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). (Rule 307(a)(1) provides for interlocutory appeal of orders relating to injunctive relief.) With one justice dissenting, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction (160 Ill. App. 3d 613), and we granted appellant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nOn the evening of January 19, 1987, Jo McCord, a reporter for appellant, attended a Watseka city council meeting. While there, she talked with the police chief of Watseka about a fatal shooting which had taken place two days before. A minor had been arrested in connection with the shooting. McCord asked the police chief to tell her about family disputes which the police had been called to quell at the home where the killing occurred, and in the course of answering McCord\u2019s questions, the police chief disclosed the minor\u2019s name. The minor\u2019s identity also appeared to McCord to be known to the city council members present that evening. In casual conversation, several council members discussed the minor\u2019s personality, and expressed surprise that he would be accused of violence.\nThe next day, January 20, 1987, the minor was taken before the trial court to be charged in connection with the shooting. Under the mistaken impression that the courtroom was closed to the press, McCord chose not to attend. During and immediately after the hearing, however, she spoke about the case with an Iroquois County juvenile probation officer, who told her what had happened at the hearing and about the minor\u2019s family life. In the course of the conversation the probation officer, like the police chief, freely used the minor\u2019s name.\nOn the following day, January 21, 1987, appellant published McCord\u2019s report of the hearing. The article included the minor\u2019s name. Appellant claims that its policy is to publish the names of minors who are charged with serious felonies, such as murder or attempted murder.\nOn January 28, 1987, McCord attended a second hearing in the juvenile proceedings. At the start of this hearing, the trial judge ordered the reporters present not to disclose the minor\u2019s name in their reporting of the proceedings held that day. The next day, however, January 29, 1987, appellant published a second article, reporting on the hearing and again publishing the minor\u2019s name. It also stated that the minor would be placed in the custody of a juvenile probation officer and would continue to be housed at the Du Page County Youth Home in Wheaton.\nOn February 11, 1987, the trial court sua sponte entered an order which banned appellant from the juvenile proceedings unless it agreed to comply with the orders of the court. In support of its order, the trial court cited section 1 \u2014 20(6) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701 \u2014 20(6)). At a hearing held to vacate the January 28 and February 11 orders, the trial judge explained that he had entered the orders because of \u201ccertain threats *** made toward the juvenile involved in this case\u201d which had been \u201ccirculating in the community\u201d and were \u201cmade known to the Court by more than just one individual, just by general knowledge and comment.\u201d The judge also alluded to his concern about releasing the minor\u2019s whereabouts. The trial judge \u201cfelt very strongly that this information could be known or be relayed to and be made known to any person or persons that might have any desire or willingness to commit harm against the minor.\u201d Because the minor was to be placed in foster care outside of the local community, \u201cthe fact that where the juvenile was going, if it was known to the people in that community or area that the juvenile was going to be in their midst, might unduly alarm the citizens of that area.\u201d Additionally, people in the local community who wished to harm the minor \u201cwould learn of his whereabouts\u201d and would travel there \u201cperhaps *** and harm the minor.\u201d As to this last concern, the judge stated that \u201c[h]ow serious a threat that would be, I suppose you could say your guess is as good as mine.\u201d The Attorney General appeared at the hearing to argue that section 1 \u2014 20(6) is constitutional. The trial court denied the appellant\u2019s motion to vacate.\nOn March 30, 1987, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court\u2019s orders. On the same day, the circuit court held a further hearing. At that hearing, McCord agreed to comply with the prior orders, pending the appeal, and the court ordered all persons present not to use or publish the name of the minor \u201cfrom any proceedings arising in Court this date.\u201d\nWhile the appeal was pending in the appellate court, another hearing was held in the juvenile proceeding. At that hearing, on August 27, 1987, the court ordered all persons present \u201cnot to utilize the name of the minor in any reference to the minor, from any proceedings held here today, outside the courtroom.\u201d The next day appellant filed an emergency motion to vacate this order and a request for an immediate ruling in its appeal. The appellate court denied the motions. Appellant then published an article about the August 27 hearing that did not reveal the minor\u2019s name.\nShortly thereafter, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the trial court\u2019s orders were merely \u201cadministrative,\u201d rather than \u201cinjunctive,\u201d and were not, therefore, appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). (160 Ill. App. 3d at 616.) The dissenting justice stated that the orders were injunctive and, on the merits, that they were unconstitutional as \u201ca restraint upon [the appellant] in the exercise of its first amendment rights.\u201d (160 Ill. App. 3d at 617 (Heiple, J., dissenting).) Since the appellate court\u2019s decision, proceedings in the circuit court relating to the juvenile have apparently come to an end.\nIn this court the State puts forward three arguments in favor of affirmance and/or the dismissal of the appellant\u2019s appeal. The State first argues that since the juvenile proceedings have ended, this case is now moot. Next, the State argues that the trial judge\u2019s order is not appealable under Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Finally, the State argues that the trial court\u2019s order is constitutional. The brief filed on behalf of the State by the State\u2019s Attorney for Iroquois County does not also argue that section 1 \u2014 20(6) is constitutional, but instead argues that the court\u2019s orders were a proper exercise of \u201cthe inherent power of the circuit court.\u201d The brief filed on behalf of the State by the Attorney General pursuant to Rule 19 argues that section 1 \u2014 20(6) is constitutional. Although we decline to reach the question of the facial validity of section 1 \u2014 20(6), we reject the remainder of the State\u2019s arguments, and find that the section, as applied here, violates appellant\u2019s rights of free speech and free press.\nWe first consider the State\u2019s argument that this case is now moot. A case on appeal becames moot where \u201cthe issues involved in the trial court no longer exist\u201d because events occurring after the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the appellate court to grant the complaining party effectual relief. (LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 375, 378-79, 380; see also In re Marriage of Landfield (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 229, 232; Bluthardt v. Breslin (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 246, 250; Madison Park Bank v. Zagel (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 231, 235 (case is moot where judgment would be wholly ineffectual for lack of a subject matter on which it can operate).) The doctrine stems from the fear that parties to a dispute which for practical purposes has ceased to exist will lack the \u201c \u2018personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [which serves] to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult *** questions.\u2019 \u201d (People ex rel. Black v. Dukes (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77, quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703.) The State argues that this case is now moot because the juvenile proceeding has now been concluded.\nWe do not agree. Insofar as appellant is concerned, it is still subject to the trial court\u2019s orders of February 11, 1987, and January 28, 1987. The order of January 28 forbade appellant to use the juvenile\u2019s name in any of its reporting on the proceedings held that day, while the order of February 11 conditioned appellant\u2019s access to future hearings upon its willingness to refrain from using the minor\u2019s name. On March 30, McCord agreed to comply with the February 11 order and was therefore allowed to attend the August 26 hearing; but this agreement must be considered in the light of appellant\u2019s decision to file a notice of appeal on the same date. It is appellant\u2019s position that it should have been allowed to attend the hearing and publish the minor\u2019s name, and it has not published the minor\u2019s name since January 29, 1987. It apparently still wishes to publish the minor\u2019s name, even though the passage of time has obviously made the identity of the minor somewhat less newsworthy than before. If it publishes the minor\u2019s name, it will violate the February 11 order and may be held in contempt. The fact that appellant ultimately attended the August 26 hearing is therefore of no consequence.\nNor can it be contended that the trial court's orders have been withdrawn or are no longer in effect. So far as the record is concerned the trial judge first entered an order on January 28, renewed it on February 11, denied a motion to vacate it on March 26, assured himself of appellant\u2019s willingness to comply with it on March 30, and allowed appellant\u2019s reporter to attend the hearing on August 26 only after he had satisfied himself that appellant would not defy the order. We therefore cannot agree with the State that the trial court \u201ceffectively vacated\u201d its orders by allowing appellant to attend the hearing on August 26. Moreover, we are unable to understand the State\u2019s contention that the \u201cforce and effect of the orders have lapsed\u201d following the conclusion of the juvenile proceeding. The statute itself provides that \u201cthe court may *** prohibit any person or agency present in court from further disclosing the minor\u2019s identity\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 701 \u2014 20(6)) and does not limit the effect of the court\u2019s order of prohibition to any specified time.\nThe heat of this controversy may have somewhat abated, but it is not yet stone cold. All the subject matters of the litigation \u2014 the appellant, the minor\u2019s identity, and the circuit court\u2019s orders \u2014 are still in existence. A judgment in appellant\u2019s favor will allow appellant to publish the minor\u2019s name and a judgment against appellant will prevent publication.\nEven were we to agree with the State that the termination of the juvenile proceeding had rendered this case formally moot, we would still believe that it falls within any one of several exceptions to the mootness doctrine.\nFor example, a case which normally would be considered moot may qualify for review if it involves a question of great public interest. (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 622; see also People ex rel. Black v. Dukes (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 273, 277.) The criteria for application of the public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will generally recur. (Labrenz, 411 Ill. 2d at 622; Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 71, 76.) This case falls within the public interest exception. The interests involved \u2014 the State\u2019s interest in the minor\u2019s physical safety, and appellant\u2019s interest in the publication of newsworthy information \u2014 are both of surpassing public concern. It is desirable that circuit court judges receive guidance as to the constitutionality of section 1 \u2014 20(6), which may be applied in any juvenile proceeding. This question of the constitutionality of section 1 \u2014 20(6) has arisen in the past (see In re M.B. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 992) and is almost certain to recur in the future.\nSimilarly, this case, even if otherwise moot, involves an event of short duration which is \u201c \u2018capable of repetition, yet evading review.\u2019 \u201d (Madison Park Bank v. Zagel (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 231, 236, quoting Sosna v. Iowa (1975), 419 U.S. 393, 399-400, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 540, 95 S. Ct. 553, 557.) To receive the benefit of this exception, the complaining party must demonstrate that: (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. (People v. Bailey (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 259, 261-62, citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (1979), 443 U.S. 368, 377, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608, 620, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2904.) By asserting that the circuit court\u2019s orders will not survive the termination of the juvenile proceeding, the State itself has impliedly conceded that the challenged action is so short in duration that it will normally end before it can be fully litigated. In similar cases involving court-ordered restrictions on the reporting of judicial proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has regularly found the restrictions to be \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review.\u201d (See, e.g., Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 377-78, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 620, 99 S. Ct. at 2904 (lifting of order closing pretrial hearing to the press does not deprive Court of jurisdiction since underlying criminal proceeding will not normally last long enough to permit full appellate review); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 602-03, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 254-55, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2617-18 (order excluding press and public during testimony of minor victim in a rape trial capable of repetition, yet evading review because criminal trials are typically of short duration).) Just as in these cases it was reasonably likely that the newspapers involved would again be subjected to the challenged restrictions in future criminal trials, so here it is reasonably likely that appellant will be subjected to similar orders in the future when it again attempts to report the names of minors charged with serious crimes.\nThe State contends, however, that appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that a juvenile court judge will again enter an order to protect a minor\u2019s physical safety, rather than his reputation or future rehabilitation. It is the State\u2019s contention that such orders are relatively rare, \u201cbecause it is unheard of for a minor\u2019s life to be threatened by anyone in the context of a juvenile proceeding.\u201d The State neglects to mention the case of In re M.B. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 992, in which a similar order was entered to protect a minor\u2019s physical safety. The State is also fudging the distinction between an actual threat to a minor\u2019s safety, which may indeed be rare, and a judicial assertion that such a threat exists, which may be more common. But in any case, we do not agree that appellant must demonstrate that the statute will in the future be applied in precisely the same circumstances or for precisely the same reasons. Such a requirement would mean that no case would ever be \u201ccapable of repetition,\u201d for the simple reason that the facts of a future case might be slightly different. It is sufficient that the same statutory provision will most likely be applied in future cases involving the same party.\nLastly, the State argues that appellant could have prevented the case from becoming moot by petitioning this court for a writ of mandamus. We agree that one of the functions of an extraordinary writ is to permit speedy appellate review in cases where the passage of time would otherwise render a case moot. But we cannot agree that the mere availability of the writ prevents appellant from pursuing the normal appellate process and claiming the benefit of exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The issuance of such a writ is discretionary (Peo pie ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 170, 175) and might not be granted even in cases where the petitioner\u2019s underlying claim has merit. In fact the newspaper involved in the similar case of In re M.B did ask this court for a writ of prohibition, and was denied. (In re M.B., 137 Ill. App. 3d at 995.) Requiring this time-consuming and uncertain remedy as a prerequisite to, or as a substitute for, an ordinary appeal would only add cases to this court\u2019s motion docket.\nWe therefore hold that this case is not moot. Similar considerations persuade us that the circuit court\u2019s order was the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal under Rule 307(a)(1), and that the appellate court erred by holding otherwise.\nSupreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) provides that \u201c[a]n appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court *** granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).) The question presented here is whether a court order preventing the publication of certain information constitutes an injunction.\nTo determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order under Rule 307(a)(1) we look to the substance of the action, not its form. (Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co. v. Barker (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 177, 180.) An apple calling itself an orange remains an apple. Actions of the circuit court having the force and effect of injunctions are still appealable even if called something else. Temporary restraining orders are reviewable (Bohn Aluminum, 55 Ill. 2d at 178), and in Valente v. Maida (1960), 24 Ill. App. 2d 144, 149, which we cited with approval in Bohn Aluminum, an order staying proceedings in a case pending the rendition of judgment in a related case was treated as a reviewable order, notwithstanding the fact that the order used the term \u201cstay\u201d rather than \u201cinjunction.\u201d Similar results have been reached with respect to an order denying a motion for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration (School District No. 46 v. Del Bianco (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 145; Applicolor; Inc. v. Surface Combustion Corp. (1966), 77 Ill. App. 2d 260), and the denial of a motion to stay proceedings in one case until the conclusion of an appeal in a different case (Wiseman v. Law Research, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 790). While we express no opinion as to the merits of these appellate court cases, they do reflect a policy of broadly construing the meaning of the term \u201cinjunction.\u201d\nDictionary definitions of the term \u201cinjunction\u201d also support the appellant\u2019s position. An injunction has been defined as a \u201cprohibitive, equitable remedy issued or granted by a court at the suit of a party complainant, directed to a party defendant in the action, or to a party made a defendant for that purpose, forbidding the latter to do some act *** which he is threatening or attempting to commit,\u201d or, more simply, as a \u201cjudicial process operating in personam and requiring [a] person to whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1983).) Our court has similarly described an injunction as \u201ca judicial process, by which a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ, the most common sort of which operate as a restraint upon the party in the exercise of his real or supposed rights.\u201d (Wangelin v. Goe (1869), 50 Ill. 459, 463.) The circuit court in this case ordered the appellant to refrain from \u201cdoing a particular thing\u201d \u2014 from publishing the minor\u2019s name. The order operated as a restraint upon the appellant in the exercise of its first amendment rights, real or imagined.\nThe State argues, however, that the term \u201cinjunction\u201d is to be defined by the traditions peculiar to equity jurisprudence and the historical powers of chancery courts. This argument is not without merit. Not every nonfinal order of a court is appealable, even if it compels a party to do or not do a particular thing. Orders of the circuit court which can be properly characterized as \u201cministerial,\u201d or \u201cadministrative\u201d \u2014 because they regulate only the procedural details of litigation before the court \u2014 cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. (See People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (stating that discovery orders and subpoenas are not appealable interlocutory orders).) Such orders may be considered noninjunctive because, they did not form part of the power traditionally reserved to courts of equity, but, instead, were part of the inherent power possessed by any court to compel witnesses to appear before it and give testimony. (See JFS v. ABMJ (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 261, 262.) They do not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation, and are therefore distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief. While we thus agree with the State that such a category of administrative, noninjunctive orders exists, we do not agree that orders of the court forbidding the publication of information fall within that category.\nOur conclusion is based on two considerations. First, it is by no means clear that orders to cease publication form part of the traditional \u201cinherent\u201d powers possessed by all courts. Second, and more importantly, we have already reviewed a similar restraint upon publication which was appealed pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1). In Kemner v. Monsanto Co. (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 223, the trial judge issued an order prohibiting the defendant from discussing the facts of a pending action with the media until the conclusion of the trial. Pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1), the defendant appealed the order. (112 Ill. 2d at 235.) Assuming, apparently, that the appellate court properly took jurisdiction of the appeal, we reached the merits of the defendant\u2019s challenge to the order. 112 Ill. 2d at 242-50.\nThe State argues that Kemner is distinguishable because the order in Kemner affected a party to the underlying proceeding; here, in contrast, the appellant was not directly involved in' the juvenile proceeding which prompted the judge\u2019s order. We do not agree. \u201c \u2018To ren- - der a person amenable to an injunction it is not necessary that they should have been a party to the suit\u2019 \u201d (O\u2019Brien v. People ex rel. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co. (1905), 216 Ill. 354, 366, quoting J. High, Injunctions \u00a71444), and nonparties have often been the subject of injunctions (e.g., Bullard v. Bullard (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 132, 134 (savings and loan association, not a party to the case, enjoined from distributing funds belonging to the respondent)). If anything, the appellant\u2019s status as a nonparty strengthens the need for interlocutory appellate review, since the appellant would never be subject to an appealable final judgment in the underlying juvenile action. Nor can we agree with the State\u2019s contention that the availability of mandamus, or other extraordinary writs, obviates the need for interlocutory review.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that interlocutory restraints upon publication of information are reviewable as interlocutory injunctive orders under Rule 307(a)(1). To the extent that JFS v. ABMJ (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 261, 262, conflicts with our holding here and in Kemner, that case is overruled. In JFS v. ABMJ, the court held that a provisional order of the trial court, impounding certain court records and prohibiting either party in an action from making public pleadings or other papers, was not an appealable interlocutory order.\nHaving cleared the procedural underbrush, we turn to the merits. The circuit court claimed to act under the authority granted to it by section 1 \u2014 20(6) of the Juvenile Court Act, which provides:\n\u201cThe general public except the news media and the victim shall be excluded from any hearing and, except for the persons specified in this Section, only persons, including representatives of agencies and associations, who in the opinion of the court have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court shall be admitted to the hearing. However, the court may, for the minor\u2019s protection and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or agency present in court from farther disclosing the minor\u2019s identity. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 701-20(6).)\nAppellant challenges the circuit court\u2019s order as \u201cabridging the freedom of speech, or of the press\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. I) and violative of the principle that \u201c[a]ll persons may speak, write, and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a74). The first amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). The appellant attacks the validity of the power granted the court in the last sentence of section 1 \u2014 20(6) on its face and as applied in this instance. While we do not reach the question of whether an exercise of the power granted in section 1 \u2014 20(6) would be unconstitutional in all instances, we believe that it is unconstitutional as applied here.\nThe appellant contends, and we agree, that the circuit court\u2019s order in this case constitutes a \u201cprior restraint\u201d upon speech. A prior restraint has been defined as a \u201cpredetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression.\u201d (Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer (7th Cir. 1985), 522 F.2d 242, 248.) While protection of free speech reaches beyond prior restraints (Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia (1978), 435 U.S. 829, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1, 98 S. Ct. 1535), a prior restraint upon publication is \u201cthe most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights\u201d (Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 559, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 697, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803). Prior restraints are particularly suspect when they prevent the timely disclosure of truthful information. Because a speaker\u2019s defiance of a judicial order can place the speaker in contempt even if his speech is ultimately held to be protected (Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967), 388 U.S. 307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1210, 87 S. Ct. 1824), a prior restraint freezes the flow of ideas during the course of litigation, and tends to deprive the public of timely news, information, and comment. In this case, for example, the appellant\u2019s decision to obey the court\u2019s order of February 11, 1987, meant that it could not receive, and never will receive, the full benefit of a timely publication of the minor\u2019s identity. At this late date, few readers will be interested.\nFor this reason, any prior restraint upon speech, while not unconstitutional per se, bears a heavy presumption against its validity. (Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971), 402 U.S. 415, 419, 29 L. Ed. 2d 1, 5, 91 S. Ct. 1575, 1578.) In order to pass constitutional muster, the restraint must either contain certain specified procedural safeguards (see, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland (1965), 380 U.S. 51, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649, 85 S. Ct. 734), not present here, or must fall within one of several narrowly defined exceptions to the doctrine (see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad (1975), 420 U.S. 546, 555, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448, 457, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 1245). In the context of pending judicial proceedings, a judicial order restraining speech will not be held invalid as a prior restraint if it is: (1) necessary to obviate a \u201cserious and imminent\u201d threat of impending harm, which (2) cannot adequately be addressed by other, less speech-restrictive means. (Cf. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 699, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-04; Kemner v. Monsanto Co. (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 223, 243.) Or, as the distinguished Judge Learned Hand once put it, the question is whether \u201cthe gravity of the \u2018evil,\u2019 discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.\u201d United States v. Dennis (2d Cir. 1950), 183 F.2d 201, 212, affd (1951), 341 U.S. 494, 95 L. Ed 1137, 71 S. Ct. 857.\nOur determination that this standard has not been met is largely controlled by two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the disclosure of a minor\u2019s identity during the course of a criminal trial. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977), 430 U.S. 308, 51 L. Ed. 2d 355, 97 S. Ct. 1045, a minor was charged at a detention hearing with murder. Under the applicable statute, the hearing should have been private unless the judge specifically ordered it to be public, but reporters were present and learned the minor\u2019s identity. Thereafter, newspapers, radio, and television reports freely disseminated the minor\u2019s name and/or photograph throughout the local area. Following this publicity the minor was arraigned at a closed hearing, pursuant to the statute, and the court issued an order which enjoined members of the news media from further publishing the minor\u2019s name and photograph in connection with the juvenile proceeding. The Court held that since the trial court\u2019s decision to allow reporters to attend the detention hearing had allowed the minor\u2019s identity to be \u201c \u2018publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime\u2019 \u201d and to be \u201cplaced in the public domain\u201d (430 U.S. at 311, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 97 S. Ct. at 1047), the court\u2019s order abridged the petitioner\u2019s freedom of speech despite the fact that subsequent hearings in the case were closed.\nIn Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979), 443 U.S. 97, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399, 99 S. Ct. 2667, reporters learned before the commencement of judicial proceedings of the name of a minor who had allegedly shot and killed one of his classmates. They discovered the name simply by asking various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecutor, who were all present at the scene. When the newspapers published the minor\u2019s name, they were indicted under a statute which prohibited newspaper publication of the name of a minor charged in a juvenile proceeding without prior judicial approval. Sidestepping the question of whether the judicial approval feature of the statute made it a prior restraint, the Court held that penalizing the publication of truthful information which had been discovered by \u201croutine newspaper reporting techniques\u201d offends the first amendment, especially since the State\u2019s asserted interest in the minor's rehabilitation and reputation was not sufficiently compelling to justify the ban and was not sufficiently furthered by a selective ban applying only to the print media. The Court stated:\n\u201cThe sole interest advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender. It is asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employment or suffer other consequences for this single offense. In Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105, similar arguments were advanced by the State to justify not permitting a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution witness on the basis of his juvenile record. We said there that \u2018[w]e do not and need not challenge the State\u2019s interest as a matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender.\u2019 [Citation.] However, we concluded that the State\u2019s policy must be subordinated to the defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. [Citation.] The important rights created by the First Amendment must be considered along with the rights of defendants guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. [Citation.] Therefore, the reasoning of Davis that the constitutional right must prevail over the state\u2019s interest in protecting juveniles applies with equal force here.\u201d (443 U.S. at 104, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 405-06, 99 S. Ct. at 2671.)\nJustice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment solely because of the statute\u2019s selective application to newspapers.\nIn this case also, the appellant\u2019s reporter also learned the name of the minor through lawful and \u201croutine\u201d newspaper reporting techniques. It therefore is difficult to argue that Smith can be distinguished. Whatever interest the State may legitimately assert in keeping the name of a minor secret, that interest is hardly compelling when the State itself, or its agents, have helped to disclose the minor\u2019s identity. Nor does the State\u2019s decision to hold closed hearings before and after revelation of the minor\u2019s identity change our analysis. This fact was also present in Oklahoma Publishing. Most, if not all, of the benefit which might be achieved by a prior restraint was lost when appellant, not yet subject to a court order, lawfully published the minor\u2019s name in connection with the juvenile proceeding and the underlying events.\nNor does the appellant\u2019s agreement not to publish the name in return for admission to the hearing change our analysis. Even assuming, without deciding, that this agreement did not violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions (see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972), 408 U.S. 593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694) the first amendment strips the State of the power to proscribe the publication of information which has already been lawfully revealed and which has been obtained by lawful means.\nThe legitimate entry of the minor\u2019s name into the public domain thus robs the State of any argument that the court\u2019s order was \u201cnecessary\u201d to protect the State\u2019s interest, regardless of what that interest is. For this reason, we cannot agree with the State that the trial court\u2019s invocation of an interest in the minor\u2019s safety, rather than his reputation, serves to distinguish this case from Smith. In either case, the harm the State\u2019s action seeks to avert has largely been done. It serves no purpose to shut the barn door when the horse has already fled.\nBut even were we to concede that this infringement upon appellant\u2019s first amendment rights should yield to an interest in obviating a threat to the minor\u2019s physical well-being, we could not agree that the State has adequately demonstrated such a threat. The court\u2019s vague reference to \u201ccertain threats\u201d which had been \u201ccirculating in the community\u201d and which had been revealed by \u201cgeneral knowledge and comment\u201d does not sufficiently demonstrate a serious and imminent threat of harm. Cf Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d at 244, 245 (\u201cgag order\u201d requires \u201cspecific findings\u201d of a serious and imminent threat supported by \u201csubstantial evidence,\u201d not merely a finding of a possibility of harm).\nSince the minor had already been moved to a location outside the local community, the danger posed by the further publication of his name was exceedingly remote. To believe that such publication would place his life in danger requires the acceptance of an extremely tenuous chain of inference. We would have to believe: (1) that specific persons were planning to harm the minor, (2) that these persons had not previously learned the minor\u2019s name either through the rumors circulating in the community or through the appellant\u2019s initial report, and (3) that, once having learned the name through fresh reports, these individuals would travel outside the local community to carry out their plot. As to the likelihood of such a scenario, the trial judge himself conceded that \u201cyour guess is as good as mine.\u201d While we are sympathetic to the trial court\u2019s anxiety, a finding of a serious and imminent threat of harm must rest on something more than guesswork.\nWe emphasize that our decision does not require the trial judge to wait until a lynch mob has placed a rope around a child\u2019s neck. But we are loath to conclude that a newspaper\u2019s interest in publishing truthful information must yield to a concern about a minor\u2019s safety based solely on such vague intimations of danger as were alleged here.\nThe State has also not shown that the minor could not be protected by other, less speech-restrictive means. Protective custody, for example, might keep the minor from harm without infringing upon appellant\u2019s first amendment rights.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that part of section 1 \u2014 20(6) of the Juvenile Court Act which gives the court the power to proscribe the publication of a minor\u2019s name in connection with a juvenile proceeding cannot be constitutionally applied where the publisher learns the identity of the minor not in a hearing closed to the public, but through routine, reportorial techniques, at least where a serious and imminent threat of harm to the minor\u2019s well-being has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence. We express no opinion as to the question of the statute\u2019s facial validity, or its application in other instances. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed, and the challenged orders of the circuit court of Iroquois County are vacated.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court orders vacated.\nJUSTICE CALVO\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK JUSTICE CALVO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael M. Conway and Wm. Carlisle Herbert, of Hopkins & Sutter, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Tony Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (Shawn W. Denney, Solicitor General, Terence M. Madsen and Jack Donatelli, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Kenneth R Boyle and John X. Breslin, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Jon A. Duncan, of Mass, Miller & Josephson, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Chicago Headline Club." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 66013\nIn re A MINOR, Whose Name is Omitted (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. The Daily Journal of Kankakee, Appellant).\nOpinion filed March 22, 1989.\nCALVO, J., took no part.\nMichael M. Conway and Wm. Carlisle Herbert, of Hopkins & Sutter, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Tony Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (Shawn W. Denney, Solicitor General, Terence M. Madsen and Jack Donatelli, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Kenneth R Boyle and John X. Breslin, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nJon A. Duncan, of Mass, Miller & Josephson, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Chicago Headline Club." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 285, "last_page_order": 308 }