{ "id": 3228386, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CLARENCE McCLAIN, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McClain", "decision_date": "1989-05-24", "docket_number": "No. 66672", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "509", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587767 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188399 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218359 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549752 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3613278 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0157-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 631, "char_count": 16572, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9952205058129494e-07, "percentile": 0.7422840096082822 }, "sha256": "4ca59b298d04ffb660bbb22664693a66c66605f8ccbac119bff4c8b7a427cf3f", "simhash": "1:9d368aa76966c511", "word_count": 2763 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:46.843720+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CLARENCE McCLAIN, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellant, Clarence McClain, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A breathalyzer test disclosed a 0.14 concentration of alcohol in his blood, and McClain\u2019s driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). The circuit court of Cook County rescinded the summary suspension due to perceived defects in the documentation filed by the arresting officer. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and reinstated the suspension. (165 Ill. App. 3d 157.) We subsequently granted McClain\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nWe begin consideration of this appeal with an examination of the summary suspension process. Under the summary suspension statute, any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this State is deemed to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath or urine for purposes of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person\u2019s blood. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).) Under the implied-consent doctrine, a person requested to submit to this test must be warned by the arresting officer that a refusal to submit to the test or a finding of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater will result in summary suspension of the person\u2019s driver\u2019s license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c).) The officer is then required to submit a sworn report to the Secretary of State and the circuit court of venue certifying that the test was requested and that the person either refused to submit to the test or submitted to testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d).) Upon receipt of the officer\u2019s sworn report, the Secretary of State summarily suspends the person\u2019s license. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(e).\nA person whose driving privileges are suspended under section 11 \u2014 501.1 may request a hearing in the circuit court to seek rescission of the suspension pursuant to section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1). Section 2 \u2014 118.1 provides in part:\n\u201cThe scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issues of:\n1. Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket; and\n2. Whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof; and\n3. Whether such person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person refused to submit to and complete the test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete such test or tests to determine the person\u2019s alcohol or drug concentration; or\n4. Whether the person, after being advised by the arresting officer that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if the person submits to a chemical test, or tests, and such test discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and such person did submit to and complete such test or tests which determined an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 2-118.1(b).\nIn the present case, McClain requested a hearing pursuant to section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1). In his \u201cPetition to Rescind Statutory Suspension\u201d he alleged that: (1) he was not properly placed under arrest for an offense defined in section 11\u2014 501.1 of the Code; (2) the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol; (3) he had not been adequately warned by the arresting officer; and (4) he did not refuse to submit to the breathalyzer test pursuant to the statute. However, at the hearing, McClain argued two other grounds for rescission. He claimed that the arresting officer's failure to swear under oath as to the truth of his reports, along with the officer\u2019s failure to list the time and place of the breathalyzer test, invalidated the summary suspension entered by the Secretary of State. The trial court found the sworn report was fatally defective and rescinded McClain\u2019s suspension.\nOn appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court and reinstated McClain\u2019s suspension. It held that the questions of whether the arresting officer failed to swear under oath to the truth of his report and whether the form was correctly completed were outside the scope of a section 2 \u2014 118.1 hearing. (165 Ill. App. 3d at 163.) The appellate court held that such matters could only be raised in an administrative hearing before the Secretary of State. 165 111. App. 3d at 164.\nMcClain maintains that the appellate court\u2019s decision unduly restricts the scope of a section 2 \u2014 118.1 hearing and urges us to affirm the trial court. The State contends that the appellate court properly limited the scope of a section 2 \u2014 118.1 hearing to the issues specifically enumerated in the statute. The State further argues that even if deficiencies in the officer\u2019s report could be considered at a rescission hearing, the evidence establishes that the arresting officer\u2019s report complied with the statute and that McClain\u2019s license was properly suspended.\nThus, the first issue we must decide is whether the circuit court could consider alleged deficiencies in the sworn report at the rescission hearing. We find the case of People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50, to be dispositive of this issue. In Badoud, the motorist similarly challenged the sufficiency of the officer's sworn report on the basis that it had not been affirmed before an individual authorized to administer oaths. In holding that this issue could be considered at a rescission hearing, this court stated:\n\u201c[W]e do not believe that the General Assembly intended to preclude at the hearing inquiry into whether the report was properly sworn. This is indicated in part by the fact that section 2 \u2014 118.1 states that the hearing \u2018may be conducted upon a review of the law enforcement officer\u2019s own official reports.\u2019 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b).) It would seem incongruous to permit conducting a hearing based on a report and yet not permit examination of whether the report was properly sworn. Moreover, in this expedited proceeding the sworn report also serves a function analogous to a complaint in an ordinary civil proceeding. Section 2 \u2014 118.1 states that the hearing is to proceed in the same manner as in other civil proceedings, and in an ordihpry civil proceeding a circuit court is not precluded from examining and permitting amendment to the complaint. For these reasons we conclude that the circuit court could properly consider whether the report was sworn to in accordance with the statute.\u201d 122 Ill. 2d at 54.\nWe recognize that the appellate court did not have the benefit of Badoud at the time it decided this case. However, pursuant to Badoud, we hold that the trial court properly considered whether the report was \u201csworn\u201d at the rescission hearing.\nWe next consider whether the documents filed by the arresting officer constituted a \u201csworn report\u201d as required by section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11-501.1(d)). The record establishes that the arresting officer customarily executed and forwarded three documents to the Secretary of State and the circuit court.\nThe first document, labeled \u201cLaw Enforcement Sworn Report,\u201d notified McClain that the chemical test administered showed an alcohol concentration of 0.14 and that his driver\u2019s license would be suspended for a minimum of three months. This report was signed by the officer under the following notation:\n\u201cI do solemnly, sincerely and truely [sic] declare and affirm that I have placed the above named person under arrest for a violation of section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance. *** I further solemnly, sincerely and truely [sic] declare and affirm that pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code I have served immediate notice of summary suspension of driving privileges on the above named person.\u201d\nThe second document was a \u201cWarning to Motorists\u201d in which the officer \u201csolemnly, sincerely and truely [sic] declare[d] and affirm[ed]\u201d that he had given the warning required by section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) of the Code to Clarence McClain. Neither of these instruments provided space for the officer to swear under oath before an official authorized to administer an oath.\nFinally, a third document styled \u201cVerification of Certification\u201d and \u201cSupplement to \u2018Warning to Motorist\u2019 and \u2018Law Enforcement Sworn Report\u2019 \u201d was attached to the warning and the report. This document certified as true the contents of both the warning and the law enforcement report, with the following provision:\n\u201cUnder penalties provided by law pursuant to Section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in the warning to motorists and law enforcement sworn report, attached hereto and made a part hereof, are true and correct except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies that he verily believes the same to be true.\u201d\nThe State contends that this certification is the equivalent of swearing under oath and is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Code. We agree.\nAs noted previously, section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) requires that an arresting officer submit a sworn report to the circuit court of venue and the Secretary of State certifying that a chemical test was requested and that the driver either refused or failed the test. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d).) In the event that the driver requests a summary suspension hearing, the sworn report serves a function analogous to that of a complaint in an ordinary civil proceeding. (People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50, 54.) In a civil proceeding, a complaint is \u201csworn\u201d if it is certified in accordance with section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1\u2014 109). Section 1 \u2014 109 provides in part:\n\u201cUnless otherwise expressly provided by rule of the Supreme Court, whenever in this Code any complaint *** or other document or pleading filed in any court of this State is required or permitted to be verified, or made, sworn to or verified under oath, such requirement or permission is hereby defined to include a certification of such pleading, affidavit or other document under penalty of perjury as provided in this Section.\n* * *\nAny pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section may be used in the same manner and with the same force and effect as though subscribed and sworn to under oath.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109.)\nSection 1 \u2014 109 further provides that any person who makes a false statement certified in accordance with this section is guilty of a Class 3 felony. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109.\nThus, any document verified in accordance with section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code clearly subjects the person executing the verification to penalties for perjury. In using the term \u201csworn report,\u201d the General Assembly contemplated that a report would be signed under the pains and penalties of perjury. (People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50, 55.) Consequently, we hold that a verification pursuant to section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure satisfies the requirements of section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Code that a report be sworn.\nThe second alleged deficiency in the officer\u2019s report was the omission of the date, time and place of the breathalyzer test. The \u201cLaw Enforcement Sworn Report\u201d contained sections titled \u201cPLACE OF REFUSAL/ TEST\u201d and \u201cREF./TEST DATE.\u201d The arresting officer mistakenly believed that these sections did not apply to McClain since he had consented to the breathalyzer test, and did not complete them but, rather, penciled in \u201cD.N.A.\u201d The appellate court held that the officer\u2019s failure to properly complete the report could not be considered at a rescission hearing. (165 Ill. App. 3d 157.) We cannot agree.\nIn a summary suspension hearing the burden of proof is on the motorist to present a prima facie case for rescission. (People v. Orth (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 326.) Where the argument for rescission is based on the fact that the test results are unreliable, the motorist is not precluded from contesting their validity (People v. Hamilton (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 153, 160) and may present evidence of any circumstance which tends to cast doubt on the accuracy of the test results (People v. Orth (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 326). The length of time between the arrest and the breathalyzer test is a factor which affects the weight to be afforded to the test results and should be considered in relation to the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest. (People v. Call (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 571, 579.) Thus, the manner in which the report was completed may be relevant to the validity of the test results and could therefore be considered by the trial court.\nWe do not feel, however, that the officer\u2019s failure to include the time and place of the test on his report was cause for rescission in this case. Section 11 \u2014 501.1 authorizes the Secretary of State to summarily suspend a driver\u2019s license upon receipt of a law enforcement officer\u2019s sworn report certifying (a) that the motorist was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and (b) that the person either refused to submit to a test, or submitted to testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, pars. 11 \u2014 501.1(d), (e).) There is no requirement that the time of the test be included in the report. Rather, the time at which the test was administered is merely an evidentiary issue which may be considered in determining the weight to afford to the test results.\nHaving thus decided, we consider whether McClain established a -prima facie case for rescission based on other grounds. The record indicates that Officer Ciszewski, the arresting officer, testified that on March 3, 1986, at approximately 3:20 a.m., he observed McClain\u2019s vehicle make a U-tum on 75th Street and disregard a stop sign at the intersection of Coles and 75th Streets. At the time of the arrest, McClain\u2019s eyes were bloodshot and watery, there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his speech was slurred and he had difficulty maintaining his balance. The officer placed McClain under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and took him to the Third District police station, where he advised him of his rights under the summary suspension statute. McClain indicated that he understood the warnings and consented to a breathalyzer test, which was then administered by Officer Ricks in Officer Ciszewski\u2019s presence.\nThe record also contains a stipulation that if Officer Ricks of the Chicago police department were to testify, he would testify that on March 3, 1986, at approximately 4:49 a.m., he administered a breathalyzer test to McClain which disclosed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.14. The breathalyzer machine in question was in proper working order at the time and had been tested both before and after the test given to McClain. There is no evidence challenging either probable cause for the arrest, the date or time of the test, or the accuracy of the test results. Based on these facts, McClain did not establish the invalidity of the summary suspension. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court reinstating McClain\u2019s suspension is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Ahem, of Connelly & Ahem (Sue Augustus, of counsel), of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund and James S. Veldman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 66672.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CLARENCE McCLAIN, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 24, 1989.\nJames J. Ahem, of Connelly & Ahem (Sue Augustus, of counsel), of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund and James S. Veldman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 519 }