{ "id": 5569956, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE THOMAS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1989-09-27", "docket_number": "No. 64804", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151982 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856293 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812309 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160843 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-13" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538082 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "434-35" }, { "page": "1178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229038 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 374640 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/315/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182598 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179976 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0072-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 859, "char_count": 17599, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8205988007150392e-07, "percentile": 0.7191633566281277 }, "sha256": "2e8918816753a02d3b3fe5534f6f951f2ed889f63c9b1effec399332cff38172", "simhash": "1:fa1344729ab3069b", "word_count": 2847 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:12:19.575566+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE THOMAS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALVO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Willie Earl Thomas, was indicted in the circuit court of Cook County on two counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 9\u20141(a)(1), (a)(2)), one count of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 33A\u20142), and one count of indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11\u20144(a)(1)) in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961. The armed violence count was subsequently nol-prossed by the State. Defendant was tried by a jury and found guilty on the remaining counts of murder and indecent liberties with a child. At defendant\u2019s death penalty hearing, the jury found defendant eligible for capital punishment on the basis of a stipulation that the decedent was killed in the course of the offense of indecent liberties. The jury found no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Defendant was thereupon sentenced to death on the murder charges and to a 30-year extended term of imprisonment on the indecent liberties charge. Defendant\u2019s post-trial motion was denied, and he brings a direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a74(b); 107 Ill. 2d R. 603).\nDefendant has raised numerous issues for our consideration. Our review of the record reveals one issue to be dispositive of the appeal: Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney\u2019s contemporaneous representation of an informant/witness against defendant? We believe defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney labored under a per se conflict of interest; therefore, we reverse defendant\u2019s convictions and remand the cause for a new trial. We will briefly summarize the facts as they pertain to this issue.\nThe body of 15-year-old Laura Lee Trass was discovered along a driveway in Harvey, Illinois, on the morning of May 20, 1984. Trass had been stabbed numerous times and had been disemboweled. Seminal material was discovered on the decedent\u2019s panties and jeans.\nWhile on routine patrol on the evening of May 20, 1984, Chicago police officers were approached by Madis Lacy, defendant\u2019s cousin. Lacy allegedly told the officers she had seen bloodstains in defendant\u2019s car and had been informed by defendant\u2019s wife that defendant had \u201cgutted\u201d a girl in Harvey. Lacy gave the officers a picture of defendant and defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s address. Later, Lacy contacted the police to advise them that she had been warned by defendant\u2019s mother that defendant was about to flee and had said he would not be taken alive. After speaking with Lacy, police officers proceeded to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home in Chicago, where they placed defendant under arrest. Prior to making the arrest, officers corroborated Lacy\u2019s statements only to the extent of verifying that a girl\u2019s body had been found in Harvey.\nDefendant was transported to Harvey, where he was informed of his Miranda rights and gave a statement to police. Defendant stated that he was driving in Harvey during the early morning hours of May 20, 1984, when he encountered Laura Lee Trass, a prostitute he had known. In response to Trass\u2019 inquiries about money he owed her, defendant assured Trass that he had the money and would pay her if she would have sex with him again. Defendant and Trass drove to a secluded location where, in the back seat of defendant\u2019s car, they had \u201can affair\u201d consensually. They returned to the front seat and, shortly thereafter, Trass indicated she had to leave. As she opened the door, defendant pulled a knife and began stabbing her. Trass jumped out of the car and defendant followed, repeatedly stabbing her, and continuing to stab her after she fell to the ground. Defendant then pulled down her pants and cut her abdomen. When he got home, he told his wife he had stabbed Trass. The next morning defendant\u2019s wife advised him that there was blood \u201call over the car.\u201d\nSometime in late May of 1984, defendant retained attorney Cassandra Watson to represent him. Watson filed a motion to suppress the confession on January 7, 1985, amendments thereto on July 21, 1985, and a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence on July 21, 1985. The latter motion was premised on the contention that the police arrested defendant without a warrant or probable cause. Defendant\u2019s suppression hearing commenced on March 31, 1986, and concluded on June 2 when the court denied defendant\u2019s motions.\nFrom circuit court documents in another case which were supplemented to the record on appeal without objection, it appears that attorney Watson undertook the representation of Madis Lacy on a 1984 charge of welfare fraud no later than January 9, 1985. Records from that case, which were apparently not brought to the attention of the circuit court, but which we may consider on appeal (see People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 114), indicate that Watson filed a motion to suppress Lacy\u2019s confession on April 9, 1985, and amendments thereto on July 9, 1985. Although the documents from Lacy\u2019s pending criminal case do not reveal when Watson\u2019s representation of Lacy terminated, clearly, Watson was still representing Lacy on April 21, 1986, at the time of defendant\u2019s suppression hearing. On that date, Watson filed an answer to the State\u2019s request for discovery in Lacy\u2019s case.\nIt was the State, rather than Watson, that first apprised the trial court of Watson\u2019s contemporaneous representation of defendant and Lacy. After defendant\u2019s suppression hearing \u2014 -where officers testified regarding Lacy\u2019s statements, but where Lacy was not called as a witness \u2014 a pretrial hearing was held on November 13, 1986, wherein the prosecutor informed the court that Madis Lacy was a State witness and that Watson was attorney of record in Lacy\u2019s pending felony case. The following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cTHE PROSECUTOR: Now, I don\u2019t know if that\u2019s going to present a problem as far as the Court is concerned or as far as, you know, conflicts and what not. I thought it should just be made of record in case it, you know \u2014 In case it comes up at some point in the future.\nTHE COURT: Is that true, Miss Watson? Are you representing a witness?\nMS. WATSON: That\u2019s true, Your Honor, yes.\nTHE COURT: That case has not been disposed of?\nMS. WATSON: No, it has not, Judge.\nTHE COURT: All right. The record will reflect that problem. If it becomes a meaningful issue in the trial of this case we may have to hear more about it. As of the moment the Court is not proposing to do anything.\u201d\nWhen Madis Lacy was subsequently called as a State witness at defendant\u2019s trial, she either denied making statements attributed to her or stated she could not remember making them. On cross-examination, Watson questioned Lacy regarding her history of mental illness, suggesting that Lacy honestly could not remember her earlier statements to police in an attempt to blunt any inference that Lacy was lying to protect defendant, her relative. On redirect, the prosecutor attempted to establish that Watson represented Lacy in a pending case. Objections to that line of questioning were sustained.\nAfter police officers testified that Lacy had, indeed, made statements to them inculpating defendant and leading to his arrest, Watson informed the court that she intended to elicit testimony from another witness \u201cas to the hospitalization and mental condition of Mattie Lacy.\u201d The State informed the court that it would respond by raising the fact of Watson\u2019s representation of Lacy in the pending criminal matter. The State reasoned that there would be \u201ca natural inclination\u201d of Lacy to help her attorney and, therefore, the jury should be apprised of the relationship. The court indicated it was prepared to allow the State to expose the professional relationship between Watson and Lacy if Watson proceeded with her intended line of inquiry. Watson subsequently refrained from pursuing that line of inquiry.\nIn defendant\u2019s post-trial motion, Watson claimed that the court erred in:\n\u201cnot allowing defense testimony as to the extensive psychiatric history of Madis Lacy *** when it was Miss Lacy\u2019s statement which formulated the basis for the defendant\u2019s arrest and detention so that the jury was thereby unable to evaluate the credibility of the witness\u2019 testimony on this issue.\u201d\nWatson made no mention of her dual representation of Lacy and defendant or possible conflicts arising therefrom. Defendant\u2019s post-trial motion was denied and this appeal followed.\nDefendant\u2019s attorney, Cassandra Watson, had a duty to advise the court of her representation of one of the State\u2019s witnesses before this trial commenced.\nShe surely knew a conflict would develop when she attempted to attack the credibility of her client on cross-examination and the prosecution would respond by raising the fact of her representation of the witness in a pending criminal case. Under these circumstances, she certainly was ethically required to withdraw as counsel for defendant prior to trial.\nAn accused\u2019s sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right. (Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708; Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457.) The right to effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment entitles a criminal defendant to the undivided loyalty of counsel, free from conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations. (People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 66, 83.) Where facts presenting an attorney\u2019s possible conflict of interests are made known to the court, the court must ascertain the extent of the risk and take whatever measures are necessary to protect the accused\u2019s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 484-85, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 434-35, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178-79.) Where defense counsel has represented a State\u2019s witness, a per se conflict of interests exists if the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel\u2019s representation of defendant. (Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 83; People v. Free (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 154, 168; People v. Washington (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 104, 110-13.) \u201cIn order to assure and protect [defendant\u2019s] rights, the defendant need not show prejudice in order to justify a reversal of his conviction if the attorney representing him has an actual or possible conflict of professional interests.\u201d (Washington, 101 Ill. 2d at 110.) In such an instance, prejudice is presumed. Free, 112 Ill. 2d at 167; People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113.\nWhether or not we choose to characterize Madis Lacy as a \u201cState\u201d witness, attorney Watson\u2019s contemporaneous representation of Lacy and defendant undoubtedly presents a conflict of professional interests.\nInitially, in its appellate brief, the State contended that the record did not conclusively show that Watson had begun actively representing Lacy by the time of defendant\u2019s trial. The State\u2019s position was founded upon Lacy\u2019s trial testimony wherein she stated she had not spoken to Watson prior to the date of her testimony. Aside from Watson\u2019s unequivocal statement to the court that she represented Lacy, since the filing of the State\u2019s brief the defendant has been allowed to file, without objection, documents affirmatively showing Watson\u2019s active representation of Lacy, commencing at a date prior to defendant\u2019s suppression hearing. Presumably, the State would now abandon its contention, and, in any event, we reject it.\nThe State next maintains that Lacy \u201callied herself with the defendant,\u201d thus no prejudice resulted to the defendant from the \u201cso-called representation.\u201d\nWe note, initially, that on November 13, 1986, the State represented to the trial court that Lacy was a State witness. To the extent that the State is now attempting to claim Lacy was not a State witness, we find the claim disingenuous and unpersuasive. True, much of Lacy\u2019s trial testimony consisted of \u201cI don\u2019t remember\u201d; however, in repeatedly extracting that response from the witness, the prosecutor was able to pose his questions in a way that apprised the jury of Lacy\u2019s previous statements to police. Moreover, when police officers l\u00e1ter testified concerning Lacy\u2019s statements to them, the substance of Lacy\u2019s statements was again brought before the jury in the guise of \u201cimpeachment.\u201d Furthermore, information Lacy had given to the police previously formed the foundation upon which the .State built its case of probable cause at the defendant\u2019s suppression hearing. Under these circumstances, we believe Lacy can be properly characterized as a State witness for the purpose of applying the per se conflict rule.\nEven if this were not the case, we believe attorney Watson labored under a conflict of professional interests under circumstances such that prejudice must be presumed. We have observed in the record on appeal at least two instances where Watson\u2019s representation may have been affected by her dual representation. Therefore, defendant may have received something less than the \u201cundivided loyalty of counsel\u201d and the aggressive advocacy to which he was entitled.\nThe first such instance occurred during Watson\u2019s representation of defendant at the suppression hearing. As previously noted, Watson had filed a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence which was based upon lack of probable cause to support defendant\u2019s arrest. Without the hearsay information provided by Ma-dis Lacy, the State, in our view, had insufficient information to establish probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest. Madis Lacy, as an informant providing hearsay information, logically should have been called to testify at defendant\u2019s suppression hearing since her veracity and basis of knowledge were highly relevant to a probable-cause determination. (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 230 n.6, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 543 n.6, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 n.6; People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 236-38.) If Lacy admitted supplying information to the police, Watson would have been obliged to challenge her veracity and her basis of knowledge. If, on the other hand, Lacy denied making the statements in question, counsel could have used her denial to challenge the credibility of the police. Counsel may well have declined to call Lacy as a witness for fear of offending her in the course of examination and losing her business, or counsel may have felt that an attack on Lacy\u2019s veracity might later come to haunt Lacy in her felony case. In any event, the failure to call Lacy as a witness would seem to have nothing to do with sound trial strategy in defendant\u2019s case.\nThe second instance of possibly inhibited representation occurred at trial. Watson informed the court that she was prepared to question Dorothy London on the matter of Madis Lacy\u2019s mental health in an attempt to show that Madis Lacy honestly did not remember providing essential information to police which led to defendant\u2019s arrest. The State threatened to expose the attorney-client relationship between Watson and Lacy if counsel proceeded along that line, and the court indicated that it would allow the State to do so. Watson chose to forgo her intended line of inquiry. The inference is unavoidable given Watson\u2019s vehement argument that the State should not be allowed to expose her professional relationship with Lacy: Watson altered her trial strategy to avoid revelation of the attorney-client relationship.\nWe have no way of knowing in what other ways counsel\u2019s effectiveness might have been affected by the conflict. The per se conflict rule is a means of protecting defendant\u2019s interests. In reversing defendant\u2019s convictions and remanding the case for a new trial, we reaffirm our commitment to the precepts set forth in Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d at 113, wherein we stated:\n\u201c[Sjound policy disfavors the representation of an accused *** by an attorney with possible conflict of interests. It is unfair to the accused, for who can determine whether his representation was affected, at least, subliminally, by the conflict. Too, it places an additional burden on counsel, however conscientious, and exposes him unnecessarily to later charges that his representation was not completely faithful. In a case involving such a conflict there is no necessity for the defendant to show actual prejudice.\u201d\nAlthough the State does not claim that defendant knowingly waived his right to representation by counsel unhindered by any conflict of interests, we note in passing that the record is devoid of any indication that defendant was aware of the possibility of conflict or its consequences, and there is certainly no knowledgeable waiver of defendant\u2019s right of record.\nSince this cause must be retried, we will not address defendant\u2019s other issues on appeal, which need not arise upon retrial. For the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s convictions are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALVO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Gary S. Rapaport and Timothy M. Gabrielsen, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund, Kevin Sweeney and Gael M. O\u2019Brien, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 64804.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIE THOMAS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 27, 1989.\nCharles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Gary S. Rapaport and Timothy M. Gabrielsen, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard M. Daley and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund, Kevin Sweeney and Gael M. O\u2019Brien, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 114, "last_page_order": 125 }