{ "id": 5589100, "name": "HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee, v. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Insurance", "decision_date": "1989-09-27", "docket_number": "No. 67649", "first_page": "79", "last_page": "85", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 79" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477954 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5333316 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 Mich. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1991414 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "26-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/430/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.W.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 537, "char_count": 11126, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.8330052001468e-08, "percentile": 0.41694670229808767 }, "sha256": "a79d5f9cfb3134485c9a72e1436176414c5334d49af0bb0bc001fec4cca2aa7d", "simhash": "1:cf0a1da8ac529674", "word_count": 1737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:26.300937+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee, v. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALVO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe instant action stems from an underlying wrongful death case in which the $1.5 million judgment exceeded the insurance coverage provided by the primary insurer, defendant, Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company (Aetna). The excess insurer, plaintiff, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford), filed a complaint for declaratory relief and damages in January of 1987, seeking, in count I, a determination that Hartford was not liable for post-judgment interest that accrued on the portion of the underlying judgment for which Hartford provided excess coverage, and seeking, in counts II and III, a finding that Aetna breached a duty to Hartford when Aetna failed to settle the case for $1 million (Aetna\u2019s policy limit), resulting in a $500,000 loss to Hartford.\nOn cross-motions for partial summary judgment with respect to count I of Hartford\u2019s complaint, the circuit court, on August 18, 1987, entered an order granting Aetna\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and denying Hartford\u2019s. The circuit court determined that Hartford was solely liable \u201cfor the accrued post-judgment interest on the $500,000 excess portion of [the] judgment.\u201d Pursuant to the circuit court\u2019s Rule 304(a) finding (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), Hartford sought review of the circuit court\u2019s order.\nThe appellate court reversed (173 Ill. App. 3d 665), relying upon language in the insurers\u2019 policies and this court\u2019s decision in River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 242. Although the applicability of River Valley is controverted in the cause now before us, the material facts of this case are not subject to dispute.\nIn 1979, Helen Buczyna brought a wrongful death action against the insured, Cuomo & Son Cartage Company (Cuomo), and its employee John Arias. Aetna provided Cuomo and Arias with primary vehicle liability insurance coverage in the amount of $1 million for the period in which decedent\u2019s death occurred. Hartford provided Cuomo and Arias with excess vehicle liability insurance coverage. On April 10, 1984, the jury returned a verdict against Cuomo and Arias assessing Buczyna\u2019s damages at $1.5 million, an amount that exceeded Aetna\u2019s primary policy limit and thereby triggered Hartford\u2019s umbrella coverage. The judgment was affirmed on July 21, 1986. The suit was defended, and the appeal prosecuted, by an attorney selected by Aetna.\nOn October 11, 1986, while a petition for leave to appeal to this court was pending, Aetna entered into a partial-settlement, partial-satisfaction-of-judgment agreement with Buczyna, whereby Aetna paid Buczyna $1,191,667, an amount representing Aetna\u2019s policy limit plus accrued interest and minus the settlement discount. On December 23, 1986, Hartford entered into a partial-satisfaction-of-judgment agreement with Buczyna, paying Buczyna $500,000, the amount of the judgment exceeding Aetna\u2019s policy limit, but excluding the post-judgment interest that accrued thereon. Both Aetna\u2019s and Hartford\u2019s agreements with Buczyna acknowledged the dispute between Aetna and Hartford concerning liability for the post-judgment interest on the $500,000 portion of the judgment in excess of Aetna\u2019s policy limit. That dispute spawned the litigation previously mentioned which culminated in the circuit court\u2019s order holding Hartford liable for the portion of post-judgment interest at issue.\nWe begin our analysis by examining the pertinent contractual provisions in the insurers\u2019 agreements with the insured. Section VI(c) of the Hartford umbrella policy provides:\n\u201cWith respect to any occurrence not covered by the underlying policies *** or any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured, but covered by the terms and conditions of this policy *** the company shall:\n* * *\n(c) pay *** all interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the company\u2019s liability thereon.\u201d\nThe Aetna primary policy, the \u201cunderlying policy\u201d in this instance, reads as follows:\n\u201cIn addition to our limit of liability, we will pay for you:\n* * *\n4. All interest accruing after the entry of a judgment in a suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when we pay or tender our limit of liability.\u201d\nIn River Valley, 17 Ill. 2d at 244, this court construed policy language which obligated the insurer to pay:\n\u201call interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid, tendered or deposited in court such part of the judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company\u2019s liability thereon.\u201d\nIn River Valley, the insurer had provided coverage only to the extent of $50,000. A judgment for $175,000 was obtained against the insured. The insurer contended, inter alia, that it was liable for interest only on the sum of $50,000. After commenting on the ambiguity of the policy provisions, this court concluded that the language of the insurer\u2019s policy created liability for interest on the entire judgment, stating:\n\u201cThe phrase referring to interest uses the term \u2018judgment\u2019 without qualification while in the same clause the phrase limiting the duration of the liability for interest refers to \u2018such part of the judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company\u2019s liability thereon.\u2019 Obviously the insurer knew how to qualify the term \u2018judgment\u2019 to achieve the result that it urges. It did not do so.\u201d River Valley, 17 Ill. 2d at 245.\nAlthough the language employed in Aetna\u2019s policy is not identical to that used by Hawkeye-Security in the River Valley case, the provisions are very similar in that the insurer promised to pay \u201call interest\u201d after entry of judgment, and the unqualified use of the term \u201cjudgment\u201d is followed by language intended to limit the duration of liability for interest, wherein the insurer refers to its \u201climit of liability.\u201d As in River Valley, we have no doubt that Aetna knew how to limit its liability for post-judgment interest and simply failed to do so.\nIndeed, Aetna acknowledges that it would be liable for post-judgment interest on the entire judgment under the River Valley holding, but for Hartford\u2019s involvement in the case. However, Aetna urges us to hold Hartford liable for interest that Aetna would otherwise be contractually obligated to pay, arguing that such a result is warranted because of public policy considerations and Hartford\u2019s \u201cseparate common law equitable obligation.\u201d Although Aetna devotes much of its argument to matters of public policy and \u201cfairness,\u201d it restricts its discussion of Hartford\u2019s contractual obligation to a single paragraph. In that paragraph, Aetna charges that Hartford \u201cmischaracterizes the language of [Hartford\u2019s] contract and confuses its voluntary contractual obligation with its wholly separate common law equitable obligation.\u201d Aetna continues, presenting its own interpretation of Hartford\u2019s policy:\n\u201cNowhere in its policy did Hartford provide that it would be liable for post-judgment interest only when underlying coverage was unavailable. Merely because Hartford undertook, by contract, to pay post-judgment interest when no other policy expressly assumed that obligation does not mean that it can never be held liable for post-judgment interest under common law principles of equity, when another policy happened to provide coverage for the occurrence at issue.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nEvidently, there is some confusion as to Hartford\u2019s contractual obligation, and Aetna\u2019s foregoing analysis does nothing to clarify the matter. Our reading of Hartford\u2019s policy is consistent with the appellate court\u2019s:\n\u201csection VI of Hartford\u2019s excess policy comes into play only when Hartford is acting as the primary carrier.\u201d 173 Ill. App. 3d at 668.\nConstruing the two policies together, we perceive no overlapping of obligations to pay post-judgment interest. This distinguishes the instant case from Matich v. Modern Research Corp. (1988), 430 Mich. 1, 420 N.W.2d 67, the primary case upon which Aetna relies. In Matich, a jury award substantially exceeded the combined policy limits of the primary and excess liab\u00fcity insurance carriers. Clauses common to the policies of both insurers committed them to pay \u201call interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein which accrue[d] after entry of judgment.\u201d (Matich, 430 Mich, at 24, 420 N.W.2d at 77.) Under the facts in Matich, the supreme court of Michigan determined that the insurers were obligated to pay post-judgment interest on the entire amount of the judgment, including the amount in excess of the combined policy limits, in proportion to the limits of their respective policies. (Matich, 430 Mich, at 26-27, 420 N.W.2d at 78.) Unlike Matich, the judgment in this case did not exceed combined policy limits and the insurers did not assume identical obligations with respect to the payment of all post-judgment interest. Had both carriers assumed identical obligations, the solution which Aetna proposed, and which Matich adopted, might have been considered. In the case sub judice, however, the insurers\u2019 policies were not duplicate; nor did they conflict.\nGiven the facts of this case, we see no reason to impose liability upon Hartford which it did not contract to undertake. Under the terms of Aetna\u2019s policy, and our decision in River Valley, Aetna, the company that defended the suit and prosecuted the appeal, would have been obligated to pay all post-judgment interest had Cuomo not obtained excess coverage. Presumably, Aetna charged premiums accordingly to cover the risk it had assumed. True, Hartford had use of the $500,000 and, no doubt, drew interest on that sum at Aetna\u2019s expense until such time as Aetna tendered its policy limit and terminated its duty to pay interest; however, Cuomo would have obtained the same benefit had it been responsible for paying the $500,000 excess. Aetna poses various other hypothetical situations in which inequity might occur unless we invoke \u201cpublic policy\u201d to achieve a \u201cfair\u201d result and hold Hartford liable for what Aetna believes should be Hartford\u2019s proportionate share of post-judgment interest. We decline to do so. The dilemma in which Aetna finds itself appears to be of its own making. If Aetna had wanted to limit its liability for post-judgment interest in the event that its insured purchased excess coverage, it could have so indicated in its policy. It can hardly be argued that Aetna lacks the legal sophistication to limit its liability as it sees fit. Under the circumstances, we will not rewrite the parties\u2019 policies for them to impose an obligation where none was undertaken.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALVO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas F. Bridgman, Edward J. Zulkey, Michael J. Wagner and John M. Murphy, of counsel), for appellant.", "Norman J. Barry and Alan S. Madans, of Rothschild, Barry & Myers, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 67649.\nHARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee, v. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 27, 1989.\nRehearing denied December 4, 1989.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas F. Bridgman, Edward J. Zulkey, Michael J. Wagner and John M. Murphy, of counsel), for appellant.\nNorman J. Barry and Alan S. Madans, of Rothschild, Barry & Myers, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0079-01", "first_page_order": 89, "last_page_order": 95 }