{ "id": 3256828, "name": "PAUL DE LOS REYES et al., Appellees, v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "De Los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Companies", "decision_date": "1990-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 67839", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "412 Ill. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2665292 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3555170 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a79", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11065827 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/402/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ind. App. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind. App.", "case_ids": [ 1482295 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind-app/168/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 1082", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568466 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/1082-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5312870 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2665292 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162-63" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083008 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152306 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991510 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0367-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 638, "char_count": 16514, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.13202604806537e-07, "percentile": 0.9108357282606051 }, "sha256": "dbb790aa5e3dbd1c58fd53294424b6e83b0727468187d3146a004166e5152508", "simhash": "1:e471df365fcda68f", "word_count": 2633 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:01.441971+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAUL DE LOS REYES et al., Appellees, v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Paul de los Reyes, an Illinois resident, was injured in an automobile accident in Indiana on August 18, 1984. The driver responsible for the accident was insured by defendant, Travelers Insurance Companies. Defendant offered to pay plaintiffs, Paul and Priscilla de los Reyes, $10,000, which defendant contends is the upper limit of the coverage for bodily injury under the policy. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and sought a declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Cook County that the coverage limit for bodily injury under the policy is $25,000 per person, rather than $10,000 as Travelers contends. The trial court found defendant\u2019s liability to be limited to $10,000 and granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, further denying a similar motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment of the trial court. On appeal, a divided appellate court found that the policy issued by defendant provided coverage for bodily injury in the amount of $25,000, rather than $10,000 as the trial court had found. (175 Ill. App. 3d 169.) Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court order granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment instead. We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nThe relevant facts are undisputed. On August 18, 1984, Remar de los Reyes, Paul de los Reyes\u2019 brother, was driving Paul\u2019s pickup truck; plaintiff Paul de los Reyes was a passenger in the vehicle. Remar, Paul, and Paul\u2019s children were traveling to Remar\u2019s home in Massachusetts. While driving through Indiana, Remar lost control of the vehicle, causing it to overturn, and Paul was severely injured.\nPrimary coverage for the accident was provided by Paul and Priscilla de los Reyes\u2019 insurance company. In addition, Remar, the driver, was insured by defendant, Travelers Insurance Companies, under a policy issued in Massachusetts to Aquilina Panalagin, Paul and Remar\u2019s sister. The policy named Remar as an additional insured and limited coverage for bodily injury to $10,000 per person. However, the insured paid an additional premium to obtain optional coverage for accidents occurring outside Massachusetts. The relevant portion of the optional provision states:\n\u201cIf the accident occurs in any other state or in a Canadian province and you have purchased any coverage at all under this Part, your policy will automatically apply to that accident as follows:\nIf the state or province has:\n1. A financial responsibility or similar law specifying limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage higher than the limits you have purchased, your policy will provide the higher specified limits.\n2. A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring your auto to have insurance whenever it is used in that state or province, your policy will provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage.\u201d\nThe State of Indiana, where the accident occurred, has a financial responsibility law entitled the Indiana Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility and Driver Improvement Act (Ind. Code \u00a79 \u2014 2\u20141\u201415 (Burns 1987)). The statute reads in pertinent part:\n\u201cProof of financial responsibility shall mean proof of ability to respond in damages for liability thereafter incurred, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) because of bodily injury to or death of any one (1) person ***. Proof in the amounts required by this section shall be furnished for each motor vehicle registered by such person.\u201d\nAt the time of plaintiff\u2019s accident, section 9 \u2014 2\u20141\u201416 of the Act, since amended, provided:\n\u201cProof of financial responsibility when required under this act *** may be given by the following alternate methods; either by proof that a policy or policies of motor vehicle liability insurance have been obtained and are in full force and effect, or that a bond has been duly executed, or that deposit has been made of money or securities, all as hereinafter provided.\u201d Ind. Code \u00a79 \u2014 2\u20141\u201416 (Burns 1987).\nIn construing the policy provision questioned here, we look to Indiana law to determine the meaning and purpose of Indiana\u2019s financial responsibility statute. Decisions interpreting the Indiana Act make it clear that the Act\u2019s provisions come into play only after a motorist has been involved in an accident. (Grimes v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (Ind. App. 1980), 402 N.E.2d 50.) Once a driver has been involved in an accident, the driver must provide the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles with proof that he will be able to respond in damages in the event of future accidents. (Grimes, 402 N.E.2d at 52.) Section 9 \u2014 2\u20141\u201416 of the Act provides that financial responsibility may be proved by insurance, by bond, or by a deposit of money or securities. (Ind. Code \u00a79 \u2014 2\u20141\u201416 (Burns 1987).) The purpose of the statute is to increase public protection against a select group of drivers; that is, those who have been involved in a previous accident. Green v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 168 Ind. App. 434, 343 N.E.2d 828.\nPlaintiffs concede that Remar de los Reyes, the driver in the instant case, was not subject to the statute at the time of the accident since he had no prior accidents. Plaintiffs contend that although the Act does not apply to Remar de los Reyes, defendant failed to limit the application of its financial responsibility provision to those instances where compliance with financial responsibility laws is required.\nDefendant argues that since Indiana\u2019s financial responsibility statute does not apply to the insured, coverage limits in the amounts specified in the statute should not be read into the policy. Defendant cites in support of its argument Grimes v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (Ind. App. 1980), 402 N.E.2d 50, Green v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 168 Ind. App. 434, 343 N.E.2d 828, and Wisdom v. Stonewall Insurance Co. (1986), 139 Ill. App. 3d 1082. In each case, the court held that because the insured was not subject to the State\u2019s financial responsibility law, the coverage limits of the policy involved were not increased to the amounts specified in the statute.\nThe appellate court found that the policy provision in question operated to increase the coverage for bodily injury for this accident from $10,000 to $25,000. In reaching its decision, the appellate court focused on the wording of the policy provision, particularly on defendant\u2019s use of the word \u201cspecify,\u201d rather than the word \u201crequire.\u201d The provision states that when an accident occurs in a State other than Massachusetts, defendant will provide the coverage limits of the State\u2019s financial responsibility law if the statute \u201cspecifies] limits of liability\u201d higher than those otherwise provided under the policy. The appellate court, relying on a dictionary definition, noted that the word \u201cspecify\u201d means \u201c[t]o mention or name in a[n] *** explicit manner.\u201d The appellate court concluded that the Indiana statute explicitly mentions coverage limits; therefore, it reasoned, those limits should be incorporated into the policy, regardless of whether the statute required the insured to carry such coverage at the time of the accident. The appellate court found the cases cited by defendant to be inapposite because the language used in those policies differed from the wording of defendant\u2019s policy.\nWe find that because the insured was not subject to the Indiana financial responsibility law at the time of the accident, defendant\u2019s liability under the policy for this accident is limited to $10,000.\nThe function of the court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement. (Lentin v. Continental Assurance Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 158.) An insurance contract should be construed as a whole (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486), and the construction given the policy should be a natural and reasonable one (Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America (1952), 411 Ill. 325).\nThe instant policy contains two optional coverage provisions. The first provides that if the State where the accident occurs has a financial responsibility law \u201cspecifying limits of liability\u201d higher than the limits otherwise provided under the policy, the policy will provide the higher specified limits. The second provision states that if the State where the accident occurs has a compulsory insurance or similar law \u201crequiring\u201d the insured to carry insurance, the policy will provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage.\nIt is apparent in the policy that the purpose of the provisions is to ensure that with the optional coverage defendant\u2019s insureds are in compliance with the financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws of any State in which they drive. Thus, the reasonable construction of the policy is that an insured subject to the provisions of the financial responsibility laws of any State would be provided coverage up to the minimum amount of required financial responsibility specified in the statute; similarly, the policy would provide insurance coverage in the amount required by any State\u2019s compulsory insurance law.\nWe do not find that defendant\u2019s use of the word \u201cspecify,\u201d rather than the word \u201crequire,\u201d in the financial responsibility provision operates to increase the policy\u2019s coverage limits. The Indiana financial responsibility act does not require motorists to carry insurance. Even when drivers have been involved in a prior accident and are therefore subject to the provisions of the Act, the Act provides that financial responsibility may be proved by the posting of a bond, or by a deposit of money or securities, as alternatives to proof that the person has purchased a policy of insurance. (Ind. Code \u00a79 \u2014 2\u20141\u201416 (Burns 1987).) Compulsory insurance statutes, on the other hand, do require drivers to carry automobile insurance. Because financial responsibility statutes generally do not require motorists to carry insurance, defendant\u2019s use of the word \u201cspecify\u201d in the financial responsibility provision more precisely reflects the intent of the parties than would the word \u201crequire.\u201d\nThe parties in the case before us agree that the insured had no accidents prior to the one in question here and that he was not subject to Indiana\u2019s financial responsibility law at the time of the accident. Because the insured was not subject to the Act, the policy provision in question did not increase the coverage limits of the policy to the minimum amount of required financial responsibility specified in the Act. To hold otherwise would convert the financial responsibility provision of the policy into a compulsory insurance provision, with limits of liability in the minimum amount required of drivers who have had prior accidents in any State having a financial responsibility law. Such a result could not reasonably have been intended by the parties.\nAccordingly, we find that the appellate court erred in concluding that the financial responsibility provision of the policy operated to increase coverage limits under the policy. Since the Indiana financial responsibility act does not specify limits of liability higher than the $10,000 coverage limit otherwise provided by the policy, we find defendant\u2019s liability under the policy for this accident to be limited to $10,000.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CALVO,\ndissenting:\nI cannot subscribe to the majority opinion, which ignores the clear and unambiguous language of the policy provision in question and, essentially, rewrites the parties\u2019 agreement for them to reflect what the majority believes the insurer meant, but did not say, when it drafted the policy. I believe a sophisticated corporate entity, such as the defendant, should be capable of drafting a policy which accurately reflects its intentions and should not receive the aid of this court in avoiding a clear contractual commitment.\nIf the provisions of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, if the words of a policy can reasonably be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, then there is no need for construction, the provisions will be applied as written, and the parties will be bound to the agreement they made. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 495; United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 1, 4; Dora Township v. Indiana Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 376, 378.) In the absence of ambiguity, the intention of the parties at the time the contract was entered into must be ascertained by the language utilized in the contract itself. Lenzi v. Morkin (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 290, 293.\nThe policy, issued in Massachusetts, limits coverage for bodily injury to $10,000 per person, but, where an accident occurs in another State, and the other State has \u201c[a] financial responsibility or similar law specifying limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage higher than the limits *** purchased, [the] policy will provide the higher specified limits.\u201d I perceive no ambiguity. Indiana, the State where the accident occurred, has \u201ca financial responsibility law *** specifying limits of liability [$25,000] *** higher than the limits *** purchased [$10,000].\u201d The policy unequivocally states, under those circumstances, the policy \u201cwill provide the higher specified limits.\u201d Defendant could have restricted its liability by merely requiring that the financial responsibility law be \u201capplicable to the accident.\u201d It did not do so. We must not inject terms and conditions different from those agreed upon by the parties. Lentin v. Continental Assurance Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 158,162-63.\nI am aware that all the provisions of an insurance contract, rather than an isolated part, should be read together to interpret it and to determine whether an ambiguity exists; however, in applying the rules of interpretation, the words in the policy should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the court should not search for an ambiguity where there is none. (Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d at 5.) Here, the policy provision can be applied as written, in keeping with the \u201cplain and ordinary\u201d meaning of the words defendant employed. It does not conflict with any other provisions of the policy. It should be applied in accordance with the language defendant used.\nEven assuming, arguendo, the provision is subject to different interpretations, such ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the insured, and against the insurance company that drafted the contract of insurance. (Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d at 4; Dora Township, 78 Ill. 2d at 379; Kirk v. Financial Security Life Insurance Co. (1978), 75 Ill. 2d 367, 371.) The majority discerns ambiguity where there is none, then resolves that ambiguity in favor of the insurance company, all the while purporting to ascertain and enforce the intention of \u201cthe parties\u201d as expressed in the agreement. It is, no doubt, because of the difficulty inherent in ascertaining the \u201cintention of the parties\u201d \u2014 usually, as here, an insured who probably never thought much about the actual application of the provision when the policy was purchased, and an insurance company that wants to limit its coverage to the extent possible \u2014 that the rule developed resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured, the party who, in most instances, does not have the opportunity to participate in the drafting process. The majority fails to explain why this rule of construction is inoperative in this case.\nBecause I find no ambiguity, I see no need for further construction of the policy provision in an attempt to ascertain \u201cthe parties\u2019 \u201d intent. Even if there were ambiguity, I would resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE CALVO," } ], "attorneys": [ "Raymond R. Cusack, of Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas H. Fegan, of counsel), for appellant.", "Topper & Weiss, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry Weiss, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 67839.\nPAUL DE LOS REYES et al., Appellees, v. THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 22, 1990.\nCALVO, J., dissenting.\nRaymond R. Cusack, of Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas H. Fegan, of counsel), for appellant.\nTopper & Weiss, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry Weiss, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 373 }