{ "id": 3254735, "name": "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. County of Cook", "decision_date": "1990-05-23", "docket_number": "No. 68677", "first_page": "334", "last_page": "362", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 334" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "5 U.S.C. \u00a7552", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Supp. I 1976" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ohio App. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1481249 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-2d/53/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5329199 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 N.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Mass. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 885037 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/296/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ark. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1730592 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/239/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 A.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.H. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4437455 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/113/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 F.2d 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 503167 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/596/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 F. Supp. 760", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3744924 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/603/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621616 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173748 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394435 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Software L.J. 775", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Software L.J.", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-87", "parenthetical": "Illinois Act defines computer tape as public record and, because it was designed to protect requesters of information who lack computer skills, should not penalize those who are computer-literate" }, { "page": "787-91", "parenthetical": "determining that appellate court in case at bar misconstrued Dismukes" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621616 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "943" }, { "page": "943" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126692 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 303", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785555 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "863" }, { "page": "1582" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 L. Ed. 537", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "case_ids": [ 3567361, 3567221 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/148/0503-01", "/us/148/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 U.S. 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3567361 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" }, { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/148/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1352, "char_count": 48513, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.252293935578687e-07, "percentile": 0.8690054902814798 }, "sha256": "5f3ccc93235a46b65692799b0732d4b1fdcda69c5e7203bb1f18f4cad365b2cc", "simhash": "1:c78a05d3e3812ab2", "word_count": 7879 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:08:10.696220+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RYAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a decision of the first district of the appellate court that reversed the ruling of the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court determined that defendants, Cook County and George Dunne, as president of the county board, must furnish plaintiff, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), with certain information requested pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.) (Act), in the form of a computer tape, which plaintiff wanted, rather than a printout, which defendants furnished.\nThe appellate court reversed this ruling, holding that the furnisher of information need only provide the requested information in a reasonably accessible format, and that the computer printout sufficed. (182 Ill. App. 3d 941.) We granted plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315). While we agree with the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that the circuit court did not properly decide this case, we cannot concur with the appellate court\u2019s reasoning.\nOn several occasions during October and November 1986, representatives of AFSCME made requests for information pursuant to the Act to Thomas P. Beck, Cook County comptroller. The requests were made using preprinted forms on which the requester typed the following sentence above the line requiring a specific identification of the information being requested: \u201cSee attached list: Names of employees by department with job title, rate of pay, and work locations.\u201d Attached to the requests was a list of several departments that are under the control of the Cook County board. The requesters checked the portion of the form asking the furnisher to copy the information and signed the portion of the form authorizing a $0.10 copying charge per page and a $1 document certification fee. Defendants furnished the requested information shortly thereafter in the form of a computer printout.\nOn November 26, 1986, Robert Lawson, a representative of AFSCME, sent a letter to Mr. Beck asking for essentially the same information, with the apparent addition of the offices of State\u2019s Attorney, county clerk, chief administrator, and highway safety, and several federally funded programs, on computer tape or diskette, offering to pay any reasonable costs incurred in providing the information. Mr. Beck denied the request in a letter dated December 1,1986, stating as follows:\n\u201cIn reply to your request of November 26, 1986, for information on computer tape or diskette, your request is denied.\nThe majority of the information you requested was already supplied to your union by my office within the last two weeks and I know your union is also requesting the same information from various elected officials.\u201d\nMelissa Auerbach, counsel for Mr. Lawson, repeated the request in a letter dated December 17, 1986. Ms. Auerbach urged Mr. Beck to supply the information because, she stated, \u201c[ijnformation maintained by your agency on computer tape or diskette is *** clearly subject to release under [the Act], and must be made available for inspection and copying pursuant to a proper request.\u201d In response to this inquiry, Mr. Beck sent a letter to Ms. Auerbach, dated December 31, 1986, again denying the request. Mr. Beck stated that the information had already been provided, that the information was not stored in the format requested and that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office advised him that he was not required to furnish the information on computer tape or diskette. Ms. Auerbach then sent a letter, dated January 5, 1987, to William M. Doyle, chief administrative officer, appealing Mr. Beck\u2019s denial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 210.) Mr. Doyle responded, in a letter dated February 11,1987, as follows:\n\u201cHaving reviewed this matter with our attorneys, we take the position that we have already complied with the Freedom of Information Act by providing your client, AFSCME, the information requested in hard copy.\nIt is our continued position that the Act does not require us to now provide that same information on computer tape.\u201d\nPlaintiff filed its complaint for injunctive relief on March 5, 1987, alleging essentially that defendants failed to respond to plaintiff\u2019s November 26, 1986, request,- and that defendants had a duty to do so because information stored on computer tape is subject to inspection and copying pursuant to the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 203(a).) Defendants answered the complaint by admitting most of plaintiff\u2019s allegations, but further stating that defendants had supplied all of the information in printed format before plaintiff filed suit and that, as a matter of law, the Act does not require that the provider of information furnish the same information in the form of a computer tape or diskette.\nPlaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the issue to be decided was \u201cwhether, when certain information is maintained by a public body on computer tape, a person is entitled, under the Freedom of Information Act, to obtain a copy of that tape.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s motion was accompanied by an affidavit by Roy M. Heffner, a data processing systems consultant, who stated that the cost of entering the data on computer would be $900, most of which could be avoided if the computer tape was provided.\nDefendants responded by stating that \u201cthe Freedom of Information Act [citation] creates no right to receive information on computer tape where the requested information has been previously provided in a reasonably accessible format.\u201d Defendants\u2019 response was accompanied by an affidavit from Mr. Beck stating that his office\u2019s practice was to respond to requests such as plaintiff\u2019s by providing a printout so to \u201censure the accuracy and consistency of the material; and because a visually readable print-out is the most generally accessible format.\u201d Defendants also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to the same effect.\nAfter conducting hearings and analyzing the memoranda accompanying the parties\u2019 motions, the circuit court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied defendants\u2019 motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court, in applying a balancing test, found that there was no greater burden on defendants in providing the information on computer tape, but the inconvenience to plaintiff in having to physically transfer the data to its computer rather than merely copying the tape was great.\nThe appellate court reversed both rulings. It held, adopting the standard set forth in Dismukes v. Department of the Interior (D.C. Cir. 1984), 603 F. Supp. 760, that the agency that is asked to provide the information \u201cneed only provide responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably accessible form,\u201d and that defendants complied by providing the information in the form of a printout. (182 Ill. App. 3d at 946.) We hold that the appellate court erred by applying the standard set forth in Dismukes to the Illinois Act. However, we are also not satisfied that the circuit court heard sufficient evidence or made sufficient findings of facts to dispose of this matter.\nThe initial inquiry is whether the computer tape that plaintiff requested is generally within the scope of the Act. The Illinois Act is a clearly stated statute. It provides generally that \u201cpersons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201.) The Act is not designed, though, to provide access to information to the extent that it disrupts the efficient functioning of a government agency. The Act, therefore, creates a simple mechanism whereby a public body must comply with a proper request for information unless it can avoid providing the information by invoking one of the narrow exceptions provided in the Act.\nThe Act states that, upon receiving a request, \u201c[e]ach public body [must] make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 203.) \u201cPublic records\u201d means, among other things, \u201ctapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, recorded information and all other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 202(c).) This definition, therefore, includes computer tapes within its scope. See also Long v. United States Internal Revenue Service (9th Cir. 1979), 596 F.2d 362, 365 (Federal Freedom of Information Act applies to computer tapes).\nAs such, upon receiving a proper request for a copy of a computer tape, defendants were obligated either to comply or state clearly upon ,what exception it was relying to avoid compliance. Section 7 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 207) enumerates several exceptions under which a public body may avoid information disclosure. None of these appear relevant to this case. Section 3 of the Act, however, which creates the duty to make public records available for inspection and copying, contains its own internal exception. Subsection (f) states that a public body may avoid compliance if it would prove to be \u201cunduly burdensome,\u201d and the burden cannot be avoided. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch: 116, par. 203(f).) This subsection also states that repeated requests for the same public record are presumed to be unduly burdensome. As stated earlier, the term \u201cpublic records\u201d means, among other things, \u201crecorded information.\u201d Therefore, if one generally requests recorded information, as may have been the case here, that person may not request the same recorded information soon thereafter, even if the requester asks for the recorded information in a different physical format.\nHaving reviewed the statute and the record in this case, we can attempt to apply the facts, to the extent that they were presented in the lower court, to the law. As indicated earlier in this opinion, defendants complied with plaintiff\u2019s original request for information. Defendants rejected plaintiff\u2019s subsequent request that specified the form in which plaintiff was requesting the information, however. Defendants have provided several reasons for their denial of plaintiff\u2019s request. Some that are found in the correspondence and some that defendants raised after plaintiff filed suit might have merit, some clearly do not.\nFirst, defendant contended that the information requested in the November 26, 1986, letter had been provided in the form requested two weeks prior to that request. While the record indicates that this is substantially true, the trial court did not address this factual issue, or whether the November 26, 1986, letter constituted a \u201crepeated request\u201d for the purpose of the Act.\nDefendant also contended that the information requested was not stored in the format requested. While this might also provide a valid reason for denying plaintiff\u2019s request, because the provider of information is not required to prepare its records in a new format merely to accommodate a request for certain information, it was also not presented to the circuit court, nor did the circuit court address it.\nAnother one of defendants\u2019 responses to plaintiff\u2019s request for information stated that they were not required to furnish information on computer tape. This is not correct. If plaintiff has properly made a request for a copy of the computer tape, which as we stated earlier is a public record, and defendants cannot properly invoke an exception to their duty to make the computer tape available for copying, the plaintiff\u2019s request should be honored. To avoid the defense of \u201crepeated requests\u201d the plaintiff should have in the first request asked for a copy of the computer tape.\nSimilarly, defendant now argues, and a majority of the appellate court specifically found, that a public body may choose the format in which it releases information so long as the requester is provided reasonable access to the information, regardless of the format that was requested. This is likewise incorrect. The Act states that public bodies must make public records available for inspection and copying, unless they can avoid doing so by invoking an exception that is provided in the Act. Computer tapes are public records and must, therefore, be made available to the public. The Act does not state that a public body may reply to information requests by supplying different public records than those for which the requester asked. Rather, the public body must make the public record available, including computer tapes, unless it can properly invoke an exception. It is the public body\u2019s burden, moreover, to establish that an exception applies.\nBoth parties, and the appellate court, cite several cases in support of their positions. While we think that the Illinois Act speaks for itself, and none of the cases that the parties cite construe the Illinois Act, we will nevertheless examine the significance of the various authorities cited.\nPlaintiff first calls this court\u2019s attention to Menge v. City of Manchester (1973), 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116. This case was brought by a college professor pursuant to New Hampshire\u2019s \u201cright to know law\u201d to force the defendant to make a computer tape available. The Menge court first found that computer tapes are public records for the purpose of the New Hampshire law. It further stated that, \u201c[t]aking into account the practical realities of the situation, we believe it not only possible, but in accord with our law and what seems to be its basic philosophy, to so construe the statute as to permit plaintiff to have the reproduced tapes at his expense.\u201d (Menge, 113 N.H. at 538, 311 A.2d at 119.) While this and other cases plaintiff cites support its general position, which we addressed earlier in this opinion, that computer tapes are public records, they do not shed light on the factual questions to be decided in the present case. See also Whorton v. Gaspard (1965), 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (voting lists available for copying); Direct Mail Service, Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1937), 296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d 545 (right to inspect and copy automobile registrations); Ortiz v. Jaramillo (1971), 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (affidavits of registration on magnetic tape subject to copying); Lorain County Title Co. v. Essex (1976), 53 Ohio App. 2d 274, 373 N.E.2d 1261 (microfilm is a public record).\nThe case upon which defendants and the appellate court primarily rely, Dismukes v. Department of Interior (D.D.C. 1984), 603 F. Supp. 760, is more on point, but we decline to interpret the Illinois Act as narrowly as the Dismukes court interpreted the Federal Freedom of Information Act and as the appellate court in this case interpreted the Illinois Act. In Dismukes, the plaintiff specifically requested certain information in the form of a computer tape. Defendant responded by denying the request for a copy of the computer tape, but offered the same information in the form of microfiche cards. Plaintiff brought suit seeking to enforce its original request. The court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the requester of information may not dictate the format in which the information will be provided, and that the furnishing public body \u201cneed only provide responsive, nonexempt information in a reasonably accessible form.\u201d (603 F. Supp. at 763.) The reasons that the Dismukes court gave for adopting this rule, while perhaps consistent with the Federal Freedom of Information Act, are clearly not applicable to the Illinois Act.\nThe Dismukes court first reasoned that the agency furnishing the information can provide it in a form that varies from that which was requested if the different form does not alter the content of the information. The court came to this conclusion because it found that what was important was the information content of the record and not the record itself for the purpose of the Federal Freedom of Information Act. The Federal statute appears to require only that \u201cpublic information\u201d be made available. (5 U.S.C. \u00a7552 (Supp. I 1976).) The Illinois Act, however, requires that \u201cpublic records,\u201d which include computer tapes, be made available. That is, the Illinois Act is not solely concerned with content, it also requires that information be made available in the form in which it is normally kept.\nBecause the focus of the Federal statute is on the content of the information, the Dismukes court essentially shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the form in which the information was provided in some way changed its content: \u201c[N]either plaintiff nor any document in the record suggests that the quantum of information contained in the microfiche varies in any way from that recorded on the computer tape.\u201d (603 F. Supp. at 762.) The Illinois Act, however, does not contemplate such burden-shifting. Under the Illinois Act, having received a proper request to inspect or copy a public record, the public body must either comply or state why it cannot comply. It is not sufficient in Illinois for a public body to furnish a public record that does not conform and then force the requester to explain why the record furnished is inadequate.\nThe Dismukes court also concluded that the furnisher of information may choose the form in which it provides it so long as the form chosen does not, as a practical matter, deny access to the information. That is, for the purpose of the Federal statute, according to the Dismukes court, only if the public body provides the information in an extremely inconvenient form has it failed to comply with the request. Again, in Illinois the focus is different. Under the Illinois Act, once a proper request has been made, the public body must either comply, or explain why it cannot. One legitimate reason for choosing not to comply is that the burden on the public body in producing a specific public record is too great, in which case the two parties can agree to, or a court can impose, a more manageable solution, such as providing an alternate public record that contains substantially the same information. A public body may not in Illinois, however, as it did in Dismukes, provide a public record that does not conform to the request and then force the requester to explain why it will not suffice.\nThe Dismukes court also accepted the defendant\u2019s contention that it was providing the information in the form of microfiche because \u201cmicrofiche is the format more likely to be readable by the largest number of requesters.\u201d (603 F. Supp. at 762.) So too, in the present case, defendants argue that a computer printout is the most accessible form. The Dismukes court does not address the question, however, of why information cannot be provided in a different form to different requesters. In Illinois, the Act requires an individualized determination for each request. While it might be excusable for a public body not to provide information in a specified form if its historic policy has been to provide the same information in a different form and to deviate would create a burden, it is not excusable for a public body to set its policy after receiving a request with which it chooses not to comply, as appears to be the case here. Again, though, this is a factual question that has not yet been addressed below.\nBecause of the many distinctions raised above between Dismukes and the Illinois law, we find that the appellate court erred in adopting the standard set forth in Dismukes for the Illinois Act. We cannot, however, merely reinstate the circuit court\u2019s ruling. While we hold here that computer tapes are public records and, therefore, subject to inspection and copying, the circuit court must still determine if defendants properly invoked any exception to their general duty to make public records available for inspection and copying. One obvious possible exception is that the November 26, 1986, request constituted a repeated request and was, therefore, unduly burdensome. There may be other valid reasons why defendants should not furnish the information on computer tape. For instance, at oral argument it was suggested that the means of verifying the accuracy of the information contained on the computer tape was more difficult than on the printout. These and other matters may be considered by the circuit court in determining whether or not the request for a computer tape should be honored.\nAs such, we affirm the appellate court\u2019s judgment reversing the circuit court\u2019s granting of plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. We do so for different reasons, however. While we think that the circuit court has yet to decide whether defendants properly invoked a statutory exception to their duty to make public records available for inspection and copying, we reject the conclusion of the appellate court that the circuit court erred in granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment because, as a matter of law, a public body has complied with the Act by providing reasonable access to nonexempt information. We also disagree with the appellate court as to its reversal of the circuit court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion for judgment on the pleadings. We remand the cause to the circuit court and direct it to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court affirmed; cause remanded with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RYAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STAMOS,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI concur with the majority\u2019s determination that the computer tape which plaintiff requested is within the scope of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Act). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.; see Note, AFSCME v. County of Cook: Access to Information Beyond Reach as Computer Tape Lengthens Bureaucratic Red Tape, 3 Software L.J. 775, 785-87 (1989) (Illinois Act defines computer tape as public record and, because it was designed to protect requesters of information who lack computer skills, should not penalize those who are computer-literate).) I also agree that defendants would be required to comply with the Act and provide plaintiff with a copy of the tape if such compliance would not be \u201cunduly burdensome.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).) The majority is also correct in distinguishing the Federal case law in this area, particularly the Dismukes case (see Note, AFSCME v. County of Cook: Access to Information Beyond Reach as Computer Tape Lengthens Bureaucratic Red Tape, 3 Software L.J. 775, 787-91 (1989) (determining that appellate court in case at bar misconstrued Dismukes)). However, I must dissent with respect to the majority\u2019s reasons for partially affirming the appellate court\u2019s judgment.\nThe proper construction of a statute and its application to undisputed facts are questions of law subject to independent determination by a court of review. (People v. Blair (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 371, 373). The facts in the case at bar are undisputed. Plaintiff first made a general request to defendants for certain public records, using preprinted forms which did not clearly state in what format the requester expected the information to be provided. Defendants complied with this request by sending a typed computer printout of desired information. After receipt of the printout of the information, plaintiff made a second request for the same information, this time in a computer tape format. Because these facts are undisputed and because the language of section 3(f) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f)) is plain and unambiguous, we can determine as a matter of law whether this second request qualifies as a \u201crepeated request\u201d for the same \u201cpublic record\u201d which would require us to find it \u201cunduly burdensome\u201d under the Act.\nSection 3(f) specifically states:\n\u201cRequests calling for all records falling within a category shall be complied with unless compliance with the request would be unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is no way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body outweighs the public interest in the information. Before invoking this exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making the request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions. If any body responds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would unduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are met, it shall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would be unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so burden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be treated as a denial of the request for information. Repeated requests for the same public records by the same person shall be deemed unduly burdensome under this provision.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).\nThe majority misfocused its analysis by concentrating on the term \u201crecorded information\u201d when it recited the definition of what a \u201cpublic record\u201d is. (See 136 Ill. 2d at 341-42.) Section 3(f) emphasizes repeated requests for the same public record. After analyzing the Act under the accepted principles of statutory construction in light of the undisputed facts, I conclude that the Act clearly indicates that a computer tape and a typed printout which contain essentially the same information are not the same \u201cpublic record\u201d for purposes of the statute.\n\u201cPublic records\u201d are defined in section 2(c) of the Act as \u201call records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, recorded information and all other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 202(c).) The emphasis in section 2(c) is on the different formats or media a public body may use to preserve information and which qualify as \u201cpublic records.\u201d The kind of information which may be included in a public record, regardless of the format in which it is preserved, is addressed in the next portion of section 2(c).\nThe key to determining the difference between the Act\u2019s definitions of \u201cpublic records\u201d and \u201cinformation\u201d is seen in the verbs which follow the term \u201cpublic records\u201d in section 2(c). The list of the various formats is tied to what the term \u201cpublic records\u201d \u201cmeans.\u201d These formats are then identified as \u201c[including], but *** expressly not limited to\u201d the different types of information. Thus, a \u201cpublic record\u201d is defined by its format, and can contain a myriad of different kinds of information. We can logically conclude from the plain language of section 2(c) that the General Assembly intended the availability of all the different formats and media to be the predominant concern under the Act. See Maloney v. Bower (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (courts, when interpreting a statute, must give the language of that statute its plain and ordinary meaning); County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (courts should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters).\nThe majority appears to recognize the precedence of format over information when it distinguishes Dismukes from the case at bar. According to the majority, the Federal standard allows the public body to provide the information in any format, as long as all the pertinent information is included and the form is not extremely inconvenient. The majority correctly states that under the Illinois Act, the public body must release the information in the format requested, unless it can explain why such a format would be overly burdensome. (136 Ill. 2d at 345-48.) I find it inconsistent for the majority to note the difference between \u201crecords\u201d and \u201cinformation\u201d under the Federal law, but fail to similarly apply this analysis to section 3(f).\nTherefore, I would interpret the statutory phrase \u201csame public records\u201d in section 3(f) to refer to the form of the public record as opposed to the information included in the public record. A request for a computer tape containing specific information does not seek the same public record that a request for a typed printout of the same information does. With the explosion of electronic information in business and government today, I can easily imagine how one could legitimately require two records, in different formats, which contain partly or wholly duplicative information. This analysis leads me to conclude that the \u201crepeated request\u201d language of section 3(f) is inapplicable to the case at bar.\nThe majority\u2019s focus on the term \u201crecorded information\u201d in section 3(f) further magnifies its failure to recognize the Act\u2019s clear distinction between what a \u201cpublic record\u201d is and the \u201cinformation\u201d such a record may contain. Specifically, the majority states that \u201cthe term \u2018public record\u2019 means, among other things, \u2018recorded information.\u2019 Therefore, if one generally requests recorded information, as may have happened here, that person may not request the same recorded information soon thereafter, even if the requester asks for the recorded information in a different physical format.\u201d (136 Ill. 2d at 342.) Thus, the majority apparently defines both the typed printout plaintiff received and the computer tape plaintiff requested as being examples of \u201crecorded information\u201d under the Act, and expressly states that a duplicative request for \u201crecorded information\u201d \u201csoon thereafter\u201d is prohibited under the Act.\nThis analysis violates several basic principles of statutory interpretation. \u201cRecorded information\u201d is only one of several enumerated formats that the General Assembly recognizes as public records. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch, 116, par. 202(c).) When construing a legislative act, a court must determine the legislative intent from the entire statute, not just an isolated passage. (Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318.) By concentrating on only one of several enumerated examples of public records, the majority uses the term \u201crecorded information\u201d out of context, and misconstrues the legislative intent underlying the Act.\nThe maxim \u201cnoscitur a sociis,\u201d a canon of statutory construction which means \u201c[i]t is known from its associates\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 956 (5th ed. 1979)), is applicable here. Noscitur a sociis allows a court to ascertain the meaning of terms in a statute by reference to words associated with them in the statute. (Virginia v. Tennessee (1893), 148 U.S. 503, 519, 37 L. Ed. 537, 543, 13 S. Ct. 728, 734.) Thus, when two or more words are grouped together, and generally have a similar meaning but are not equally inclusive, the general term is limited and qualified by the special term. (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction \u00a747.16 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).) This maxim is often applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid giving the statute a meaning that the legislature did not intend. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1961), 367 U.S. 303, 307, 6 L. Ed. 2d 859, 863, 81 S. Ct. 1579, 1582.\nAs I have already stated, section 2 defines public records in terms of formats. Specifically, section 2 lists \u201call records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, recorded information and all other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics\u201d as qualifying as \u201cpublic records.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 202(c).) The legislature, by specifically naming most of the common formats which public bodies use to store information, has indicated its intent to have all formats accessible to the public. Most of the terms in the list which describe modern technological methods of storing information are very specific and concrete (e.g., \u201cmicrofilms\u201d and \u201celectronic data processing records\u201d). The other terms, which are slightly more general in scope, define more traditional formats (e.g., \u201cwritings\u201d and \u201crecords\u201d). Thus, the plain language of section 2(c) manifests an intent to provide for access to specific electronic formats. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 202(c).\nFurther, the last two items in the list, \u201crecorded information and all other documentary materials,\u201d are general and all-inclusive, unlike the previous terms. Under noscitur a sociis, the context in which these last two terms appear compels the court to interpret them in light of the others. This leads to one of two conclusions. The court could view these last two terms as a single clause which the legislature intended as a \u201ccatch all,\u201d covering any possible format not already in the list. In the alternative, we could view the words \u201call other documentary materials\u201d as the \u201ccatch all,\u201d and view \u201crecorded information\u201d as a format which the legislature intended to be a separate and distinct category.\nIn either case, the result in the case at bar should be the same. The undisputed facts show that plaintiff filled out a form requesting a public record containing certain information. The form provided no means for the plaintiff to specify a particular format. Plaintiff, however, did sign the portion of the form which indicated it would pay $0.10 per page for the copying of the record. Defendants responded to this request by sending the typed printout of the record. (136 Ill. 2d at 338.) Plaintiff then made a second request for the same information, this time specifying a computer tape format. (136 Ill. 2d at 338.) After plaintiff filed suit, it requested the information in computer tape format four more times. On each occasion, defendant provided a copy of the typed printout. (182 Ill. App. 3d 941, 943.) The majority believes this scenario creates a question of fact which the trial court failed to address. (See 136 Ill. 2d at 347.) Nevertheless, the majority further intimates that if the trial court determines on remand that plaintiff\u2019s initial request was for \u201crecorded information,\u201d the subsequent requests for the same information in a different format qualified as a \u201crepeated request\u201d under section 3(f) of the Act. See 136 Ill. 2d at 342.\nI cannot agree. Whether this court interprets plaintiff\u2019s initial request as ambiguous, or as a specific request for a typed printout, the undisputed facts show that plaintiff\u2019s initial request was for a public record containing specific information. Defendants responded by sending a typed printout of that information, a public record which clearly fits \"within at least one of the specific formats listed in section 2(c). The facts also show that, regardless of what this court interprets the plaintiff\u2019s initial request to mean, the printout objectively fulfills the request as contained on the form.\nPlaintiff\u2019s subsequent requests were not for printouts, but for computer tapes \u2014 a format category distinct and separate from the terms which would include a typed printout in section 2(c). No matter how the majority defines the general terms contained in section 2(c) under which the printout might be included (\u201crecords, reports, *** writings, *** papers\u201d), there is no way to define \u201ctapes\u201d or \u201celectronic data processing records\u201d in a way that includes typed printouts. The legislature clearly intended public records such as the computer tape in the case at bar to be a distinct category under the Act, and therefore a separate and different public record from the printout \u2014 despite the fact that both public records contain substantially the same information. To accept the majority\u2019s view that both the typed printout and the computer tape qualify as \u201crecorded information\u201d under section 2(c) would not only violate the maxim of noseitur a sociis, but would make the listing of other formats prior to \u201crecorded information\u201d meaningless (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (statutes should be construed so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless)) and would frustrate the manifest legislative intent to specifically require the disclosure of electronic data processing formats. Further, such a limiting construction of the statute violates the express purpose of the Act, which is to limit restraints on the public\u2019s access to information. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 201.\nI have further misgivings about the majority\u2019s statement that a person who requests recorded information \u201cmay not request the same recorded information soon thereafter, even if the requester asks for the recorded information in a different physical format.\u201d (136 Ill. 2d at 342.) Not only do I find fault with the majority\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201crecorded information\u201d and its failure to recognize the legislative distinction of format from information, I find insertion of the word \u201csoon\u201d into the analysis to be erroneous. Section 3(f) merely states that repeated requests are to be deemed unduly burdensome under the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).) There is nothing in the statutory language to indicate that the passage of time has any bearing on what is a \u201crepeated request.\u201d In fact, the majority\u2019s determination that a second request for the same information in a different format \u201csoon\u201d after the original request is a \u201crepeated request\u201d under the Act serves only to add confusion to the analysis. For example, after how long a time period is \u201csoon\u201d? Had plaintiff waited six months instead of a few weeks to make the second request, would that have eliminated the perceived \u201crepeated request\u201d problem? If the information were to change slightly on a day-to-day basis, would a second request on the following day be too \u201csoon\u201d \u2014 or a repeated request for the \u201csame\u201d record at all? I submit that the plain language of section 3(f) focuses on whether compliance with a request actually is unduly burdensome for the public body involved, and not on how long it has been since a requester last asked for a particular collection of information. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).\nHaving determined that the request for the computer tape was not a \u201crepeated request\u201d under section 3(f), this court could then apply the rest of section 3(f)\u2019s language to the undisputed facts in the case at bar to determine, as a matter of law, whether the request for the computer tape was \u201cunduly burdensome\u201d for defendants. The record reveals, and the parties stated at oral argument, that defendant regularly stores the information in the public record in question on computer tape. Plaintiff had agreed to pay all copying expenses. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 206.) Plaintiff made no demand for the record to be produced in a specific computer program; plaintiff\u2019s request only required defendants to copy a computer tape, which was already a part of their record-keeping system, and give the copy to plaintiff. Also, the record reveals that defendants sent a new copy of the typed printout every time plaintiff submitted a new request for the computer tape. The undisputed facts show that the cost in time, materials, and labor to repeatedly send out a typed printout of the same record far outweighs the cost of sending a single copy of the record on computer tape. In light of this, I determine that plaintiff\u2019s request is anything but \u201cunduly burdensome.\u201d I would hold as a matter of law that defendants are required to provide plaintiff with a copy of the computer tape under section 3(f).\nBut even if this court did determine that plaintiffs request somehow was an undue burden to defendants and that the request was \u201ccategorical\u201d (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f)) rather than (as here) for a discrete, existing compilation of records \u2014 or even if the request were actually a \u201crepeated request\u201d and hence presumed to be \u201cunduly burdensome\u201d \u2014 section 3(f) then requires us to determine if plaintiff\u2019s request was as narrowly drawn as possible and to balance the burdens placed on the public body in producing the record against the public\u2019s interest in the information in the record. The burden on defendants here is so minimal as to be inconsequential. The effort required to reproduce the computer tape is minimal, and is far less than that required to produce a typed printout of the same information. Neither party disputes the fact that the information in computer tape format is infinitely easier and cheaper for plaintiff to process and use than the typed printout is. (See 182 Ill. App. 3d at 943.) Use of this information is essential to the operation of plaintiff\u2019s organization. Thus, in light of the undisputed facts, I would hold that as a matter of law plaintiff\u2019s request is as narrowly drawn as possible, and that plaintiff\u2019s interest in the public record requested far outweighs any burden that plaintiff\u2019s request places upon defendants. Accordingly, any hypothetical \u201cundue burden\u201d would still not suffice to justify noncompliance with plaintiff\u2019s request.\nI also disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the case must be remanded to determine if defendants properly invoked any exception to their general duty to make public records available for inspection and copying. (136 Ill. 2d at 348.) My prior analysis regarding \u201crepeated requests\u201d proves that section 3(f) does not provide an exemption on that account from providing records under the Act (despite the majority\u2019s characterization of it as doing so), and that, for the case at bar, the question of undue burden is a matter of law, which allows this court to decide the issue. A list of what is exempt from inspection and copying is found in section 7 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 207). However, section 7 is essentially a list of information which is exempt from disclosure \u2014 not formats. Because defendants have already disclosed the information in the public record to plaintiff, it seems pointless to remand the cause for a determination whether the information, already disclosed once, is in fact exempt from inspection.\nAlso, the defendants, at oral argument before this court, suggested that verifying computer tape for accuracy is more difficult than verifying the printout. Specifically, the defendants argued that, because the content of computer tapes cannot be determined without a computer, the wrong computer tape could be released by mistake, while anyone preparing a public record for distribution can check a typed printout to determine if the proper record is being sent. The majority states that this is another factual question which needs to be settled on remand. (136 Ill. 2d at 347-48.) Again, I cannot agree.\nThe computer tape\u2019s accuracy can be checked by anyone with a compatible computer equipped with the proper program. It is clear in the record that both parties regularly use computers to store and verify information. It is no more difficult than in the case of the printout for the staff of either party to verify the information on the tape through use of their own computer terminals. Indeed, because of automation, it is undoubtedly easier. As for the argument that a typed printout can be checked more readily before being sent out, I submit that both the tapes and the containers used to ship them can be properly labeled by the person copying and verifying contents of the tape without creating an undue burden on a public body such as Cook County. Also, the claim that defendants must'allow plaintiff access to only a typed printout because it is easier to verify is tied to the \u201cgeneral accessibility\u201d argument in the Dismukes case (see 136 Ill. 2d at 340-41), which the majority properly distinguished from the Act. Besides, the Illinois Act\u2019s focus on format rather than information makes this a hollow argument.\nFurther, defendants\u2019 failure to follow the Act\u2019s procedures in denying plaintiff\u2019s request for the computer tape also supports the trial court\u2019s determination that defendants did not comply with the Act and therefore are required to supply plaintiff with a copy of the computer tape. The undisputed facts show that defendants failed to comply with several express requirements of the Act, refuting defendants\u2019 claim that they complied with the Act when they provided plaintiff the typed printout.\nI have already explained that, even if plaintiff\u2019s subsequent requests were \u201crepeated requests,\u201d the \u201crepeated request\u201d language of section 3(f) of the Act is not itself an exemption for public bodies from complying with a request for a public record. This language can form the basis for an exemption only if other specified conditions and procedural requirements are met, and the record shows that defendants did not comply with the Act\u2019s express instructions, whether or not plaintiff\u2019s request is deemed \u201crepeated.\u201d\nFirst, before a public body can invoke the \u201cunduly burdensome\u201d exemption under section 3(f), that body \u201cshall extend to the person making the request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).) Defendant never extended such an invitation, and I submit that the record reveals that such a conference would have proven that compliance with the request for the computer tape would not be unduly burdensome.\nSecond, section 3(f) requires:\n\u201c[i]f any body responds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would unduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are met, it shall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would be unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so burden the operations of the public body.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 203(f).)\nThe record shows that, while defendants responded in writing (see 136 Ill. 2d at 339 (defendants\u2019 letter stated that the printout served as compliance)), they failed to comply with the rest of section 3(f)\u2019s requirements. We could interpret defendants\u2019 statement in the letter that the printout fulfilled plaintiff\u2019s request for a computer tape as invoking the \u201crepeated request\u201d language of section 3(f), but this is not entirely clear. However, if so, defendants failed to explain the extent to which sending a copy of the computer tape would burden their operations. I suggest that this is because the undisputed facts show that compliance with the request could not have burdened defendants\u2019 operation.\nThird, section 9 of the Act describes specific procedures a public body must follow when it denies a request for a public record. These procedures include notice by letter, an explanation of the reasons for denial, the names and positions of persons responsible for the denial, and an explanation of the requester\u2019s right to appeal the decision. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 116, par. 209(a).) It appears from the record that defendants also failed to follow several of these procedures.\nThus, the undisputed facts show that, even if we do not consider the issues already discussed involving whether plaintiff\u2019s request was a \u201crepeated request\u201d under section 3(f) or whether the computer printout fulfilled defendants\u2019 obligations to disclose public records under the Act, defendants failed to follow the basic procedures of the Act. When I combine this analysis with what I have already explained regarding the clear language and intent of the Act, I see no reason to remand this case to determine if the evidence shows that defendants\u2019 response complied with the Act. Clearly, it did not, and defendants, as a matter of law, are required to comply with plaintiff\u2019s request for a computer tape.\nFor these reasons, I would reverse, the judgment of the appellate court insofar as it reversed the circuit court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for plaintiff, and I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Thus, on that issue and on the issue of remanding the cause at bar for further factual determinations, I respectfully dissent.\nJUSTICE CALVO joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE STAMOS," } ], "attorneys": [ "Melissa J. Auerbach, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Deputy State\u2019s Attorney, and Susan Condon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 68677.\nAMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed May 23, 1990.\nSTAMOS, J., joined by CALVO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nMelissa J. Auerbach, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Deputy State\u2019s Attorney, and Susan Condon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0334-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 372 }