{ "id": 5573752, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EMMALINE WILLIAMS et al. (Emmaline Williams, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1990-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 68876", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "23", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2618877 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 374640 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/315/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "1178" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "1182" }, { "page": "490-91" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "1182" }, { "page": "490-91" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "1182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182598 ], "weight": 24, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "1717" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "344-45" }, { "page": "1716" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "1718" }, { "page": "349-50" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "1719" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "1718" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "1718" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "1718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5551204 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "22-23" }, { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 776", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28169 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "3121" }, { "page": "785-86" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "3121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5407159 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554757 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "190-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441195 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 24, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "2066" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "2066" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "294-95" }, { "page": "2065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5377977 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708271 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5016776 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/301/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557518 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542288 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2408775 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/274/0616-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1122, "char_count": 32621, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6692840318002393e-07, "percentile": 0.825643502767922 }, "sha256": "50350d732f5f62df61e9d74f929119abbba366ee416fc88e2d47d053a90f1d14", "simhash": "1:c99653807b4c5079", "word_count": 5151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:31.097191+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EMMALINE WILLIAMS et al. (Emmaline Williams, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn December 4, 1986, appellant, Emmaline Williams, was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4(a)(1)). Her husband and codefendant, Roy Williams, who is not a party to this appeal, was convicted at the same trial of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 1(a)) and indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4(a)(1)). Both appellant and codefendant were represented at trial by the same attorney. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed, (182 Ill. App. 3d 598.) We granted appellant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).\nThe State introduced evidence at trial to establish the following. Appellant and codefendant adopted complainant, then 11 years old, in 1983. Appellant and codefendant lived in a house in Chicago with their daughter, several foster children and complainant. Complainant\u2019s bedroom was located on the second floor of the residence. On April 1, 1984, complainant went to bed at approximately 9 p.m. She was awakened from her sleep later that evening by appellant\u2019s calls to her from a bathroom on the first floor of the residence. Complainant went to appellant in the bathroom. Appellant asked complainant to do a \u201cfavor\u201d for her, to which complainant agreed.\nAppellant led complainant from the bathroom to the bedroom appellant shared with codefendant on the first floor of the residence. Codefendant was lying naked on the bed. Appellant closed the bedroom door and told complainant that she wanted her to \u201cdo something\u201d with the codefendant. Complainant refused and attempted to leave the bedroom. Appellant prevented her exit from the bedroom by blocking the bedroom door. Appellant removed complainant\u2019s clothing and pulled complainant to the bed despite complainant\u2019s protests. Appellant then removed her own clothing and got into the bed, placing complainant between herself and codefendant. Codefendant sexually molested and raped complainant while appellant restrained her. Appellant then sexually molested complainant and did so again when complainant went into the bathroom shortly thereafter.\nComplainant told appellant\u2019s elder daughter of the incidents, but the young woman did not believe complainant. Approximately two weeks after the incidents, complainant described the events in a letter to her former foster mother. Complainant never mailed or otherwise delivered the letter to the woman.\nComplainant left appellant\u2019s house in June 1985, and returned to her former foster mother\u2019s home. Complainant described the incidents of April 1984 to the woman, who then notified the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). After DCFS notified the Chicago police department, Chicago police officer Joseph Lux interviewed complainant and, based upon the information gathered in the interview, appellant was arrested on June 17,1985.\nAt police headquarters, Officer Lux advised appellant of her Miranda rights. Appellant waived those rights and admitted to Officer Lux and two other police officers that she was present while codefendant and complainant engaged in sexual intercourse. Appellant claimed, however, that the act was consensual.\nCodefendant was arrested that evening by Officer Lux and advised of his Miranda rights. Codefendant waived those rights and, during an interview with Officer Lux after his arrest, admitted having had sexual intercourse with complainant. Codefendant stated that he and appellant had to restrain complainant during the incident and added that, thereafter, both he and appellant forcibly sexually fondled complainant.\nThe statement given by codefendant was reduced to writing and read aloud to codefendant. Codefendant then reviewed the statement before signing it. The written statement was later read to appellant, who stated that the events in question must have occurred if codefendant admitted them.\nBoth appellant and codefendant testified at trial. Both denied making any pretrial admissions and denied engaging in any acts which would constitute the offenses with which they were charged.\nAppellant was found guilty of indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4(a)(1)) and sentenced to 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Codefendant was found guilty of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 1(a)) and indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4(a)(1)) and was sentenced to 19 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. After appellant\u2019s conviction was affirmed on appeal (182 Ill. App. 3d at 604), the appellate court granted appellant\u2019s petition for a certificate of importance (107 Ill. 2d R. 316). We granted leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nAppellant argues that her conviction should be reversed for the following reasons. First, appellant argues that a conflict of interest existed between appellant and codefendant which precluded representation by the same counsel during their joint bench trial. Next, appellant argues that she was denied her rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment to effective assistance of counsel and to confront witnesses. Lastly, appellant argues that reversible error occurred when complainant\u2019s letter which detailed the crimes with which appellant was charged was allowed into evidence at trial.\nThe United States Supreme Court has considered conflict of interest in multiple representation in two contexts: where the defendant makes a timely objection to the trial court before or at an early stage in the proceedings (United States v. Glasser (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173) and on appeal where a defendant who failed to object to joint representation at trial demonstrates that the conflict adversely affected his representation (Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708). The Court addressed the first situation in its decision in United States v. Glasser, holding that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI) \u201ccontemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent conflicting interests.\u201d (Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70, 86 L. Ed. at 699, 62 S. Ct. at 465.) Although the Court did not establish that multiple representation is per se violative of the sixth amendment, it did state that the trial court\u2019s error in appointing one attorney to represent two defendants at trial was one that \u201crequire[dj that the verdict be set aside and a new .trial ordered.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76, 86 L. Ed. at 702, 62 S. Ct. at 468.\nIn a subsequent discussion of this statement in Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court held that a defendant\u2019s right to effective assistance of counsel is denied where a trial court, after being advised that a possible conflict of interest exists which could adversely affect the defendants\u2019 assistance of counsel, appoints counsel to represent multiple defendants. (Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 434, 98 S. Ct. at 1178.) The Court explained that such a denial of a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right can never constitute harmless error because the \u201cevil [involved in conflict of interest situations] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 438, 98 S. Ct. at 1182.) The Court held that a defendant is not required to show how a conflict of interests \u201cprejudiced him in some specific fashion\u201d because \u201cit would be difficult to judge *** the impact of a conflict on the attorney\u2019s representation of a client.\u201d (Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 438, 98 S. Ct. at 1182.) The defendant need not show that he in fact suffered prejudice as a result of the conflict. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 438, 98 S. Ct. at 1182.\nIn Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court resolved two issues that had been expressly reserved in Holloway. First, the Court held that a State trial judge need not inquire into the propriety of multiple representation where no party lodges an objection to such representation unless there are \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d in the case that the trial judge \u201cknows or reasonably should know\u201d create a conflict. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 100 S. Ct. at 1717.\nThe second issue left unresolved by Holloway was whether a defendant who failed to raise an objection to multiple representation at trial can establish ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal by showing that a possibility of a conflict existed at trial. (Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45, 100 S. Ct. at 1716.) The Court in Cuyler resolved this question in the negative, holding that \u201ca defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1718.) That is, \u201cthe defendant must point to some specific defect in his counsel\u2019s strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to the conflict.\u201d (People v. Spreitzer (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 1, 18.) The defendant need not, however, \u201cdemonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.\u201d Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 347,100 S. Ct. at 1719.\nWith these principles in mind, we now turn to an examination of the instant case. At trial, appellant did not raise any objections or indicate any concerns about possible conflicts in the joint representation of appellant and codefendant. The issue of a conflict between appellant\u2019s and codefendant\u2019s interests was first raised in the final sentencing hearing on December 30, 1986,. in a motion for new trial filed by appellant\u2019s appellate counsel. As noted above, trial courts have no independent duty, \u201cabsent special circumstances,\u201d to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representations, and appellant does not argue that such \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d existed in this case. We conclude, therefore, that not having raised an objection in the trial court to the joint representation, appellant must now demonstrate an \u201cactual conflict of interest [and how it] adversely affected [her] lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47,100 S. Ct. at 1718.\nAlthough appellant vigorously maintains that trial counsel was operating under a conflict of interest, her argument is composed of speculative allegations and conclusory statements, neither of which are sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 22-23.) Appellant does not point to any actual conflict of interest or demonstrate that such a conflict had any effect on her counsel\u2019s performance. Nowhere, for instance, does appellant argue that trial counsel could or should have advanced a \u201c \u2018lesser culpability\u2019 \u201d argument on behalf of appellant (see Burger v. Kemp (1987), 483 U.S. 776, 784, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 651, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3121), and further, there is no evidence in the record that reveals trial counsel affirmatively avoided this argument out of deference to codefendant\u2019s interests. Likewise, appellant does not maintain that trial counsel failed to negotiate a plea bargain with the State to receive a lesser charge against the appellant in exchange for her cooperation. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 785-86, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 652,107 S. Ct. at 3121.\nThe most specific allegation of conflict appellant makes is her statement that the conflict in this case \u201cwas manifested by [codefendant\u2019s] testimony that [appellant] had back problems.\u201d At trial, the State argued that a reason appellant participated in the crimes was because appellant had back problems which prevented her from having sex with her codefendant-husband. Appellant, however, testified that she did not .have any back problems in April 1984 (the time that the crimes occurred) and codefendant testified on cross-examination that although both he and appellant had back problems on occasion, he could not recall whether appellant had any back problems at the time the crimes occurred.\nAppellant argues that because codefendant\u2019s testimony undermined her claim that she did not have back problems in April 1984, counsel should have raised questions about codefendant\u2019s credibility through cross-examination. Appellant maintains that because of the alleged conflict of interest, counsel could not engage in such cross-examination.\nWe reject appellant\u2019s argument because we are not persuaded that codefendant\u2019s testimony undermined appellant\u2019s claim. Appellant testified that she did not have back problems in April 1984, while codefendant testified that he did not know if appellant had back problems in April 1984. As such, there was no contradiction between, appellant\u2019s and codefendant\u2019s testimonies about which counsel should have cross-examined codefendant; codefendant\u2019s testimony neither supported nor undermined appellant\u2019s claim.\nThe appellate court opinion addressed the question of whether a conflict of interest arose in this case out of the fact that both appellant and codefendant made pretrial statements implicating each other. (182 Ill. App. 3d at 603.) Although it is not entirely clear from the appellate courfls opinion, it appears that the question was raised by codefendant, who was a party to the appeal below. In any event, because appellant has not raised the question before this court, we decline to address it. (See Taylor v. St. Clair (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 367; see also Dineen v. City of Chicago (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 248.) We therefore conclude that appellant has failed to establish \u201cthat an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [her] lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1718.\nWe turn now to appellant\u2019s argument that she was denied her constitutional right to a fair trial by the admission of complainant\u2019s letter into evidence, which letter appellant argues is hearsay. Appellant argues that this error constitutes reversible error. The appellate court concluded that the letter was simply cumulative evidence and found no reversible error in its admission. (182 Ill. App. 3d at 603.) We conclude that appellant waived this issue for purposes of appeal by failing to object at trial and by failing to raise the issue in her post-trial motion. People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176; see also 107 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(2)(iii).\nThe law is well settled that the failure to object at trial to the admissibility of evidence and the failure to complain of the alleged error in a post-trial motion results in waiver of the issue for purposes of appeal. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186; see also 107 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(2)(iii).) The only exception to the waiver rule is where the complained-of error constitutes plain error. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190-91.) Moreover, the failure to object to hearsay during trial not only waives the issue on appeal, but allows such evidence to be considered by the trier of fact and to be given its natural probative effect. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 263.) In the instant case, appellant failed to object to the admission of the letter at trial and failed to allege error in a post-trial motion. In so doing, appellant did not preserve the issue of the letter\u2019s admissibility for appeal.\nNotwithstanding appellant\u2019s waiver of this issue, we will consider the admissibility of the letter into evidence in response to appellant\u2019s argument that trial counsel\u2019s failure to object to its admission amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.\nIn People v. Robinson (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 192, 195, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s convictions for rape, armed robbery and deviate sexual assault. The defendant argued that the victim\u2019s statement, entered into evidence through the testimony of other witnesses, did not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule and was therefore inadmissible hearsay. (Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 199.) Defendant argued that the admission of the statement constituted reversible error.\nThis court agreed that the hearsay statement should not have been admitted, but held that the hearsay revelations concerning the crime and the identity of the assailant did not amount to reversible error. (Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 200.) This court observed that there was no fact introduced by the State which was not later corroborated by the complainant\u2019s testimony. (Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 200.) We conclude the same in the instant case.\nIn her brief to this court, appellant argues that complainant testified that the motive for the sexual assault by appellant and codefendant was that appellant was unable to have sexual intercourse with codefendant as a result of a back injury. Appellant notes that complainant\u2019s letter, however, states that appellant and codefendant engaged in intercourse at the time of the crimes, thereby contradicting complainant\u2019s testimony.\nWe note initially that appellant fails to indicate in her brief that the testimony regarding appellant\u2019s inability to have sex with codefendant pertained to an entirely separate sexual assault that occurred in May 1984 and was introduced at appellant\u2019s sentencing hearing. Complainant\u2019s letter, on the other hand, recounted the sexual assault which is the basis for appellant\u2019s conviction and which took place in April 1984. Complainant\u2019s testimony therefore does not contradict her handwritten letter.\nAssuming that the letter did indeed conflict with the portion of complainant\u2019s testimony pertaining to the condition of appellant\u2019s back, we fail to see how this fact would support appellant\u2019s claim that she was prejudiced by the letter\u2019s admission. To the contrary, to the extent the letter is inconsistent with the State\u2019s motive theory in this case, the letter\u2019s admission helped rather than prejudiced appellant\u2019s defense.\nWe further note admission of the letter did not constitute reversible error because, with the possible exception of the alleged conflict pertaining to the condition of appellant\u2019s back, the facts set forth in the letter were corroborated by complainant\u2019s testimony. (See Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 200.) Furthermore, appellant was able to cross-examine the maker of the hearsay statement. As this court observed in Robinson, \u201c[ajside from the unsworn and sometimes cumulative nature of hearsay evidence, *** the main rationale underlying its exclusion, is the opposing party\u2019s inability to test the real value of the testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to cross-examination.\u201d (Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 200.) In the instant case, defense counsel had an opportunity to and did in fact cross-examine complainant. We therefore find no reversible error in the admission of the letter.\nWe turn now to appellant\u2019s claim that she was denied effective assistance of counsel under the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that trial counsel\u2019s performance \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) To establish this first prong, a defendant must do more than make a general, conclusory allegation of ineffectiveness. Rather, the defendant must identify with specificity \u201cthe acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.) Furthermore, the defendant must overcome the \u201cstrong presumption\u201d that the tactics used by counsel were \u201cwithin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.\nThe second prong of the Strickland test requires that a defendant demonstrate that \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.\nIn the instant case, appellant has presented us with a myriad of allegations and conclusions regarding counsel\u2019s performance. With few exceptions, however, appellant has failed to identify the specific acts or omissions which \u201care alleged not to have been the result of *** professional judgment.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.) For example, appellant argues that trial counsel \u201centirely failed to subject the prosecution\u2019s ease to meaningful adversarial testing\u201d and that \u201ctrial counsel *** objected not often enough,\u201d objecting \u201ca grand total of six times.\u201d Neither allegation is supported by references to specific instances where trial counsel should have acted differently. As such, neither of appellant\u2019s allegations establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.\nAppellant makes a number of other unsubstantiated allegations of ineffectiveness. We need not discuss the merits of each of these individual allegations other than to note that, as with the two examples cited above, appellant fails to support her allegations with any specific instances where counsel should have acted differently. Instead, we will address only those few instances in which appellant\u2019s claim of ineffectiveness is made with any specificity.\nAppellant argues that counsel\u2019s failure to object to the admission of complainant\u2019s letter was prejudicial to her defense. Because we have already concluded that admission of the letter, if questioned at all, did not amount to reversible error, we find no merit in appellant\u2019s claim. Likewise, our conclusion that the contents of complainant\u2019s letter were merely cumulative evidence disposes of appellant\u2019s claim that the fact trial counsel was unaware of the existence of the letter was an impairment of her right to effective assistance of counsel. Although we agree that a thorough preparation for trial includes familiarity with a case file, we do not believe that because trial counsel in the instant case was unfamiliar with and claimed never to have seen complainant\u2019s letter prior to trial, appellant\u2019s defense received ineffective assistance of counsel. As we noted above, there was nothing contained in complainant\u2019s letter that was not repeated in her testimony. Even if he had been aware of the letter\u2019s contents well in advance of the trial, counsel would not have had any new evidence that would or could have changed the outcome of the trial. Moreover, complainant testified to the contents of the letter and was available for and was in fact cross-examined by trial counsel. (See Robinson, 73 Ill. 2d at 200.) Appellant\u2019s claim, therefore, is without merit.\nWith regard to appellant\u2019s exception to counsel\u2019s general failure to object to testimony and evidence (\u201cCounsel\u2019s *** 10-page cross examination *** [is] indicative of his ineffective assistance\u201d), we note that effective advocacy is not measured by the number of objections raised or the number of pages of cross-examination. Appellant\u2019s argument that the sheer number of objections reveals counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness is without merit.\nAppellant argues that trial counsel should have objected to the reference in the State\u2019s closing argument to appellant and codefendant\u2019s plan to open an out-of-State business. Trial counsel objected to the reference at trial, which objection was sustained. We conclude that trial counsel\u2019s failure to repeat the objection during the State\u2019s closing argument had no prejudicial effect on appellant\u2019s defense, given the collateral nature of the matter on the issue before the trial court.\nAppellant argues that trial counsel\u2019s failure to call appellant\u2019s daughter, Tanya Bergen, as a defense witness was another example of trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness. Complainant testified that immediately after being sexually assaulted by appellant and codefendant, she told Tanya what had just taken place. Complainant testified that \u201c T told [Tanya] what happened and she didn\u2019t believe me.\u2019 \u201d Appellant argues that trial counsel should have had Tanya testify as a defense witness based on complainant\u2019s testimony that \u201cTanya thought [complainant] was a liar.\u201d Complainant did not in fact testify that Tanya thought she was \u201ca liar.\u201d Complainant\u2019s testimony that Tanya did not believe her story may have simply been Tanya\u2019s understandable incredulity at the nature of the crimes, especially in light of the fact that complainant was alleging the crimes were committed by Tanya\u2019s parents. We are in no way persuaded that trial counsel\u2019s failure to call Tanya as a witness was evidence of his ineffectiveness and therefore conclude that this is another of appellant\u2019s unsubstantiated arguments.\nAppellant argues that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine complainant through the use of leading questions. While use of leading questions is allowed and, in fact, may be expected in examining a witness on cross-examination, and while this technique may lend control to the attorney examining the witness, we must presume that trial counsel\u2019s failure to exercise this style of questioning was a result of \u201csound trial strategy.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.) Appellant has failed to overcome this presumption. Likewise, we conclude that the fact trial counsel chose not to use .complainant\u2019s letter as a source of impeachment, which appellant cites as an example of ineffective assistance of counsel, was a reasonable defensive tactic. Other than the alleged inconsistency between complainant\u2019s testimony and the letter concerning appellant\u2019s ability to have sex with codefendant, we fail to find examples of where the contents of the letter in fact impeached complainant\u2019s testimony.\nAppellant\u2019s next argument is that trial counsel should have introduced evidence in the form of testimony from complainant\u2019s seventh- and eighth-grade teachers saying that complainant was an \u201cinveterate liar.\u201d Appellant bases this argument upon the fact that two letters were introduced at appellant\u2019s sentencing hearing on December 30, 1987, in which complainant\u2019s seventh- and eighth-grade teachers spoke about complainant\u2019s behavior at school. As we shall explain, we conclude that such testimony would have been inadmissible.\nA witness in a criminal case may be impeached by proof of reputation for untruthfulness. (People v. Nash (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 275; People v. Melnick (1916), 274 Ill. 616; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7608.2 (5th ed. 1990).) In all cases, the proper procedure to introduce evidence of truthfulness is to ask the witness whether he knows the general reputation of the defendant\u2019s truthfulness in the neighborhood in which the defendant lives or at his workplace. (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7608.3 (5th ed. 1990).) Where a trait of character, such as truthfulness, is at issue, opinion testimony is not permitted. (People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 494; People v. Willy (1921), 301 Ill. 307; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7405.2 (5th ed. 1990).) The letters introduced at the sentencing hearing are the opinions of only the individual teachers. There is nothing in the contents of either letter to indicate that complainant\u2019s character for truthfulness was ever discussed between the two teachers or among any of complainant\u2019s other teachers. Clearly, testimony from these teachers as to their opinion of complainant\u2019s character for truthfulness would not have been allowed at trial. Accordingly, we reject appellant\u2019s claim that trial counsel\u2019s failure to introduce this evidence impaired her defense.\nIn her brief to this court, appellant states that \u201ccounsel also suggested during his cross-examination of [complainant] that a hospital examination proved she had not been penetrated, but [trial counsel] failed to produce any supporting medical records or hospital personnel. Inasmuch as these records were readily discoverable and may have affected the outcome of the case, counsel\u2019s failure to produce them cannot be easily or cavalierly dismissed.\u201d Appellant argues that trial counsel\u2019s failure to produce these records resulted in prejudicial error. Appellant\u2019s argument is based on the assumptions that (1) the records and personnel exist and that (2) examination of the records and testimony by the hospital personnel would corroborate appellant\u2019s claims that complainant was not sexually molested. Appellant fails to demonstrate, however, that there are either hospital records or personnel indicating that complainant had not been penetrated. (See People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 128, 167.) Because appellant has not proven otherwise, this court can only assume that trial counsel\u2019s failure to produce such evidence was because the evidence does not exist.\nAppellant argues that trial counsel erred by failing to seek a severance. In fact, appellant argues that trial counsel\u2019s failure to recognize that a conflict existed between the interests of appellant and codefendant was itself an example of counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness. We reject what is essentially an argument that counsel\u2019s failure to recognize the conflict was per se ineffectiveness; we cannot assume that trial counsel did not make a motion for severance because he did not recognize a potential conflict. We will indulge the presumption, which appellant has failed to overcome, that counsel\u2019s actions were part of a \u201c \u2018sound trial strategy\u2019 \u201d (see People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248, 260, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 294-95,104 S. Ct. at 2065).\nMoreover, appellant neglects to indicate on what basis trial counsel should have made a motion for severance. Both appellant and codefendant testified at trial and denied that they were involved in any sexual misconduct with complainant. Their defenses, therefore, were compatible and we believe that it was a sound trial strategy to present the defenses of the two jointly (\u201c \u2018[a] common defense *** gives strength against a common attack\u2019 \u201d (Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17, quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 100 S. Ct. at 1718)). If appellant believes there is a reason other than conflict of interests for which a severance should have been sought, she has failed to indicate the reason and we are unable to discern one from the record.\nAppellant argues that trial counsel should have made a motion to suppress codefendant\u2019s pretrial statement. Codefendant made a confession of the crimes recounted by complainant and indicated that appellant had participated in the events in substantially the same manner as complainant had stated.\nAppellant adopted codefendant\u2019s statement in an oral admission to the police and both the statement and appellant\u2019s admission were introduced into evidence at trial. At trial, appellant repudiated her admission, as did codefendant during his testimony.\nAppellant cites to no evidence, other than codefendant\u2019s uncorroborated testimony that his confession was coerced, that there was a basis for trial counsel to have sought to have appellant or codefendant\u2019s pretrial statements suppressed. (See People v. Hall (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 376.) Appellant wholly fails to demonstrate the merits of a motion to suppress, and we are unable to derive any from the record before us. Appellant has therefore failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial would have been different had counsel moved to have codefendant\u2019s pretrial statement suppressed.\nWe therefore reject appellant\u2019s claim that she was denied effective assistance of counsel under Strickland. For the foregoing reasons we affirm the appellate court\u2019s decision which affirmed appellant\u2019s conviction in the circuit court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary Ravitz, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald and Gayle L. Terry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 68876.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. EMMALINE WILLIAMS et al. (Emmaline Williams, Appellant).\nOpinion filed September 26, 1990.\nRehearing denied November 30, 1990.\nGary Ravitz, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald and Gayle L. Terry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 11, "last_page_order": 33 }