{ "id": 3238152, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PRIMITIVO RIVERA, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rivera", "decision_date": "1990-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 69690", "first_page": "528", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 528" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ill. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2426298 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267-68" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587730 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469128 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524574 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2583790 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ga. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 18516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/60/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Cal. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 2345975 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/75/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 P. 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 9746, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.22383782585142e-08, "percentile": 0.38492359979288365 }, "sha256": "24c2a94d7ecd5033b58acb6eada3e3f5d52d6c73a55d9fa9bbca313824ae8cb7", "simhash": "1:b304f83bccc026d1", "word_count": 1685 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:32.293529+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PRIMITIVO RIVERA, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Primitivo Rivera, was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County of possession of a stolen motor vehicle under section 4 \u2014 103 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 4\u2014 103) and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant did not possess or obtain exclusive control over the automobile, as the statute requires for the commission of the offense. (191 Ill. App. 3d 977.) We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe criminal charge stemmed from an occurrence on the late evening of November 19, 1985. On that evening, Officer Victor Rivera (no relation to the defendant) of the Chicago police department who was on patrol approached a used car lot on North Western Avenue in Chicago. Evidence at trial showed that the car dealership had been closed since 7 p.m. and that the car lot was unlighted. Officer Rivera saw a blue Oldsmobile without lights being driven through the car lot. As he watched, the car was driven into a cable that extended between two poles at the entrance to the lot. The cable did not break and the car was not driven from the lot. Because the cable was caught between the grill and the bumper, the car could not be moved. Officer Rivera approached the car and asked the driver, the defendant, what he was doing in the car. The defendant replied that he had permission of the owner to move the car and when asked whether the owner was on the lot, the defendant said, \u201cNo.\u201d At this point, Officer Rivera placed the defendant under arrest.\nAt the police station, Officer Rivera called Vincent Burba, the owner of the car lot who stated that he had not given the defendant permission to drive or to move the car.\nDuring the day on November 19, 1985, the defendant had come to the car lot and had talked to Burba about buying the blue Oldsmobile but left without purchasing the car. At 7 p.m., Burba closed his office and placed the cable across the entrance to the lot.\nOfficer Rivera and Burba were the witnesses at the trial at which the defendant was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. As stated, the appellate court reversed the conviction holding that the State had not established that the defendant had obtained exclusive possession of the car or that he took or carried away the car. It considered that since the security cable did not break and the defendant did not remove the car from the owner\u2019s lot, the owner did not relinquish control or possession of the car.\nThe State argues that the appellate court erred in holding that the car was not stolen. It argues that this court explained the definitions of \u201cpossession\u201d and \u201cstolen\u201d in People v. Lardner (1921), 300 Ill. 264, and cites People v. Davenport (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 142, and People v. Robinson (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 131, to support its contention that a car is stolen under section 4 \u2014 103(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 103(a)(1)) when it is moved without the owner\u2019s permission from the place where the owner parked it. The State stresses that there is no requirement in the statute that under the circumstances here a car must be driven off of the owner\u2019s premises in order to be stolen and that the cable did not prevent the defendant from exercising exclusive control over the car as he, without the owner's consent, drove it through the car lot.\nThe defendant responds that the appellate court correctly held that a theft necessitates a \u201ctaking,\u201d which requires complete physical control by the offender so that there is a complete severance from the possession of the owner.\nThe State argues that the owner\u2019s possession of the car was severed when the defendant moved the car from where it had been parked. Though the defendant did not drive the car off the lot, he possessed the car for an appreciable amount of time without the owner\u2019s permission.\nThe defendant was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Under section 4 \u2014 103 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, it is a violation for one \u201cnot entitled to the possession of a vehicle *** to receive, possess, *** or transfer it, knowing it to have been stolen or converted.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 103.) The defendant\u2019s conviction was for the possession of the motor vehicle he drove through Burba\u2019s lot.\nA person commits theft when he knowingly \u201c[obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a); People v. Cramer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 92, 100.) The provision \u201c \u2018obtains or exerts control\u2019 over property\u201d is defined as including \u201cthe taking, carrying away, *** or possession of property.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 15 \u2014 8; see People v. Soskins (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 564, 570.) This court has held that, when one takes personal property and secretes it from the owner, he is exercising complete and exclusive control over it, and the fact that his possession is brief and that the article is not taken from the owner\u2019s premises is not material. (People v. Baker (1936), 365 Ill. 328, 332; Lardner, 300 Ill. 264 (the defendant took handbags from a showcase, concealed them in his coat, was confronted by a sales person, and left the coat in the store; held: completed theft); see also 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, \u00a78.2(i), at 345 (1986) (\u201cOne may be said to have taken another\u2019s property *** though he has not removed it from the other\u2019s premises or from his presence\u201d).) This court has held that \u201c[a]ny change of location whereby complete control of the article is transferred from the true owner to the thief is sufficient evidence of the taking away.\u201d Lardner, 300 Ill. at 267-68, citing Lundy v. State (1878), 60 Ga. 143.\nAs stated, the fact that the article is not taken from the owner\u2019s premises is immaterial. (Baker, 365 Ill. at 332.) The defendant exercised exclusive control over the car when he got in the car, started it, and drove it through the lot.\nThe elements of theft include a \u201cfelonious taking by which the owner is deprived of possession and the thief acquires such possession for an appreciable period of time, although it may be only for a moment.\u201d (Baker, 365 Ill. at 332; Lardner, 300 Ill. at 266.) Where a thief, having taken possession of the property with intent to steal, \u201ctakes property from the place where it is regularly kept[,] the crime is complete though he is detected and stopped before the goods are actually carried from the owner\u2019s premises.\u201d (Baker, 365 Ill. at 332.) This is true even if \u201ca thief, being discovered in the very act of taking, immediately abandons or returns the thing [he is accused if stealing].\u201d Lardner, 300 Ill. at 267.\nIn Lardner, the court observed too: \u201cIf an article is secured by a string or chain which is not broken there is no taking which will constitute [theft].\u201d (Lardner, 300 Ill. at 268.) The court referred also to People v. Meyer (1888), 75 Cal. 383, 17 P. 431, where it was held that the owner\u2019s possession was not severed when the defendant grabbed a coat displayed and chained to a mannequin. The defendant argues that a string or chain can preserve the owner\u2019s possession of the property and states, as the appellate court reasoned, that the security cable served as a string or chain to the owner\u2019s possession. The comparison is not apt because here the owner\u2019s possession was not unbroken. The defendant took complete though unauthorized control of the car by getting in it, starting it, and driving it through the car lot without the owner\u2019s permission. It can be seen from this court\u2019s above-cited decisions that this action of the defendant satisfied the requirements of theft. It cannot be said that the owner retained control of the car. The security cable did not serve as a chain to Burba\u2019s possession of the car; it simply prevented the defendant from driving off with it.\nThe defendant argues that he did not violate section 4 \u2014 103(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 4\u2014 103(a)(1)) (possession of a stolen motor vehicle) because he did not possess the car. He contends that the security cable made it physically impossible for him to divest Burba of possession of the car. What we have already said, rejecting the defendant\u2019s contention that there was no theft, applies to reject the claim that the defendant was not in possession of the car.\nTo be convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the State must establish that the defendant, without permission, possessed the owner\u2019s car knowing it to have been stolen. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 103(a)(1).) Here, the defendant got into the car, started it, and drove it around the car lot without permission from Burba. The testimony of the owner, Burba, that he did not give permission to the defendant to use the auto was uncontradicted.\nFor the reasons given, the appellate court\u2019s judgment is reversed, and the circuit court judgment is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Gael O\u2019Brien, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.", "Brian M. Collins, of Magee, Collins & Lodge, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 69690.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PRIMITIVO RIVERA, Appellee.\nOpinion filed November 30, 1990.\nRehearing denied February 4,1991.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Gael O\u2019Brien, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nBrian M. Collins, of Magee, Collins & Lodge, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0528-01", "first_page_order": 538, "last_page_order": 544 }