{ "id": 3236590, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. FREDDIE GONZALEZ, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gonzalez", "decision_date": "1991-02-22", "docket_number": "No. 69372", "first_page": "481", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 481" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965476 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692666 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568-69", "parenthetical": "Quinlan, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607662 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535572 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535418 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070111 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984278 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589139 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560345 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298852 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d, 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588761 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937684 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971537 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228677 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 834, "char_count": 18838, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.332703411645143e-07, "percentile": 0.9686661268668559 }, "sha256": "eb19e8a1e9daacf892d44b2dbdb5407b936271cbe4cd4bf5ed8e54201cdd1267", "simhash": "1:7a24b7217348f94b", "word_count": 3080 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:01:40.347119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. FREDDIE GONZALEZ, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Freddie Gonzalez, was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery, violations of sections 18 \u2014 1 and 12 \u2014 4(b)(8), respectively, of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 4(b)(8), 18 \u2014 1). The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 41/z years\u2019 imprisonment for the offenses. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the defendant\u2019s convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. (188 Ill. App. 3d 559.) We allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBefore trial, the defendant made an oral motion in limine to exclude any testimony suggesting his involvement with street gangs. The trial judge ruled that such evidence would be admissible for the limited purpose of showing the circumstances leading to the defendant\u2019s identification as the offender and his subsequent arrest.\nAt trial, the victim, 17-year-old Jose Asia, testified that during the afternoon of September 4, 1986, he was riding his bicycle in the vicinity of 3100 West Belden in Chicago when he noticed a group of boys nearby. The victim knew that the youths were members of the Spanish Cobra street gang because he had previously lived in the neighborhood and on other occasions had heard them shout gang slogans to passers-by. The victim also testified that the youths were gathered in front of the gang\u2019s headquarters, a burned-out building that had the gang\u2019s symbols painted on it.\nThe victim was a short distance from the other youths when the defendant, who approached from behind, grabbed the handlebars of the bicycle. The defendant declared, \u201cThis is my bike,\u201d and threatened to hit the victim if he did not surrender the bicycle. When the victim failed to comply, the defendant punched the victim in the left eye and on the forehead. The defendant then took the bicycle and left. At trial, the victim estimated that his confrontation with the defendant lasted about one minute; he did not recall testifying at the preliminary hearing that the confrontation lasted 5 to 10 minutes.\nThe victim notified the police and provided a description of the age, height, weight, and clothing of the assailant, a male Hispanic. The victim also told police that he believed that the offender was a member of the Spanish Cobra street gang. The next day. at the police station, the victim identified the defendant from an album containing photographs of 75 to 100 Spanish Cobra gang members.\nThe defendant was taken into custody several days later by police officer Daniel Noon, a gang crime investigator. Officer Noon testified that the defendant, at the time of his arrest, asked whether the officer was \u201c \u2018looking for me for that robbery where I took that kid\u2019s bike[?]\u2019 \u201d In subsequent questioning, the defendant again admitted to Noon that he had taken the victim\u2019s bicycle. The defendant said that he kept the bicycle for several days and then gave it to a member of another street gang. The defendant denied striking the victim. Officer Noon testified that he made a summary of the defendant\u2019s admissions but did not take a formal statement from the defendant.\nAt trial, the defendant challenged the reliability of the victim\u2019s identification of him as the offender. In support of that contention, the defendant presented the parties\u2019 stipulation that a court reporter would testify that during the preliminary hearing the victim described the confrontation as lasting 5 or 10 minutes. The defendant also presented the testimony of a police officer that the victim was hysterical following the confrontation and that the officer did not believe that the victim had told him the hair color and eye color of the offender.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of robbery and aggravated battery, and the defendant appealed. A divided appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. (188 111. App. 3d 559.) The majority determined that the evidence of street-gang activity was irrelevant and, furthermore, that certain comments about gangs made by the prosecutor in closing argument denied the defendant a fair trial. The dissenting justice believed that the evidence of gang affiliation was correctly admitted for its limited purpose, and that any error in the prosecution\u2019s closing argument was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt. 188 Ill. App. 3d at 568-69 (Quinlan, J., dissenting).\nWe first consider whether the gang-related evidence was properly admitted for the limited purpose of showing the circumstances surrounding the victim\u2019s identification of the defendant, and the defendant\u2019s eventual arrest. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (People v. Eyler (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 173, 218; People v. Monroe (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 317, 322; see also People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 372 (evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible if relevant).) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 217; Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d at 322.\nAt trial, the reliability of the victim\u2019s identification of the defendant as the offender was the central issue in the case. The accuracy of the victim\u2019s description of the assailant and the incident was certainly of consequence to this determination. To the extent that the gang-related evidence strengthened the victim\u2019s identification testimony, the evidence was relevant. See People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365 (evidence of gang membership relevant as probative of the defendant\u2019s identification); People v. McMurray (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134 (same).\nThe challenged evidence was also relevant as part of the narrative describing the events leading to the defendant\u2019s identification and arrest. (See People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 170, 194; People v. Walls (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 394, 397; People v. Marose (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 340, 343.) In light of the victim\u2019s description of his assailant and the incident, the police produced a book containing photographs of Spanish Cobra gang members, from which the victim positively identified the defendant as his attacker. In this way the police narrowed the search for the offender. Within four days of the incident, Officer Noon, a gang crime investigator, was able to locate and arrest the defendant, who then confessed to having taken the victim\u2019s bicycle. The gang-related evidence was relevant to the jury\u2019s consideration of the steps in the investigation, and of the circumstances culminating in the defendant\u2019s arrest as the offender.\nThe defendant further asserts that whatever probative value the evidence had was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In support of this contention, the defendant notes the widespread disapproval that exists toward street gangs. (See People v. Parrott (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 328, 331.) Although it is true that gangs are regarded with considerable disfavor, gang-related evidence will not necessarily be excluded if it is otherwise relevant and admissible. (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 372; People v. Anderson (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 542, 549-50; People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 641.) As the appellate court has noted, \u201cAn accused may not insulate the trier of fact from his gang membership where it is relevant to a determination of the case, simply because prejudice attaches to that revelation.\u201d People v. Rivera (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 609, 618.\nIt is the function of the trial court to weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence in determining whether it should be admitted. (Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 218; People v. Shum (1988), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 353; People v. Greer (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 103, 117.) In the present case, the trial judge acknowledged the potential prejudicial effect the evidence might have. The judge apparently believed, however, that the defendant\u2019s concerns were overstated. For example, the judge considered that the police book containing photographs of Spanish Cobra gang members was \u201ca most fair identification book.\u201d The judge also noted that excluding evidence that the book contained only photographs of gang members could lead the jury to believe that the victim identified the defendant from a police book containing photographs of individuals with prior arrests. Emphasizing the balancing process involved, the judge determined that the gang-related evidence was admissible for the' purpose of showing \u201cthe procedures and circumstances leading to the arrest and identification of the defendant, not for any other purposes, not for showing he is a bad person or something.\u201d\nEvidentiary rulings of this nature will not be overturned on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. (People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 353; Greer, 79 Ill. 2d at 117.) Here, the trial judge carefully balanced the probative value of the evidence against the prejudice it might engender and determined that the evidence was admissible. Under the circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion.\nWe next consider whether certain portions of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument denied the defendant a fair trial. The appellate court, having determined that the gang-related evidence was improperly admitted, found additional error in several comments relating to the evidence made by the prosecutor during his closing argument. Before this court, the defendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks afford an additional ground for granting him a new trial. The State asserts that the challenged comments were either based on properly admitted evidence or invited by defense counsel\u2019s own argument to the jury.\nIn closing argument, the following exchange took place:\n\u201c[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: He gives the police a description, a physical description, a clothing description and he tells him, I think he belongs or I think he is a Spanish Cobra. And he explains to you why he made that statement.\nHere\u2019s a young man who grew up in the neighborhood, who spent his summer there because that is where all his friends are and he knows about this particular group, the Spanish Cobras, and again use your common sense. These kids that live in the neighborhood where these groups hang out know about these groups.- They know what they do, what they represent and the signs they use and the graffiti and the hassle they put up with every day.\n[Defense Attorney]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: That is sustained. The last comment, the hassle they put up with every day, the jury is instructed to disregard that.\u201d\nWe find that these were proper comments on the evidence of the victim\u2019s familiarity with the neighborhood and the Spanish Cobra gang, information that had assisted in narrowing the search for the offender. Furthermore, we do not consider that the defendant could have been prejudiced by the brief reference to \u201chassle,\u201d assuming that the remark was error, for the trial judge sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection and admonished the jury to disregard the comment. Such action is normally sufficient to cure an error in argument to the jury. See People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30.\nThe appellate court found error in several additional comments, to which the defendant did not object at trial. The prosecutor remarked to the jury, \u201cWe don\u2019t live in a vacuum in this city. You know what happens in the streets of the city.\u201d He also stated that the police investigator, Officer Noon, \u201cknew he had this information that this person may have been a Spanish Cobra and lo and behold, he is a Spanish Cobra. He was picked out of the book. He is brought in and he admits to it.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s failure to make a contemporaneous objection to these comments would generally operate as a waiver of any error in relation to them (People v. Harris (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 366, 386), unless the comments were so improper that they constituted plain error (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); see People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-78). We do not believe that the prosecutor\u2019s ambiguous reference to \u201cwhat happens in the streets of the city\u201d was so inflammatory that it denied the defendant a fair trial. (See People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 518.) The prosecutor\u2019s remark concerning the description and subsequent identification of the defendant as a Spanish Cobra gang member was not error, for it was based on properly admitted evidence and was used for the purpose for which the evidence was admitted.\nFinally, the prosecutor made several remarks in closing argument that emphasized the victim\u2019s courage in testifying against the defendant. The comments are as follows:\n\u201c[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Counsel has just got through telling you it is not a gang case. Well, let me tell you this. It took a lot of guts for Jose to get on that stand and face this man and say he did\u2014\n[Defense Attorney]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\n* * *\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Why would [the defendant] say that to the police officers that he has committed this robbery. Maybe he didn\u2019t think Jose. Asia would be here. Maybe he didn\u2019t think he would testify.\n[Defense Attorney]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\n* * *\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Based on the overwhelming evidence in this case, the fact that Jose had the guts to come in here and testify.\n[Defense Attorney]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: That is sustained.\u201d\nThe defendant argues that the comments on the victim\u2019s courage in testifying improperly suggested that gangs often attempt to intimidate witnesses. The State asserts that the comments were invited by defense counsel\u2019s own argument that the prosecution was attempting to \u201cshift over and say this is a gang case\u201d and was suggesting that \u201c[m]aybe [the jury] should convict the defendant because he may be a member of a gang.\u201d In addition, defense counsel argued in closing that the defendant denied making inculpatory statements to the police and that it was for the jury to determine if the police officer testified truthfully about the defendant\u2019s two admissions. The State contends that defense counsel\u2019s remarks invited the prosecutor to comment in rebuttal that the defendant made the inculpatory statements because he thought that the victim would not testify against him.\nWe agree with the defendant that it would be improper for the prosecutor to take advantage of the admission of evidence by ostensibly offering it for a limited purpose and, once it was admitted, making impermissible use of it in closing argument. (See People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 516; People v. Buckner (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 391.) Here, the prosecutor\u2019s comments on the victim\u2019s courage in testifying might have led the jury to consider the gang-related evidence for a purpose beyond that for which it was admitted. The trial judge\u2019s rulings on the objections to the prosecutor\u2019s remarks clearly expressed the court\u2019s view that the remarks were improper and should not be continued. Although prosecutorial indifference to the admonitions of the trial court must be discouraged, that task is generally accomplished through avenues other than the present appeal. (See United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 103 S. Ct. 1974.) The question before us here is whether the alleged errors denied the defendant a fair trial.\nThe record in this case demonstrates that the prosecutor\u2019s comments on the victim\u2019s courage in testifying did not deny the defendant a fair trial. The trial judge sustained the defendant\u2019s objections to the comments and ruled that the references were improper. It is well established that \u201calthough the prejudicial effect of an improper argument cannot always be erased from the minds of the jurors by an admonishment from the court [citation], the act of promptly sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to disregard such argument has usually been viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice. [Citations.]\u201d People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30. See also People v. Lucas (1989), 132 Ill. 2d, 399, 437-38.\nMoreover, in the present case the trial judge expressly stated the view that his rulings on the defendant\u2019s objections were sufficient to cure the alleged error. When the issue was raised in the defendant\u2019s post-trial motion, the trial judge explained that his rulings sustaining the objections were made in such a way that \u201cthe jury clearly got the message that they were to disregard [the comments].\u201d The judge also stated that he could not \u201cimagine that this jury would be influenced by the closing arguments in light of the evidence in this particular case.\u201d Because the trial court is generally in a better position than a court of review to determine the prejudicial effect, if any, of comments made during closing argument, its ruling will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion. See People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 172, 176; see also People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 114, 121 (Ryan, J., dissenting).\nThe evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt in the present case was overwhelming. The victim\u2019s identification of the defendant was clear and unequivocal; the defendant made an unprompted admission when he was arrested, and he later gave the police an additional statement admitting that he had taken the victim\u2019s bicycle. In addition, the jury was instructed that statements made in closing argument do not constitute evidence. On this record, we do not believe that any of the alleged errors in the prosecutor\u2019s argument could have denied the defendant a fair trial. See People v. Turner (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 540, 564; People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 276.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund, Walter P. Hehner and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Defender, of counsel, and Caroline J. Smith, law student), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 69372.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. FREDDIE GONZALEZ, Appellee.\nOpinion filed February 22, 1991.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Inge Fryklund, Walter P. Hehner and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Defender, of counsel, and Caroline J. Smith, law student), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0481-01", "first_page_order": 491, "last_page_order": 504 }