{ "id": 5591965, "name": "RAMONA GONZALEZ, Adm'r of the Estate of Juanita Caraveo, Appellant, v. THOREK HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, a Corporation, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Gonzalez v. Thorek Hospital & Medical Center", "decision_date": "1991-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 69144", "first_page": "28", "last_page": "43", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 28" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543409 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549593 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564696 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5539451 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "281-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188600 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567341 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Ill. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3197411 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/180/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2657240 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "Jiganti, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "Jiganti, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0648-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 921, "char_count": 22715, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3416348839735502e-07, "percentile": 0.6314149975539114 }, "sha256": "c770e4374805c1bca0f66db9465e4f5f22792ae800c3a26979e09dfe33572281", "simhash": "1:3ff7555ac144c0b0", "word_count": 3748 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:09:26.787690+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAMONA GONZALEZ, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Juanita Caraveo, Appellant, v. THOREK HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, a Corporation, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff\u2019s decedent was admitted to Thorek Hospital and Medical Center on June 14, 1982. She. died on February 15, 1983. On June 14, 1984, plaintiff, as administrator of decedent\u2019s estate, brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against Thorek and 14 of the hospital\u2019s physicians (1984 complaint). A copy of the 1984 complaint on file with the circuit court is attached as the appendix. Plaintiff failed to attempt or serve process on any of the defendants. On December 14, 1984, the trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action for want of prosecution.\nRelying on section 13 \u2014 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 217), plaintiff filed a new complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants on July 5, 1985 (1985 complaint). Section 13 \u2014 217 of the Code provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIn the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any other act or contract where the time for commencing an action is limited, if *** the action is dismissed for want of prosecution, *** then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff, his of her heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after *** the action is dismissed for want of prosecution ***.\u201d\nVarious defendants were immediately served while others were not served for over six months after the filing of the 1985 complaint. Defendants Honer, Abdelnurchawla, Nammohan, and Jones were never served with copies of the 1985 complaint.\nDefendant Thorek moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the 1985 complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than \u201ctwo years after the alleged occurrence\u201d which injured the plaintiff (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13-212). Although section 13 \u2014 217 of the Code grants a party the absolute right to commence a new action within one year after a dismissal for want of prosecution, defendants argued that the 1984 complaint did not contain the basic minimum requirements of a legally and factually sufficient complaint to toll the statute of limitations for the 1985 filing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 603(a), 2\u2014 604.) Defendants Odiaga, Stuebner and Chan joined in Thorek\u2019s motion, while defendants Silvetti, Forman, Hsu, Thampy, Kaminski, and Hernandez filed separate motions, to dismiss. The remaining defendants who were served took no action during the pendency of the matter in the trial court.\nOn July 14, 1986, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice of defendants Kaminski, Odiaga and Chan. Plaintiff sought to have the order vacated on December 10, 1986, which motion was denied by the trial court. Plaintiff also sought to have defendants Stuebner, Thampy, Silvetti, Forman and Hsu voluntarily dismissed with prejudice from the matter, which motion was granted in the trial court\u2019s December 10 order.\nIn response to the remaining defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, plaintiff also filed a supplemental memorandum of law on December 10. As part of her memorandum, plaintiff attached an affidavit in which her counsel stated that in 1984 she had prepared a 16-count complaint with the same caption as the 1984 complaint. The affiant attached a copy of the 16-count complaint to her affidavit, which complaint was substantially the same as the 1985 complaint. The affiant stated that she had no knowledge that any portion of the 1984 complaint was missing from the court file until defendant Thorek filed its motion to dismiss.\nOn January 8, 1987, the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion to voluntarily dismiss defendant Hernandez. On March 23, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss of defendants Thorek and Kaplan and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the trial court\u2019s previous dismissal of Drs. Kaminski, Chan, and Odiaga. It is from this order that plaintiff appeals.\nThe appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal with prejudice. (186 Ill. App. 3d 648.) The majority concluded that the complaint \u201c[did] not satisfy the minimum requirements of the Code\u201d and therefore was not a proper filing for purposes of the refiling statute or the relation-back doctrine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, pars. 13-217, 2 \u2014 616(b)). (186 Ill. App. 3d at 651.) Moreover, the appellate court concluded that \u201c[s]ince more than two years had elapsed after the alleged cause of action arose and the [filing of the 1985 complaint],\u201d the 1985 complaint would have been barred by the statute of limitations but for sections 13 \u2014 217 and 2 \u2014 616(b) of the Code. (186 Ill. App. 3d at 652.) The dissent concluded that there was enough information in which to relate the 1985 complaint to the 1984 complaint and that any deficiencies in the original complaint could be rectified by way of amendment. 186 Ill. App. 3d at 656 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).\nThe majority declined to consider the affidavit of plaintiff\u2019s counsel, in light of this court\u2019s decision in Gibbs v. Crane Elevator Co. (1899), 180 Ill. 191. In Gibbs, the plaintiff commenced his suit by filing a praecipe (writ) and service of summons. The suit was dismissed when plaintiff failed to timely file his declarations. Declarations are specifications of facts and circumstances describing the cause of action; they are the equivalent of the complaint in code pleading. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 367 (5th ed. 1979).\nAlthough the applicable statute of limitations had elapsed, the plaintiff in Gibbs refiled pursuant to paragraph 24 of chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes (the predecessor of section 13 \u2014 217), alleging that the new action was based upon the same facts as the first action. The defendant argued that no declarations had been filed before the first dismissal and therefore he was entitled to judgment.\nAfter reviewing the record in the original action, this court observed that there was \u201cno information as to the particular claim upon which [the original] suit was brought.\u201d (Gibbs, 180 Ill. at 194.) The praecipe or writ in the original action did not \u201cset out the cause of action,\u201d eliminating any way in which to determine whether the cause of . action in the refiling was the same as that intended in the first filing. Without identifying the cause of action sued upon in the first matter as the \u201csame identical cause of action\u201d for which the second action was brought, plaintiff was not entitled to the extension of time under paragraph 24. Gibbs, 180 Ill. at 194.\nThe plaintiff in Gibbs tried to supplement the record in the original filing with testimony that he had no other cause of action against the defendants except the one which existed at the time of bringing the first suit. In reaching a conclusion on the admissibility of evidence to prove the identity of the two actions, this court said the following:\n\u201cWhen the plaintiff avers that the cause of action in the first suit is the same as that declared upon in the present action and claims the right to prove it by parol testimony, he tenders no issue or fact capable of being proved on his part and disproved on the part of the defendants. Manifestly, his proof would be, in effect, that when he brought his first suit he intended it for the purpose of recovering damages for the same injuries averred in his present declaration. But that proof would be of nothing more than an intention on his part, \u2014 that is, that which rested in his own mind and known to no one else.\u201d Gibbs, 180 Ill. at 194-95.\nIn the present case, the trial court concluded that plaintiff was precluded from having the affidavit of her counsel considered in determining the sufficiency of the 1984 complaint in light of the Gibbs decision. In its order granting defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, the court stated that this court in Gibbs held that \u201cparol testimony is incompetent to establish the relationship between the first two actions; it rises or falls based on the allegations contained in the complaint.\u201d Similarly, the appellate court concluded that this court held that \u201cparol testimony is inadmissible to establish the identity of actions.\u201d (186 Ill. App. 3d at 653.) Thereafter, we granted plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R 315).\nThis court has, on many occasions, been called on to determine whether a cause of action has been sufficiently stated in a complaint. (See, e.g., Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 497; Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496; In re Beatty (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 489; Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 407.) As case law in this area indicates, it is impossible to formulate any simple methodology by which to make this determination. It is clear, however, that certain considerations are paramount. A flexible standard must be applied to the language of pleadings, since the Code requires that pleadings be liberally construed. The ultimate measure is one which facilitates the dispensation of substantial justice between the parties involved. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 603(c).\nIn the instant case, however, we are asked to resolve an issue that precedes even the fundamental concern of whether a cause of action has been stated in a litigant\u2019s pleadings. We are now asked to determine whether allegations in a complaint, conceded by both parties as insufficient to state a cause of action, are nonetheless sufficient to constitute a complaint. We hold that, in the instant case, the allegations in the 1984 complaint were sufficient to constitute a complaint and thereby tolled the statute of limitations for the 1985 complaint.\nThe requirement that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts to establish the cause of action under which he is proceeding has been established by this court in the context of a motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. This court has observed that if a plaintiff fails to allege in his complaint facts \u201cwhich are necessary to recover,\u201d he has failed to state a cause of action. (See, e.g., Con-dell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d at 510.) This standard is sufficiently stringent so as to require a party to plead the essential elements of an action if he is to survive an opposing party\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThis court\u2019s opinions on the sufficiency of facts alleging a cause of action have been grounded in the Code\u2019s requirement that pleadings shall contain a \u201cplain and concise statement\u201d of the cause of action advanced. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 603(a).) Likewise, we believe there is an analogous standard in the Code by which one can judge at what juncture pleadings that do not state a cause of action will be deemed \u201ctoo deficient\u201d to constitute a complaint. We believe, however, that a standard less stringent than that established for sufficiently stating a cause of action is indicated in the language and spirit of the Code.\nIn addition to requiring that pleadings contain a \u201cplain and concise statement\u201d of the action advanced, the Code requires that no pleading is to be considered bad in substance where it is composed of intelligible allegations and information which reasonably inform the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to counter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b).) In light of this provision, as well as the Code\u2019s admonishment that pleadings be \u201cliberally construed\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 603(c)), it is this court\u2019s opinion that a complaint can be considered sufficiently \"bad\u201d (that is, not a complaint) only where the opposing party is without any reasonable notice as to the facts or circumstances of the action advanced by the pleadings.\nWe believe this holding continues to adhere to and is compatible with this court\u2019s previously articulated rule that a complaint which fails to allege all the facts necessary for a plaintiff to recover fails to state a cause of action. We do not believe, as defendants urge us to, that pleadings which fail to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action do not constitute a complaint. Rather, we believe that a complaint is framed once facts are pled that reasonably inform the opposing party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to counter, no matter how inartfully or imprecisely that information is presented.\nPlaintiff urges this court not to adopt a rule whereby pleadings may be deemed too insufficient to constitute a complaint. If this determination is made after the limitations period expires and the pleadings are dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code, plaintiff argues, a party would be barred from amending the insufficient pleadings. Having determined that there was no complaint originally filed, there would be nothing for a party to amend and the expiration of the limitations period would prohibit a new filing.\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument, while persuasive, does not dissuade this court from the belief that. some \u2022 minimal standard must be established to determine the sufficiency of pleadings. Without some guidelines, any document will be given credence as a \u201ccomplaint\u201d if it is so styled by its drafter. We do not believe that section 13\u2014 217 suggests that plaintiffs may avoid the strictures of an applicable limitations period by filing a meaningless document to assure themselves of an extended filing period. The extension of the .applicable statute of limitations is afforded by section 13 \u2014 217 because the defendant already has had notice of litigation arising out of the same facts and circumstances. (Cf O\u2019Connell v. St. Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 273, 282.) To conclude otherwise would, essentially, provide a litigant with the means and opportunity to avoid complying with the applicable statute of limitations. We believe the standard announced by this court today comports with the Code\u2019s required liberal pleading construction without compromising the substantive requirement of fact pleading.\nIn the present case, we conclude that although there are not enough facts pled to state a cause of action, the 1984 complaint clearly contains intelligible allegations and information which would reasonably inform defendants of the nature of the claim or defense which they were called upon to counter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b).) As noted by the dissent below, although the 1984 complaint is \u201cadmittedly deficient,\u201d it is slightly more expansive than the majority would have one believe:\n\u201cThe complaint identifies Thorek Hospital and Medical Center and names the doctors as agents of the hospital. The [1984] complaint identifies the decedent as a person under the care of the hospital and of its employees. It states that it was the duty of the hospital, their agents and specifically the doctors to render medical care so as not to negligently cause injury to the decedent. It alleges that the decedent was in the exercise of ordinary care and free from contributory negligence. It states that on or about June 14, 1982, the decedent entered the hospital and entrusted herself entirely to the care of the defendant hospital and its employees.\u201d 186 Ill. App. 3d at 655 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).\nMoreover, we find that the 1984 complaint was clearly intended to allege medical malpractice. The original filing indicates that there was an injury to the decedent as a result of the admission to the hospital on June 14, 1982, and that the injury was a result of some conduct by the physicians and the hospital. The 1985 complaint realleges these facts and specifically charges defendants with certain acts of negligence. The second filing also includes a request for judgment in excess of $15,000. It is apparent that the two filings are for the same causes of action.\nAs an alternative ground upon which this court could affirm the opinion below, defendants argued for the first time in the appellate court and again in this court that the 1984 complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (107 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)). This issue, because it was not raised by the defendants in the trial court, was not properly preserved- for review on appeal. However, pursuant to this court\u2019s \u201cconstitutional authority to regulate the judicial system of Illinois,\u201d we will address the merits of this issue. O\u2019Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 281-82.\nRule 103(b) requires the exercise of reasonable diligence in obtaining service of process. Pursuant to the rule:\n\u201cIf the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the action as a whole or as to any unserved defendant may be dismissed without prejudice. If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service occurs after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be with prejudice. In either case the dismissal may be made on the application of any defendant or on the court\u2019s own motion.\u201d 107 Ill. 2d R. 103(b).\nIn the instant action, plaintiff\u2019s diligence in serving the 1984 complaint was not challenged by any of the defendants in their motions to dismiss the 1985 complaint. Defendants, however, were not on notice of the pendency of the 1984 complaint at any time during which the matter was in fact pending in the circuit court. Defendants were first placed on notice of the 1984 complaint when they were served with the 1985 complaint. The 1985 complaint was filed over six months after the 1984 complaint was dismissed and almost 13 months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.\nIn light of and consistent with the intent of this court\u2019s decisions in Martinez v. Erikson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 112, Muskat v. Sternberg (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 41, Catlett v. Novak (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 63, and O\u2019Connell, 112 Ill. 2d 273, we hold that on remand in further proceedings on this matter, the parties have not waived their right to raise this argument.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and the trial court\u2019s order of March 23, 1987, granting Thorek and Kaplan\u2019s motion to dismiss and denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the July 14, 1986, trial court order granting Chan, Odiaga, and Kaminski\u2019s motion to dismiss. We remand this cause to the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.\n. JUSTICES CALVO, BILANDIC and HEIPLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nCOMPLAINT AT L\u00bbV\nNow comes the Plaintiff, RAIMONA GONZALEZ, as Administrator of the Estate of JUAHItA CARAVEO, Deceased, by her attorneys, LOUIS S. GOLDSTEIN 1 ASSOCIATES, LTD., and complaining of the Defendants, THOREK HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, a corporation, DR. KAPLAN, DR. BONER, DR. I. ODRAGA, DR. CHAN, DR. FORMAN, DR. ABDELNURCHAWLA, DR. KAMINSKI, DR. HERNANDEZ, DR. NAMMOHAN, DR. HSU, DR. SILVETTI, DR. STUEBNER, DR. EVANS, DR. JONES and DR. T3AMPY, and each of then, states as follows:\nCOUNT :\n\u2022 \" 1) That during the years J9\u00cd2 \u25a0'\u2022n