{ "id": 5592370, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOHN SZABO, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Szabo", "decision_date": "1991-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 69284", "first_page": "525", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 525" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2480353 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574172 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139219 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201694 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229038 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690, 693" }, { "page": "695, 697" }, { "page": "2066, 2067" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102209 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172916 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106892 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 280", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177464 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "961" }, { "page": "2991" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172916 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "93-94" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93-94" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "99", "parenthetical": "Clark, C.J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106892 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0327-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 711, "char_count": 14246, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.433396728397356e-07, "percentile": 0.8022994776915565 }, "sha256": "38826281a31732f4ba7924a69fec24951f3831502d306b26ec805f2cc3a284df", "simhash": "1:aa7631ee6ccf9c53", "word_count": 2237 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:33.369201+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOHN SZABO, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, John Szabo, was indicted by a Will County grand jury on two counts of intentional murder, two counts of felony murder and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Following a July 1979 bench trial before the circuit court of Will County, defendant was found guilty on all counts. A jury sentenced defendant to death for the murders, and the court imposed an additional three-year sentence on the conspiracy charge.\nDefendant appealed to this court pursuant to article VI,\u2019 section 4(b), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a74(b)) and Supreme Court Rule 603 (73 Ill. 2d R. 603). This court vacated defendant\u2019s convictions and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for a determination as to whether a new trial was warranted. Defendant\u2019s death sentence was vacated due to errors at sentencing. (People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327.) On remand, defendant\u2019s convictions were reinstated and defendant was again sentenced to death. On direct appeal, these judgments were affirmed. People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83.\nIn September 1987, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that attorney David Landau had been prevented from rendering effective assistance of counsel to defendant due to disciplinary problems which led to Landau\u2019s subsequent disbarment. The petition also alleged the ineffective assistance of defendant\u2019s counsel at resentencing in 1984. Counsel was appointed to represent defendant on his pro se petition and informed the court that the defense would stand on the pro se petition. On March 10, 1989, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. The circuit court denied post-conviction relief on September 2, 1989, finding that Landau had provided effective assistance of counsel even though he had been the subject of complaints to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) during his representation of the defendant. The court further held that defendant had presented no evidence to substantiate the claim that resentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. This court granted review under Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)).\nDefendant first urges this court to grant him a new trial solely on the basis of Landau\u2019s problems with the ARDC. In support of his contention, defendant relies exclusively on People v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, in which this court ordered a new trial for a defendant whose trial counsel had been disbarred following an ARDC investigation which overlapped with defendant\u2019s trial. The Williams court characterized the facts as \u201cunique circumstances and sequence of events *** which will rarely, if ever, be duplicated.\u201d (93 Ill. 2d at 325.) We now hold that the Williams decision was an aberration peculiar to the facts of that case. The unique circumstances of Williams have not been duplicated here and we decline to follow its holding.\nNotwithstanding our view that Williams was a singular ruling, we note that the factual differences between the two cases are marked, and application of the Williams decision to the instant facts would be inappropriate. In Williams, the defendant offered \u201cnumerous instances of inaction by counsel to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.\u201d (93 Ill. 2d at 324.) This court\u2019s doubts about counsel\u2019s representation were accentuated by the burden of his simultaneous defense of three clients before two juries. (93 Ill. 2d at 325.) In the instant case, no effort was made to suggest ineffective assistance of counsel in either of the two previous appeals. Defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition includes only two brief paragraphs alleging Landau\u2019s deficient representation. The petition describes Landau\u2019s failure to call witnesses on petitioner\u2019s behalf, including petitioner himself, petitioner\u2019s father and \u201cother witnesses who could have impeached Leatherman\u2019s account of the crimes.\u201d Additionally, the petitioner alleges Landau\u2019s failure to investigate the State\u2019s expert witness.\nThese vague allegations do not compare favorably with the extensive list of alleged counsel errors in Williams, which included: the failure to make a motion to suppress physical- evidence crucial to the State\u2019s case; the failure to object to the testimony of numerous witnesses; the failure to object to information imparted to the jury concerning review of its verdict; and the failure to make a motion for a new trial. (93 Ill. 2d at 324.) The Williams decision resulted from numerous allegations of significant counsel error in conjunction with counsel\u2019s disciplinary problems. The instant case does not present a parallel set of facts.\nThe circumstances surrounding Landau\u2019s disbarment further illustrate the factual dissimilarities between Williams and the instant case. Landau undertook representation of defendant in March 1979 and represented him through trial in July 1979. ARDC records reflect that prior to July 1979, four complaints had been filed against counsel. Landau first appeared before the Inquiry Board on May 30, 1980, some 10 months after defendant\u2019s trial. At that time, numerous additional complaints had been received by the ARDC. Landau was eventually confronted with 78 complaints, 74 of which post-dated his representation of defendant. Landau subsequently requested that his name be removed from the roll of attorneys and was disbarred in November 1980. In contrast, counsel in Williams was the subject of disbarment proceedings at the time of the defendant\u2019s trial. Those proceedings were the result of counsel\u2019s misconduct in a matter predating the Williams case. 93 Ill. 2d at 314.\nThe standard for a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Strickland established a two-prong test for judging attorney performance: first, that counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; second, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (466 U.S. at 690, 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 2067.) The burden of proving prejudice rests with the defendant. (466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) This court adopted the Strickland standard in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504. Defendant has failed to meet the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance.\nThe record in the instant case reveals competent representation on defendant\u2019s behalf. Counsel engaged in extensive discovery and effective presentation and cross-examination of witnesses. He filed and argued motions before and during trial. Finally, he delivered a strong closing argument on defendant\u2019s behalf. Defendant\u2019s complaints regarding Landau\u2019s failure to present witnesses, including defendant, are directed at trial strategy. This court has repeatedly held that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim which arises from a matter of defense strategy will not support a finding of ineffective representation. People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 66; People v. Ashford (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 55; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201.\nThe law does not require a perfect trial. It does, however, require a fair one. The trial court correctly determined that David Landau\u2019s representation afforded defendant a fair trial. Parenthetically, it should be noted that merely losing a case does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. If such were the rule, every defendant would be entitled to continuous litigation and retrials until and unless he obtained an acquittal. Such a result would make a farce of the judicial system.\nDefendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as a result of counsel\u2019s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)). Defendant argues that post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c), requiring appointed counsel to certify that he \u201chas made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner\u2019s contentions.\u201d The record contains no certificate of compliance with the rule. Defendant claims that his pro se allegations with regard to resentencing counsel\u2019s failure to call correctional officers in mitigation were not properly substantiated. He contends that appointed counsel failed to obtain affidavits or other documentation of correction officers that defendant alleges would have testified on his behalf.\nThis court has held that Rule 651(c) works in conjunction with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 4), to ensure that counsel appointed to represent an indigent petitioner \u201cascertains the basis of his complaints, shapes those complaints into appropriate legal form and presents them to the court.\u201d (People v. Owens (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 351, 359.) Rule 651(c), therefore, requires that the record on appeal disclose that appointed counsel took the necessary steps to secure adequate representation of petitioner\u2019s claims. (Owens, 139 Ill. 2d at 359.) Failure of appointed counsel to file a Rule 651(c) certificate of compliance is harmless error if the record establishes that counsel met the requirements of the rule. (People v. Alexander (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 571.) The record indicates that there was considerable communication between post-conviction counsel and defendant, and that defendant received reasonable assistance, of counsel as contemplated by the rule. Transcripts include comments by post-trial counsel regarding his recent conversations with defendant. Counsel called defendant\u2019s father to testify about hiring Landau. Additionally, counsel secured investigative services from the court and conducted an exhaustive search for Landau. Looking beyond certification to the attorney\u2019s actions, the record clearly supports the trial court finding of effective assistance of appointed counsel.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Tuesday, January 21, 1992, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court is to be executed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 119 \u2014 5). A certified copy of the mandate in this case shall be delivered by the clerk of this court to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution wherein defendant is confined.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK,\ndissenting:\nFor the reasons I stated in my earlier dissent in this case (see People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 97 (Clark, C.J., dissenting)), I respectfully dissent now.\nThe procedural history of the defendant\u2019s murder trial is well documented in the majority opinion. What I disagree with is this court\u2019s waiving of several issues the defendant raised regarding his second sentencing hearing. (See People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 93-94.) After this court initially vacated defendant\u2019s murder convictions and death sentence, and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a determination as to whether a new trial was warranted (see People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327), the circuit court reinstated the defendant\u2019s convictions and a second sentencing hearing was held. Subsequently, the defendant was again sentenced to death. On direct appeal to this court, the defendant\u2019s murder convictions were affirmed, as was his sentence of death. (See People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83.) At this time, this court also declined to consider any of the issues the defendant raised concerning his second sentencing hearing, stating that those issues were waived. (See Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 93.) This court noted that, although the defendant filed a post-trial motion for a new trial after the circuit court reinstated his convictions on remand, the defendant failed to file a post-trial motion after his second sentencing hearing. (Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 93.) Thus, any issues he raised regarding his second sentencing hearing must be reviewed under the more stringent plain error doctrine. (See Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 93-94.) After conducting this analysis, this court determined that none of defendant\u2019s alleged errors rose to the level of plain error.\nAt the time, I disagreed and continue to believe that the defendant should not have had to file a post-trial motion to ensure that his arguments pertaining to his second sentencing\u2019hearing were addressed. As I stated in my earlier dissent:\n\u201c \u2018Since this is a death penalty case, which under our constitution is automatically reviewed by this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b)), we must review the case whether or not a written motion for a new trial has been filed. Otherwise, the constitutional provision for an automatic appeal would be meaningless.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 98 (Clark, C.J., dissenting), quoting People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, 32.)\nThe Illinois constitutional provision providing for direct appeal to this court in death cases does not place any limitation on the scope of review. Thus, because the death penalty is \u201cqualitatively different\u201d than a sentence of imprisonment due to its finality (see Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d at 99 (Clark, C.J., dissenting), quoting Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991), I feel I must reiterate my reasons for my earlier dissent in this matter.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Robert E. Davison, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 69284.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JOHN SZABO, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 17, 1991.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied December 2, 1991.\nCLARK, J., dissenting.\nCharles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Robert E. Davison, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0525-01", "first_page_order": 535, "last_page_order": 544 }