{ "id": 3283348, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEVEN PALMER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Palmer", "decision_date": "1992-03-12", "docket_number": "No. 69991", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "95", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 N.E.2d 980", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501125 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753", "parenthetical": "Reinhard, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "753-54", "parenthetical": "Reinhard, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 966", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567313 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188732 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2688866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468706 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 849021 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/239/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443660 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471056 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510726 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "958" }, { "page": "958" }, { "page": "956" }, { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513541 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5492960 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597327 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408379 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952699 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5304840 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3266361 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479164 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448976 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3077130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5480303 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532300 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 354", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195188 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559491 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0273-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1109, "char_count": 41029, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.095872591543905e-07, "percentile": 0.9094200086568753 }, "sha256": "3d64a5d1bfc2c1da91231ef5b70b9ae11ab7dec22a2c80100a63f27cf84d8c28", "simhash": "1:c6befa9b626d6414", "word_count": 6801 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:12.559919+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEVEN PALMER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe appellate court, one justice dissenting, determined certain proceedings held pursuant to section 5\u2014 2 \u2014 4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144) in the circuit court of Lake County involving defendant, Steven F. Palmer, were void for lack of jurisdiction. (193 Ill. App. 3d 745.) The appellate court also concluded that the maximum period of involuntary commitment for an insanity acquittee could be based upon the extended-term sentencing statute of the Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142) and could include a maximum term of natural life (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(1)). This court allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nI\nIt is unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion to repeat the facts surrounding the offense. These facts are recounted in detail in People v. Palmer (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 966.\nIn April 1984, defendant was tried for murder (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1)). A verdict of guilty but mentally ill was returned by the jury. At a sentencing hearing following the trial, the circuit court found the murder to be exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, and sentenced defendant to an extended term of natural life imprisonment on the murder conviction.\nOn appeal, the appellate court found that a reasonable doubt existed as to defendant\u2019s sanity at the time of the offense and reversed the conviction. (People v. Palmer (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 966.) The appellate court issued the following mandate:\n\u201c[T]he judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court is then directed to proceed in accordance with section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 of the [Code], which controls such dispositions.\u201d (Palmer, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 974.)\nThe State filed a petition for rehearing with the appellate court, which was denied. The State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court\u2019s decision was denied by this court on June 3, 1986. The mandate of the appellate court was filed in the circuit court on July 10,1986.\nOn September 9, 1986, the State filed a motion to reinstate defendant\u2019s conviction or, in the alternative, a motion to set the matter for a new trial. The motion was denied by the circuit court on October 3, 1986. At that time, the circuit court entered a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered defendant to be transferred to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (the Department of Mental Health) for an evaluation as to whether he was subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental health services. The matter was set for a hearing on November 18, 1986.\nBefore the evaluation of defendant was completed, the State filed two motions with this court: a motion for stay and a motion for leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition or, in the alternative, a motion for supervisory order. This court granted the State leave to file the writs on November 12, 1986. (People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, No. 64223.) On the same day, this court recalled the mandate of the appellate court, and set the case to be heard at the January 1987 term.\nBecause the appellate court mandate was recalled by this court, the circuit court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed further. On November 18, 1986, the circuit court ordered defendant transferred from the Department of Mental Health to the Illinois Department of Corrections. On November 24, 1986, the appellate court ordered \u201cthe mandate of this Court heretofore issued on July 9, 1986, is recalled pursuant to Supreme Court order.\u201d\nOn September 21, 1987, this court issued its opinion in People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 90, which found the State\u2019s motion for leave to file writs and motion for supervisory order had been improvidently granted. This court held that the writs or the motion for supervisory order would not be \u201can appropriate remedy because it would in effect constitute an additional appeal to which the People are not entitled\u201d (Nash, 118 Ill. 2d at 98-99), and denied the request for writs or supervisory order.\nThe State secured a new indictment against defendant on October 28, 1987, which repeated the charges of the original indictments of January 6, 1984. The circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the new indictment on February 18, 1988. The dismissal of the new indictment was appealed by the State to the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court\u2019s decision. People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 378.\nOn February 18, 1988, the circuit court entered an order finding defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. The circuit court ordered defendant remanded to the Department of Mental Health and ordered an evaluation of defendant to determine whether he was subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental health services. The Department of Mental Health submitted an evaluation to the circuit court by Dr. A. Calabio in March 1988. Dr. Calabio concluded defendant was in need of inpatient mental health services.\nThe circuit court held a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 on May 5, 1988. Section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 governs proceedings after a defendant has been acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity. Counsel for defendant and the State stipulated as to what Dr. Calabio would say if called to testify. Defendant objected to the testimony and stated his disagreement with Dr. Calabio\u2019s findings. Defendant testified he was no longer mentally ill and requested outpatient status through a Veteran\u2019s Administration hospital.\nThe circuit court determined that defendant was subject to involuntary admission. Pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u2014 4(b), the circuit court found that, had defendant been convicted, he would have been eligible for natural life in prison, as the circuit court found the crime to be \u201cwanton, cruel, to indicate wanton cruelty, it was heinous ***. Probably a textbook case of wanton cruelty.\u201d Additionally, the circuit court provided that if commitment for natural life was impermissible, the term of commitment shall be 100 years, and, if the 100-year term was impermissible, the term of commitment shall be 80 years. Defendant then filed a notice of appeal to the appellate court from the circuit court\u2019s order.\nOn September 15, 1988, the appellate court reissued its original mandate of December 31, 1985, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court and \u201cremanded for entry of a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court is then directed to proceed in accordance with section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 of the [Code]. Reversed and remanded with directions.\u201d\nOn February 9, 1990, the appellate court issued an opinion which reversed the May 5, 1988, order of the circuit court which committed defendant, as an insanity acquittee, to an extended term of natural life. The appellate court concluded the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to conduct any proceedings concerning defendant between November 12, 1986, the day this court recalled the mandate of the appellate court filed with the circuit court on July 10, 1986, and September 15, 1988, the day the appellate court reissued its mandate of July 10, 1986, to the circuit court.\nAccording to the appellate court, jurisdiction was divested from the circuit court on May 11, 1984, when defendant filed his appeal from his sentence of natural life for the murder conviction. Jurisdiction was revested in the circuit court on December 31, 1985, when the appellate court reversed defendant\u2019s murder conviction, issued its mandate which remanded the cause with instructions to enter a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, and instructed the circuit court to proceed in accordance with section 5 \u2014 2\u20144. The circuit court was vested with jurisdiction on October 3, 1986, to enter a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and to set the matter for hearing on November 18, 1986. The circuit court was divested of jurisdiction when this court, on November 12, 1986, granted the State\u2019s motions for leave to file a petition for writs or supervisory order. At that time, this court expressly recalled the appellate court\u2019s mandate which had directed the circuit court to proceed in accordance with section 5 \u2014 2\u20144.\nWhen this court denied the State\u2019s motions in Nash, on September 21, 1987, the judgment order stated: \u201cWrits denied; Motion for supervisory order denied.\u201d The judgment order did not provide for the reinstatement of the appellate court\u2019s mandate. According to the appellate court, jurisdiction did not revest in the circuit court until the appellate court affirmatively reissued its mandate on September 15,1988.\nIn its opinion, the appellate court rejected the State\u2019s argument that the order of this court in Nash automatically reinstated the appellate court\u2019s mandate and thus revested jurisdiction in the circuit court. The appellate court determined that either this court or the appellate court had to expressly reinstate the recalled mandate before jurisdiction in the circuit court could revest. The appellate court stated that the involuntary commitment proceedings were void and vacated the orders entered by the trial court.\nThe dissent disagreed that the proceedings held by the circuit court between November 12, 1986, and September 15, 1988, were void for lack of jurisdiction. According to the dissent, once the appellate court issued its mandate in the original appeal in People v. Palmer (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 966, after this court denied the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal, the appellate court was divested of jurisdiction and had no authority to recall the mandate on November 24, 1986. The dissent characterized the motions for leave to file a petition for writs and supervisory order initiated by the State as separate and distinct actions from the original appeal to the appellate court.\nThe dissent concluded that jurisdiction revested in the circuit court once this court issued its opinion and mandate in Nash because \u201cthe appellate court\u2019s mandate, which had been recalled, was automatically reinstated in the circuit court.\u201d (193 Ill. App. 3d at 753 (Reinhard, J., dissenting).) The dissent stated:\n\u201cWhile the supreme court did not expressly reinstate the appellate court\u2019s mandate in its opinion or mandate, there can be no other conclusion drawn as the supreme court denied, without reaching the merits, the writs and motion for supervisory order requested by the State\u2019s Attorney of Lake County and issued its mandate. The effect of the supreme court\u2019s decision and issuance of its mandate was to reinstate the proceedings in the circuit court. Matters which are implied may be considered embraced by the mandate. See PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308.\u201d 193 Ill. App. 3d at 753-54 (Reinhard, J., dissenting).\nThe State advances the same argument as the dissent. The State acknowledges that this court\u2019s opinion in Nash and this court\u2019s October 20, 1987, order did not expressly provide for automatic reinstatement of the appellate court\u2019s mandate, but concludes that \u201cthe only reasonable inference is that [the mandate of the appellate court] was reinstated, as this Court found that the State\u2019s motions had been improvidently granted.\u201d Both the State and the dissent rely on PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308, which states: \u201cIn construing the language [in the mandate], matters which are implied may be considered embraced by the mandate.\u201d\nWe disagree that PSL Realty is authority for jurisdiction revesting automatically in the circuit court by implication from this court\u2019s opinion in Nash. The existence of jurisdiction was not at issue in PSL Realty, at issue in PSL Realty was the correctness of the trial court\u2019s action on remand. The court in PSL Realty noted that the resolution of whether the actions of the trial court were correct had:\n\u201cto be determined from the appellate court\u2019s mandate, as opposed to the appellate court opinion. [Citations.] However, if the direction is to proceed in conformity with the opinion, then, of course, the content of the opinion is significant. [Citations.] In construing the language, matters which are implied may be considered embraced by the mandate. (Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. National Hollow Brake Beam Co. (1909), 239 Ill. 111.)\u201d PSL Realty, 86 Ill. 2d at 308.\nIn Chicago Railway, the appellant argued that a certain act by the trial court was not authorized by a prior decision of a reviewing court. The remanding order in Chicago Railway was lengthy and contained detailed directions to the trial court. The language being construed in the remanding order in Chicago Railway was concerned with one of several actions the trial court was being instructed to follow. At issue in Chicago Railway was not whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the action done, but whether the action taken was in conformance with the remanding order. The only question before the reviewing court remained whether \u201cthe decree of the circuit court [was] in accordance with the mandate and directions of [the reviewing] court.\u201d Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. National Hollow Brake Beam Co. (1909), 239 Ill. 111, 115.\nIn the case at bar, this court affirmatively recalled the mandate of the appellate court in response to the State\u2019s motion for stay; this court did not simply order proceedings stayed in the circuit court pending resolution of the State\u2019s petition and motion. There was no remandment; there were no directions to the circuit court to proceed in conformity with the opinion either of this court in Nash or of the appellate court in People v. Palmer (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 966.\nWhen a mandate issues which remands a cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinion issued by the reviewing court, the trial court must look to the opinion for directions and will of necessity construe the language of the opinion when needed. In such an instance, PSL Realty may reasonably be said to allow the trial court to embrace matters \u201cnot expressly stated in the remanding order *** [which are] the clear and necessary implication from the language employed in the remanding order of [the reviewing] court.\u201d (Chicago Ry., 239 Ill. at 115.) When a mandate issues which fails to remand a cause to the trial court, and which simply states that writs and motion for supervisory order are denied, it cannot reasonably be said that it embraces the revesting of jurisdiction in the trial court by \u201cclear and necessary implication.\u201d (Chicago Ry., 239 Ill. at 115.) Unless and until further action is taken by the reviewing court, jurisdiction does not revest in the trial court, but remains in the reviewing court.\nApplying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that jurisdiction did not revest, by implication or otherwise, in the circuit court following the issuance by this court of its opinion in Nash. The circuit court acted without jurisdiction when it committed defendant to a maximum period of natural life, and such commitment period is vacated. Jurisdiction has remained in this court, and we hereby remand this cause to the circuit court with directions to proceed in conformity with the mandate of the appellate court filed on July 10, 1986, and with this opinion.\nII\nThe appellate court determined that the maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee could be based upon the extended-term statute and could include natural life. Whether natural life is a permissible maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) has been answered by other appellate districts with contrary results. The court in People v. Larson (1st Dist. 1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 594, concluded natural life was not a permissible maximum period of commitment; the court in People v. Cochran (5th Dist. 1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 830, concluded it was. Both the Larson and Cochran courts concluded that the maximum period of commitment could be based upon the extended-term statute.\nThe State argues that the extended-term statute, including the maximum period of natural life, is available as a maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee. Defendant argues that an insanity acquittee\u2019s maximum period of commitment should not be set by reference to the extended-term statute.\nWhen a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court is to order the defendant to \u201cthe Department of Mental Health *** for an evaluation as to whether he is subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental health services.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(a).) The trial court shall hold a hearing to determine if the individual is: subject to involuntary admission, in need of mental health services on an inpatient or outpatient basis, or not in need of mental health services. 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(a).\nPursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) of the Code, if a defendant is found to be subject to involuntary admission, the defendant must be committed to the Department of Mental Health for an indefinite term. Section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) requires the trial court to set a maximum period for the involuntary commitment which:\n\u201cshall not exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, less credit for good behavior, before becoming eligible for release had he been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity. The Court shall determine the maximum period of commitment by an appropriate order.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(b).\nA defendant convicted of a criminal offense may be sentenced to an extended term if factors set forth in paragraph (b) of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 of the Code are found to be present. (See 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142(a).) Paragraph (b) of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 provides for the imposition of an extended-term sentence under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142 \u201c[w]hen a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2).) We do not reach the issue whether natural life is a permissible maximum period of commitment pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) because we conclude, for the reasons stated herein, that a trial court may not base a maximum commitment period for an insanity acquittee on the extended-term statute.\nSeveral districts of the appellate court have concluded that the maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee may be based upon the extended-term sentencing provisions of the Code. (193 Ill. App. 3d 745 (2d District); People v. Winston (1st Dist. 1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 948; People v. Cochran (5th Dist. 1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 830; People v. Thomas (1st Dist. 1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 113; People v. Larson (1st Dist. 1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 594.) Because the districts have followed the rationale set forth in Larson in reaching their conclusions that the maximum period of commitment may be based upon the extended-term statute, we will examine that case in detail.\nThe Larson court reached the conclusion that an insanity acquittee\u2019s maximum period of commitment could be based upon the extended-term statute as a result of statutory construction. The court stated that in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court should look first and foremost to the terms of the statute. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475.) The Larson court noted that section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) provides a formula for computing the maximum period of involuntary commitment: the trial court will refer to the existing sentencing scheme to determine the most punitive sanction which could be imposed for the most serious crime charged, which is then reduced by credit for good behavior. In re Commitment of Guy (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 267, 269.\nThe court in Larson compared the maximum sentence available under the extended-term statute (in Larson, a term of 80 years), with the maximum sentence under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 (a term of 40 years). According to the Larson court, the maximum sentence under section 5-8-1:\n\u201csimply is not the \u2018maximum sentence\u2019 that can be given under the section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) formula. Moreover, nothing in the plain language of the statute indicates that the words \u2018maximum sentence\u2019 are to be limited by the maximum sentence available under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of [the Code]. In the event that the legislature had intended to impose such a limitation, it could have clarified this statute via express language to that effect. Absent any express intent to the contrary, we must read section 5 \u2014 2\u2014 4(b) to be in accord with the ordinary use and meaning of its terms.\u201d Larson, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 597.\nWhile, as correctly noted in Larson, a \u201ccourt may not read a limitation into a statute which the legislature has not seen fit to enact nor may it, by subtle construction, alter the plain meaning of the words employed\u201d (Larson, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 596), neither may a court read a limitation, which the legislature has seen fit to enact, out of a statute, by subtle construction or otherwise. The overriding consideration in construing statutory enactments is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358.) To this end, the entire statute must be considered (People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 91, 93), as well as \u201cthe evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained\u201d (People ex rel. Simpson v. Funkhouser (1944), 385 Ill. 396, 403).\nIn determining that a trial court may base an insanity acquittee\u2019s maximum period of commitment upon the extended-term statute, the court in Larson looked only to the length of time which a convicted defendant might receive under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 and section 5 \u2014 8\u20142 when it determined that nothing in the \u201cplain language\u201d of section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) indicated that the words \u201cmaximum sentence\u201d of section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) should be limited to the maximum sentence available under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141. It was within this limited context the Larson court concluded that the legislature intended a trial court to be free to base a maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee upon the extended-term statute.\nThis limited reference is reflected in Larson\u2019s progeny: in Winston, the court noted \u201cthere is no history of the extended-term statute specifically reflecting the legislative intent that the statute be applicable to commitments under section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b), *** neither is there anything in the plain language of section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) indicating that the words \u2018maximum sentence\u2019 were intended to be limited by *** section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 ***.\u201d (Winston, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 958.) After acknowledging this dearth of legislative history, the court in Winston concluded: \u201cOur view here, as in Larson, is that had the legislature intended to impose such a limitation, the statute would have included express language setting forth the limitation.\u201d Winston, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 958.\nIn the case at bar, section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) requires the court to refer to the existing sentencing scheme in order to determine the maximum length of time the defendant would have been required to serve before becoming eligible for release had he been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(b).) It is clear that the trial court may commit an insanity acquittee to a maximum period by reference to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141. In order to commit an insanity acquittee by reference to the extended-term statute, however, the trial court must first find that the insanity acquittee\u2019s offense comes within the statutory requirements for application of section 5\u2014 8 \u2014 2(a). Section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a) refers to the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2. Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) requires that, in order for an extended-term sentence to be applicable, the trial court must find that the offense is accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\nAs noted by this court in People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501: \u201c \u2018Heinous\u2019 is defined by Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) as \u2018hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad: enormously and flagrantly criminal\u2019; \u2018brutal\u2019 includes \u2018grossly ruthless,\u2019 \u2018devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel and coldblooded.\u2019 \u201d The terms \u201cwanton\u201d and \u201ccruelty\u201d were discussed in People v. Jones (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 99,103:\n\u201cIn the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969), \u2018cruelty\u2019 is defined as \u2018something that causes pain or suffering.\u2019 And Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1976), defines \u2018cruelty\u2019 as a \u2018disposition to inflict pain or suffering or to enjoy its being inflicted.\u2019 But the term \u2018wanton\u2019 was defined as follows by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Bartolucci v. Falleti (1943), 382 Ill. 168, 174, 46 N.E.2d 980, 983:\n\u2018111 will is not a necessary element of a wanton act. To constitute an act wanton, the party doing the act or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury.\u2019 \u201d\nThe insanity defense is defined as follows:\n\u201cA person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6 \u2014 2(a).\nA defendant who successfully asserts an insanity defense \u201cis not criminally responsible for [his] conduct.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6 \u2014 2(a).) The insanity defense \u201cadhere[s] to the fundamental principle that a person is not criminally responsible for an involuntary act. *** [T]he insanity defense exculpates a person whose volition is so impaired *** that he is substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the law. *** [The insanity defense is a] theorfy] at the disposal of a defendant whose volition to control or prevent his conduct is at issue.\u201d (People v. Grant (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 551, 558-59.) As noted by the appellate court in People v. Clark (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 414, 417: \u201cThe law has long expressed the deep commitment of society to avoid the injustice of convicting a person who is insane. To that end, the criminal law is made to apply only to those who can be held responsible for their conduct.\u201d\nDefendant contends that, given the nature of the insanity defense, an insanity acquittee\u2019s conduct may not be evaluated in terms of wanton cruelty. Defendant argues that an insanity acquittee cannot be considered to have consciously chosen to inflict pain or suffering, or to have been capable of consciously realizing that such infliction was wrong. We agree. The successful assertion of the insanity defense precludes a finding that the insanity acquittee was conscious of his conduct such that the requisite finding that the insanity acquittee\u2019s offense was indicative of wanton cruelty could be made.\nA court is not free to rewrite legislation, or to ignore an express requirement contained in a statute. The Larson court, by failing to consider whether an insanity acquittee\u2019s offense may ever satisfy the prerequisites for application of the extended-term statute, effectively rewrote section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) to require only brutal or heinous behavior before a court may apply the extended-term statute, reading out of the statute the requirement that such behavior be indicative of wanton cruelty.\nAccording to the State, the fact that defendant successfully asserted the insanity defense \u201cdoes not detract from the fact that the offense comes within the statutory language of \u2018brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u2019 See [Larson]. Application of the extended-term statute is determined by the \u2018offense\u2019 rather than by the extent or nature of defendant\u2019s participation. Larson [132 Ill. App. 3d at 598].\u201d The State, as well as Larson\u2019s progeny, relies on Larson as authority that the mental state of an insanity acquittee is irrelevant when it comes to determining whether the insanity acquittee\u2019s offense is brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. A close reading of Larson shows this reliance to be misplaced.\nAfter having determined, based on statutory construction, that an insanity acquittee may be committed to a maximum period based upon the extended-term statute, the court in Larson addressed a separate argument advanced by the defendant. The defendant in Larson contended that the \u201cutilization of the extended-term statute constituted punishment because the statute was designed primarily to enhance the punishment of the guilty.\u201d (Larson, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 598.) The Larson court rejected this argument and stated:\n\u201c[C]haracterization of defendant\u2019s conduct as \u2018exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty\u2019 did not indirectly punish defendant, who was not criminally responsible for that conduct. Application of the extended-term statute is determined by the \u2018offense\u2019 rather than by the extent or nature of defendant\u2019s participation (People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 153, ***) ***.\" Larson, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 598.\nThe court in Gray, relied upon in Larson, did not, however, address the issue whether the offense of an insanity acquittee could come within the statutory definition of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Gray involved, inter alia, whether a defendant convicted of criminal offenses under the theory of accountability could be sentenced to an extended term where the trial court found the offenses to be accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\nThe defendant in Gray argued that in light of her age, mental capacity, lack of prior record, and lack of participation in the crimes, her conduct was not such that an extended sentence was proper. In response to this argument, the court in Gray stated: \u201c[T]he application of the [extended-term] statute is determined by the \u2018offense\u2019 rather than by the extent or nature of the offender\u2019s participation ***. In view thereof and because we have found [the defendant] legally accountable for the offenses, we cannot say that the extended sentences given\u201d the defendant were inappropriate. (Emphasis added.) People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 153.\nThe above-emphasized language in Gray, cited in Larson, has been interpreted by Larson\u2019s progeny as authority for a trial court to completely disregard the state of mind of an insanity acquittee when determining the maximum period of commitment pursuant to section 5 \u2014 -2\u20144(b). (See Thomas, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 122; Winston, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 956.) In Thomas, the court stated: \u201c[I]n deciding whether to impose an extended-term sentence, the court is to look at the offense itself.\u201d (Thomas, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 122, citing People v. Clay (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 140.) The court in Thomas opined that Clay supported the proposition that it is the offense itself, and not the defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the offense, which is the only relevant factor in determining whether an offense meets the requirements of being exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Thomas, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 123.\nIn Clay, the appellate court stated:\n\u201c[W]e have consistently held that because the application of the extended-term statute is determined by the offense, not by the extent or nature of the offender\u2019s participation therein, the fact that a defendant is convicted under the theory of accountability or that his participation in the crime was less than that of his co-offenders does not preclude the imposition of an extended sentence upon him. People v. Rogers (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 384; People v. Rowe (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 322, 450 N.E.2d 804; People v. Tibbs (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 73, 430 N.E.2d 681; People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150.\u201d (Clay, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 154.)\nEach of the above-cited cases in Clay concerned the applicability of the extended-term statute where a defendant was found guilty of a criminal offense under the theory of accountability.\nThe mental state of a defendant convicted of a criminal offense under the theory of accountability was not made irrelevant by Gray for purposes of determining whether the offense was exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. One is legally accountable for the acts of another when:\n\u201c \u2018Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u2019 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 5\u2014 2(c).\u201d (Gray, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 147.)\nOne cannot be found guilty of an offense under an accountability theory unless that person has the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. It is in this context that application of the extended-term statute \u201cis determined by the \u2018offense\u2019 rather than by the extent or nature of the offender\u2019s participation.\u201d Gray, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 153.\nWhen the Larson court stated that the application of the extended-term statute is determined by the \u201coffense\u201d rather than by the extent or nature of the defendant\u2019s participation, it did so not in order to determine whether the extended-term statute was applicable to insanity acquittees, but in order to explain why utilization of the extended-term statute in section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) proceedings did not constitute \u201cpunishment\u201d of a defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity.\nWe reject the proposition that a trial court is required to focus exclusively on the conduct of an insanity acquittee, turning a blind eye on the insanity acquittee\u2019s mental state or \u201cthe extent or nature of the offender\u2019s participation,\u201d in determining whether an insanity acquittee\u2019s offense can meet the statutory requirement of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2).\nThe mental state of a convicted defendant is not an irrelevant factor in the determination whether an offense is accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. For example, such factors as history of criminal activity, attitude, presence or absence of remorse, and premeditation have been considered. (People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 451.) Given the nature of the insanity defense, an insanity acquit-tee\u2019s conduct may not be held to be indicative of wanton cruelty. Because the statutory requirement of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2) is not satisfied in the case of an insanity acquittee, the maximum period of commitment of the insanity acquittee pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) cannot be based upon the extended-term statute.\nThe conclusion that the conduct of an insanity acquittee cannot be considered to be indicative of wanton cruelty for purposes of the application of the extended-term statute in section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) proceedings is not inconsistent with the purposes which lie behind the imposition of involuntary commitment. \u201c[T]he purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal is to treat the individual\u2019s mental illness, and at the same time protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.\u201d People v. Williams (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 216.\nAs noted in Winston, \u201cthere is no correlation between the seriousness of an offense and the length of time necessary for recovery; an insanity acquittee\u2019s confinement is based solely upon his continuing illness and the danger he poses to the community. Thomas, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 121, citing Jones v. United States (1983), 463 U.S. 354, 368-69, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 708, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051-52 ***.\u201d (Winston, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 956.) The insanity acquittee who has been involuntarily committed \u201cis entitled to be released when he has recovered his sanity and is no longer dangerous to society, even if this is prior to the maximum term of involuntary commitment set by the trial court. *** [I]f the acquittee has not recovered from his mental illness by the time he has reached his maximum term of commitment, he shall be subject to a \u2018civil\u2019 commitment hearing (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(i)) since an acquittee\u2019s hypothetical maximum sentence, as calculated by the trial court, does not provide the constitutional limit of this person\u2019s commitment.\u201d People v. Hampton (1983), 121 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277, citing Jones v. United States (1983), 463 U.S. 354, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694,103 S. Ct. 3043.\nThis court may not render superfluous the requirement that, in order to impose an extended-term sentence, an insanity acquittee\u2019s offense must be brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The need to protect society from an insanity acquittee, whose maximum period of commitment pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) has expired, who has failed to recover from his mental illness, and who continues to pose a danger to the community, must be met by resort to civil commitment proceedings.\nDefendant raises several other issues involving the propriety of the proceedings pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u2014 4(b). Because of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to address these issues.\nIn summary, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to conduct proceedings pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2\u20144 and such proceedings are hereby rendered void. The maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee may not be based upon the extended-term statute. The cause is remanded to the circuit court. The mandate of the appellate court filed on July 10, 1986, is hereby reinstated. Further proceedings are to be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAppellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nDefendant Palmer was found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. The circuit court determined, and the appellate court agreed, that the maximum period of commitment for an insanity acquittee could be based upon the extended-term sentencing statute (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142) and could include natural life (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(1)). In order to commit an insanity acquittee under the extended-term sentencing statute, the acquittee must meet the statutory requirements under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code). That is to say, the court must find that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The trial court so found and sentenced defendant accordingly.\nThe majority \u2022 opinion holds that a trial court may not base a maximum commitment period for an insanity acquittee on the extended-term sentencing statute as an insanity acquittee cannot be conscious of his conduct \u201cso that the requisite finding that the insanity acquittee\u2019s offense be indicative of wanton cruelty can be made.\u201d The majority reasons that an insanity acquittee is not criminally responsible for his conduct and, thus, he cannot be considered to have \u201cconsciously chosen to inflict pain or suffering.\u201d\nContrary to the majority\u2019s finding, an insanity acquittee\u2019 s conduct can fall within the definition of \u201cbrutal,\u201d \u201cheinous\u201d and \u201cindicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d None of these terms requires a specific mental state. These definitions are what the trier of fact perceives the crimes to be. That is to say, an objective standard. In this case, the trial court determined that defendant\u2019s conduct fell within this descriptive language. Accordingly, I dissent in part, as above indicated, and otherwise concur.\nCHIEF JUSTICE MILLER joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris and Neil F. Hartigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller and Fred L. Foreman, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Waukegan (Kenneth R. Boyle, Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers, David A. Bernhard, and Colleen M. Griffin, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Thomas A. Lilien, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 69991.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEVEN PALMER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed March 12, 1992.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied June 1, 1992.\nHEIPLE, J., joined by MILLER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nRoland W. Burris and Neil F. Hartigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller and Fred L. Foreman, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Waukegan (Kenneth R. Boyle, Norbert J. Goetten, William L. Browers, David A. Bernhard, and Colleen M. Griffin, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Thomas A. Lilien, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 80, "last_page_order": 105 }