{ "id": 3292349, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. THOMAS V. ODLE, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Odle", "decision_date": "1992-10-01", "docket_number": "No. 72371", "first_page": "168", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 168" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070111 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555486 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "2066" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591273 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126839 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. Ct. 3289", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 L. Ed. 2d 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 1031", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6302024, 6302273, 6302523, 6302983 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/1031-01", "/us/497/1031-02", "/us/497/1031-03", "/us/497/1031-04" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228807 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0111-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 534, "char_count": 9607, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.696410032887941e-07, "percentile": 0.8280509790339128 }, "sha256": "424cb24852f140762acae4c36f44e22ff617f1c9ef74b6172ad28328c8fa81a4", "simhash": "1:aa5e544a568c99a5", "word_count": 1510 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:31.068393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. THOMAS V. ODLE, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Thomas V. Odle, was convicted of the brutal murders of his father, mother, two brothers, and a sister in their family residence located in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, on November 8, 1985. A jury rejected defendant\u2019s insanity defense and found him guilty of all five murders. The defendant waived a jury at sentencing, and the trial court found the defendant eligible for the death penalty. After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death.\nDefendant\u2019s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill. 2d 111. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied review of defendant\u2019s direct appeal. (People v. Odle (1990), 497 U.S. 1031, 111 L. Ed. 2d 798, 110 S. Ct. 3289.) On December 3, 1990, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. After hearing oral arguments on the petition, but without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. This court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)).\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that post-conviction Circuit Judge Donald E. Garrison erred in deciding to deny defendant\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief, without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the defendant\u2019s petition contained the following allegations: (1) defendant\u2019s attorneys continued to tell defendant that he would \u201cwalk\u201d free due to his strong insanity defense even after they knew that the experts they retained concluded that he was not insane; (2) the relationship between the defendant and one of his attorneys, Charles Stow, was unprofessional as illustrated by the attorney stating that he was the \u201cnumber one fan of the Tom Odle fan club\u201d; (3) counsel did not discuss the possibility of or seek to enter into a negotiated plea on behalf of the defendant; and (4) defendant did not testify at trial, nor did counsel discuss with the defendant the possible advantages of his testifying.\nThe gruesome facts of this case are adequately set forth in this court\u2019s opinion on the defendant\u2019s direct appeal (People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill. 2d 111) and will be repeated here only where necessary. The 18-year-old defendant was apprehended the day after the murders, was read his Miranda rights, and waived his right to have an attorney present during questioning. During questioning, the defendant made an oral statement in which he confessed to the murders. Defendant\u2019s tape-recorded confession, as well as the transcript of the confession, were admitted into evidence at trial. In that confession, the defendant detailed the premeditated manner in which he stabbed and strangled to death the five family members.\nPrior to trial the defendant was examined by two mental health professionals to determine the defendant\u2019s motivation for committing the crimes and neither was able to render an opinion as to the defendant\u2019s sanity on the day of the murders. Additionally, the defendant admitted to his psychiatrist that he understood what was happening in this case.\nIn ruling on the post-conviction petition, the trial court stated:\n\u201cI believe that People v. Spreitzer, cited by the Illinois Supreme Court in early 1991 sets forth the principles the court is to apply in a Post-Conviction Relief Act proceeding. I reviewed the principles set forth. I won\u2019t recite them all for the record, but I am aware of them.\nIn particular, let me mention the principle that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can often be disposed [of] upon a showing that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors without deciding whether the error constituted constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel. I believe that in People v. Odle, the Defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors.\nIn addition, I believe that the errors alleged did not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the State\u2019s Motion to Dismiss is granted and the Defendant\u2019s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is denied ***.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, is amply supported by the instant record and Illinois law. At a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.), the burden is on the defendant to establish a substantial deprivation of rights under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Illinois and determinations by the trial court will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous. (People v. Griffin (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 293, 303.) \u201cThere is no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition unless the allegations of a defendant are supported by the trial record, accompanying affidavits, and make a substantial showing that a defendant\u2019s rights have been violated.\u201d People v. Spreitzer (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 210, 218.\nThe defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be analyzed in light of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Under Strickland, the defendant must prove the following in order to establish that defense counsel\u2019s performance was constitutionally defective: (1) that \u201ccounsel\u2019s performance was deficient\u201d in that it \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness,\u201d and (2) that the \u201cdeficient performance prejudiced the defense\u201d such that the defendant was deprived a fair trial whose result was reliable. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) Further, Strickland holds that an ineffectiveness claim can often be disposed upon a showing that a defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors without deciding whether the errors constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.) Additionally, the Strickland standard requires \u201ca reasonable probability of a different result, not merely a possibility.\u201d People v. Gacy (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 117,129-30.\nHere, the trial court correctly determined that no prejudice resulted from the defendant\u2019s claimed errors. The defendant confessed to having murdered his entire family in a premeditated and heinous manner without provocation and he had no hope of a viable defense for avoiding conviction at trial. Moreover, two psychiatrists were unable to render an opinion as to defendant\u2019s sanity on the day of the murders and the jury rejected defendant\u2019s insanity defense. Accordingly, it cannot be said that a reasonable probability existed that the jury would have reached a different result if it were not for the claimed errors.\nMoreover, the trial court correctly determined \u201cthat the errors alleged did not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d Given the facts of this case, defense counsel\u2019s performances were not constitutionally defective. It is well settled that a defendant is entitled to competent, not perfect, representation. (People v. Greer (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 103.) Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066.\nIn this case, there is nothing to indicate that defense counsel erred in their strategy of advancing an insanity defense and not advising the defendant to testify at trial. Based on the record, i.e., five brutal murders admittedly committed at the hands of the defendant, the insanity defense offered the only hope of acquittal at trial. Further, defense counsel had the defendant address the court at the sentencing phase through allocution. This allowed the defendant to explain the cause of his misconduct, express his remorse over the crimes, and request mercy, without being subjected to cross-examination. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to support defendant\u2019s allegations that attorney Stow\u2019s personal relationship with the defendant affected the outcome of the defendant\u2019s trial. Finally, there is no reason to believe that a plea agreement could have been reached with the prosecution, given the defendant\u2019s overwhelming guilt.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, January 20, 1993, as the date on which sentence of death, entered in the circuit court of Jefferson County, is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by section 119 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 119 \u2014 5). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where the defendant is now confined.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Howard B. Eisenberg, of Little Rock, Arkansas, and James E. Elmore, of Elmore & Reid, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen and Karen Alice Kloppe, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 72371.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. THOMAS V. ODLE, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 1, 1992.\nHoward B. Eisenberg, of Little Rock, Arkansas, and James E. Elmore, of Elmore & Reid, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen and Karen Alice Kloppe, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0168-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 186 }