{ "id": 5603320, "name": "RICHARD HECK et al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS LIGHT COMPANY et al. (Central Illinois Light Company, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Heck v. Central Illinois Light Co.", "decision_date": "1992-10-15", "docket_number": "No. 73094", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "406", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5254024 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2841524 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260172 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146320 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260487 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254989 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877462 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574264 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260556 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0356-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 510, "char_count": 9421, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9793119642046474e-07, "percentile": 0.7403757902487751 }, "sha256": "78d5be8cf0e31f4e858eff452fb47e097501ebcc5c150630f7cd73c95e00f2a9", "simhash": "1:ac27dc14697b5db6", "word_count": 1528 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:58:52.574529+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD HECK et al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS LIGHT COMPANY et al. (Central Illinois Light Company, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented in this case is whether a defendant\u2019s contribution claim against a codefendant is considered a \u201ccounterclaim\u201d within the meaning of section 2\u2014 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141009), so as to prevent a plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his cause of action without the defendant\u2019s consent. We hold that it is.\nThis case arises out of a November 16, 1988, multivehicle collision on Interstate 55, in McLean County. On that date, employees of defendant Central Illinois Light Company (Central) were performing maintenance work on power lines near Interstate 55. Plaintiff Richard Heck was driving his semi-tractor and trailer northbound on Interstate 55 when he stopped his vehicle due to Central\u2019s maintenance work. While Heck was stopped, defendant Randy Koch drove his vehicle into a passenger car and pushed that car into Heck\u2019s truck. As a result of this accident, Heck\u2019s trailer was destroyed and he sustained bodily injury. In addition, plaintiff Dennis Roberts, a passenger in Heck\u2019s vehicle, also sustained bodily injury.\nOn June 2, 1989, plaintiffs filed in the circuit court of McLean County a complaint against Central, Randy Koch and Donald Koch, d/b/a Koch Trucking, the owner of the vehicle driven by Randy Koch. For simplicity\u2019s sake, we will refer to Randy and Donald collectively as Koch. On January 11, 1990, Central filed a claim for contribution against Koch. On May, 1, 1991, defendant Koch filed a claim for contribution against Central.\nOn May 20, 1991, plaintiffs filed a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141009). On May 22, 1991, Central filed an objection to the voluntary dismissal, claiming that under section 2 \u2014 1009, plaintiffs could not voluntarily dismiss the cause without Central\u2019s consent. Over Central\u2019s objection, the trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs then refiled their action in Madison County on July 1, 1991, and the cause was consolidated with three other suits arising out of the same occurrence.\nCentral appealed the order granting the voluntary dismissal. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the action. (223 Ill. App. 3d 301.) We granted plaintiffs\u2019 petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315).\nResolution of this case turns on the relationship between two provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely the voluntary dismissal section (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141009) and the counterclaim section (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014608). The voluntary dismissal section provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a72 \u2014 1009. Voluntary dismissal, (a) The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each such party\u2019s attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause. Thereafter the plaintiff may dismiss, only on terms fixed by the court (1) upon filing a stipulation to that effect signed by the defendant, or (2) on motion specifying the ground for dismissal, which shall be supported by affidavit or other proof. After a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant no dismissal may be had as to the defendant except by the defendant\u2019s consent.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141009(a).)\nSection 2 \u2014 1009 is substantially the same as former section 52 of the Civil Practice Act as revised in 1955 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 110, par. 52). (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2\u20141009, Historical & Practice Notes, at 416 (Smith-Hurd 1983).) In fact, the sentence dealing with counterclaims was included in former section 52 when it was originally enacted in 1933. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 110, par. 180.\nThe critical inquiry in this case is whether Central\u2019s contribution claim against Koch constitutes a counterclaim within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 1009. In section 2 \u2014 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature defined \u201ccounterclaim\u201d as follows:\n\u201c\u00a72 \u2014 608. Counterclaims, (a) Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, whether in the nature of setoff, recoupment, cross claim or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross claim in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014608.)\nSection 2 \u2014 608 is substantially the same as former section 38 of the Civil Practice Act as enacted in 1933. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 110, par. 166.\nDespite the definition of \u201ccounterclaim\u201d found in section 2 \u2014 608, plaintiffs argue that \u201ccounterclaim,\u201d as used in section 2 \u2014 1009, includes only a defendant\u2019s substantive claim against a plaintiff. In support of this position, plaintiffs point to the following statements from this court\u2019s decision in People v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 115:\n\u201c[I]t would seem that in order for [a] plaintiff to be precluded from dismissing its own cause, an independent (even though it might arise out of the same transaction) substantive cause of action against plaintiff would be requisite. *** Where, as here, the filed \u2018counterclaim\u2019 fails to state a cause of action against the plaintiff, he is not prevented thereby from taking a voluntary nonsuit.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (American National Bank, 32 Ill. 2d at 119-20.)\n(See also Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1009, Historical & Practice Notes, at 416 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (quoting the above passage).) Plaintiffs argue that this interpretation became a part of the former section 52, and subsequently a part of section 2 \u2014 1009. Plaintiffs rely on the rule of construction that \u201c[w]hen a statute has been judicially considered, the sections that have been construed by the court keep their same meaning in any subsequent amendments, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.\u201d Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 146, 155.\nWe disagree, and find that plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on American National Bank is misplaced. In American National Bank the question of whether a counterclaim must be against a plaintiff in order to preclude the plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his action was not at issue. Rather, the issue in American National Bank was whether the defendant\u2019s pleading stated a cause of action at all. Thus, the above quote is dicta and is not binding authority on the question at issue here. See People v. Palmer (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 340, 348.\nWe must now decide whether the legislature intended the term \u201ccounterclaim\u201d to have separate meanings under the two sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is axiomatic that when interpreting a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature when it enacted the statute. The language of the statute itself provides the best indication of the drafters\u2019 intent. (See Kirwan v. Welch (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 163, 165.) There is \u201c \u2018no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of a statute imports.\u2019 \u201d (Cardwell v. Rockford Memorial Hospital (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 271, 278, quoting Droste v. Kerner (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 495, 503.) Thus, where a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the law as enacted, without considering other aids of construction. People v. Drakeford (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 206, 214.\n\u201cIt is well established that the legislature may define terms within a statute in any reasonable manner.\u201d (Town of Libertyville v. First National Bank (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 356, 361.) In this instance, the legislature defined \u201ccounterclaim\u201d to include claims by one defendant against a co-defendant. As there is no indication that the legislature intended a different definition of \u201ccounterclaim\u201d for the voluntary dismissal section of the Code, we will not presume such an intention.\nHad the legislature intended to limit the applicability of section 2 \u2014 1009 to counterclaims asserted against a plaintiff it could have easily done so. The legislature could merely have inserted the phrase \u201cagainst the plaintiff\u201d into that section. Instead, the legislature placed no qualifications on the term \u201ccounterclaim\u201d when it enacted section 2 \u2014 1009. This indicates that the legislature intended counterclaim as used in section 2 \u2014 1009 to include claims by one defendant against a codefendant.\nPlaintiffs argue that their position is supported by the general policy that a plaintiff should be allowed to control his action. While we do not disagree with this general principle, it is insufficient to override the clear language of the statute.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Loren Thomson, of Thomson & Weintraub, of Bloomington, for appellants.", "Gordon R. Broom and J. Todd Hayes, of Burroughs, Simpson, Hepler, Broom & MacDonald, of Edwardsville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 73094.\nRICHARD HECK et al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS LIGHT COMPANY et al. (Central Illinois Light Company, Appellee).\nOpinion filed October 15, 1992.\nRehearing denied November 30, 1992.\nW. Loren Thomson, of Thomson & Weintraub, of Bloomington, for appellants.\nGordon R. Broom and J. Todd Hayes, of Burroughs, Simpson, Hepler, Broom & MacDonald, of Edwardsville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 416 }