{ "id": 5603117, "name": "In re APPLICATION OF THE DU PAGE COUNTY COLLECTOR, for Judgment and Sale for Taxes Against Real Estate Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1985 (John Lotus Novak, Du Page County Treasurer and Ex-Officio Collector, Appellant; Inland Real Estate Corporation, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "In re The Du Page County Collector", "decision_date": "1992-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 73148", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "551", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529121 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465630 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "Reinhard, P.J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533430 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 841", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506660 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510203 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5085620 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2549202 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0455-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 536, "char_count": 11046, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.287507184866636e-07, "percentile": 0.8711127559946545 }, "sha256": "014cc3a476d6032e97f0aee1c38d295a77579fea1db5e388d62fc768ab1fe5a3", "simhash": "1:93b5f5921bc9c647", "word_count": 1793 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:58:52.574529+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re APPLICATION OF THE DU PAGE COUNTY COLLECTOR, for Judgment and Sale for Taxes Against Real Estate Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1985 (John Lotus Novak, Du Page County Treasurer and Ex-Officio Collector, Appellant; Inland Real Estate Corporation, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal, we consider whether the written finding required by Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), permitting review of final judgments that do not dispose of an entire proceeding, must refer to both enforceability and appealability for appellate jurisdiction to exist.\nTaxpayers Application Engineering, Jewel Companies, Inc., and the Inland Real Estate Corporation, owners of real estate in Du Page County, paid real estate taxes in 1986 under protest, separately contending various levies were improper. Relevant here, each of the taxpayers contended that the levy for tort liability insurance was improper because it caused the general corporate levy to exceed the rate permitted by statute. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 9 \u2014 104.) All three of those objections were sustained in identically worded orders following hearings in the circuit court of Du Page County. Acknowledging that other pending objections were to be disposed of subsequently, each order recited that there was \u201cno just [reason] to delay appeal\u201d of the successful challenges related to the levies for tort liability insurance.\nThe Du Page County treasurer and ex-officio county collector, through the State\u2019s Attorney of Du Page County, timely sought review of the orders pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The matters were thereafter consolidated for review. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal (Nos. 2 \u2014 90\u20141288, 2 \u2014 90\u20141289, 2\u2014 90 \u2014 1290 cons, (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), concluding that the language of the orders was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction under the rule. More specifically, although noting that each order referred to its appealability, the court concluded that the absence of language relating to enforceability was fatal to appellate jurisdiction under the requirements of Rule 304(a). We granted the collector leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse.\nDISCUSSION\nRule 304(a), supplanting, without change in substance, section 50(2) of the Civil Practice Act, was intended to provide an easy method of determining when orders affecting fewer than all of the parties or claims in an action were appealable. (134 Ill. 2d R. 304, Committee Comments, at 245.) Instead, the operative language, contained in the first sentence of the rule, has proven problematic. (134 Ill. 2d R. 304, Committee Comments, at 245.) That sentence provides:\n\u201cIf multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).\nConsiderable confusion concerning the rule\u2019s application has centered on what must be stated in the required written finding for appellate jurisdiction to exist. More specifically, courts have struggled with the question of whether the written finding must employ both the terms \u201cenforcement\u201d and \u201cappeal\u201d or whether reference to only one of those terms is sufficient.\nThe fourth and fifth divisions of the first district of the appellate court (see Hopkins v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 652; Hamer v. Lentz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 692) and the second district of the appellate court (see Pettie v. Williams Brothers Construction, Inc. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 801; Arachnid, Inc. v. Beall (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 1096) have read the rule to require virtual duplication of the phrase \u201cno just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\u201d Those courts have construed the words \u201conly if\u201d in the rule to prescribe what words must be contained in \"the written finding. As a result, \u201cor\u201d in the phrase \u201cenforcement or appeal\u201d is read as the conjunction \u201cand\u201d such that the terms \u201cenforcement\u201d and \u201cappeal\u201d are required to appear in the written finding.\nThe third division of the first district of the appellate court (see Cwiertnia v. Zaborowski (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 841; Kucharski v. Floro (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 1032) and the third district of the appellate court (see Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Kneller (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 210) have allowed appeals where an intent to invoke the rule is expressed in the written finding even though one of the two terms \u201cenforcement\u201d or \u201cappeal\u201d is missing, reasoning that to rule otherwise would elevate form over substance. Those courts have construed the words \u201conly if\u201d to merely require that a written finding be made. As a result, \u201cor\u201d is read in its common disjunctive usage to indicate a choice between alternatives such that reference to either the term \u201cenforcement\u201d or the term \u201cappeal\u201d satisfies the requirements of the written finding.\nIn fact, neither of those constructions of the rule is accurate.\nProper reading of the rule depends, first, on understanding that the appealability of a judgment which confers a legal right can be expressed in terms of either its enforceability or its appealability, depending on the perspective of the party affected by the judgment. Further, correct construction of the rule requires the recognition that not every judgment to which the rule is applicable may be logically referred to in terms of both enforceability and appealability.\nIt is the prevailing party who benefits by the provision in Rule 304(a) that enforcement of a judgment may be sought without delay. The rule\u2019s provision allowing immediate appeal of the judgment is of concern to that party only because the nonprevailing party may thereby prevent enjoyment of the benefit conferred. It is precisely the prevailing party\u2019s ability to enforce a judgment which gives rise to the nonprevailing party\u2019s ability to immediately challenge the judgment on appeal. That point is made evident in understanding the sole purpose of the rule, for, while the written finding may be stated in terms of enforceability, Rule 304, in both title and substance, directly addresses the appealability of certain judgments, not their enforcement.\nAppropriate reference to either enforceability or appealability in the written order is therefore a function of the perspective from which the judgment being appealed is viewed. Where the rule is invoked to allow immediate appeal (see Kurr v. Town of Cicero (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 455 (dismissing an appeal because, while the order containing judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for mandamus relief contained reference to enforceability, the record revealed that the trial judge had no intention of invoking the rule until a later date)), it is of little consequence from which perspective the written finding may be expressed. Thus, where the written finding makes the judgment immediately enforceable and it is clear from the record that Rule 304(a) is intended to be invoked, reference to appealability is unnecessary as surplusage.\nHowever, the above conclusion follows only in the case of a judgment which confers a legal right capable of enforcement, as where a legal duty or liability is established (see 49 C.J.S. Judgments \u00a71 (1947)). By definition, a judgment may also be a judicial determination that no cause of action exists, as where a claim is defeated or a count of a complaint dismissed. (See 49 C.J.S. Judgments \u00a71 (1947).) In such a case, it makes no sense to speak of enforceability for there is simply no judgment to enforce. (Pettie, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 805 (Reinhard, P.J., dissenting).) It would be proper in such cases to find only that there is no reason to delay appeal from such a judgment.\nWith the understanding that the effect of any judgment is to establish a legal right or defeat a claim, the correct usage of \u201cor\u201d in the rule becomes clear. \u201cOr\u201d is to be read in its common disjunctive usage (see Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1585 (1986)) to indicate that a choice is to be made between reference to the term \u201cenforcement\u201d or the term \u201cappeal.\u201d All the rule requires is that the written finding refer to either \u201cenforcement\u201d or, alternatively, \u201cappeal\u201d depending upon which term is appropriate in view of the effect of the judgment from which appeal is sought.\nWe therefore hold that where it is clear from the record that review is sought from a judgment pursuant to Rule 304(a) and the judgment confers a legal right capable of enforcement, the required written finding is sufficient to establish appellate jurisdiction if it refers to either the judgment\u2019s immediate enforceability or its immediate appealability. That must be so because the nonprevailing party\u2019s ability to appeal from such a judgment under the rule can be stated in the written finding directly with reference to appealability or indirectly as the result of a finding allowing the prevailing party to immediately enforce the judgment. However, we hold that where appeal is sought pursuant to Rule 304(a) from a judgment which defeats a claim or is in the nature of a dismissal, the written finding is sufficient only if it refers to appealability. For such judgments, reference to enforceability cannot confer appellate jurisdiction because there is simply no judgment to enforce.\nWe now turn to consideration of the appellate court\u2019s dismissal of the consolidated appeal in the matter before us. The record indicates that the collector sought to appeal the taxpayers\u2019 successful challenges to the levies related to tort liability insurance pursuant to Rule 304(a) and, accordingly, a written finding to that effect was included in each of the orders. Each finding referred to appealability of the respective judgments reciting that the levies for tort liability insurance purposes were \u201cillegal, excessive, and void.\u201d The substance of each of the judgments essentially was to defeat a claim for real estate taxes due. The judgments contained no ruling for which it would be logical to speak in terms of enforcement. Thus, reference to appealability of those judgments in the written finding was appropriate and was sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 304(a).\nAlthough the parties have submitted arguments on the substantive issues involved in this case without addressing, -with citation to authority, why we should consider those issues, we decline the invitation to do so.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the causes are remanded to that court for consideration of the issues raised in the appeals.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, and Barbara A. Preiner and Anna B. Harkins, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Wheaton, for appellant.", "James A. Geraghty, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 73148.\nIn re APPLICATION OF THE DU PAGE COUNTY COLLECTOR, for Judgment and Sale for Taxes Against Real Estate Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the Year 1985 (John Lotus Novak, Du Page County Treasurer and Ex-Officio Collector, Appellant; Inland Real Estate Corporation, Appellee).\nOpinion filed October 22, 1992.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, and Barbara A. Preiner and Anna B. Harkins, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Wheaton, for appellant.\nJames A. Geraghty, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 561 }