{ "id": 4738482, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY SPEIGHT et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Speight", "decision_date": "1992-11-19", "docket_number": "No. 73084", "first_page": "365", "last_page": "382", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 365" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251719 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155800 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494131 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5608069 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126354 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378433 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2975398 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625836 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633652 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971333 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3282453 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3018406 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489221 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262228 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "770" }, { "page": "770" }, { "page": "770" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0766-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 25293, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.021733894925956e-07, "percentile": 0.8539322176698333 }, "sha256": "824b99501a9027faca09d8b14a366ab412121bb3d9203d65344503c7450afaf9", "simhash": "1:0f39852c381af0d6", "word_count": 4175 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:53:24.153197+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY SPEIGHT et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Anthony Speight and Melvin Whitten, were charged in the circuit court of Cook County with armed robbery of Grady Guilty and attempted armed robbery of Patricia Gamble. After a bench trial, Whitten was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison, while Speight was found guilty of the same charges after a simultaneous jury trial. Speight was sentenced to 15 years in prison.\nThe appellate court reversed the convictions of both defendants and remanded for a new trial. (222 Ill. App. 3d 766.) The appellate court held that the trial court erred in Whitten\u2019s case when it sua sponte took judicial notice of facts which partially discredited a defense witness. Speight\u2019s conviction was reversed based upon the improper introduction of evidence of other crimes. (222 Ill. App. 3d at 768.) We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315). In addition, defendant Speight has requested cross-relief (134 Ill. 2d R. 315(g)), arguing that (1) the State\u2019s definition of reasonable doubt in its closing argument as \u201csomething substantial\u201d improperly shifted the burden of proof, (2) the State\u2019s misstatement of the law in its closing argument regarding the use at trial of tape-recorded statements was prejudicial and improperly implied that defense counsel was trying to confuse the jury, and (3) the cumulative impact of the prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and the improper evidence of other crimes requires reversal of his convictions.\nTestimony at trial revealed that on Thursday, January 14, 1988, at approximately 5:45 p.m., Grady Guilty and his cousin Patricia Gamble were walking by an alley near the corner of Jackson and Sacramento Streets when two black men stepped in front of them. One man said to them, \u201cHey, get back and give it up.\u201d According to Guilty, one of the men, allegedly defendant Speight, was dark-skinned and wore a green field jacket and a black skullcap on his head. The other man, allegedly defendant Whitten, was lighter-skinned and wore a black navy \u201cpeacoat.\u201d Guilty testified that the darker-skinned man pushed him back into the alley and demanded that Guilty give him his money. Guilty testified that he gave him $37. Meanwhile, the lighter-skinned man grabbed Gamble around her collar, held a knife to her throat, and frisked her. Gamble did not have any money, and the assailants told Gamble and Guilty to walk down the alley and not look back.\nAfter walking a short distance, Guilty turned back and followed the two men for several blocks to a gas station. Guilty phoned the police to report the robbery and described the two men. Minutes later, the police picked up Guilty and drove him to where defendants Speight and Whitten were being detained. Guilty positively identified the two men as the two who had just robbed Gamble and him, stating that the darker-skinned man took his money and the lighter-skinned man possessed the knife. At trial, both Guilty and Gamble identified the lighter-skinned man as defendant Whitten and the darker-skinned man as defendant Speight.\nWe will first address whether defendant Speight was denied a fair trial. The appellate court reversed Speight\u2019s convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery due to testimony that Speight was carrying a \u201cpony pack\u201d at the time of his arrest. (222 Ill. App. 3d at 770.) Because the appellate court held that Speight was denied a fair trial due to the introduction of this \u201cpony pack\u201d evidence, it refused to consider Speight\u2019s other claims of error which he now raises in his motion for cross-relief. (222 Ill. App. 3d at 770.) For reasons of judicial economy, we will address Speight\u2019s claims of error which were raised before the appellate court, but not resolved.\nBefore this court, the State responds to all of Speight\u2019s claims of error in the same fashion, i.e., Speight suffered no prejudice because any alleged error was cured when the trial judge admonished the jury after each alleged error to disregard the improper testimony or statement. Further, even if the trial judge\u2019s admonishments were insufficient to cure the alleged errors, the State claims the errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against defendant.\nWe now reverse the appellate court, and will discuss each error in turn.\nDuring direct examination, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from Officer Touss regarding drug paraphernalia found on defendant Speight at the time of his arrest:\n\u201cQ. [Prosecutor]: In the course of this search what, if anything, did you discover, Officer?\nA. [Officer Touss]: $27.\nQ. Did you find anything else in the course of your search of this individual?\nA. Yes.\nQ. What was that?\nA. There was cigarettes, some keys, there was some empty pony pack.\nQ. What is a pony pack, officer?\nA. It is a piece of white paper approximately four by four commonly used to\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\n[Court]: Sustained. The jury will disregard testimony concerning anything that has been related, has been called a pony pack.\nQ. [Prosecutor]: What did you do with those other items?\nA. Turned them over to the gentleman.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nA \u201cpony pack\u201d is a piece of white paper used to conceal cocaine.\n\u201cEvidence of crimes for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish his propensity to commit crime.\u201d (People v. Thingvold (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137.) \u201cSuch evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he is a bad person deserving punishment.\u201d (Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 452; Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d at 137.) Here, the appellate court determined that the testimony regarding the \u201cpony pack\u201d was prejudicial to Speight because it implied the defendant used drugs, and further, that the trial judge\u2019s admonishment to the jury did not \u201ceradicate\u201d the prejudicial effect of this evidence. 222 Ill. App. 3d at 770.\nWe disagree. It is important to note that there was no testimony that Speight possessed cocaine or any other narcotic at the time of his arrest. Indeed, Speight was not charged with an offense involving a controlled substance. There was no testimony that a \u201cpony pack\u201d is drug paraphernalia, as the appellate court concluded. Although we do not doubt that a \u201cpony pack\u201d is the \u201cstreet\u201d term for the packaging of cocaine, we are not as easily convinced as the appellate court that the jurors necessarily made this inference.\nFurther, even assuming that the jurors knew what a \u201cpony pack\u201d was, for prejudice to occur it must be assumed that the jurors disregarded the trial judge\u2019s admonishment to ignore the testimony about the \u201cpony pack.\u201d Generally, \u201c[i]f a timely objection is made at trial, either to improper interrogation, or to an improper remark by counsel to the jury, the court can, by sustaining the objection or instructing the jury to disregard the answer or remark, usually correct the error.\u201d (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577; People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30; People v. Barrow (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 226, 266; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 111, 135; People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 508, 517; People v. Hampton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 41.) However, in People v. Garreau (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 388, 391, this court deemed the prosecutor\u2019s remarks so prejudicial that the trial judge\u2019s admonishment to the jury did not cure the error. In Garrean:\n\u201cThe prosecutor referred to the defendant as a pervert, a weasel and a moron; told the jury that the defendant, who raped his . mother\u2019s friend, would rape a dog and would rape each and every member of the jury; told the jury that the defendant would always be a danger to society, even if he lived to be 80 years old; and told the jury that they should fix a punishment of at least 199 years.\u201d Garrean, 27 Ill. 2d at 391.\nIn Speight\u2019s case, we find that the judge\u2019s prompt action in sustaining counsel\u2019s objection and instructing the jurors to disregard the \u201cpony pack\u201d evidence cured any alleged error. Following the admonishment, the prosecutor never revisited this evidence, and thus, we do not think Speight was prejudiced by this testimony.\nThe second error at Speight\u2019s trial occurred during rebuttal when the prosecutor attempted to define reasonable doubt for the jury:\n\u201c[Prosecutor]: Reasonable doubt, well what does reasonable doubt mean? It means a doubt that has to be substantial, ladies and gentleman.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nImmediately after this statement, the trial judge sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection, and admonished the jury:\n\u201c[Trial Judge]: Ladies and gentlemen, I will tell you what the law is in this case. And [the prosecutor\u2019s] statement of what the law is is not correct.\u201d\nThe law in Illinois is clear that neither the court nor counsel should attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury. (See People v. Malmenato (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 52, 61; People v. Cagle (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 528, 536.) However, in this case, we do not find that the prosecutor\u2019s attempt to define reasonable doubt caused Speight substantial prejudice. (See People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 276; Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d at 29.) The prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that the State had no burden of proof or attempt to shift the burden to the defendant (see People v. Starks (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 395). The prosecutor did not reduce the State\u2019s burden of proof to a pro forma or minor detail (see People v. Eddington (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 780; People v. Frazier (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1102; People v. Martinez (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 280, 284), nor was an \u201cinvolved instruction\u201d on reasonable doubt given to the jury (see People v. Viser (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 568, 584; Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d at 536).\nImmediately after the prosecutor\u2019s improper statement, the trial judge sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection and admonished the jury that he would tell the jury what the law is, and that the prosecutor\u2019s statement of the law was not correct. Subsequently, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt. Thus, because the trial judge admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor\u2019s improper statement (Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d at 30; People v. Peebles (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 221), and because the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt, we find that Speight suffered no prejudice (Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d at 266; People v. Bell (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 588, 600; People v. Amos (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902; cf. People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467).\nThe third error at Speight\u2019s trial also occurred during the State\u2019s rebuttal. Earlier in the trial, Officer Rybicki testified for the State that once in custody, Speight told him and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Axelrod that on January 14, 1988, he and defendant Whitten were walking near the intersection of Jackson and Sacramento Streets when they saw a black male and female walking near an alley. According to Speight, Whitten approached the couple with the intention of stealing their money, but that he (Speight) had no involvement in the incident. Rybicki stated that Speight refused to commit this statement to writing. On cross-examination, Rybicki conceded that although court reporters and tape-recorders were available to transcribe or record Speight\u2019s statement, none was used. Subsequently, during closing argument, defense counsel questioned whether the statement was made because it was not written down, transcribed by a court reporter or tape-recorded. On rebuttal, the following exchange took place:\n\u201c[Prosecutor]: No written statement taken by this man. He refused to sign a written statement. No tape-recorded [sic], counsel knows we can\u2019t use that in court.\n[Defense counsel]: Objection.\n[Trial Judge]: Sustained.\n[Defense counsel]: Ask counsel be admonished.\n[Trial Judge]: That is an improper statement, [prosecutor], you know that. The jury will disregard the last statement of [the prosecutor] concerning the use of tape recorders.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe prosecutor\u2019s statement, that \u201ccounsel knows we can\u2019t use [a tape-recorded statement] in court,\u201d misstates the law in Illinois. (See People v. Williams (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 327, 338; People v. McCommon (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 853.) Defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s misstatement of the law denied him the opportunity to persuade the jury that Speight never made. the statement about which Officer Rybicki testified. We disagree, and find that the trial judge\u2019s admonishment to the jury to disregard the prosecutor\u2019s improper statement cured the error. (See Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d at 30; Peebles, 125 Ill. App. 3d 213.) Moreover, we note that through his cross-examination of Rybicki and during closing argument, defense counsel argued to the jury that Speight\u2019s statement was never made given that it was not tape-recorded or transcribed by a court reporter, although such means were readily available to the State.\nFinally, Speight, citing People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, argues that the cumulative impact of the prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and the improper evidence of the \u201cpony pack\u201d requires reversal of Speight\u2019s convictions. Certainly, while individual trial errors may not require a reversal, those same errors considered together may have the cumulative effect of denying defendant a fair trial. (See People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 54, 83; Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d at 341.) In this case, however, we find that Speight has failed to establish cumulative error. First, the trial judge took corrective action in each of the three instances defendant alleges error. The trial judge in each instance promptly sustained the defense counsel\u2019s objections and admonished the jury to disregard the improper evidence and statements. Such prompt action prevented prejudice to Speight and insured that he received a fair trial. Further, even if we were to presume that the trial judge\u2019s admonishments to the jury were insufficient to cure the alleged errors, we would agree with the State that the alleged errors were harmless. The evidence against Speight was overwhelming. Grady Guilty identified the two attackers minutes after the robbery, in the same vicinity of the crime. Officer Rybicki testified that Speight told him he was with defendant Whitten when Whitten approached Guilty and Gamble to rob them, but that he did not participate in the robbery. At trial, both Grady Guilty and Patricia Gamble identified Speight in court as one of the two robbers. Although Patricia Gamble was unable to identify Speight in a lineup during the evening of January 14, it is important to note that it was defendant Whitten who allegedly held the knife to her throat, not Speight. Given the overwhelming evidence, we find the cumulative impact of these trial errors did not affect the jury\u2019s verdict.\nWe will now address whether defendant Whitten received a fair trial. At trial, Reverend James Clasberry testified on behalf of Whitten. Rev. Clasberry is a church minister, Masonic lodge president and the manager of the grocery store where defendant worked at the time of the incident. During direct examination, Rev. Clasberry testified to Whitten\u2019s reputation in the community. In addition, Rev. Clasberry stated that on January 14, 1988, defendant worked at the grocery store and that he left at approximately 5:30 p.m. Rev. Clasberry stated that he remembered this because he lent Whitten money that day. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Rev. Clasberry\u2019s recollection of January 14:\n\u201cQ. [Prosecutor]: Now did you review the records for January 14, 1988, to see when Mr. Whitten started and when Mr. Whitten left that day, sir?\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, no alibi.\n[Court]: Overruled.\nA. [Rev. Clasberry]: At the time I am the one that loaned him, you know, the money he asked me for. I am the one who checked him out.\nQ. [Prosecutor]: You are the one who checked him out?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You have records of that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Did you review those records before you came to court?\nA. No, I did not.\nQ. You are using your own personal memory?\nA. The reason why I told you because I was, I am an investigator for him coming into the Masonic organization. He supposed [sic] to come in that Saturday, which was the 15th of January, 1988.\nQ. You are saying the 14th was a Friday?\nA. I am not for sure. I am just, you know, I know on a Saturday he supposed [sic] to came [sic] in. I am not for sure.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nLater, on cross-examination, Rev. Clasberry was again asked to clarify his remembrance of these dates, to which he replied:\n\u201cI am saying that on the 14th I loaned him some money. I know it was that day because the 15th he supposed [sic] to came [sic] into the Masonic organization. I got a call from his wife.\u201d\nAfter the closing arguments and in his findings of fact, the trial judge stated:\n\u201cI have had an opportunity to look at a calendar and I take judicial notice of the fact that the 15th was a Friday and the 14th was a Thursday, not a Saturday.\nIf Reverend Clasberry was initially right and the' rites of initiation into the Masonic lodge were to take place on Saturday, [the] 14th was a Thursday not the Friday next.\nI have reason to think maybe Reverend Clasberry\u2019s remembrance of these dates is legitimately and honestly in error.\nBut I do believe that he has testified truthfully and completely about his knowledge of the reputation of Mr. Whitten.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nPrior to this, no party had requested the trial judge to take judicial notice of the dates.\nThe appellate court reversed Whitten\u2019s convictions and determined that \u201c[a] trial judge may, on rare occasions, take sua sponte judicial notice of facts during a trial, however, not after the close of evidence, at the report of his findings. If taken during the course of the trial, such evidence may be argued, explained or rebutted.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (222 Ill. App. 3d at 771.) The appellate court held that the trial judge\u2019s actions in sua sponte taking judicial notice amounted to plain error. 222 Ill. App. 3d at 773.\nThe State initially argues that since Whitten failed to object at trial and raise this issue in his written post-trial motion, he has waived review of this issue. \u201cIt is a well-established principle that issues not raised at the trial court level may not be raised for the first time on review.\u201d (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87.) Both an objection at trial and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an alleged error. (See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.) In this case, Whitten failed to properly preserve this issue for our review. However, the waiver rule is not without exception. Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides that \u201c[pjlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) The plain error rule permits a reviewing court to consider a trial error not properly preserved for review in two circumstances: (1) where the evidence is closely balanced, or (2) where the error was of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. (People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 82; People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10.) The plain error rule guards against \u201cthe \u2018possibility that an innocent person may have been convicted due to some error which is obvious from the record, but not properly preserved.\u2019 \u201d Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 108, quoting People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77.\nHowever, after carefully considering Whitten\u2019s argument, we find that even if the trial judge erred in sua sponte taking judicial notice that January 15 was a Friday, and January 14 was a Thursday, such error was harmless. First, the evidence against Whitten was overwhelming. Although the appellate court stated that the evidence against Whitten was not so overwhelming, \u201cincluding the disputed identification evidence\u201d (222 Ill. App. 3d at 773), we disagree with the appellate court\u2019s interpretation of the record. There was simply no \u201cdisputed identification evidence\u201d in terms of Whitten. Grady Guilty identified Whitten as one of the two attackers minutes after the robbery, a few blocks from the crime scene. Whitten was found with a knife in his pocket, which both Guilty and Gamble identified in court as the knife Whitten held to Gamble\u2019s throat. Patricia Gamble identified Whitten in a police lineup approximately 40 minutes after the robbery. At trial, both Grady Guilty and Patricia Gamble identified Whitten in court as one of the two robbers.\nSecond, the trial judge\u2019s actions in taking judicial notice could not have prejudiced Whitten because Rev. Clasberry testified as a character witness, not as an alibi witness. In his brief to this court, Whitten states that \u201c[t]o challenge the testimony implicating him in the charged offenses, defendant Melvin Whitten offered the testimony of his employer, Rev. James Clasberry, to establish Whitten\u2019s presence elsewhere at the time of the crimes.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ostensibly, defendant is arguing that Rev. Clasberry was offered as an alibi witness.\nThis assertion, however, conflicts with defense counsel\u2019s statements at trial. When the prosecutor questioned Rev. Clasberry on cross-examination about the first time Whitten worked at the grocery store, defense counsel objected to the question arguing that \u201cthe evidence presented by Mr. Clasberry is basically reputation evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Later, on cross-examination, when the prosecutor specifically asked Rev. Clasberry if he reviewed the store\u2019s records from January 14, 1988, to see when Whitten arrived at work and when he left that day, defense counsel objected, stating \u201cno alibi.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel did not point to Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony as evidence that Whitten was elsewhere at the time of the armed robbery of Grady Guilty and Patricia Gamble. Rather, defense counsel again stressed that Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony spoke of Whitten\u2019s reputation and character. Based on these statements, it is apparent that the purpose of Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony was to establish Whitten\u2019s reputation and character in the community, and not to establish that Whitten was at Debbies\u2019 Grocery at 5:30 p.m. on January 14, 1988.\nMoreover, if the purpose of Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony was to establish Whitten\u2019s presence elsewhere at the time of the crime, Whitten had an obligation to reveal this information to the State prior to trial. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(d)(iii).) Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 413(d)(iii), the defendant, if he intends to prove an alibi, must furnish \u201cspecific information as to the place where he maintains he was at the time of the alleged offense.\u201d (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(d)(iii).) Whitten failed to reveal this required information in the pretrial discovery. Instead, defense counsel filed an amended answer to the State\u2019s motion for pretrial discovery which merely informed the State that \u201cdefendant may assert alibi time and place to be supplied,\u201d and that Rev. Clasberry might be called as a witness. There is no other information in the pretrial discovery to show that Whitten complied with this rule.\nFinally, we note that the trial judge did believe Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony for the purpose for which it was offered. The trial judge stated: \u201cBut I do believe that [Rev. Clasberry] has testified truthfully and completely about his knowledge of the reputation of Mr. Whitten.\u201d Thus, the fact that the trial judge took judicial notice of the dates apparently did not impact the weight given to Rev. Clasberry\u2019s testimony regarding Whitten\u2019s character and reputation in the community.\nIn light of our disposition of Whitten\u2019s case, we find it is unnecessary to respond to the State\u2019s assertion that this court should adopt Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 201 states that \u201c[a] court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not\u201d (Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)), \u201cat any stage of the proceeding\u201d (Fed. R. Evid. 201(f)). This court has previously considered Rule 201, and decided not to adopt it as a rule of evidence in Illinois. We see no reason at this time to reconsider this issue.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Andrew R. Dalkin and Randall E. Roberts, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Martin Carlson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago (Michael T. Benz, of Chapman & Cutler, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Anthony D. Speight.", "Rita Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee Melvin Whitten." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 73084\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY SPEIGHT et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed November 19,1992.\nRehearing denied February 1, 1993.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Andrew R. Dalkin and Randall E. Roberts, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Martin Carlson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago (Michael T. Benz, of Chapman & Cutler, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Anthony D. Speight.\nRita Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee Melvin Whitten." }, "file_name": "0365-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 392 }